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     This project has drawn extensively upon Arabic-language primary sources such as 
Iraqi and Egyptian newspapers and memoirs, and American and British diplomatic, 
political, and military documents. Arabic-language secondary sources have also been 
consulted to a great extent. These secondary sources have provided access to Arabic-
language primary sources and have been of great value in that they reflect how 
interpretations of the primary sources have changed over time. Similarly, British and 
American primary sources also reflect the differences in American and British 
interpretations of the same Iraqi primary sources and also provide valuable insights into 
the American Embassy’s readings of British assessments of developments in Iraq and 
vice versa. Occasionally these reports also reveal Anglo-American rivalry in certain areas 
and frustration with the policies of the other side. Furthermore, these reports also reveal 
to what extent London and Washington disagreed with or condoned the Iraqi Prime 
Minister Nuri al-Sa‘id’s policies and attempted to influence him in one direction or 
another.  
     Arabic-language memoirs have been drawn upon extensively for this study. Memoirs 
by former members of the Free Officers movement which overthrew the Iraqi monarchy 
have provided particularly useful information about the structure, program, meeting 
procedures, and coup plans of the movement, and the massacre of the royal family on 
July 14, 1958. Memoirs by former Iraqi ministers in cabinets, both in the monarchic and 
the revolutionary eras, have also been an important source of information about how Iraqi 
politicians viewed the issues of the day and the development program.  





     Finally, transcripts from court proceedings against leading officials of the old regime 
published in Iraqi and Egyptian newspapers, and special economic reports also constitute 
especially valuable primary sources for this project. The former have been an important 
source in particular with regard to Nuri’s policies towards Egypt and Syria.  American 
and British economic reports written by Western experts hired by pre-revolutionary 
governments to assess the policies of the Development Board, and a report presented at 
the trial of a minister of the revolutionary era shed much light from different angles on 
the problems of Iraq’s pre-revolutionary and revolutionary development policies.      
     Compared to the existing literature on the Iraqi Revolution this dissertation differs 
from many other works in several respects. It offers a more detailed account and analysis 
of the Free Officers movement, its program, its numerous coup plans, and the tension 
among the leading officers than most other works on the Iraqi Revolution. There are 
scholars who may offer a more thorough analysis of a particular aspect of the movement, 
but there are few works, English-language or Arabic-language, which analyze in detail so 
many aspects of the Free Officers movement. Another issue which this dissertation has 
exhaustively analyzed is the events of July 14, 1958, that is the overthrow of the 
monarchy, which has been examined from more angles than by many other works. A 
third area which other works have largely disregarded is Qasim’s foreign policy, to which 
this dissertation devotes a whole chapter. Finally, this research project also analyzes in 
detail the explicit and implicit significance of the first proclamations of the revolutionary 
government. This study of the Iraqi Revolution draws upon sources available to other 
scholars as well. What sets it apart from many other works is its interpretation of the 
research material and some of the arguments which it advances.             
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     This dissertation contends that a revolutionary situation built up in Iraq during the last 
decade of the monarchic system. Opposition to constraints on civil rights, close ties with 
Britain, accession to the Baghdad Pact, the semi-feudal economic system in rural areas, 
and the plight of the unemployed in the slums of the big cities fanned revolutionary 
sentiments in Iraq during the monarchic era. The ambitious development program 
financed with Iraq’s considerable oil revenues did not address these problems, however, 
since the program focused on large-scale and long-term projects which did not rapidly 
improve the situation of the poorer strata of the population. Furthermore, external events 
such as the formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 and the Suez Crisis of 1956 directly 
fueled anti-regime sentiments in Iraq, since students and intellectuals contended that the 





monarchy’s foreign policy had contributed to these events and isolated Iraq from its 
Arabs neighbors. The regime managed to remain in power, however, through heavy-
handed suppression of any public manifestation of political opposition. This left the army 
the only force in Iraqi society capable of effectuating change. The regime was convinced 
of the army’s complete loyalty and therefore made the mistake to dismiss intelligence on 
coup plans.      
     This dissertation further argues that the Free Officers coup of July 14, 1958, was the 
initial phase of a social, economic, political, and psychological revolution. The fact that 
Baghdadis took to the streets in massive numbers on the morning of July 14 shows strong 
popular support for and participation in the Free Officers coup. The foreign and economic 
policies of the new regimes also constituted a revolutionary departure from those of the 
monarchy. Furthermore, the new government declared that Iraq’s foreign policy would be 
based on the principle of neutralism, and that its economic policy would eliminate the 
semi-feudal system in the rural areas to build an equitable society. Iraq’s decision not to 
withdraw from the Baghdad Pact and not to nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company was 
made for security reasons, and did not signify a continuation of the policies of the 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
 
 
This dissertation uses two diacritical marks to transliterate Arabic names, titles, and 
terms—(‘) for ‘ain and (’) for hamza. Arabic personal and geographic names familiar to 
the Western reader, such as Nasser and Basra have been rendered according to their 
commonly known form in English and not as al-Nasir and al-Basra. In order not 
unnecessarily to complicate the transliteration and confuse the reader no other diacritical 



























  This dissertation advances the argument that a revolutionary situation developed in Iraq 
over the period 1948 to 1958 and that the events of July 14, 1958 were the initial phase of 
a social, political, economic, and psychological revolution. A general discussion of the 
genealogy of revolutions falls outside the purview of this study, since its focus is 
exclusively on the Iraqi Revolution and the forces which overthrew the monarchy. The 
dissertation proposes a number of criteria in order to establish whether the events of July 
14 and subsequent developments in Iraq constituted a revolution.1 The first criterion 
involves an analysis of the role of the Iraqi people in the execution of the Free Officers’ 
coup on July 14. An argument to the effect that the military single-handedly carried out 
the coup would seriously weaken the contention that it was the initial phase of a social 
revolution. This dissertation clearly establishes, however, that popular participation, in 
particular in Baghdad, was an important element of the coup. The enormous crowds 
which filled the streets around key targets in the capital would have posed an obstacle to 
loyalists to the monarchy, had the latter decided to attack the Free Officers. Furthermore, 
the huge numbers of Baghdadis taking to the streets in celebration of the revolution 
served to discourage any attempts at a counter-revolution, since they demonstrated to 
loyalists and foreign powers alike that the Free Officers enjoyed the massive support of 
the Iraqi people. Demonstrators outside the besieged Rihab Palace actively participated in 
convincing the Royal Guard that the best course of action was to surrender.2 Also, 
frequent contacts between Free Officers and leading Iraqi politicians prior to the coup 
                                                          
1 The definition of a revolution discussed here to a certain extent follows that laid out by Theda Skocpol in 
her States & Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, & China (Cambridge, United 
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1999,  first published 1979).    
2 Falih Hanzal, Asrar Maqtali al-‘Aila al-Malika [Secrets of the Murder of the Royal Family in Iraq]  (n.p., 
second and revised edition, 1992), p. 112. 





reinforce the argument that the July 14 events constituted a social revolution.3 In 
summary, civilian Iraqis, in particular in Baghdad, played an important role in the 
overthrow of the monarchy.        
      The second criterion applied to determine to what extent the Iraqi Revolution 
constituted fundamental change in Iraqi society is change in relations among social 
classes. The new regime made clear on the first day of the revolution that the power and 
influence of “imperialists” and the corrupt ruling class had been eliminated.4  The Free 
Officers reflected the sentiments among the Iraqi people at large. Most of them had a 
middle class background and held a rank below Brigadier. The ruling class of oligarchs 
had thus been replaced by a group of officers who had maintained close ties with the 
political opposition and now pledged to raise the standard of living for the poorer strata 
of the population.5 The status and standard of living of the poor were raised by providing 
housing for many of Iraq’s sarifa dwellers.6 Relations between social classes thus 
changed with the new policies, clearly favoring classes which had previously occupied 
the lowest rung on the social ladder.7    
     An analysis of the trade and economic policies of the new regime generates evidence 
that the role of the state in the national economy increased considerably. State 
                                                          
3 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old 
Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba‘thists and Free Officers (London: Saqi Books, 
2004, first published by Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1978), pp. 793-794; Majid Khadduri, 
Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1969), pp.31-32. 
4 14th of July Celebration Committee 1958-1959, The Iraqi Revolution: One Year of Progress and 
Achievement (Baghdad: The Times Press, 1959), p. 7. 
5 The new regime lowered housing rents, and reduced prices on meat, bread, fruits, and vegetables, 
Izvestiya, September 27, 1958 
6 Sarifa, literally reed-mat hut, is the term used for the slums in Iraq’s larger cities.  
7 Hanna Batatu argues that: “The social power of the greater landed sheikhs…was to a considerable extent 
destroyed , and the position of the urban workers and the middle- and lower-middle strata of society 
qualitatively enhanced. The pattern of the life of the peasants was also altered, partly by the transfer of 
property, and partly by the abolition of the Tribal Disputes Regulations…,” Batatu, The Old Social Classes,  
p. 807.    





intervention resulted in far-reaching restrictions imposed on imported goods which could 
be manufactured locally, and a reorientation of foreign trade towards barter trade with 
socialist countries. Furthermore, the Qasim regime reduced the negative trade balance 
with Western powers, and encouraged trade with countries which, like Iraq, pursued 
neutralist policies.8 The most ambitious project to change Iraqi society, however, 
consisted in attempting to eliminate the power of the great landlords in the rural areas of 
Iraq by limiting the size of privately owned land. The so-called Agrarian Reform Law 
stipulated that confiscated land be distributed among poor peasants. The reform did not 
have the desired effect, however, due to the extremely time-consuming redistribution of 
the lands, which in turn was a result of the shortage of trained professionals to implement 
this complicated task.9                   
     A comparison of Qasim’s foreign policy with that of Nuri al-Sa‘id yields a clear 
indication that changes in relations with foreign powers under Qasim constituted a 
revolutionary departure from Nuri’s foreign policy. The military regime had declared on 
the first day of the revolution that it had put an end to the pro-West policies of the 
previous regime and that Iraq would thenceforth conduct a neutralist foreign policy. The 
socialist countries had by extending early recognition to the new Iraqi regime 
demonstrated that they sought to establish closer ties with the Iraqi republic. Baghdad 
responded favorably to these overtures, partly due to delayed Western recognition. The 
closer political ties with the socialist countries eventually led to closer military ties. 
Under Nuri Iraqi-Soviet diplomatic relations had been severed in January of 1955 in 
preparation for the formation of the Baghdad Pact. Iraq’s reorientation of its foreign 
                                                          
8 14th of July Celebration Committee 1958-1959, The Iraqi Revolution, pp. 59-60. 
9 Rony Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian Reform in Iraq (London: Croom Helm, 1978), pp. 113-114, 
116; Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 837. 





policy under Qasim thus constituted a revolution. This fundamental shift did not result in 
a withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact until 1959, however, for reasons of national 
security, since Qasim feared that an immediate withdrawal from the defense organization 
would trigger Western economic or military retaliation. The argument that Iraq’s foreign 
policy under Qasim changed little compared to that of Nuri is therefore not convincing, 
since this status quo was maintained for the aforementioned reasons and not as a result of 
ideological considerations.           
     The fifth criterion—structural change—has been used to establish whether the new 
Iraqi society differed to such a high degree from that of the ancien régime that it 
constituted a revolutionary change. July 14 resulted in a fundamental change in system of 
government. Proclamation No. 1, the Free Officers’ first announcement broadcast to the 
public on Radio Baghdad, stated that Iraq had become a republic, with the Sovereignty 
Council headed by a president constituting the highest organ of the state. Real political 
power, however, was vested in the office of the prime minister, a post held by Brigadier 
‘Abd al-Karim Qasim. The new cabinet included members of all opposition parties and 
followers of all political persuasions, with the exception of supporters of the old regime. 
The ministers did not hold office as representatives of political parties, however, but in 
their capacity of private citizens, supposedly appointed due to their expertise in running a 
government. This attempt to appoint a cabinet reflecting so many different political 
ideologies was unheard of in Iraq, where politicians with leftist leanings had previously 
been banned from participation in the nation’s political life. 





     Finally, the psychological impact of July 14 on Iraqis is a criterion which testifies to 
the perception of revolutionary change in Iraqi society.10 The sudden introduction of civil 
rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, and the right to organize trade 
unions—although certain constraints were later unofficially imposed on the former two 
by virtue of social pressure and self-censorship—greatly contributed to the sense that a 
real revolution had taken place in Iraq. Public manifestation of opposition to official 
policies had previously resulted in jail terms, dismissal from work, or expulsion from 
university. The aforementioned civil liberties, demonstrations organized by political 
parties and other organizations, and the efforts in official quarters to improve the lot of 
the poor, such as price and rent reductions, created a sense of empowerment among poor 
Iraqis, since their interests had played no significant role under the previous regime. The 
psychological impact discussed above also allowed Iraqis to identify with the state, a 
sentiment which had been almost completely non-existent outside the narrow circle of 
urban oligarchs and tribal shaikhs in the Nuri era.  
     The above analysis of the criteria used to establish the revolutionary nature of change 
in Iraq in 1958 shows that the July 14 coup was the initial phase of a social, economic, 
political, and psychological revolution. Critics of this conclusion will emphasize aspects 
of the revolution which were not implemented successfully or which were only 
temporary. These critics will also point to policies which did not undergo radical change, 
such as the delayed official withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact, or the fact that the new 
                                                          
10 Skocpol does not discuss this criterion in her States & Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of 
France, Russia, & China,  





regime did not nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company.11 Such criticism obviously does 
not take into account the underlying national security aspects of these policies. 
Furthermore, the psychological dimension should not be underestimated, since the 
perception among Iraqis of Qasim’s revolutionary credentials were necessary to keep his 
regime in power. Iraqis saw tangible change in society even if the revolution was beset 
with many problems. This combined with the early nationwide enthusiasm for the 
overthrow of the monarchy contributed to creating a revolutionary atmosphere in Iraq.   
The first proclamations of the new regime testify to the importance which Qasim 
attributed to the maintenance of this popular perception.  
     This dissertation further argues that Arab nationalism and the efforts to achieve Arab 
unity were the principal cultural and political ideas permeating Iraqi society in the 1950s. 
These ideas operated both at the transnational and the national levels and had two major 
consequences. The first result of Arab nationalism in the political landscape of Iraq was 
anti-Western sentiments and revolution as analyzed above. The second consequence was 
unity and disunity. In Iraq the nationalist response to what was perceived as past and 
present Western imperialism, in particular in the form of the Baghdad Pact and economic, 
primarily oil interests, caused revolutionary sentiments among the population to increase 
between 1948 and 1958.12 These sentiments eventually erupted in the Free Officers coup 
on July 14, 1958.13  
                                                          
11 Iraq did not withdraw officially from the Baghdad Pact until March of 1959. The Company’s Kirkuk oil 
field concession and installations were nationalized on June 1, 1972, and the remaining foreign oil interests 
in Iraq in 1975.   
12 In 1948 violent anti-British demonstrations against the unpopular Anglo-Iraqi Portsmouth Treaty caused 
the Iraqi Parliament to reject the Treaty. 
13 Mahmoud Haddad has advanced a partly similar argument with respect to Mesopotamian opposition to 
the central Ottoman authorities based on their inability to protect the three provinces of Basra, Baghdad, 
and Mosul against British economic and political influence in the early twentieth century, Mahmoud 
Haddad, “Iraq Before World War I: A Case of Anti-European Arab Ottomanism,” in Rashid Khalidi et al., 





     In addition to the argument laid out on the first six pages above, that the events of July 
14, 1958 constituted a revolution, this research project also contends that the efforts to 
achieve Arab unity resulted in disunity. Furthermore, the Iraqi Free Officers executed the 
revolution in the context of Arab nationalism and unity, which also served as a direct 
catalyst for the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy. Had the Jordanian part of the Iraqi-
Jordanian Arab Union not experienced the destabilizing effects in early July of the efforts 
to realize Arab unity, the Iraqi Army would not have taken action against the Nuri regime 
on July 14. An order to deploy to Jordan enabled two brigades to occupy key positions in 
the Iraqi capital and overthrow the Iraqi monarchy on the morning of July 14. Like the 
efforts by both the Iraqi monarchy and the United Arab Republic to achieve Arab unity 
before the Iraqi Revolution destabilized the Arab Union, these attempts also caused deep 
divisions in Iraqi society after the revolution, owing to competing interpretations of Arab 
unity among military officers, party activists, and Iraqi intellectuals. 
     The two forces of Arab unity and revolution also formed the overarching social and 
intellectual framework for Iraqi society in the 1950s. Both forces operated throughout the 
1950s causing revolutionary sentiments to grow over the decade and also continued 
profoundly to affect the direction the Iraqi Revolution took. The power struggle between 
proponents of qawmiyya and wataniyya clearly distracted from the important task of 
building an equitable society for all Iraqis, which the revolutionaries had promised the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
eds., The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 120-121. The 
principal difference between the two arguments, however, is that unlike the early twentieth century when 
merchants formed a vocal opposition to British penetration, highly politicized intellectuals and students 
constituted the driving force behind the opposition to Nuri’s pro-British policies in the 1950s.  





country.14 Arab unity also destabilized the United Arab Republic and eventually led to 
Syria’s secession from the union in 1961.        
     The idea of Arab unity, an integral part of Arab nationalism, was embraced both by 
Iraqi leaders of the monarchic era such as Nuri al-Sa‘id, and the revolutionary leader 
‘Abd al-Karim Qasim. The Arab nationalism and unity advocated by Nuri differed, 
however, from that promoted by Qasim, despite both leaders’ focus on Iraqi interests. 
Paradoxically enough, both men’s efforts, although fundamentally different in certain 
respects, produced similar effects: a sharp polarization of political forces in Iraq and the 
Arab world, with ensuing disunity as a lasting result. This disunity occurred due to 
another competing brand of Arab unity advocated by the Egyptian President Gamal 
‘Abdul Nasser, who emphasized Egypt’s leading role in uniting the Arab world.15       
     The Arab nationalist movement was not a cohesive force and this was particularly the 
case in Iraq in the 1950s. This circumstance created tension within the country and 
between Iraq on the one hand, and Egypt and Syria on the other. The reason for this state 
of affairs was the polarization of political forces operating in Iraqi society, with the 
intellectuals’ brand of Arab nationalism conflicting with Nuri’s concept of the Fertile 
Crescent, a federation of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine under Iraqi 
leadership. Despite the lack of cohesion and unity among proponents of Arab nationalists, 
                                                          
14 Qawmiyya is usually translated as Arab nationalism, which implies the political concept of pan-Arabism, 
that is, a single state for all Arabs. The term wataniyya, however, denotes nationalism focused on one state, 
and the priority of the interests of this state over those of the pan-Arab state.   
15 In this context, it is worth mention that Nasser initially had serious concerns about a Syrian-Egyptian 
merger into the United Arab Republic in 1958, which is an indication of Nasser’s caution with respect to 
the single-state concept of pan-Arabism, Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal ‘Abdul Nasser and His 
Rivals, 1958-1970 (New York: Oxford University Press, third edition, 1971), p. 11. Furthermore, Nasser’s 
reaction during a meeting in Syria in the first days after the Iraqi Revolution with Qasim’s deputy ‘Abd al-
Salam ‘Arif when the latter suggested immediate Iraqi-U.A.R. merger was to advice ‘Arif to wait, Riadh 
Taha, Qissat al-Wahda wa al-Infisal: Tajribat Insan ‘Arabi Khilal Ahdath 1955-1961 (Bairut: Dar al-Afaq 
al-Jadida, 1974), p. 141.   





this idea was nevertheless a powerful driving force behind many of the major 
developments in Iraq and the Arab world in the middle of the twentieth century, 
determining Iraq’s domestic policies as well as Baghdad’s relations with other Arab 
states, with Western powers, and with the socialist countries.  
     Although widely embraced as an abstract concept and ideal by many Iraqis and 
ordinary citizens in the Arab world, the idea of Arab unity and the intensified efforts to 
realize it, paradoxically enough generated increased disunity within Iraq and between 
Iraq and certain other Arab states.16 The enthusiasm for Arab unity peaked in 1958 with 
the merger of Egypt and Syria into the United Arab Republic on February 1, 1958. The 
proclamation of the Syrian-Egyptian Republic caused great alarm in ruling circles in 
Amman and Baghdad, and fears that this propaganda victory for Nasser would turn 
Jordanians and Iraqis against their monarchic regimes.17 The former Finance Minister 
                                                          
16 Such disunity had a long tradition in Iraq. In the 1930s the political discourse between followers of the 
idea of qawmiyya, usually translated as Arab nationalism, which in turn implied the political concept of 
pan-Arabism, that is, a single state for the Arabs, and the proponents of the idea of wataniyya, who 
emphasized the importance of Iraq over that of the pan-Arab ideal, caused a political split of Iraqi 
intellectuals in two camps, pan-Arab nationalists, adherents of qawmiyya, and the Ahali movement, 
advocates of wataniyya, Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 297. Also, it is clear from the Iraqi primary 
school curriculum that the distinction between qawmiyya and wataniyya was drawn as early as in the 
beginning of the 1920s, Amatzia Baram, “A Case of Imported Identity: The Modernizing Secular Ruling 
Elites of Iraq and the Concept of Mesopotamian-Inspired Territorial Nationalism, 1922-1992,” Poetics 
Today 15, 2 (1994), p. 289, referred to in Peter Wien, Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, totalitarian, 
and pro-fascist inclinations, 1932-1941 (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 6.  
The distinction Arab nationalists make between the two concepts of qawmiyya and wataniyya normally 
implies a higher degree of desirability of the former for al-umma al-‘arabiyya, the Arab nation, than that of 
the latter. The frequently negative connotations in the context of the Arab nationalist discourse of a third 
term, iqlimiyya, regionalism, confirms the higher status of qawmiyya as a goal for the Arab nation.  From 
this conceptual differentiation does not follow, however, that the two terms are mutually exclusive, as 
evidenced by ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim’s simultaneous acceptance of qawmiyya and pan-Arabism as 
guidelines for certain policies such as foreign and defense policies and advocacy of wataniyya as the main 
principle for Iraq’s domestic policies.  
17 There were obvious grounds for these fears: The proclamation of the United Arab Republic caused 
resentment among many educated Iraqis against the ruling circles in their country, since the former 
regarded these circles as an impediment to the realization of the dream of Arab unity, a fact which would 
isolate Iraq from the rest of the Arab world, ‘Abd al-Karim al-’Uzri, Tarikh fi Dhikrayat al-‘Iraq 1930-1958 
[History in Reminiscences of Iraq] (Bairut: Markaz al-Abjadiyya li al-Saff al-Taswiri, 1982), p. 544. A 
congratulatory telegram from Iraqi intellectuals and politicians in defiance of Nuri al-Sa‘id on the occasion 
of the proclamation of the United Arab Republic, testifies to the sentiments among Iraqis at the time, Fikrat 





‘Abd al-Karim al-’Uzri writes in his memoirs that he found Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah in 
“a state of great agitation and alarm” at the news of the proclamation of the United Arab 
Republic. The Crown Prince was full of pessimism and told al-’Uzri that the Syrian-
Egyptian union was an unnatural creation and that it would not last for a number of 
reasons, the most important of which was the geographic separation of the two regions. 
He also said that the union “nevertheless constituted a serious challenge to Iraq and a 
threat to its existence.”18 Considering this fear, the United Arab Republic could not boost 
Arab unity, but only result in Arab disunity. Therefore, such an interpretation of the 
proclamation of the United Arab Republic left the rulers in Amman and Baghdad little 
choice but to form a rival Arab Union two weeks after the Syrian-Egyptian merger in 
hopes of avoiding destabilization of their countries.  
     The reasons for the division over the issue of Arab unity within the Arab ranks were 
the fundamental difference between Nasser’s and Nuri’s interpretations of Arab unity, the 
British presence in the Middle East, and the pro-British policies of Nuri. In the prime 
minister’s mind Arab unity was to be realized under the leadership of Iraq, preferably 
excluding political rivals such as Nasser and reducing their influence over Arab public 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Namiq ‘Abd al-Fattah, Siyasat al-‘Iraq al-Kharijiyya fi al-Mantaqa al-‘Arabiyya, 1953-1958 [Iraq’s Foreign 
Policy in the Arab Region, 1953-1958] (Baghdad: Dar al-Rashid li al-Nashr, 1981), pp. 214-215. 
Conversely, Iraqis received the news of the formation of the Arab Union with indifference, Isma‘il Ahmad 
Yaghi, Al-‘Alaqat al-‘Iraqiyya al-Urdunniyya, 1941-1958 [Iraqi-Jordanian Relations, 1941-1958 (Al-
Qahira: Dar al-Sahwa li al-Nashr, 1988), p. 55. 
18 Al-’Uzri, Tarikh fi Dhikrayat al-‘Iraq, p. 550. ‘Abd al-Ilah’s words, as al-’Uzri quotes the Crown Prince, 
appear somewhat contradictory. If he was convinced that the Syrian-Egyptian union would not last very 
long, why then be in a state of great agitation? Despite his words, he most likely thought that the United 
Arab Republic would last long enough to seriously destabilize Iraq. Interpreted in this way ‘Abd al-Ilah’s 
prediction was prophetic in two ways: the monarchy was overthrown five and a half months later and the 
United Arab Republic was dissolved in 1961 following Syria’s secession.  
‘Abd al-Ilah’s efforts to persuade Iraq’s Baghdad Pact allies not to recognize the United Arab Republic 
corroborates al-’Uzri’s impression that the Crown Prince was in a highly agitated state, ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-
Hasani, Tarikh al-Wizarat al-‘Iraqiyya [The History of Iraqi Cabinets] (Sida: al-‘Irfan, 1968), vol. x, p. 202.       





opinion.19 Conversely, to the latter Arab unity meant unity under Egyptian leadership and 
the elimination of the Western military presence in the region. This argument does not go 
as far as invalidating the claim that the strong Western presence in Iraq contributed to 
sowing seeds of discord among the Arabs thus constituting an obstacle to Arab unity.20 
The case of Iraq demonstrates clearly, however, that despite the strong British presence in 
monarchic Iraq, Iraqis such as Nuri al-Sa‘id, who cooperated closely with the British, had 
their own reasons for opposing closer ties with their ideological opponent and rival for 
leadership in the Arab world, the President of Egypt and later of the United Arab 
Republic, Gamal ‘Abdul Nasser.  
                                                          
19 Nuri was thus no stranger to pan-Arab ideas, a fact which was probably reinforced by his habit to think in 
strategic terms, although his Fertile Crescent project would not be open to Arab states with leftist or 
revolutionary governments. Republics such as Syria would be welcomed to accede, most likely because 
Nuri hoped to install a king in Damascus. In certain respects, Nuri’s pan-Arabism was therefore similar to 
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Khaldun Sati‘ al-Husri’s argument regarding the tension in the Arab world between the ideal of qawmiyya 
and the individual considerations of wataniyya in different Arab states. The focus of the concept of 
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time, the objective of qawmiyya, which transcends the borders of the individual Arab states, is to create a 
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Husri, Abhath Mukhtara fi al-Qawmiyya al-‘Arabiyya [Selected Studies in Arab Nationalism] (Bairut: 
Markaz Dirasat al-Wahda al-‘Arabiyya, Silsila al-Tarath al-Qawmiyya, al-A‘mal al-qawmiyya li Sati‘ al-
Husri, IV, wa Dar al-Mustaqbal al-‘Arabi, 1985, first published in 1964), p. 24.       
20 Al-Husri, the foremost Arab nationalist theoretician, clearly linked the contemporary division in the Arab 
world to Western imperialism: “ The Arab states which exist today were not created as a result of the wish 
of the people. They were created as a consequence of agreements and treaties concluded by states which 
divided the Arab nation and assumed control over it. Also, the borders separating the Arab states were not 
determined in accordance with the interests of the Arab nation and its members…The differences which we 
now see between the Arab states…are largely a legacy of the treaties of occupation,” Abu Khaldun Sati‘ al-
Husri: Al-‘Uruba Awwalan [Arabness First] (Bairut: Dar al-‘Ilm li’l-Malayin, fifth edition, 1965), p. 13. 
Like al-Husri, Michel ‘Aflaq, the most prominent theoretician of the Syrian Ba‘th Party, emphasized Arab 
unity in his writings, arguing that Western imperialism was a major impediment to this unity. ‘Aflaq argued 
that Zionism constituted the other main obstacle to Arab unity, Mishil ‘Aflaq: Ma‘rakat al-Masir al-Wahid 
[The Battle for a Unique Destiny] (Bairut: Al-Mu’assasa al-‘Arabiyya li’l-Dirasat wa al-Nashr, fourth 
revised and expanded edition, June 1972), p. 45. ‘Aflaq’s argument regarding the reasons for the divisions 
in the Arab world, however, was more nuanced than that of al-Husri, laying part of the blame for Arab 
division on the Arabs themselves. The former contended that: “The threat to the Arab nation from 
imperialism, Zionism, and Israel is based on conspiratorial reactionary forces in the Arab world,” ‘Aflaq: 
Ma‘rakat, p. 177. The emphasis here is on the threat to Arab societies emanating from within and obviously 
refers to the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa‘id’s pro-British policies. Iraq’s position on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, however, cannot be characterized in any way as pro-Israel, although Nuri took a more 
pragmatic stance than ‘Aflaq on this issue.  





     It is difficult to maintain that Western imperialism was responsible for Arab disunity 
after the Iraqi Revolution. The reason is, of course, that the British presence had been 
greatly reduced in Iraq, and neither London nor Washington possessed any effective 
means to influence Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim’s policies.21 During the first 
few months following the Revolution U.A.R.-Iraqi relations grew ever closer. At the 
same time there were no signs that the new leader in Baghdad intended to become 
Nasser’s disciple or allow the latter to influence Iraqi domestic policies. This tendency 
would become more obvious over time. 
     The Iraqi Revolution thus appeared to have ushered in an era of close U.A.R.-Iraqi 
cooperation. What initially looked like a genuine rapprochement between the United 
Arab Republic and Iraq, however, was replaced with cooler relations in late fall following 
the Deputy Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif’s fall from grace in September 1958 and 
arrest in November, only to be followed by an intense propaganda war between the two 
republics, and U.A.R. involvement in a coup attempt against Qasim in March of 1959. As 
a result, over the period of nine months U.A.R.-Iraqi relations deteriorated radically, even 
to the extent that the hostility between Cairo and Baghdad became more intense than it 
had been in the Nuri era. How could relations between two supposedly revolutionary 
governments deteriorate to such a degree? The reasons for this development were 
contradictory interpretations of Arab unity at the national Iraqi level.  
     Qasim and his deputy ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif represented different aspects of Arab 
nationalism. Qasim advocated an Arab nationalism which was a combination of 
qawmiyya, the ultimate goal of which was a single state for all Arabs, and wataniyya, a 
                                                          
21 Britain could have applied economic pressure, which would, however, have hurt not only Iraqi but 
British interests as well. Furthermore, such pressure would only have increased Qasim’s recalcitrance and 
his dependence on Soviet aid.   





form of nationalism which advocated retention of full national sovereignty for individual 
Arab states with respect to domestic policies. Conversely, ‘Arif was the most prominent 
proponent of qawmiyya and Arab unity. During his short career as second in command in 
Baghdad he exerted himself to bring about Iraqi accession to the Syrian-Egyptian union. 
Qasim’s interpretation of Arab unity differed from both that of Nuri and that of Nasser, 
since Qasim neither strove for Iraqi preeminence in the Arab world nor displayed any 
interest in attempting to influence other Arab states in one direction or another.22 ‘Arif’s 
position on unity, however, differed from that of Nasser in as much as the former did not 
necessarily envision a leading role for Iraq in the Arab world and would have been 
satisfied with occupying the position of Nasser’s lieutenant. ‘Arif thus took a stance on 
Arab unity which to a certain extent resembled that of the Syrians prior to the 
proclamation of the United Arab Republic. Conversely, Qasim’s speeches reveal that he 
was prepared to cooperate closely with the United Arab Republic in the areas of foreign, 
defense, and educational policies. He would have accepted a federation with the United 
Arab Republic provided that Iraq had been guaranteed full sovereignty in internal 
affairs.23  
     Developments in the Syrian region of the United Arab Republic most likely further 
strengthened Qasim’s misgivings about the wisdom of acceding to the United Arab 
Republic. Nasser’s announcement of the first U.A.R. cabinet in October 1958 clearly 
indicated Syria’s status as the junior partner in the Arab Republic. Only fourteen Syrians 
were appointed ministers out of a total of thirty-four cabinet members, with all key 
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23 14th July Celebrations Committee, The Iraqi Revolution, p. 9.  





ministries going to Egyptians. Syrians’ discontent with their diminishing influence over 
policies in their region spread among Ba‘thists and military officers, the two groups 
which had most strongly advocated union with Egypt in February 1958.24 Ironically 
enough, the person who had more or less forced the merger upon the Syrian government, 
Syria’s Chief of Staff General ‘Afif al-Bizri, was so embittered after his removal by 
Nasser from this position that he sent a message to Qasim, urging him not to accede to 
the United Arab Republic in order to avoid meeting the same fate as the Syrians, who had 
already lost their independence.25 Syria’s former president, Shukri al-Quwatli, another 
prominent Syrian who had contributed to the Syrian-Egyptian merger into the Arab 
Republic later expressed his disappointment with the union claiming that the Egyptians 
had “trampl[ed] on the honour and dignity of citizens,” and “unleashed a class struggle” 
in order to maintain their rule.26 Such testimonies from individuals instrumental in the 
forming of the Syrian-Egyptian union must have been regarded by Qasim as a vindication 
of his decision not to join the United Arab Republic.            
     Despite the differences between the pan-Arab ideal of one Arab state and Qasim’s 
policies, he accepted the former in an Iraqi context. Iraq’s diverse ethnic and religious 
composition somewhat resembled the lack of unity in the Arab world with its many 
individual states. What Qasim did was to apply the idea of qawmiyya to the Iraqi 
wataniyya context. The Iraqi Revolution had shown that Nuri had failed to create a united 
Iraqi society and state, which all Iraqis felt they were part of. With this in mind Qasim set 
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out to create a united Iraq for all Iraqis, not just the wealthiest stratum of the population.27 
Therefore, in a sense he applied the ideal of Arab unity to the social and political realities 
in Iraq simultaneously, however, emphasizing pan-Arab unity in areas which would not 
interfere with his project to realize Iraqi unity.             
     In summary, participation of the Iraqi capital’s population in the July 14 coup testifies 
to the extent to which Baghdadis embraced nationalist ideas. Furthermore, the massive 
popular support for and participation in the events of July 14 made these a coup far from 
exclusively executed by the Iraqi military, and also reveal that these events were the 
initial phase of what would prove to be a social, political, economic, and psychological 
revolution. Third, as to the revolutionary Iraqi regime’s subsequent policies, both 
domestic and foreign policies constituted such a radical departure from those of the 
previous regime that they can be termed a revolution, even though they were not always 
successful. Finally, it was the perception of ordinary Iraqis, in particular the poorer strata 
of the population, that Qasim’s radical departure from the previous regime’s policies due 
to the lifting of constraints on civil rights and the new regime’s focus on raising the 
standard of living for the poor majority of Iraqis had given them a voice in the political 
life of the nation.             
     The above analysis has also focused on the concept of Arab unity, the question to 
what degree it influenced domestic and foreign policies and generated disunity, and how 
Nuri’s and Qasim’s interpretations of this concept differed. The strong British military 
and economic presence in Iraq constituted one reason among others for the disunity in 
which the efforts to realize Arab unity resulted prior to the Iraqi Revolution. Following 
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the Revolution, however, British policies in Iraq can hardly be blamed for having such a 
detrimental influence on Arab unity. During this period Arab disunity was a result of the 
struggle between two different interpretations of the concept of unity in Iraq and 


























INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE REVOLUTION IN 1958 
 
     This chapter will analyze the economic, social, and political situation in Iraq in the 
middle of the 1950s, and to what extent the internal situation in Iraq reflected Western 
policies towards the Middle East in general and Nasser in particular, and the perceived 
threat of Nasserism and communism. This approach is important, since it will establish to 
what extent Iraq was directly involved in or isolated from transnational policies and 
issues prevalent in the Middle East in the 1950s, and what role these forces played in 
fanning revolutionary sentiments in Iraq. Finally, the analysis will also address the 
question of why the considerable oil revenues invested in development projects failed to 
prevent the Iraqi Revolution. Was the Nuri regime alone to blame for this failure, or were 
foreign experts also responsible for the direction of the development program?  
      
Ideologies and Propaganda 
     The Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955 resulted in a surge 
of neutralism in the Middle East.28 The proceedings at the Conference dominated front 
pages and editorials of the Iraqi press, and were seen as a renaissance for the Afro-Asian 
nations with the concomitant criticism of the West and the white man expressed in Iraqi 
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newspapers.29 Neutralist ideas, however, had circulated among intellectuals, students, and 
the National Democratic Party, the Popular Front, and the Istiqlal Party since the early 
days of the Cold War, fuelled by widespread anti-British sentiments and leftist 
ideologies.30 This criticism also targeted the United States since it was Britain’s ally and 
the main supporter of Israel. As a result of increased East-West tension during the Korean 
War, the Iraqi press had printed articles in 1950 and 1951 emphasizing the need for a 
third, neutralist power with which the Arabs could align themselves.31 Neutralist ideas in 
the Iraqi context did thus not originate with the Bandung Conference, but were only 
reinforced by it.  
     Views on and interpretations of the concept of neutralism, or nonalignment which 
became the preferred term in the early 1960s, differed greatly.32 A Soviet scholar, for 
instance, argued that the socialist countries had shown non-Western societies the way by 
“demonstrat[ing] the possibility of applying in practice the principles of equality, 
fraternal cooperation and comradely assistance among free peoples.”33 This in turn had 
led to the emergence in 1946-1947, during the Indian struggle for independence, of the 
concept of nonalignment as formulated by India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal 
Nehru.34 Nehru had invited leaders from Asian countries, including Arab politicians and 
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32 Fayez A. Sayegh, ed., The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World: A Symposium (San Francisco: 
Chandler Publishing Company, 1964), p. 2.  
33 Yuri Alimov, The Rise and Growth of the Non-aligned Movement (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987), 
p. 12.   
34 Ibid., p. 20.  





officials from Asian Soviet republics to a conference held at New Delhi in March of 
1947, at which Nehru had emphasized that Asian countries must “stand on their own 
legs” and “have their own policies in world affairs.”35 In the context of the Cold War 
conflict, such statements were viewed with suspicion by American policymakers owing 
to their conviction that the non-communist world must present a united front against the 
Soviet Union and its allies. On June 9, 1956, John Foster Dulles had voiced his concern 
about non-alignment by stating that “ [t]he principle of neutrality is an immoral and 
short-sighted conception.”36 Given the strong neutralist sentiments and opposition to the 
Baghdad Pact in Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab world, Dulles’s own statement must be 
regarded as myopic.      
     A statement by the Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abdul Nasser reflects the deep chasm 
between the West and views held by Arab intellectuals and a number of Arab leaders: 
“Our policy…is one of Arab nationalism, non-alignment, positive neutrality, the 
liquidation of spheres of influence…”.37 The formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 had 
reinforced neutralist sentiments in the Arab world, and the subsequent Israeli raid on 
Gaza were linked to one another by Arab public opinion, and interpreted as punishment 
by the West for Egyptian opposition to the Baghdad Pact.38 Furthermore, the position of 
the nonaligned countries which participated in the Bandung Conference held in Indonesia 
between April 18 and 24, 1955, shortly after the Israeli attack, enhanced the standing of 
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neutralism in Iraq. The nonaligned participants in the Conference interpreted it as a 
manifestation of “ collective resistance to imperialism,” a position which could in the 
eyes of Iraqi, Egyptian, and Syrian intellectuals easily be applied to the situation in the 
Middle East.39 Finally, the Conference had declared that one of its principles was 
“abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve particular 
interests of any of the big powers,” which was exactly what Iraqi intellectuals had 
advocated several years prior to the Conference.40          
     Egyptian propaganda facilitated the dissemination of neutralism, but neutralist 
tendencies among Iraqi intellectuals and politicians testify to the strong opposition to 
Nuri’s policies which aimed at firmly aligning Iraq in the Western camp militarily, 
politically, and economically. The political opposition was not, however, completely 
united. Many from Nuri’s own generation and representatives of his own class largely 
opposed his pro-British foreign policy, whereas the younger generation’s opposition 
mainly stemmed from its strong dissatisfaction with the slow economic progress in the 
country.41 In addition to the above opposition Nuri also had to counter propaganda 
broadcasts by Egyptian radio. This was no easy task, however, since Nasser could 
actually point to convincing achievements which Nuri would never be in a position to 
benefit from without a fundamental policy shift. By signing an evacuation treaty with the 
British in 1954 Nasser had taken effective measures to considerably reduce British 
influence in the Middle East since the treaty stipulated the withdrawal of all British 
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troops from Egyptian soil.42 It is not surprising therefore that the Egyptian Sawt al-‘Arab 
radio station had a faithful audience in Iraq, since Nuri had apparently taken steps in the 
opposite direction by signing the Turco-Iraqi Pact in February 1955, thereby acceding to 
the Baghdad Pact, and by retaining the close Anglo-Iraqi ties with the signing of the 
Special Agreement between the two countries in April 1955.43       
     Nuri took the perceived threat of communism to the monarchy seriously, in particular 
since leftist ideas appealed to Iraqi students. By 1954 as many as 85 percent of “students 
of secondary and higher institutions of learning belonged to the General Association of 
Iraqi Students, known to be a Communist front organization.”44 Nuri was   concerned 
about communist propaganda, since it appeared to target especially the Baghdad Pact, of 
which many Iraqis were critical.45 Examples of other communist activities were 
participation in strikes at the British air base al-Habbaniyya and in Basra port, both 
locations political targets owing to the strong British presence, and incitement of students 
to organize strikes in support of Algeria in October 1956.46 The Communist Party of Iraq 
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had approximately 5,000 members by 1953-1954, and was considered a large party, since 
the number of organized members of political parties typically did not exceed a few 
hundred.47 In mid-1956 the opposition, including the Communist Party, decided to form a 
United National Front, thus constituting a credible challenge to Nuri, with a program 
including complete political and economic independence, abolition of the Baghdad Pact, 
withdrawal from the Sterling area, guarantees of democratic rights and civil liberties, 
Arab solidarity against imperialism and Zionism, and cooperation with the socialist 
countries. This program testifies to the prominent role of socialist parties in the Front.48 
Furthermore, it illustrates why Nuri found the political opposition so dangerous to the 
regime: his own political program was the direct opposite of that of the United National 
Front, which was highly appealing to Iraqi intellectuals and students.      
     The American Embassy’s reports reflect an optimistic assessment of the Iraqi 
government’s suppression of leftist activities, and a concern about Iraqi nationalism. The 
Embassy estimated in April 1955 the membership of the Communist Party of Iraq at 
2,000 with the numbers possibly reaching 10,000-12,000 if “friends, supporters, and 
sympathizers” were included.49 American analysts in the Embassy also assessed that the 
Iraqi government had been successful in its campaign against leftist groups. As a result 
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the influence of the Communist Party had allegedly been greatly reduced. The contacts of 
communist leaders with the Free Officers and the organizing activities of the Party on the 
first day of the revolution, however, partly belie this impression. American diplomats 
were also concerned about nationalism, since it 
with varying degrees of intensity, affects the larger part of the Iraqi populace. 
Generally speaking, it has operated on the a priori assumption that foreign 
influence—in the case of Iraq, usually British—is primarily responsible for the 
various ills which beset the country and for the frustration of Arab aspirations.50 
  
The claim that nationalists blamed the Western powers for the problems in the Middle 
East and in Iraq is confirmed by many Iraqi works. According to two scholars the Iraqi 
trade policy favored British interests and “monopolistic companies.”51 The above report 
reveals that American diplomats were concerned not only about communist activities, but 
also about nationalist criticism of Western influence in Iraq.52   
 
Internal Security and Repression     
     The prevailing Cold War international system was reflected not only in the regime’s 
policies towards leftist ideologies and propaganda as discussed above, but also in the 
emphasis on organizing the police and army to maintain internal security. In order to 
suppress the political opposition Nuri drew on the Iraqi Police Force which numbered 
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12,500-14,000 policemen, and the armed forces, approximately 54,000 strong. According 
to the American ambassador the two forces were “considered capable of maintaining 
internal security.”53 With regard to the Mobile Police Force the Ambassador stated that the 
Force was the “only really effective uniformed element of the Police.”54 It numbered 
3,000-4,000 policemen. The Criminal Investigation Department, “doubtless one of the 
better run departments of the Iraqi Government,” was charged with monitoring and 
investigating communist activities.55 The Investigation Department maintained records of 
300,000 people, roughly five percent of the population. Of these, 10,000 were individuals 
with leftist leanings. The American ambassador noted that a marked change with respect 
to political offenders had taken place after Nuri’s return to office in the summer of 1954, 
with the courts accepting evidence “which would have been held to be quite inadmissible 
eight months ago…The courts are almost daily handing down convictions for communist 
or communist front activities and meting out sentences ranging from three months to 
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Corporation, Gabbay, Communism, p. 58. The American ambassador should not be judged too hard, 
however, since the habit of viewing everything through a Cold War prism was the prevalent analytical 
method in Washington and London, with a few exceptions among diplomats and Western officials on the 
spot.        





three years.”56 In view of the lowered standard for what was acceptable “evidence” one 
can suspect that the large number of people being convicted for communist activities 
were not necessarily communists, but simply regime critics, whom Nuri could now 
prosecute thanks to the lowered standard for what was acceptable as evidence.   
     As to the loyalty of the armed forces, the assessment of the American ambassador was 
somewhat off the mark, whereas his conclusion regarding the capabilities of the army 
was more realistic. The Ambassador stated that the armed forces  
“are believed to be loyal to the Crown. Nuri al-Said, too, enjoys considerable 
popularity in military circles. As far as can be ascertained, the military have not 
been excessively effected by communist infiltration, although there are a few 
instances of officers and enlisted men (largely technical personnel) having been 
court-martialed for leftist affiliations.”57  
 
In view of what happened three years later, this was not an accurate assessment. If Nuri 
did not know, however, one could not expect the American Embassy to know either, 
since its assessment was most likely based on intelligence provided by the Iraqi 
Government. With regard to the armed forces’ defensive capability the Embassy 
                                                          
56 Gallman to the Department of State, April 26, 1955, Despatch no. 522, Top Secret, 787.5/4-2655, 
Subject: Threat of Communist Subversion in Iraq and Recommendations Re Possible Steps to Support 
Counter-Measures.  Furthermore, since September 1954 the Government had been empowered “to 
denationalize any Iraqi convicted of communist or communist-front activities and to detain him until such 
time as deportation can be arranged.” The fact that Nuri had lowered the standard for admissible evidence 
did not fully guarantee the success of the Criminal Investigation Department’s investigations, however, to 
which testifies a remark in an Embassy report: “The danger undoubtedly exists that the uneducated masses 
of the Iraqi public will disbelieve any suggestion that an individual may be sought by the Police for 
communist subversion; instead, the tendency is ever present to impute dubious motives to the authorities 
and to seek to protect the individual from the latter. Government and its agents in Iraq, as elsewhere in the 
Middle East, are usually suspect in the public eye.” The realization that the population tended to assume 
that individuals wanted for political crimes deserved protection and not to be handed over to the police, 
must have been disturbing to the Iraqi authorities as well as to Western Cold War ideologues in 
Washington and London, since it constitutes hard evidence that the population in general was not 
profoundly affected by the regime’s anti-communist propaganda. Conversely, this circumstance should not 
be misconstrued as ardent popular support for communist ideology. Most likely the ordinary Iraqi could 
easily identify with individuals persecuted by a regime which was not perceived as a paragon of morality.    
57 Gallman to the Department of State, April 26, 1955, Despatch no. 522, Top Secret, 787.5/4-2655, 
Subject: Threat of Communist Subversion in Iraq and Recommendations Re Possible Steps to Support 
Counter-Measures. The obsession with combating communism eventually led to the closing of the Soviet 
Legation in November 1954, perceived by the Iraqi authorities as a center for leftist activity.    





concluded that “[i]n either a localized or a general war, it is axiomatic that the Iraqi 
Armed Forces cannot defend the country without outside help.”58 This most likely did not 
come as a surprise to the West, since the British probably believed that they would have 
to do most of the fighting to repulse a Soviet attack, with the Iraqi army playing a minor 
role in such a scenario. On the basis of this assumption the primary mission—in the eyes 
of the Western powers—of the Iraqi military could have been to defend the regime 
against internal and not external enemies.59  
 
The Development Board and the Economic and Social Situation      
     Both Nuri and his British and American allies considered the economy key to political 
and social stability in Iraq. An American Embassy report stated explicitly that there was a 
close relationship between standard of living and social stability: 
The major threat to Iraq about which Iraq can do something on its own is the low 
standard of living, a factor contributing to internal instability. As long as living 
conditions continue so poor in the face of visible means to do something to 
improve them, Iraq will be vulnerable to communist exploitation. It would seem 
that in the long run the most practical defense of Iraq is to strengthen the economy 
and internal security…60   
 
The violent acts carried out by fallahin in 1946 and which continued to occur in the 1950s 
were a clear indication that the situation in the rural areas needed to be addressed. In an 
                                                          
58 Gallman to the Department of State, April 26, 1955, Despatch no. 522, Top Secret, 787.5/4-2655, 
Subject: Threat of Communist Subversion in Iraq and Recommendations Re Possible Steps to Support 
Counter-Measures. 
59 The American Chargé d’Affaires W. Clyde Dunn reported in July 1956 that rightist political groups in 
Iraq appeared to be agreed that the army would play an important role in protecting the regime in the event 
of a leftist rebellion, W. Clyde Dunn, Chargé d’Affaires, July 26, 1956, Secret, Despatch no. 67, Enclosure, 
787.5-MSP/7-2656.   
60 W. Clyde Dunn, Chargé d’Affaires, July 26, 1956, Secret, Despatch no. 67, Enclosure, 787.5-MSP/7-
2656.  





attempt to cope with the precarious situation, a law had been promulgated in 1951 which 
stipulated that state land be distributed to fallahin to be cultivated by them.61  
     In order to facilitate the implementation of the program, the government made loans 
available to the fallahin. As a result, the Agricultural Bank, established in 1940, expanded 
its operations by opening branches in Basra, Arbil, Al-Sulaimaniyya, and Al-Qadisiyya 
Provinces. The Bank granted medium-and long-term loans to the peasants. These loans 
were, however, spent on “non-productive consumption.” Instead of investing the money 
the fallahin received from the Bank, they used their loans to defray costs of living during 
the harvest period due to the unavailability of short-term loans for this purpose. 
Consequently, the peasant remained under the control of the large landowner and the 
usurer, and even more so than previously. The failure of the government program had 
thus aggravated the situation in the countryside which led to the establishment of the 
Development Board in 1950.62        
     The establishment of the Development Board gave Nuri a degree of independence vis-
à-vis his conservative political supporters who constituted an effective impediment to 
reform. In 1952 a law was promulgated which stipulated that 70 percent of the oil 
revenues be allocated to development.63 By the mid-1950s it was clear, however, that the 
                                                          
61 Yahya Ghani Najjar, Dirasa fi al-Takhtit al-Iqtisadi ma‘a Ishara Khasa li Tajribat al-‘Iraq [A Study in 
Economic Planning with Special Reference to Iraq’s Experience] (Baghdad: Manshurat Wizarat al-Thaqafa 
wa al-Funun, 1978), p. 91.  
62 Ibid., p. 92.  
63 Kazim ‘Ali, Al-‘Iraq fi ‘Ahd ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, p. 20.  The 1952 law appeared well on paper and 
both Nuri and the Western powers were hopeful that Iraq’s oil wealth would enable his regime to survive. It 
turned out, however, that the Development Board’s focus on a small number of large-scale projects at the 
expense of a greater number of small-scale projects did not win the political opposition and the critical 
public over. Al-Jamali states that the prime minister, the finance minister, and a vice president also were 
permanent members of the Board, which also had five other members appointed for a term of five years, 
Muhammad Fadhil al-Jamali, Al-‘Iraq al-Hadith: Ara’ wa Mutala‘at fi Shu’unihi al-Siyasiyya [Modern 
Iraq: Views on and Studies in Her Political Affairs; the title page states that the book’s title is “…Al-
Siyasiyya,” whereas the title is ‘…al-Masiriyya” according to the cover] (n.d., n.p.), p. 67.      





investment of oil revenues caused controversy. The large projects took four to five years 
to complete and would only then begin to benefit the Iraqis. The poorer strata of the 
population, however, were impatient to see immediate improvement of their situation in 
the villages, small towns, and slums. The result was growing signs of discontent.64 The 
Development Board survived into the revolutionary period but  
Prior to the 1958 revolution development programmes were conceived as lists of 
economic projects, unrelated to overall economic planning, with special emphasis 
on investment in social overheads as against directly productive projects.65  
 
The above quotation indicates that the Development Board’s projects suffered from two 
major flaws—lack of coordination between the projects, and an emphasis on large-scale 
projects which would not have a rapid impact on the Iraqi economy and the standard of 
living of the population.       
     Lord Salter’s report of 1955 on the Development Board’s economic program largely 
confirms the flaws in the program referred to in the above paragraph.66 The report, 
completed in the spring of 1955, offered, among other things, the following criticism: 
First, there had been too great a focus on dams and water projects. Second, no 
coordinated planning had taken place regarding the use of the water in the reservoirs to 
be built. Third, insufficient effort and money had been allocated to development to insure 
quick and palpable results. The Board had failed to prioritize housing. More attention to 
this area would have produced quick and visible results to ordinary Iraqis. The Board had 
done very little to improve Iraq’s agricultural sector. Fourth, the Board had ignored the 
                                                          
64 Ionides, Divide And Lose, p. 120. Ionides was appointed a full-time Board member (the Board had one 
British and one American member in addition to the Iraqi members) in the spring of 1955. His account of 
the last years of the Iraqi monarchy is pro-Arab, anti-Zionist, and highly critical of Britain’s role in Iraq and 
the Middle East 
65 Rony, Communism and Agrarian Reform, p. 39. 
66 In the spring of 1954 Lord Salter was appointed by the Iraqi Government to produce a report on the 
Development Board’s economic program and present it to the Board within a year. 





human capital. Efforts should be made to get endemic diseases under control. Public 
services, such as domestic water supply, needed improvement. Fifth, Salter also added a 
political dimension to his report by drawing attention to the danger of not allowing 
popular discontent to be expressed in Parliament.67 
      The former Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Fadhil al-Jamali has pointed to a 
number of reasons outside the Development Board for why the development program 
was not more successful. He largely defends the intentions of the program but concedes 
that there were problems. First, there was not much communication between the 
government and the public with respect to the development program. The reason for this 
was the government’s insufficient possession of means of propaganda in order to 
enlighten the public about the Development Board’s activities. As a result, all the public 
heard about the development projects was criticism. Second, Iraq lacked political 
stability, with the average term in office of a government being less than six months. This 
fact delayed the completion of the projects and adversely affected their organization. 
Third, technical competence in official circles was not high, and expertise was not 
encouraged.68 According to al-Jamali it would have been extremely difficult to improve 
the record of Iraq’s development program, since it would have required a radical change 
of the political system in the country in order to create political stability, the prospects for 
which appeared to be bleak in the middle of the 1950s due to the extreme polarization of 
Iraqi society.   
                                                          
67 Salter, J. A., The Development of Iraq: A Plan of Action (Caxton Press, 1955), no page reference, 
referred to in Ionides, Divide and Lose, p. 121.  
68 Al-Jamali, Al-‘Iraq al-Hadith, p. 70. Ionides emphasizes that technical expertise alone was not sufficient 
to resolve all problems. There were two reasons for this. First, the large development projects “created the 
need for legislative and administrative reforms which no one had enough to see to…” Second, few of the 
experts “had the experience…necessary to organize a multiplicity of small works to make the fullest use of 
local labor and materials…,” Ionides, Divide and Lose, pp. 212-213.      





     Later and more ideological Iraqi analyses of the failed policies of the pre-
revolutionary Iraqi regime in part corroborate Salter’s criticism. There were several 
reasons for the backwardness of the Iraqi agriculture, the most important of which was 
the inefficient use of available water. This in turn created large tracts of land, which were 
not suitable for cultivation. Primitive tilling methods were a further impediment to 
agricultural growth.69 Also, the low level of agricultural output resulted in Iraq having to 
import wheat and barley. A final important reason was that profits from agricultural 
production remained concentrated in the hands of large landowners, which made it 
difficult for the fallahin to make ends meet.70 The fact that 0.012 percent of landowners 
controlled 9.5 percent of all agricultural land goes to show how influential they were.71  
     Several Iraqi scholars have been critical of the Development Board’s failure to 
develop the Iraqi industry. The contributions of the Industrial Bank for this purpose 
                                                          
69 Kazim Habib and Makram al-Talabani, Ara’ fi Mafhum wa Qadhaya al-Islah al-Zira‘i [Views on the 
Concept and Issues of Agricultural Reform] (Baghdad: Manshurat Maktabat Baghdad, Matba‘a Salman al-
A‘zami, 1971), p. 31, referred to in ‘Ali, Al-‘Iraq, p. 17. 
70 Hisham Mutawalli, Iqtisadiyat al-‘Iraq [The Economy of Iraq] (Dimashq: Markaz al-Dirasat al-
Iqtisadiyya), p. 38, referred to in ‘Ali, Al-‘Iraq, p. 19; Tal‘at al-Shaibani, Waqi‘ al-Milkiya al-Zira‘iyya fi 
al-‘Iraq [Developments in Agricultural Ownership in Iraq] (Baghdad: Dar al-Ahali, 1959), p. 64.  
71 Habib and al-Talabani, Ara’ fi Mafhum wa Qadhaya al-Islah al-Zira‘i, p. 22, referred to in ‘Ali, Al-‘Iraq, 
pp. 17-18. Muhammad Salman Hasan adopts a nationalist approach to explaining the failures of the 
Development Board. He refers to three factors: first, the administrative and financial organization of the 
Board by external forces; second, the fact that foreign experts held leading positions; and, third, the lack of 
scientific data to support the national economy, Muhammad Salman Hasan, “Nahwa Jihaz Iqtisadi Thawri” 
[Towards a Revolutionary Economic System], Al-Thaqafa al-Jadida, No. 9 (May 1959), p. 11, referred to 
in ‘Ali, Al-‘Iraq, pp. 20-21. Another nationalist critic of the Development Board’s policies, Husain Jamil, 
emphasizes that the Board did not utilize the oil revenues to develop the industrial sector “since the lion’s 
share of these revenues went to the foreign monopolistic companies with Iraq receiving only a very tiny 
share estimated at four shilling per ton [of oil],” Husain Jamil, Al-‘Iraq al-Jadid, [New Iraq] (Bairut: Dar 
Munaimana li al-Taba‘a wa al-Nashr, book 1, 1958), p. 18; al-Durra, Al-Tatawwur al-Sina‘i fi al-‘Iraq, p. 
35, referred to in ‘Ali, Al-‘Iraq, p. 23. The picture that Jamil paints of the majority of the oil revenues going 
to foreign oil companies appears to be corroborated to a certain extent by Jawad Hashim who provides 
statistics according to which Iraq’s oil revenues increased from ID6.09 million in 1950 to ID90 million in 
1958, while, during the same period, ID 15.36 million was paid to foreign oil companies as interest on 
duties in 1950, and ID78.45 million in 1958, Jawad Hashim, et al., Lamahat fi Tatawwur al-Iqtisad al-
‘Iraqi: Qita‘ al-Tijarat al-Kharijiyya [Investigation of the Development of the Iraqi Economy: The Foreign 
Trade Sector] (Bairut: al-Mu’assasa al-‘Arabiyya li al-Dirasa wa al-Nashr, June 1977), p. 7, referred to in 
‘Ali, Al-‘Iraq, p. 25.    





merely amounted to ID1,979,898 in the three-year period of 1949-1951.72 Of these 
allocations 70 percent went to construction, 25 percent to irrigation, and 5 percent to 
industry.73 Later in the 1950s, however, the regime increased the emphasis on industrial 
development, though the primary focus was on increasing agricultural output. The 
growing importance of the industrial sector in the government’s development planning 
was reflected when the Development Board Program was increased in May 1956 to a six-
year ID500 million plan, 1955-1960, retroactive to April 1, 1955.74 Most of the great 
projects of this expanded second five-year plan, however, remained in the planning stage 
until the end of the monarchic era and were never completed.75  
      Nuri’s and other prime ministers’ policies were insufficient or did little radically to 
improve the social conditions in Iraq. At times, however, not the Government but the 
Parliament was the problem. Its mostly conservative deputies opposed policies which 
would have improved the lives of the poorest citizens. The housing program was 
according to one observer  
making good progress, except in Baghdad itself, where there was a desperate need 
for rehousing the tens of thousands of immigrants who had come in from the 
countryside…They were living in mud hovels of the kind they build for 
themselves in the countryside, but these, clustered in great agglomerations, 
without proper water supply and no sanitation, were an obvious social menace 
and political danger.76  
 
The Development Board had plans for providing poor Iraqis with land, some building 
material, and technical guidance to build their own houses. The program floundered in 
                                                          
72 Kazim Habib, Dirasa fi Ittijahat wa Mashakil al-Tatawwur al-Sina‘i fi al-‘Iraq, [Studies in Directions and 
Problems of Industrial Development in Iraq], p. 580.   
73 Al-Durra, Al-Tatawwur al-Sina‘i, p. 55, referred to in ‘Ali, Al-‘Iraq, p. 24. 
74 W. Clyde Dunn, Chargé d’Affaires, July 26, 1956, Secret, Despatch No. 67, Enclosure, 787.5-MSP/7-
2656.  
75Sa‘id ‘Abbud al-Samarra’i, Muqaddima fi al-Tarikh al-Iqtisadi al-‘Iraqi, [Introduction to Iraqi Economic 
History] (al-Qadha’-al-Najaf, 1973), p. 177, referred to in ‘Ali, p. 20. 
76 Ionides, Divide and Lose, p. 203.  





Baghdad, however, due to the fact that most land surrounding the capital was in private 
hands and the landowners resisted government take-over of their land at less than 
exorbitant prices.77  
     The educational system was in dire need of drastic improvement, particularly in the 
countryside, to which testifies the following statistics on literacy. According to the 1947 
census the literacy rate among males of five years of age and over was 40 percent in 
Baghdad but only two percent in certain remote villages. The literacy rate among women 
was even lower, with 20 percent in the large cities and just over one percent in rural 
areas.78 The 1957 census reported the national literacy rate at 18 percent (40 percent in 
the cities and 7 percent in rural areas). The percentage of literate women had remained 
more or less the same throughout the decade. If illiteracy was a problem in Iraq, 
education did not necessarily resolve it. The reason is that despite the widespread 
illiteracy in Iraq many intellectuals were under- or unemployed and constituted a section 
of society highly critical of the government. This was particularly the case among 
                                                          
77 Ionides, Divide and Lose, p. 204. An Embassy report dated April 1955 stated that the Development 
Board was planning to allocate “ID6,000,000  for the construction of low cost homes for civil servants and 
ID5,000,000 for military construction is already being contemplated by the Development Board,” Gallman 
to Department of State, April 26, 1955, Despatch 522, Top Secret, 787.5/4-2655, Subject: Threat of 
Communist Subversion in Iraq and Recommendations Re Possible Steps to Support Counter-Measures. 
Gallman believed the project would boost the morale among civil servants and military personnel and the 
United States “should [therefore] encourage its speedy implementation and perhaps subsequent expansion,” 
Despatch 522, Top Secret, 787.5/4-2655. It appears not to have occurred to either Gallman or the 
Development Board that the impact of such a project would have been much greater among poor Iraqis, 
who constituted the overwhelming majority of the population, than among a considerably smaller number 
of civil servants and military personnel. The rationale for the plans was most likely that the military was an 
instrument that could be used to control the discontented majority of the population, and that providing low 
cost housing would consolidate the military’s loyalty to the regime. At the same time such a rationale 
reflected a certain degree of doubt regarding the military’s loyalty on the part of the regime, why otherwise 
go to great lengths to keep the military content?   
78 Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian Reform, p. 21. The fact that children were included suggests that the 
criteria for literacy must have been at an elementary level. The low literacy rates, however, did not mean 
that Iraqis were ignorant of what was transpiring in their own country and in the Middle East. Gabbay 
emphasizes that the male population was kept informed by literate people who would read aloud from 
newspapers at cafés.       





lawyers.79 The government was thus facing a dilemma: If it reduced illiteracy by making 
education accessible to everyone, it simultaneously alienated a large number of graduates 
who could not find employment and quite understandably voiced harsh criticism of the 
regime.   
     The intellectuals had reason to be discontented with the regime, but their problems 
paled in comparison with those of the fallahin in the rural areas and the workers in the 
cities. An analyst has described the conditions the peasants lived under as follows: “The 
village presented a characteristic picture: there was a stately dwelling—the property of 
the local head—and round about it a conglomeration of miserable dilapidated clay hovels 
whose primitiveness almost beggared description.”80 Few fallahin owned a pair of shoes, 
and their small, windowless huts were sparsely furnished.81 Prior to the revolution 
peasants constituted 75 percent of the population, agriculture’s contribution to the gross 
domestic product was 25 percent, and the fallahin’s share of the national income before 
July 14 was less than 13 percent. The fallah’s annual income did not exceed ID20 ($56), 
which was not sufficient an income to support a family.82 The situation of the workers in 
the cities’ sarifas, slums, was similar to that of the fallahin. The former’s numbers were 
significantly smaller—354,000 in 1957—but they still exercised more influence on 
                                                          
79 Gallman to Department of State, April 26, 1955,Despatch no. 522,Top Secret, 787.5/4-2655 Subject: 
Threat of Communist Subversion in Iraq and Recommendations Re Possible Steps to Support Indigenous 
Counter-Measures.  
80 Gabbay, Communism, p. 25.  
81 Quint, M.N., “The Idea of Progress in an Iraqi Village,” Middle East Journal (Fall 1958), pp.369-84; 
“The Arab Village of the Middle East,” Annual Report of the Smithsonian Institution, 1943, pp. 523-43, 
quoted in Gabbay, Communism, p. 28. 
82 ‘Ali al-Wardi, Dirasa fi Tabi‘at al-Mujtama‘ al-‘Iraqi [Study of the Nature of Iraqi Society]0 (Baghdad: 
Matba‘at al-‘Ani, 1965), pp. 362-363; Al-Thawra al-‘Arabiyya (Ba‘thist newspaper), no. 1, 1972; both 
sources referred to in ‘Ali, Al-‘Iraq, p. 32. In the Middle East as a whole approximately 75 percent of the 
population lived on agriculture, Anwar Ali, “The Present Situation in the Middle East As Seen By Middle 
Easterners,” in The Evolution of Public Responsibility in the Middle East, edited by Harvey P. Hall 
(Washington, D.C.: The Middle East Institute, 1955), p. 14. 





national life than the fallahin due to their presence in the cities. Like the peasants, the 
workers could not make ends meet with their earnings per day ranging from ¢84 to $1.68. 
Workers could have played a more prominent role in the cities, however, had it not been 
for the backwardness of the Iraqi industrial sector.83   
     Having alienated fallahin, workers, and intellectuals as discussed above, the regime 
also deprived the Iraqi people of participation in the government of their country. The 
American ambassador in Baghdad stated the following in a report on the lack of popular 
participation in Iraqi political life: 
Power…has invariably resided in the hands of a relatively small body of men, 
probably not numbering more than 2,000 persons…about .4% of the total 
population, drawn primarily from the well-to-do and land owning classes. 
Notwithstanding the façade of occasional parliamentary elections, public 
participation in government is not encouraged.…[G]overnment in Iraq has tended 
to work almost exclusively in the interests of this controlling group, which…has 
tended to obstruct wherever possible even evolutionary emergence of sorely 
needed social and economic reform....[T]here is to this day a sizeable and… 
unbridged gap between government, identified as it is with the land owning 
group, and the vast majority of the rural and urban population of the country.84  
 
This analysis correctly identified the lack of real popular participation and the “archaic 
economic system” as serious obstacles to reform, concluding that these impediments 
perpetuated concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a small 
number of individuals.    
                                                          
83 Muhammad Salman Hasan, Al-Tatawwur al-Iqtisadi fi al-‘Iraq: Al-Tijara al-Kharijiyya wa al-Tatawwur 
al-Iqtisadi [Economic Development in Iraq: Foreign Trade and Economic Development] (Sida, Bairut: Al-
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264; both sources referred to in ‘Ali, Al-‘Iraq, p. 36. The average per capita income in Iraq in 1955 was 
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estimated at $80 per annum. In Egypt the average per capita income in 1953 was $112, Anwar Ali, 
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east As Seen By Middle Easterners,” in The Evolution of Public Responsibility in the Middle East, edited 
by Harvey P. Hall (Washington, D.C.: The Middle east Institute, 1955), pp. 11,16.    
84 Gallman to the Department of State, April 26, 1955,Despatch no. 522,Top Secret, 787.5/4-2655 Subject: 
Threat of Communist Subversion in Iraq and Recommendations Re Possible Steps to Support Indigenous 
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     Despite the accurate analysis above, the Americans like the British regarded economic 
and not political reforms as the only way to save Nuri and Iraq from a popular revolution, 
concurring with the prime minister in this assessment.85 American diplomats were 
convinced that the solution to the economic and social problems of Iraq was increased 
American influence:  
We believe the time may be ripe, therefore, to consider marshalling American 
influence—in both the Development Board and in the various Ministries where 
U.S.O.M. [United States Operations Mission] advisors may be in a position to 
offer counsel—to work for a broadening of emphasis to include both short term 
impact projects and a greater allocation of development funds to high priority 
training needs.86  
 
Priority areas according to American analysts were road building, a housing program, a 
teachers training program, and an effort to expedite the Development Board’s public 
health program. The Board was considering allocating “ID6,000,000 for the construction 
of low cost homes for civil servants and ID5,000,000 for military construction (barracks, 
housing, etc.).”87 In the American Embassy’s view the educational curriculum was also in 
need of revision. It recommended that “a greater emphasis…be laid on the development 
of civic responsibility—sadly lacking throughout Iraq—and on the ability to think 
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logically.”88 The Embassy further advocated the introduction of athletics into the 
curriculum of academic institutions, since this would presumably keep the students busy 
and prevent them from demonstrating in the streets against the regime.       
     An American report published in 1956 on how to raise living standards in Iraq, 
confirmed some of the criticism directed against the large-scale projects of the 
Development Board, discussed above.89 The report, prepared by the American company 
Arthur D. Little, Inc., was jointly sponsored by the Development Board of Iraq and the 
United States Operations Mission to Iraq. Focusing on feasible industrial development in 
Iraq, the report addressed some of the criticism offered by Iraqi scholars referred to 
above. The report stated that “[i]t will enable the [Development] Board to embark on a 
program of industrial expansion that will lead to higher living standards for the people of 
Iraq. It offers a plan for balanced industrial development…”90 Having established, “by 
direct observation of living standards in rural Iraq,” that a very low level of per capita 
income prevailed among the rural population, the report also emphasized, however, that 
industrial activity based on certain of Iraq’s resources would produce new wealth and “a 
rapid and substantial improvement” in living standards, by increasing the small numbers 
of the industrial work force, which constituted only 5 percent of Iraq’s working 
population. The report cautioned, however, that the economic structure of the country 
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was “inappropriate for the development of a substantial large-scale industry.”91 It is 
obvious that the Little Report confirms the conclusions drawn by many critics of the 
development program, namely that the development program should have focused on 
small-scale industrial projects to achieve a rapid increase in living standards.  
     This chapter has established that the Cold War policies of the Western powers and 
Nuri were reflected in the repression of leftist political activities in Iraq Like Nuri’s 
foreign policy contributed to increased tension in the Middle East, his domestic policy 
focusing on suppressing political opposition greatly polarized Iraqi society. His 
preoccupation with the alleged communist threat fuelled nationalist and leftist opposition 
to his regime. One reason for Nuri’s swift suppression of any manifestation of political 
opposition was the sharp criticism of Iraq’s membership of the Baghdad Pact, a corner 
stone in Nuri’s pro-West policies. The Iraqi prime minister must thus assume much of the 
responsibility for the highly polarized political discourse in Iraq, a result of his heavy-
handed treatment of political opposition, but less responsibility for failed economic and 
social reforms, some of which were stubbornly opposed by his conservative supporters in 
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Parliament. Their refusal to pass legislation which would have alleviated the lot of a 
majority of Iraqis contributed greatly to perpetuating the latter’s low standard of living. 
     Finally, the well-intended but often not very well thought out projects of the 
Development Board contributed to the social discontent in Iraq. One important reason for 
this situation was that most large-scale projects of the Board were also long-term 
projects. They would take several years to complete and would therefore not have an 
immediate impact on the life of the poorer strata of the population. A second reason was 
that the Board’s planners failed to address the appalling conditions in the slums of the 
major cities, where housing and health care projects could have enhanced the support for 
the regime.     






















REGIONAL SECURITY AND THE BAGHDAD PACT 
 
Insecurity in the Middle East 
     A number of important regional developments in the late 1940s and early 1950s had a 
profound impact on the world-wide strategic, political, and economic situation in the 
mid-1950s. This chapter will analyze the reasons for these developments, the impact they 
had, and whether they constituted manifestations of historical continuity or fundamental 
change and a break with previous historical processes in the Middle East. In this context 
it is important to address the question to what extent alternative policy options could have 
resulted in a radically different history of the Middle East and Iraq in the 1950s. What 
considerations motivated Nuri al-Sa‘id to pursue certain policies, even in the face of 
strong domestic and regional opposition?  
     Britain’s imperialist policies in the 1940s had left a legacy which shaped the 
perception of the Western presence in the Middle East in the following decade. In 1941 
Britain had deposed Iran’s Reza Shah due to his pro-German policies and established a 
joint British-Soviet condominium over the country. Furthermore, in the same year Britain 
had toppled the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Rashid ‘Ali al-Gailani for the same 
reason as Reza Shah had been removed, following a one-month war against the Iraqi 
Army. Also, in 1942 British tanks had surrounded King Faruq’s Palace compelling him 
to appoint a Prime Minister to London’s liking or else face abdication. This British action 





had profoundly influenced the Free Officers who overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in 
1952.92  
     The creation of the State of Israel in 1948, considered a great disaster by Arabs, had 
both negative and positive consequences for Arab leaders. Some scholars have argued 
that the problem of Israel, being of such a magnitude to the Arabs, should have united 
them, whereas the opposite actually happened: the existence of Israel did not contribute 
to Arab unity.93 In times of war, however, Arab unity was stronger, though this had not 
produced coordinated military operations. When Arabs had engaged in military 
operations against Israel, even moderate politicians such as the Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri 
al-Sa‘id had stated in public that he favored the elimination of Israel. In private, however, 
he had voiced flexibility.94 Conversely, the Arab-Israeli conflict was exploited by Arab 
leaders for domestic consumption, since it served as a means for these leaders to remain 
in power by diverting the public’s attention from social, political, and economic problems 
in Arab societies. The negative consequence of the conflict was that kings, presidents, 
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and politicians accused one another of insufficient contributions to vanquish the enemy.95  
With regard to the political exploitation of the Arab-Israeli issue, Iraq was somewhat 
exceptional. Nuri attempted to manipulate the conflict to his own advantage, without 
much success, however, due to his critics’ focus on his pro-British foreign policy and the 
constraints he imposed on civil liberties.96  
     The intensification of the Cold War in the late 1940s and early 1950s prompted the 
United States and Britain to propose to the Arab states the establishment of a collective 
security system. The first proposal, called the Middle East Command, was conveyed to 
potential allies in the Middle East on October 13, 1951.97 Egypt’s rejection of the Middle 
East Command prompted the West to put forward a new plan, the Middle East Defense 
Organization, in June 1952 which still accorded a leading role to Egypt and not to Iraq.98 
This plan met the same fate as the first one when Egypt rejected it in May 1953.99 The 
dates of the two proposals are of particular significance since they testify to the fact that 
there was continuity in Egypt’s position on Western security initiatives, and that this 
continuity was not dependent on the system of government in Egypt. The attitude of 
Egypt’s revolutionary government to West’s attempts to establish a regional collective 
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security system with Western participation was thus consistent with that of King Faruq’s 
pro-West regime. The implication of this was that a Western-led security pact in the 
Middle East would quite possibly be opposed by many Arabs.100 The aforementioned is 
also an indication that the Arab states would not invite the Soviet Union—like the U.S. 
and Britain an extra-regional power, and, furthermore, not a power with which Egypt was 
on friendly terms prior to the Free Officers coup—to play a prominent role in the Middle 
East and that it would perhaps have been in the best interests of the West to support a 
regional defense organization without Western participation.101  
     The reason for Egypt’s refusal to embrace the Western security plans was that Cairo 
aimed at establishing a security pact for Arab states only, based on the Arab League. This 
would enable the Arab states to form a bloc with a presumably unified policy towards the 
Western powers, Israel, and the Soviet Union. The intention was to secure a leading 
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position for Egypt in the Arab League and to enable Cairo to negotiate with Britain over 
the future of the Suez Canal base from a position of strength.102  Egypt had as early as the 
fall of 1949 presented a plan for the formation of an Arab League Collective Security 
Pact. One reason for the Pact was Egypt’s rivalry with Iraq for the leadership of the Arab 
world, focused at the time on Syria. As a result of this power struggle Nuri proposed as 
an alternative, a treaty between the Arab states and the Western powers. At the same time 
the Iraqi Prime Minister put forward a plan for a reorganization of the Arab League, the 
purpose of which was to reduce the powers of the League’s Egyptian Secretary. Nuri 
eventually relented and signed the Collective Security Pact in 1951, since a failure to 
accept the Pact would have meant political isolation for Iraq.103       
   As a result of their preoccupation with security the two Western powers rated as lesser 
priorities nationalism, Israel, and economic considerations, thereby alienating the 
Egyptian revolutionary leaders. An important objective of the Western powers’ plan for a 
Middle East Defense Organization was to include all states in the region.104 The idea of 
an all-encompassing pact with Israel as a member suggests that the Western scheme was 
not well thought out since it obviously disregarded the tension between Israel and the 
Arab states, and regarded Arab-Israeli peace as plausible. With hundreds of thousands of 
Palestinian refugees dispersed over the Arab world it would have been very difficult for 
any Arab leader, especially for Nasser who was perceived by many Arabs as the foremost 
champion of the Arab cause, to sign a peace treaty with Israel unless the refugees were 
allowed to return. Israel’s refusal to contemplate such a resolution to the Israeli-
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Palestinian question meant that any Arab proposal short of return for the Palestinian 
refugees would have been tantamount to political suicide for a moderate Arab leader such 
as Nuri, had he presented such a proposal. In the view of the Western powers, one way to 
achieve peace, or at least create a less volatile situation in the Middle East was the 
Tripartite Declaration of 1950, which stipulated control of Western arms transfers to 
Israel and the Arab states.105 As with the other Western plans, the Declaration was 
unsuccessful.   
     When Dwight D. Eisenhower succeeded Harry Truman as President in 1953, the new 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, visited the Middle East in order to acquaint 
himself with the issues of the region. The conclusions Dulles drew during his visit are 
somewhat surprising, particularly in the context of later U.S. policies in this part of the 
world. Generally speaking, Dulles’s perception of potential threats accorded the role of 
most likely aggressor to the Soviet Union, which was the rationale for the proposed 
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Western defense pacts. He found, however, that the world looked very different from a 
Middle Eastern perspective: 
(1) Most of the peoples of the Near East…are deeply concerned about political 
independence for themselves and others. They are suspicious of colonial powers. 
(2) A Middle East Defense Organization is a future rather than an immediate 
possibility. Many of the Arab League countries are so engrossed with their 
quarrels with Israel or with Great Britain or France that they pay little heed to the 
menace of Soviet communism. (3) In general, the northern tier of nations shows 
awareness of the danger…106  
 
emanating from their northern neighbor, are more concerned about potential Soviet 
aggression, and would not oppose accession to a Western defense organization.107 Points 
1 and 2 of Dulles’s analysis are surprisingly accurate, and point 1 also free of Cold War 
rhetoric. 
     Dulles’s analysis is perceptive, but what makes it truly remarkable is the fact that two 
years later the Secretary of State ignored his own still valid conclusions. Dulles had 
correctly identified several factors of great importance in Middle Eastern politics in the 
early 1950s: Arab nationalism, the wish to pursue independent policies, anti-colonialism, 
the perception of Israel as the foremost threat to Arab security, the awareness in the 
Northern Tier nations of a Soviet threat, and hence their willingness to accede to a 
Western defense pact.108 To a certain extent Dulles heeded his own advice, since only the 
Northern Tier joined the Baghdad Pact. The problem was, however, that Prime Minister 
Nuri al-Sa‘id, Iraq’s foremost statesman, took Iraq, as the only Arab country, into the 
Pact, which polarized the Middle East political discourse in the extreme, making a united 
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regional stance against Soviet influence impossible. The West did not even achieve unity 
within the Pact itself due to the strong opposition against it among Iraqi politicians and 
intellectuals.109 Being an astute politician Nuri must have realized that his decision would 
provoke Iraqi intellectuals and his political opponents. The Prime Minister believed, 
however, that he had good reasons for acceding to the Pact. He had seen in 1953 how, in 
his, Eisenhower’s, and Churchill’s view, Iran had been on the verge of being taken over 
by communists in the Musaddeq era. This had convinced him that communism 
represented the greatest danger to Iraq, that protection against a communist attack could 
not be insured by the Arab League or by neutrality, and that the only option for Iraq and 
the Middle East, in his judgment, was close cooperation with the West.110                       
     An objective high on Nasser’s revolutionary agenda was to put an end to the British 
military presence in Egypt, a constant reminder of Britain’s imperialist past. Difficult 
negotiations between the two countries over the future of the Suez Canal base eventually 
resulted in the signing of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Evacuation on July 27, 1954. The 
Treaty stipulated that Britain withdraw her troops in the Canal Zone by spring of 1956 
and that she have right of access for an additional seven years to the huge system of bases 
in the Zone in the event of a military attack on a Middle Eastern country.111 The British 
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were reluctant to give up their strategic bases, but believed a treaty with Egypt might 
result in some form of Egyptian association with a Western-sponsored collective security 
pact, a possibility which nourished hopes in London of a continued British role in the 
Middle East.   
     According to a telegram to the Foreign Office from the Embassy in Cairo  
[t]here is however a possibility that our relations with Egypt and the other Arab 
States may improve considerably once the Suez question is settled, and that it may 
therefore be possible to revive the M.E.D.O. [Middle East Defence Organization] 
scheme, perhaps in some rather different form. This foundered before mainly on 
the Arabs’ refusal to accept the scheme while the Suez question remained 
unsettled, though they also stated that a satisfactory settlement of the Palestine 
question would be a condition of their acceptance… It therefore seems that there 
is a remote possibility that an agreement with Egypt will eventually allow us to 
make progress towards the erection of a Middle East collective defence 
organization.112 
    
Considering that a “satisfactory settlement” of the Palestine question meant the return of 
Palestinian refugees to their old homes in Israel the most appropriate way to measure the 
possibility of Egyptian accession to a West-sponsored defense organization would have 
been in geologic time, since Israeli leaders had already stated unequivocally that they had 
no intention of letting tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees return to Israel.113 The 
British assessment of a “remote possibility” must therefore be considered somewhat 
optimistic.     
     The reason the British wished to remain in the Canal Zone was that they were 
convinced that an evacuation would considerably weaken their strategic position in the 
Middle East. First, Britain would no longer be in a position to re-deploy troops at short 
notice from the Canal Zone to the Persian Gulf, Aden, and East Africa due to “loss of 
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control over refueling stations, as well as the restrictions of overflying rights.”114 This in 
turn would also affect “the deployment of short-range fighter aircraft.”115 Second, 
London was concerned that a British withdrawal from Suez would increase tension 
between Tel Aviv and the Arab capitals and spark an arms race between the two sides.116 
Third, a top secret paper circulated by the Middle East Joint Headquarters states that if 
the British Government continued “to regard the Middle East as an area of vital 
importance to our interests” Britain’s strategic objectives in the region “must be:”117 
(a) to maintain and strengthen the influence and position which we have at great 
cost built up over the years and thus support our widespread political and 
commercial interests;” 
“(b) to provide the nucleus for a successful defence of the area in war, to preserve 
the right flank of NATO, and to be in a position to fulfill our Treaty obligations in 
Iraq, Jordan, Libya and the Persian Sheikhdoms.118    
 
The secret paper demonstrates how crucial the Canal Zone Base in Egypt was to Britain’s 
strategic position in the Middle East and that lost access to the base would seriously 
weaken the British position in the region and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 
right flank.  
     This chapter has argued so far that the United States and Britain in their Cold War zeal 
to establish an anti-Soviet collective security system in the Middle East downplayed or 
completely disregarded the largely predictable impact local threat perceptions and the 
intensity of Arab nationalism would have on such efforts. In certain cases policymakers 
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in Washington and London disregarded their own analyses, such as that of John Foster 
Dulles, and the warnings of a small number of their own diplomats in the region. A 
policy less focused on the ideological and strategic East-West conflict and more 
perceptive with regard to the legacy of British imperialism, American support for Israel, 
and covert C.I.A. operations in the Middle East, such as the 1953 C.I.A.-sponsored 
overthrow of the Musaddeq government in Iran, might have yielded a political climate of 
cooperation in this part of the world. Division was, however, not introduced by the West 
into the Middle East, although Western powers were to a certain degree responsible for 
the increased intensity of Arab discord. Traditional Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry, inflexibility on 
the part of national leaders, and diametrically opposed threat perceptions greatly 
contributed to the division in the Arab world, and the strident tone in Egyptian-Iraqi 
relations. Finally, international and regional politics in which Nuri was involved also had 
an impact on the domestic situation in Iraq to the extent that the prime minister’s 
unpopular foreign policy resulted in an acrimonious domestic relationship between the 
regime and the political opposition in Iraq. This was also a manifestation of historical 
continuity with precedents in the early 1940s.119  
 
The Baghdad Pact  
      A meeting in Cairo on September 14, 1954, at which Nuri had informed Nasser of his 
intention to sign a security cooperation agreement with Turkey and the Western powers 
later resulted in increased tension between Egypt and Iraq. Departing the Egyptian capital 
Nuri had had the impression that Nasser, in view of Iraq’s special position (of being more 
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exposed than other Arab states to the possibility of a Soviet attack), had not objected to 
his plans.120  Needless to say, the Egyptian account of the meeting was very different. 
The Egyptians claimed that Nasser had rejected cooperation with the West and asked 
Nuri to postpone the signing for two years.121 It is surprising that the two men came away 
from the meeting with diametrically opposite interpretations of what the other party had 
said. The possibility of a language problem can easily be dismissed since Nasser and Nuri 
must have communicated in Modern Standard Arabic (the language educated Arabs from 
different parts of the Arab world use to communicate with one another) and not in the 
Egyptian and Iraqi dialect. It is highly unlikely that Nasser would have sanctioned Iraqi 
membership in the Baghdad Pact, since this would have violated one of his basic 
principles, namely to keep non-Arab powers out of any collective Arab security pact.  
     There were other weighty reasons for Nasser not to accept Iraqi membership in the 
Baghdad Pact. At the time of the Cairo meeting it was more or less clear to Nasser that 
the West would not supply the weapons he was convinced he needed to defend Egypt and 
the Arab world against Israeli attacks. Consequently, in Nasser’s view, there was not 
much incentive for him or any other Arab leader to join a Western security pact, since the 
Western powers would not provide arms which could be used against Israel. Accordingly, 
it appears highly unlikely that Nasser would have approved of Iraqi membership in the 
Baghdad Pact. A possibility is that Nasser and Nuri used circuitous and imprecise 
language during their talk and that this left what exactly they had agreed upon open to 
interpretation. The advantage of such an approach was that it left both leaders some 
leeway to maneuver without locking them into fixed positions. Another possibility is that 
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Nasser and Nuri spoke their mind, disagreed sharply on the Baghdad Pact, and decided to 
exploit the situation, each one to his own advantage. As it happens, the Baghdad Pact 
turned out to be the most divisive issue in the Arab world in the mid-1950s. 
     The deep division among the Arab states in the mid-1950s did, however, not originate 
with the formation of the Baghdad Pact. The tendency towards a division of the Arab 
world in two camps had begun prior to the signing of the Turco-Iraqi Pact on February 
24, 1955 with the Iraqi-Egyptian rivalry for leadership in the Arab world. Nuri al-Sa‘id’s 
efforts to create a defense organization including Western, Arab, and the Northern Tier 
(Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan), however, greatly intensified the Iraqi-Egyptian rivalry, 
since such an organization would marginalize Egypt.122 Nasser had made clear at an early 
stage that he opposed Middle Eastern collective security arrangements which included 
non-Arab states.123 Nuri’s push for the formation of the Baghdad Pact would guarantee a 
leading role for Iraq in the region unless Nasser acted quickly. Nuri for his part was to a 
certain extent driven by similar fears—he had to act expeditiously to prevent Nasser from 
establishing Egypt as the leading power in the Middle East.124 As a preparation for the 
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signing of the Turco-Iraqi Pact Nuri severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union 
on January 3, 1955, thereby unnecessarily alienating a great power. The Iraqi prime 
minister was the only head of government in the Northern Tier who took such an extreme 
step. Nuri’s action confirmed to Moscow that the Pact was directed against the Soviet 
Union.125 It is possible Nuri believed he would impress his allies by breaking relations 
with the U.S.S.R.    
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     It appears that Nuri had serious concerns about Egyptian reactions to the Turco-Iraqi 
Pact. Ahmad Mukhtar Baban, the last prime minister of Iraq before the revolution, states 
in his memoirs that Nuri al-Sa‘id had second thoughts about the Baghdad Pact project. 
Nuri “explained to Menderes that he had agreed with Abdul Nasser that Egypt be part of 
any agreement between Iraq and Turkey and he added that he feared that any separate 
agreement between Iraq and Turkey would anger Egypt and lead to a misunderstanding 
between him and Abdul Nasser.”126 Menderes had disagreed, however, and pressed 
vigorously for a Turco-Iraqi pact. Baban’s account appears to lend support to the 
argument that Iraqi-Egyptian rivalry was not a significant factor in the formation of the 
Baghdad Pact, but most likely the traditional Iraqi-Egyptian rivalry played a certain role 
in Nuri’s strategic thinking, since the Pact meant that Iraq would have allies both among 
Western powers and the Northern Tier states, while Nasser had no such friends. In Nuri’s 
mind the Pact was indubitably not just a security arrangement, but an alliance which 
would enhance Iraq’s regional and international status as well. These considerations 
certainly played an important role during the negotiations for the Baghdad Pact, even if 
Nuri was concerned about Egyptian reactions.  
     The signing of the Turco-Iraqi Agreement on February 24, 1955 and the formation of 
the West-sponsored Baghdad Pact was a catalyst for a number of subsequent 
developments in the Middle East such as the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi alliance. In response 
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to the Turco-Iraqi Pact of February 1955, Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia formed an 
alliance in March 1955, which was further consolidated with a unified Egyptian-Syrian 
command in October the same year. The alliance was a propaganda victory for Nasser 
and resulted in Iraq’s isolation in the Arab world, since Nuri failed to persuade any Arab 
state to accede to the Baghdad Pact. The Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi alliance was, however, 
successful neither in the military nor the economic field, since its main purpose was to 
prevent Syria from acceding to the Baghdad Pact, an objective which it indeed 
achieved.127  
     A second consequence of the formation of the Baghdad Pact was the Czech arms deal. 
Nasser had previously repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to purchase arms he 
believed he needed from the West.128 When the Israeli attack on Gaza came a few days 
after the signing of the Turco-Iraqi Pact it exposed Egypt’s military weakness and 
underscored the need to turn elsewhere to acquire weapons to defend Egypt.129 An 
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opportunity was offered in April at the Bandung Conference when Nasser asked Chinese 
Premier Zhou Enlai to convey to the Soviet Union a request for arms. The request was 
granted by Moscow.130 Nasser would have preferred to purchase Western arms, however, 
and informed U.S. Ambassador Byroade of the Soviet offer, probably in the hope that the 
Americans would have a change of heart regarding the moratorium on arms transfers to 
Egypt.131 Dulles believed that both Nasser and the Russians were bluffing and dispatched 
the C.I.A. official Kermit Roosevelt to Cairo in September 1955 to convey to the 
Egyptian president that the United states might have to sever diplomatic relations with 
Egypt or impose an economic blockade if the Egyptians followed through with the arms 
deal.132 The British Ambassador Sir Ralph Stevenson also warned Nasser that an arms 
deal with the Soviet bloc would have dangerous consequences.133   
     Dulles’s decision to exercise pressure on Nasser and even to threaten him with serious 
consequences revealed that the American Secretary of State was not well informed about 
the Egyptian leader’s personality and that Dulles disregarded his own analysis of 1953 of 
political sentiments in the Middle East in favor of ideological considerations. Nasser was 
clearly under great pressure in 1955 to counter what he perceived as a three-pronged 
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threat emanating from the Western powers, Israel, and Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad 
Pact. For Dulles in such a situation to resort to threats in order to eliminate what the 
Egyptian leader viewed as the only remaining option open to him to protect Egyptian 
national security interests—the purchase of arms from Czechoslovakia—only increased 
Nasser’s recalcitrance with respect to Western pressure.134 The issue of arms transfers to 
Egypt, became a major problem in the eyes of the Western powers, since it opened the 
door to a Soviet presence in the Middle East. Conversely, the possession of modern arms 
in his military arsenal was a sine qua non to Nasser, since he believed he would not be 
able to play the leading role in the Arab political arena without modern military 
equipment.  Nasser had from early on evinced a wish to cooperate with the West in return 
for Western arms, a reasonable proposal in Nasser’s view, but unacceptable to the 
Western powers. The reason is that the latter would then have had to supply at least the 
same, and probably more weapons to Israel, which in turn would have angered the Arab 
states, triggered further requests for arms, and increased the risk of a new Arab-Israeli 
military conflict.    
     The above discussion of the Baghdad Pact has yielded the conclusion that the 
decision-making processes in Cairo, Baghdad, Washington, and London were similar in 
one respect. Egyptian, Iraqi, American, and British leaders alike made decisions 
frequently based on ideological considerations. This does not mean that economic and 
political considerations were not important. The argument advanced here, merely 
contends that the ideological-strategic dimension was the only consideration which was 
important in all four capitals with regard to Middle Eastern policies.   In Washington and 
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London policies towards the Middle East were invariably formulated against the 
backdrop of the ongoing ideological-strategic conflict with the Soviet Union. In Baghdad 
decisions were made on the basis of ideology and Nuri’s dream of the Fertile Crescent 
project and Iraqi leadership in the Arab world.135 Finally, in Cairo Nasser was guided in 
his decision-making by his pan-Arab outlook, concerns about decisions which might 
prove detrimental to his standing in the Arab world, and his conviction that non-
alignment was the true path for the Arab states. All four parties evinced lack of flexibility 
for the above reasons but it appears that Dulles’s, Eden’s, and Nuri’s strong urge to 
punish the trouble-maker in Cairo for breaking ranks with the Western powers over 
which policies were in the best interests of the Arab world was an important reason for 
the subsequent crisis in the relations between Egypt and the Western powers.  
     Not every diplomat in the State Department and the Foreign Office, however, was 
convinced of the wisdom of U.S. and British policies towards the Middle East. Unlike 
Dulles, the American Ambassador to Cairo, Byroade, argued that the Czech arms deal 
should not be viewed in terms of the East-West ideological conflict, but as a necessary 
initiative for domestic reasons.136 The British Ambassador to Syria, F. G.  K. Gallagher, 
also saw the increasing Soviet influence in the Middle East from a perspective which 
differed from the official line. Gallagher argued that  
Communism is generally considered in Syria as a lesser danger than a) Israel and 
b) ‘colonialism.’ It is exactly the part played by the West in the Palestine question 
which has been the principal cause in Syria for the growth of sympathy with the 
Soviet Union…[I]t has certainly been of great service to the local Communist 
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Party in enabling it to appeal on patriotic grounds to an audience to whom the 
doctrinaire aspects of Communism have little attraction.137.     
 
The irony here is that the policies adopted by the United States and Britain towards the 
region resulted in exactly what they were meant to prevent: they created support for the 
Soviet Union among people who were not communists.      
     Could policies based to a lesser extent on ideological considerations have yielded less 
tension? Such policies would certainly have produced a less confrontational approach to 
Nasser, but would still most likely not have fulfilled all the wishes of Nuri, Dulles, and 
Eden. The analysis above suggests that the principal mistake of the Western powers in 
formulating policies towards the Middle East was their failure or reluctance to view 
Nasser as a representative of a new tier of nations, the products of the decolonization 
process, which had acquired a new momentum after World War II. Despite their intense 
ideological conflict with the Soviet Union, the Western powers might have given greater 
consideration to the strong natural urge of nations recently granted independence, to 
pursue policies, which were not formulated in London, Paris, or Washington.  
     Could a more psychologically sensitive American and British approach to Nasser have 
excluded the Soviet Union from playing a role in Middle Eastern affairs? The West’s 
support of Israel and the large number of Palestinian refugees would sooner or later have 
lead to an enhanced role in the region for the USSR. The record of the actual policies 
adopted, however, is unequivocal: they considerably aggravated tensions in the Middle 
East, alienated Arab nationalists, and enabled the Soviet Union to establish a strong 
presence in the Arab world. Had less confrontational policies been adopted by the West, 
the intensity of the East-West rivalry in the region could probably have been reduced, and 
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reoriented from an ideological and security conflict to a rivalry in terms of trade, and 
educational and cultural influence. The Western powers with their superior resources 
would have been at an advantage in such competition, had they adopted truly egalitarian 
principles in their dealings with Middle Eastern countries and not prioritized their own 
interests over those of the states in the region.  
     There appears to have been lost opportunities with regard to East-West relations in the 
1950s following the end of the Stalin era. Had the United States and Britain pursued such 
policies as discussed above and attempted to achieve some form of cooperation with the 
new leaders in the Kremlin following Stalin’s death—instead of simply continuing 
policies laid down during the Stalin era—it is possible that a four-party agreement on a 
moratorium on arms transfers to the Middle East could have been reached with the Soviet 
Union. In February 1956 Khrushchev had stated that the Soviet Union should sell arms to 
the Middle Eastern states which wished to purchase Soviet arms, since the West supplied 
members of the Baghdad Pact with military aid. At the same time, however, he indicated 
that the Soviet Union would accept a moratorium on arms transfers to the Middle East, if 
this could be arranged with the West.138 The United States failed to explore whether 
Khrushchev was serious about this proposal, the reason most likely being that 
Washington wanted to maintain the paramount Western position in the Middle East and 
exclude the Soviet Union from playing any role at all in the region, even at the expense of 
peace. It appears that such an international understanding, if enforced by the parties to the 
agreement, would have been the best policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict short of an 
actual peace treaty.  
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     The argument laid out above will most likely be dismissed as utopian by some 
scholars. Most analysts will probably contend that foreign relations, and by implication 
diplomacy, are determined by national interest. The point here, however, is that national 
interest is the end, and that there is normally a number of paths leading to the same goal. 
Policymakers thus usually have a choice between employing means which will possibly 
achieve the objectives with a minimum of negative consequences, and employing ways to 
reach the same goal but with a negative fallout. In the case of the Middle East, British 
and American policies in the 1950s frequently belonged in the second category as argued 
in this chapter. America’s standing in the Middle East prior to the U.S. support for the 
creation of the state of Israel in 1948 was positive and therefore strong. Unlike Great 
Britain, the United States was seen as a benevolent power which played an important role 
in education and health care by running institutions of higher learning and hospitals. 
Furthermore, America was in the early twentieth century perceived by Iran and later by 
the population in former Ottoman provinces, who was placed under the mandates of 
Britain and France, as a power which could protect Iran against the imperialist policies of 
Britain and Russia. Furthermore, the Arabs in the former Ottoman Empire regarded the 
United States as a power which would be a much better trustee than France and Britain. 
This shows that the U.S. presence in the Middle East prior to the creation of Israel and 
other policies analyzed above was perceived as something positive.  
     The overarching argument advanced in this chapter is that events which transpired in 
the Middle East in the 1950s reflected a historical continuum. The developments 
discussed above therefore did not constitute a clear break with earlier historical 
processes, such as imperialism, nationalism, and cooperation among non-Western states. 





What differed from previous eras was rather the intensity of these forces in the context of 
decolonization and the Cold War. Not even the creation of the state of Israel—by all 
appearances a new element in Middle Eastern developments—constituted a break with 
previous historical processes, since it was largely a manifestation of a Western presence 
in the region which had begun much earlier. Cooperation across borders among Muslims 
had occurred in the nineteenth century when Jamal al-Din al-Afghani had spread ideas of 
cooperation against Britain from India to the Ottoman Empire, and during and after 
World War I in the form of the Khilafat movement. Finally, Soviet policies towards the 
Middle East in the 1940s and 1950s reflected earlier Tsarist aspirations to establish a 


















INDEPENDENT IRAQ AND NURI AL-SA‘ID—DOMESTIC POLICY (1) 
 
This chapter primarily addresses three questions, the answers to which partly help explain 
why a revolutionary situation developed over time in Iraqi society and eventually erupted 
in a revolution in 1958: (1) To what extent were British and American diplomats aware 
of the social and political problems Iraq was facing in the 1950s? (2) What was Nuri al-
Sa‘id’s reading of the social, economic, and political situation in Iraq in the period 
preceding the Revolution? (3) How did Nuri respond to opposition? Was brutal force 
simply a predictable reaction on his part, or did he also apply more subtle methods in 
dealing with his political opponents? Following a brief examination of the Mandate 
period, a detailed analysis of the situation in Iraqi cities as well as in the rural areas will 
provide some of the data necessary to address the above questions. The three questions 
posed above are important because they will establish whether British and U.S. policies 
in Iraq were based on available intelligence, and what might be the reason if they were 
not. Nuri’s reading of the situation in Iraq and his approach to political dissent will go a 
long way to explain his domestic policies.   
     The argument with regard to the quality of British and American intelligence on the 
pre-revolutionary situation in Iraq will in part be based on whether the findings presented 
suggest that the Western powers “ought to” have realized how serious the situation was in 
Iraq. The second question above, regarding Nuri’s reading of Iraq’s domestic situation, 
raises the question of his assessment of the strength of the opposition to his regime. The 
omnipresent Criminal Investigation Department, Iraq’s secret police, provided Nuri, on a 





regular basis, with detailed intelligence on any manifestations of dissent and opposition 
in Iraq. Consequently, in his case the question of why he interpreted the disturbing 
intelligence which was available to him the way he did, is of much greater relevance for 
the present analysis than whether he was aware of the consequences of his policies. The 
third question, how Nuri dealt with political opposition, like the second, has implications 
for Nuri’s political legacy, since the answer might depict him in a somewhat more 
favorable light than simply as an extremely authoritarian politician ready to resort to 
force at the slightest provocation.  
     
The League of Nations Mandate and Nuri’s Early Career   
     The Iraqi monarchy was created by the British on August 23, 1921. Following a few 
years of occupation during and after World War II the three former Ottoman vilayets, 
provinces, of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul were combined into a new state established as a 
British mandate by the League of Nations.139 Britain introduced a form of parliamentary 
system with Faisal I as King. A Hijazi by birth, Faisal had fought on the side of the 
British against the Ottoman Empire in World War I to liberate Arab provinces under 
Ottoman control. Following an unsuccessful attempt to establish himself as king of an 
independent Syrian state consisting of the Ottoman vilayet of Damascus, Faisal had been 
compelled to pull out of Syria in 1920 when the French army had moved in to set up the 
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mandate which had been assigned to France by the League of Nations.140 The following 
year he had been offered the throne of Iraq by the British.141  
     The British mandate over Iraq was established by the League of Nations, since the 
Iraqis were not considered by the great powers at the Paris Peace Conference to possess 
sufficient political maturity to govern themselves, a fact which guaranteed Iraqi 
dependence on Britain even after independence. The Iraqis gradually learned to use the 
system to their own advantage, however, to eventually terminate the mandate enabling 
their country to become a member of the League of Nations in 1932.142 Iraq’s 
independence was merely relative, however, in the sense that the former mandatory 
power retained a high military, political, and administrative profile in the new state, 
having made the signing of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 a precondition for 
independence. The Treaty granted Britain, for the period of twenty-five years, inter alia, 
the right to maintain air bases in Iraq and provided for British access to Iraqi territory in 
times of war.143 The system which had been introduced by the British under the mandate 
thus enabled them to exercise influence in Iraq even after independence in 1932. As a 
result, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and subsequent attempts to replace it with other treaties, 
such as the Portsmouth Treaty of 1948 and the Baghdad Pact of 1955, were vilified by 
many Iraqis as colonial infringements on Iraq’s status as an independent state.    
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     The history of pre-revolutionary Iraq is intimately linked to the public career of Nuri 
al-Sa‘id, Iraq’s foremost statesman. A brief introduction to the life of this both 
remarkable and hated man will therefore be useful for understanding his policies in the 
period between 1955 and 1958. Nuri’s military background—he had attended military 
schools in Baghdad and the Military College in Istanbul in his youth—the fact that his 
father was a prominent Ottoman civil servant in Baghdad, and that Nuri was conversant 
in Turkish, English, French, and German in addition to his native Arabic, made him well 
prepared for a prominent government career. When the British occupied Basra during 
World War I, Nuri, as an Ottoman officer was convalescing in hospital. He was taken 
prisoner and moved to India. In 1915 the British decided that he could be of use for the 
Arab Revolt of 1916-1918 and sent him to Cairo. He served as Deputy Commander in 
Chief of the Arab army under Faisal during the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire 
in World War I. He later traveled to the Paris Peace Conference with Faisal’s delegation 
to argue for independence for the liberated former Ottoman Arab territories. Between 
1921 and 1930, when Nuri was first appointed prime minister, he organized the Iraqi 
police force, the Iraqi Army, and the Ministry of Defense. Nuri’s political career—he 
served fourteen times as prime minister between 1930 and the Revolution of 1958—
testifies to his unique role in forming the policies of his country together with Crown 
Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah.144      
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     During World War I and the mandate period the British had put into operation in Iraq 
a legal system which effectively divided the population into two parts, and a 
parliamentary system which did not allow direct balloting. For one part of the population 
justice was administered according to the Baghdad Penal Code, and for another part the 
Tribal Law was applied.145 The latter had been modeled after a similar law the British 
applied in India to the tribal areas there.146 Furthermore, the British enabled tribal leaders 
to acquire what had hitherto been communal lands, thus guaranteeing the support of a 
class of landowners, while perpetuating the iqta‘, the semi-feudal system prevalent in 
Iraq’s tribal areas.147 The mandate also introduced a parliament, consisting of a senate 
and a chamber of deputies, into Iraqi political life. This legislative body, however, had 
little resemblance to the British parliament, since the deputies were selected by the 
government and by indirect balloting, thus depriving the Iraqi people of a direct role in 
electing their political representatives. As a result the Chamber of Deputies was made up 
of  “tribal shaykhs, aghas, and town politicians who had been sympathetic to British 
                                                          
145 Caractacus (Norman Daniel.), Revolution in Iraq: An Essay in Comparative Public Opinion (London: 
Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1959), p. 37. “Caractacus” was the pseudonym used by Norman Daniel for his book 
Revolution in Iraq.   
146 Caractacus (Daniel), Revolution in Iraq, p. 38. The so-called “Tribal Criminal and Disputes Regulation” 
had been drawn up by Henry Robert Conway Dobbs, and was modeled on the Indian Frontier Crimes 
Regulation. Dobbs had previously served as Revenue and Judicial Commissioner to Baluchistan. He served 
as High Commissioner to Iraq in 1923-1929. The administrative system used in the Iraqi tribal areas—
based on the central role of the tribal shaikhs—was an adaptation of that developed by Sir Robert 
Sandeman in Baluchistan in 1875. Ireland states that this system “gave little opportunity for the operation 
of civilizing processes, for the growth of less primitive social codes and of more progressive forms of 
government. The system in ‘Iraq tended to become a method of control rather than a system of government 
in its broadest sense,” Ireland, Iraq: A Study, pp. 85-86, 89, 94-95.  
147 By virtue of this system the tribesmen were turned into “debt-bonded serfs” of the shaikhs, effectively 
separating the economy in the tribal areas from that of the rest of the country. The system tended “to 
generate severe distortions in the country’s economic and political systems…”, Marion Farouk-Sluglett and 
Peter Sluglett. “The Transformation of Land tenure and Rural Social Structure in Central and Southern 
Iraq, c. 1870-1958,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 15, 1983, p. 491, quoted in Simons, Iraq: 
From Sumer to Saddam, p. 210. The iqta‘ was a semi-feudal system, which made the fallahin completely 
dependent on tribal shaikhs. The latter were, after the arrival of the British, more or less in a position where 
they controlled tribal lands as their personal property.  





rule”148 In summary, the legal and political systems introduced by the British insured that 
economic, legal, and political power was concentrated in the hands of a small number of 
individuals.  
     The political, economic and legal systems introduced by the British during the 
occupation of the Ottoman vilayets in World War I and also during the mandate period in 
the 1920s were more or less still in place in the 1950s. As to the Chamber of Deputies the 
population had been given a certain role in electing the deputies, but the government was 
in a strong position to influence the election process thus insuring that “undesirable” 
deputies were barred from the Chamber, a method which Nuri al-Sa‘id had applied in the 
elections to a new parliament in 1954.149 The legal, economic, and political system the 
British had put in place during the mandate thus guaranteed a continued British influence 
in the post-mandate period, since it created an oligarchic class of landowners and 
politicians who owed their social standing to Britain. Finally, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 
1930, which took effect upon the League of Nations’ recognition of Iraq’s independence 
in 1932, also guaranteed that the close ties between Britain and Iraq established in the 
1920s would continue, albeit in a modified form, in the post-mandate period. With the 
introduction of the above systems the British had placed instruments in the hands of a 
limited circle of individuals who were thus able to perpetuate their hold on power 
throughout the pre-revolutionary era.   
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The Situation in the Cities 
     During the post-World War II period social strife in the cities was a serious problem to 
the regime. The huge numbers of poor peasants and farm laborers leaving the semi-feudal 
conditions in the rural areas in search of a better future in Iraq’s urban centers put a 
serious strain on city administrations and the clearly insufficient construction of new 
housing, in particular in Baghdad. As a result most poor migrants ended up settling in 
sarifas, slums, which were periodically flooded by the Tigris, and where the squalid 
conditions posed a serious health hazard to the inhabitants.150 Furthermore, this situation 
posed a potential security problem to the authorities.151 The difficult social conditions in 
combination with high inflation, shortages in staple and consumer goods in the 1940s and 
1950s, and restrictions on political activity and civil liberties had resulted in student 
demonstrations and workers’ strikes, which had in turn led to further political 
repression.152 The periods of repression had often coincided with Nuri’s terms as prime 
minister and had sometimes been succeeded or preceded by periods of more liberal 
policies when he was out of office.  
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     A contributing factor to the increasingly repressive measures against all political 
opposition in the 1950s was increasing oil revenues. Putting the national oil wealth to use 
for the benefit of the whole of Iraq by initiating government-sponsored projects was a 
praiseworthy endeavor. The 1952 Oil Treaty between Iraq and the Iraq Petroleum 
Company introduced a 50:50 profit basis. The increasing revenues from the petroleum 
industry had a serious drawback, however—they made the regime less dependent on 
raising taxes, and more impervious to the criticism of the political opposition.153 
Increasing oil revenues thus made the Iraqi Government less inclined to encourage 
popular participation, since the steady flow of oil revenues kept the government coffers 
filled to the brim. 
     With the increasing opposition over time to Nuri’s policies came more repressive 
measures. This was a favorite approach of Nuri’s to dealing with a difficult situation, 
although his absence from power did not mean absence of repression. Incarceration was, 
however, not necessarily always Nuri’s initial first choice in response to opposition. He 
often tried co-optation first, and only then applied various forms of pressure when the 
former did not work. He had a strong belief in co-optation and often sent gifts to political 
opponents whose support he solicited, thereby revealing, according to one scholar, the 
profound impact of Ottoman traditions on Nuri in his formative years.154 During a two-
year period while Nuri was out of office a violent uprising, the intifadha of 1952, erupted 
after the Regent ‘Abd al-Ilah had decided to ignore the opposition’s demand that the head 
of state reign but not rule, that civil liberties be granted to the Iraqis, and that a system of 
direct elections replace the old electoral system, which made rigged elections possible. 
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The opposition had also demanded that the regime’s close ties to the West be replaced by 
a policy of nonalignment.155 The ensuing uprising in Baghdad was crushed at the end of 
November of 1952 after communist demonstrators had burned the United States 
Information Service library, and police had shot and killed eighteen protesters the 
following day. The intifadha was a clear statement of opposition to ‘Abd al-Ilah’s 
policies, and the demands of the political parties an unequivocal indication of the wishes 
of the population.   
     Nuri’s absence from power and the intifadha had led to certain successes for the 
opposition parties during Prime Minister Nur al-Din Mahmud’s term in office, but these 
achievements were eliminated as soon as Nuri returned to office. When martial law, 
imposed almost a year earlier, was lifted in October 1953 strikes soon erupted and new 
disturbances took place. Elections were held in June of 1954 and the opposition, united in 
the National Front, succeeded in getting eleven of its candidates elected to the 
Parliament. The regent invited Nuri al-Sa‘id to form a new government and one of his 
first acts was to dissolve the new Parliament and hold new elections in September to 
create a more malleable legislative body, which he did by rigging the polls.156 Nuri’s 
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further actions during his sixteen-month term in office, August 1954-December 1955, 
were to cancel all freedoms restored in 1953, ban political parties, cultural clubs, trade 
unions, place restrictions on the press, and clamp down on communists.157 Naturally, 
such acts did not endear him to political opponents, the intelligentsia, and workers.  
     Rigged elections and increasing repression resulted in reduced popular trust in the 
political system. A British Embassy report of 1956 reflects how serious the situation was:  
[O]pposition from various quarters is becoming slowly but surely more critical 
as the restrictions placed on its liberties become more irksome. It is encouraged 
by the fact that the elections for the present Parliament in September, 1954, had 
been even more blatantly rigged than usual, and by the belief that the present 
landowners in Parliament would effectively block any kind of reform which 
might weaken their powers, while the Government were not able, or willing, to 
force their hands.158      
     
This British report has correctly identified the political and social ills of the country and 
serves as further evidence of the fact that British and American diplomats were well 
informed of the difficult situation in Iraqi cities and the activities of the opposition in 
response to Nuri al-Sa‘id’s policies.  
 
The Situation in the Countryside                  
     The poor conditions in the cities were matched by those in the rural areas, to which 
fact testifies the migration of destitute peasants and farm laborers to Iraq’s urban centers. 
This situation continued due to the lack of interest on the part of the regime in enforcing a 
law passed in 1951, providing for the distribution of unoccupied state lands to peasants 
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who were also to receive state grants. A further problem was depletion of the soil owing 
to inadequate irrigation.159 Also, the existence of the twentieth century iqta‘ system in 
Iraq’s rural areas, a semi-feudal system, exacerbated lax government policies, since it 
served as a more or less insurmountable obstacle to the introduction of a system which 
would reduce the power of the shaikhs and large landowners. Finally, the low 
productivity of and labor-intensive methods employed by iqta‘ seriously impeded 
industrial development, while putting a damper on the growth of a consumer market and 
a home market for local industry.160 The iqta‘iyya was thus the main reason for the poor 
conditions in rural areas and constituted the primary obstacle to development in the 
agricultural sector.    
     Large landholders completely dominated economic life in the countryside. This fact is 
reflected by the following statistics: on the eve of the Revolution 67.1 percent of 
registered land in Iraq was owned by landlords in the form of estates of over 1,000 
dunums (approximately 600 acres), while only 15.7 percent of the land was owned by 
peasants with up to 100 dunums (approximately 60 acres); despite the law of 1951 
referred to above, the majority of the rural population of 3.8 million owned no land.161 On 
occasion the peasants rebelled against these conditions, “but on the whole they were 
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passive, inarticulate, resigned and apathetic…”162 The problem of landownership, 
however, persisted even after July 14, 1958 with 3,400 large estates making up two-thirds 
of the cultivable land and 50 percent of such land owned by 2,500 people out of a total 
Iraqi population of around seven million as late as 1960.163 In 1956 at least 70 percent of 
the population was engaged in agricultural work with approximately 54 percent primarily 
being paid in kind and only to an insignificant degree or not at all participating in the 
money economy. An American Embassy report concluded that the majority of Iraqis 
lived in small villages eking out an existence as tenant farmers and agricultural 
laborers.164  
     The typical Iraqi peasant, fallah, led an insecure existence farming land held by a 
landlord in exchange for part of the crop. The fallah’s position was not very secure since 
his landlord could remove him and his family from the land at will. Most fallahin (plural 
of fallah) were members of the same tribe as the shaikh (tribal leader). A minority, 
however, belonged to other tribes but lived in the tribe’s area with the permission of the 
shaikh. The maximum share of the produce that the fallah received did not exceed 50 
percent from which he had to deduct expenses for seeds, cattle, and various farm 
implements.165 It is estimated that a fallah’s average annual income in 1951 was US$58, 
compared with Iraq’s per capita income of US$85.in 1949.166  The fallah’s situation was 
not made easier by the fact that his only source of credit was the moneylender whose 
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interest rate could be as high as 50 percent per annum. On an average 25 percent of what 
a fallah’s land yielded went to paying interest on loans. Furthermore, the peasant’s 
inability to pay off his loans made him even more dependent on the landlord.167 How 
harsh life as a peasant was is reflected in the fact that his life expectancy only was 35.9 
years.168        
     The situation in Kut Province southeast of Baghdad was illustrative of the problems 
reform-minded local officials had to deal with regarding the situation in rural areas and 
the resistance to change on the part of powerful local landlords. In the town of Hai 
communist-inspired demonstrations in December of 1956, prompted by the Suez Crisis 
the previous month, had led to a number of deaths in violent clashes between the police 
and protesters. In an interview with a U.S. Embassy official in October of 1957 the 
governor of Kut Province stated that “the underlying conditions and the deep discontent 
which create an atmosphere responsive to Communist efforts still continue.”169 Almost 
the whole population of the town, 12,000-15,000, was still made up of individuals who 
had no means to support themselves, having been driven off the surrounding agricultural 
lands for various reasons. It is obvious from the reference to the appeal of communism 
above that the American Embassy official took the poor conditions in Kut seriously and 
wished to emphasize that they were politically explosive.  
     Even with a reform-minded governor it was almost impossible to introduce reforms in 
rural areas. A case in point is the governor in Kut Province. The governor had attempted 
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to interest the central government in establishing some small industries in Hai, which in 
his opinion would have had a rejuvenating effect on economic activity in the area, but 
had encountered strong local opposition to his efforts. A serious obstacle he had had to 
overcome was two shaikhs who were also large landowners. The two, who were brothers, 
collected over 50 percent of their tenants’ produce, a practice which guaranteed the 
shaikhs an annual income of ID500,000 apiece, enabling them to exercise sufficient 
influence in Baghdad to frustrate the governor’s attempts to improve the lot of the poor in 
the town, “even interfering with Government claims to lands coming properly under 
Government control.”170 The most likely explanation for the governor’s failure to 
introduce reforms is corruption and Nuri’s personal strong opposition to any reduction in 
the size of rural land holdings.171   
     The presence of widespread problems similar in nature to those described in the 
previous paragraph, did not prevent the American Embassy from making a positive 
assessment of the general situation in Iraq. The Embassy’s appraisal of the situation in 
the summer of 1956 was optimistic, praising the Nuri government for its strong and 
vigorous policies. A report emphasizes Nuri’s success in reestablishing political stability 
to the country, at the same time expressing slight regret: “In doing so, however, it [the 
Nuri government] has had to rely to a large extent upon enforced restriction on political 
and press activities and has as a result incurred some measure of public resentment.”172 
Although this was written before the Suez Crisis and the ensuing violent reactions in Iraq, 
it comes across as a clear understatement to claim that Nuri’s activities have “incurred 
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some measure of public resentment,” in particular in view of recurring student 
demonstrations and opposition criticisms with regard to the regime’s alleged violations of 
civil rights. The report further commends the government’s development program 
pointing out that “there has been a large increase in construction and business activity in 
the major cities, though few benefits have filtered to the lowest level as yet.”173 The 
report suggests that American Embassy officials were aware of existing negative 
consequences of Iraqi government policies, but that they did not attempt to assess how 
serious these consequences were (in the case of the development program), or simply 
underestimated them (as in the case of resentment incurred by Nuri’s authoritarian 
policies).  
     In the mid 1950s relations between peasants and landlords became increasingly 
polarized. The summer of 1955 saw the largest peasant demonstrations since World War 
II in Amara province. The situation got completely out of hand when 20,000 fallahin kept 
the whole harvest and expropriated land belonging to landlords. The authorities managed 
to suppress the rebellion only after large police forces were called in, resulting in 
numerous arrests and executions.174 The following spring the situation in the countryside 
became even more explosive when peasant uprisings erupted anew. In Kut Liwa’ the 
authorities grew so alarmed when peasants expropriated land and refused to pay their 
rents to the landowners that both the police and the army had to be called in to deal with 
the situation.175 The events referred to in this paragraph thus show that fallahin in some 
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parts of Iraq were increasingly taking matters into their own hands out of frustration with 
their economic and social situation.   
     A British Embassy report dated December1957 confirms the picture presented in the 
American report on Kut Liwa’ referred to above:  
The main cause of the trouble is the large feudal landlords. The peasants are 
oppressed and hardly able to scrape a living, with the result that they leave the 
land and come into the towns, where, however, there is little work for them…It 
seems that these people [the chief landowners] not only oppress the peasants but 
have such influence that they are beyond the law. The Mutasarrif 
[governor]…claimed that he was unable to control them because of the influence 
they enjoy in Baghdad. No law has been passed for the distribution of land in Kut 
Liwa’.176 
 
The situation was similar in Amara Liwa’ where approximately half of the population 
lived in “conditions of hideous squalor and poverty…”177 Many of them had only 
occasional employment and the family income ranged from ID4-5 per month. The 
problem with land distribution in Amara Liwa’ was that the lands belonged to the 
government but the best lands were controlled by the local shaikhs. The conditions they 
imposed on the peasants were such that many of the latter could not make a living from 
tilling land and left it. A land distribution law for Amara Liwa’ had been passed in 1955, 
stipulating that 50 percent of the land exploited by the shaikhs be distributed to the 
peasants and that the rest of the land remain with the shaikhs. The latter had resisted the 
law and had found a loophole in it allowing them to allocate the peasants’ land to their 
own relatives. Again conservative leaders in the rural areas had proven a formidable 
obstacle to any progress in the countryside.       
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     Distribution of state-owned land to the fallahin did not necessarily translate into 
higher living standard for them. Despite the shaikhs’ resistance some land had been 
distributed to peasants. These peasants were, however, dependent on the shaikh for water, 
since he controlled the pumping machinery, and had to give him in return part of their 
crop. This led the author of the British report, Sam Falle, to express skepticism about the 
prospects for success, which was not likely unless the problems of water and credit could 
be resolved. As a consequence, there was not much hope that the migration from the rural 
areas would stop or that the dwellers in the sarifas would benefit from the land 
distribution law.  
     Based on the situation described above Falle’s report concluded the following:  
…[T]he standard of living is shamefully low. The main causes are predatory 
landlords and inefficient farming. The impact of the Development Programme has 
hardly been felt. There is no obvious or immediate danger of disturbances but the 
basis is present for both communism and anarchic nationalism. (In Kut I was told 
that the communists would win a free election). This would be whipped up either 
by political events outside Iraq or by continued government refusal to take firm 
action against the sheikhs or a combination of both. Everyone I spoke to was 
highly critical of government policy…The new agricultural settlements must not 
be left to fend for themselves or they will fall under the power of the sheikhs. The 
vital essentials initially are guarantees of water, loans for purchase of seed and 
probably fertilizer and equipment, and a cooperative marketing scheme…If 
nothing more is done…it will quickly be assumed that the Government…is no 
better than its predecessors and is under the influence of the wealthy sheikhs. 178  
  
Falle’s insightful analysis correctly identified the two main problems in the rural areas as 
being the shaikhs’ domination of economic life and the government’s inefficiency with 
regard to introducing long overdue reforms, a situation which in the long run would 
endanger Iraq’s stability.    
                                                          
178 Wright to Selwyn Lloyd, Foreign Office, Confidential, December 31, 1957, FO371/134197, report by 
Oriental Counselor Sam Falle. Falle was probably the most clearsighted analyst among British and 
American diplomats in Baghdad. Characteristic of his reports is his strong language in describing the ills of 
Iraqi society.  





      The above quote is a clear testimony to the existence in the administration of officials 
who tried to address the dangerous situation in the countryside and who realized that the 
wretched conditions in which much of the rural population lived could be exploited by 
radical political forces if nothing was done by the authorities. Falle’s quite critical report 
identifies the shaikhs as the fundamental impediment to change in rural areas. Equally 
important is his observation that the Development Program had hardly had any impact in 
the countryside. This suggests that the projects of the Development Board had 
contributed little to improving conditions at the grassroots level in two of Iraq’s liwa’s. 
Given that the Program most likely was the regime’s best chance for survival, one can 
conclude that the future of the monarchy looked very bleak on the eve of the Revolution. 
Furthermore, Falle’s report cast doubt on the argument that had the regime been given 
two more years, the Development Program would have had such widespread impact that 
the monarchy would have survived. If the program, established in 1950, had not yet 
(seven years later) had any significant impact on the life of the poor majority of the rural 
population during its seven-year existence, it is hard to imagine that it would have been 
able to improve conditions so radically in such a short period of time that it would have 
prevented the Revolution.    
     The American and British diplomatic reports discussed above in this part of the 
chapter are of particular interest since the source is the same for both, but the conclusions 
the authors draw differ greatly. The American report downplays the problematic situation 
in the Iraqi countryside and the resentment caused by Nuri’s authoritarian policies, while 
emphasizing the stability the Nuri government has reestablished to the country. 
Conversely, the British report, stresses the problematic situation in rural areas, implicitly 





expressing great concern about the Development Program. This part of the chapter has 
also established that British and American diplomats, through meetings with local 
officials, were well aware of the problems in the countryside and the flaws in the 
regime’s policies towards the rural population.   
 
Opposition and Repression in the Mid-1950s 
     This chapter has argued that opposition to official policies grew after World War II 
and that the political parties realized in the 1950s that their best hope of introducing 
social and political reform in Iraq was through setting their differences aside and joining 
forces in a National Front. Therefore, in December of 1955 the opposition again 
presented the king with a memorandum.179 This memorandum was similar in content to 
that of 1952 presented to ‘Abd al-Ilah. Simultaneously with these open attempts to press 
for reform, opposition parties and groups also engaged in clandestine political activities, 
such as distributing illegal journals, newspapers, and fliers among the population.180 Iraqi 
governments also temporarily had to deal with Egyptian-based Voice of Free Iraq’s 
strident anti-regime broadcasts.181 Cooperation among opposition parties was further 
strengthened in 1956 when they formed the United National Front (Jabhat al-Ittihad al-
Watani), including, inter alia, the Istiqlal Party, the Ba‘th Party, the National Democratic 
Party, and the Iraqi Communist Party. The Front’s program included “Arab solidarity 
                                                          
179 Al-Fiha’, January 19, 1956, referred to in Fedchenko, Irak v Bor’be za Nezavisimost’, p. 206.  
180 Fedchenko, Irak v Bor’be za Nezavisimost’, p. 205. 
181 The Iraq Times, June 13, 1955.  





against imperialism and Zionism” in addition to points from earlier memoranda presented 
to the regime.182  
     External events and forces, such as the Suez Crisis, anti-Zionism, and British 
imperialism, also contributed to fueling opposition to Nuri’s policies. The violent 
suppression of a demonstration in al-Najaf on November 25, 1956, following the British-
French-Israeli attack on Egypt, in combination with public dissatisfaction with 
government policies towards Egypt resulted in an apparently spontaneous uprising in the 
northern, central and southern parts of the country. In the town of Kut al-Hai the situation 
deteriorated to the extent that rebels took over the town for two weeks and surrendered 
only after artillery units had been called in to suppress the rebellion.183 The events in Kut 
al-Hai clearly shows that some Iraqis who opposed Nuri’s policies were prepared to take 
up arms to fight the authorities. Combined with the occurrences of peasant expropriations 
in rural areas discussed above this indicates that a revolutionary situation had developed 
in certain areas, and that the reasons for this were both internal and external.      
     On August 11,1957 the opposition again submitted a petition signed by twenty-two 
prominent leaders to the new prime minister, Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, criticizing the 
previous Nuri government’s policies and calling for the lifting of restrictions imposed on 
civil liberties. The signers of the petition stated that “[m]artial administration, instead of 
                                                          
182 Gabbay, Communism and Agrarian Reform, p. 59. Fedchenko states that the National Democratic Party 
and the Iraqi Communist Party had established contact in the spring of 1956 and the Istiqlal Party had 
joined them in the summer. In February of 1957 the three parties and the Ba‘th Party formed the United 
National Front. The Front’s objective was to overthrow the monarchic regime, dissolve the Parliament, 
withdraw from the Baghdad Pact, pursue a policy of positive neutrality, grant Iraqis civil liberties, and 
release political prisoners, Fedchenko, Irak v Bor’be za Nezavisimost’, p. 215. The adoption of the Front’s 
program is a clear indication that by February of 1956 a revolutionary situation had developed in Iraq.   
183 ‘Aziz al-Shaikh, Jabhat al-ittihad al-watani wa al-muhamal-tarikhiya al-mulaqat ‘ala ‘atiqha fi al-zaraf 
al-rahin (Baghdad: 1959), p. 11; Sovremmeny Vostok, no. 8  (1957), pp. 15-16, both sources referred to in 
Fedchenko, Irak v Bor’be za Nezavisimost’, pp. 209-210. According to al-Shaikh, one of the leaders of he 
Iraqi Communist Party, the uprising failed due to the weakened state of the opposition parties following 
Nuri’s onslaught on the political parties in 1954, and due to limited peasant and Kurdish participation.  





being a means of checking defeatism was used against the liberals who expressed their 
nationalist sentiments by condemning that aggression.”184 They further emphasized that 
hundreds of citizens had been arrested and imprisoned by the Nuri government. Implicit 
in the petition was the following warning to al-Ayyubi: “it is not in the public interest to 
let citizens grow desperate waiting for the return of normal life and the reapplication of 
those provisions of the Constitution which pertain to the rights of the people.”185 The 
petition is evidence of how oppressive the Nuri regime had been in the eyes of the 
opposition.   
     In summary the petitioners demanded that Nuri’s political legacy be done away with. 
The petition requested that the prime minister: (1) “eliminate the last remaining effects of 
martial law”186; (2) “release political prisoners…”; (3) “reinstate teachers and students 
who have been convicted of political offenses”; (4)” permit the organization of political 
parties and labor unions”; and (5) “lift restrictions on the Iraqi press as well as on the free 
circulation of certain newspapers, currently banned, from other Arab countries.” The 
American Embassy commented as follows on the petition:  
It is perhaps significant that the list of persons who signed the petition includes 
every important element of the so-called opposition. Indeed it would appear that 
the NDP-Istiqlal grouping, the leftists, the ultra-nationalists, and others have all 
found common cause and have joined forces against the government. If and when 
party life is resumed, such a coalition could prove a very political force.187  
 
This comment reveals that U.S. diplomats were primarily concerned about the formidable 
force the united opposition would constitute, if allowed to engage in normal political 
                                                          
184 Emmett B. Ford, Second Secretary of Embassy (for the Ambassador), to the Department of State, 
Confidential, August 20, 1957, 787.00/8-2057.   
185 Ibid. 
186 Emmett B. Ford, Second Secretary of Embassy (for the Ambassador), to the Department of State, 
Confidential, August 20, 1957, 787.00/8-2057. Compare the opposition’s demands in 1952, footnote 143. 
187 Ibid.  





activity. The implications of the implicit warning in the petition mentioned above were 
obviously considered to be a lesser problem, which need not be commented on, a 
somewhat surprising position in the light of the series of violent demonstrations and 
uprisings which had occurred in recent Iraqi history.   
     The above petition was a clear indictment of Nuri’s policies and as such also shed 
light on the methods he had applied to silence opposition. Each one of the demands put 
forward in the 1957 petition exemplified a specific measure Nuri had taken to silence 
dissent and opposition. Martial law had been declared only when an uprising or “chaos” 
had threatened. In his defense one must, however, point out that Nuri had not made 
indiscriminate use of martial law, a fact to which testified his refusal to take such a 
serious step when pressed to do so by his government in February of 1955.188 
Incarceration of political opponents, including party leaders and other prominent 
politicians whom he had considered too dangerous to remain at large, was a measure Nuri 
had frequently resorted to throughout his political career, in particular against alleged 
communists. Like politicians, dissenting teachers posed a potentially serious threat to 
Nuri’s governments, since they had access to large and critical audiences. Students 
belonged in the same category, since they could easily influence large numbers of fellow 
students. Political parties were banned, since Nuri would have provided them with an 
opportunity to mobilize political support and he would have had to accept criticism had 
they been allowed to operate. Finally, Nuri’s closing of critical newspapers and his 
                                                          
188 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, p. 49.  





emotional reaction to Egyptian critical broadcasts shows that he had a troubled 
relationship with the press and broadcast media 189  
     Nuri had special arrangements for communists, teachers, students, and the press, 
which go to show that he, despite his authoritarian rule when in office, had a certain 
amount of patience with political opponents. He believed stripping an individual of his 
citizenship was an effective method to combat the spread of communism. This barred 
Iraqis residing abroad from returning home and also made it possible to deprive 
troublesome communists in Iraq of their civil rights. Interestingly enough, Nuri also 
offered incarcerated communists a peculiar opportunity to repent by signing a document 
to the effect that they renounced their communist belief in exchange for freedom.190 It is 
not quite clear why this option was open to communists, since Nuri could not possibly 
expect such a renunciation of faith to be sincere, or perhaps he believed that most 
communists would not agree to do such a thing, since their political conviction was more 
important than their personal freedom. On the other hand, he might have believed that 
there was still hope to turn those communists who were “weak in spirit” into law-abiding 
citizens, since they presumably would not wish to re-experience an Iraqi prison from the 
inside.  
                                                          
189 On June 13, 1955 The Iraq Times reported that The Voice of Free Iraq, a radio station broadcasting anti-
Nuri propaganda from the Egyptian-controlled Gaza strip, had announced that it would cease its broadcasts. 
This announcement coincided with an official note from the Egyptian government delivered to the Iraqi 
government expressing gratitude for an Iraqi offer to extend assistance to Egypt in case of an Israeli attack 
on Gaza. This suggests that it was not a coincidence that the radio station Nuri so loathed had gone off the 
air, though the official Iraqi explanation was that the station had ceased its broadcasts as a result of Iraqi 
and Arab pressure on the Egyptian government. Almost three years later, in May of 1958, the same paper 
reported that the Iraqi government had protested strongly to the U.A.R. government against the “malicious” 
broadcasts of the same station, The Iraq Times, May 10, 1958.      
190 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, p. 94. At the end of March of 1956 about fifty communists had been 
released from prison, having signed “disavowals” of communism. Further releases were expected as soon 
as the inmates in question had signed their statements. Half a year later the press reported that “more than 
10 Communist prisoners will be released very shortly. They have signed written pledges to renounce 
Communism and become loyal citizens.” Two of the prisoners had been “denationalized” in 1955, but 
would be reinstated after their pledges, The Iraq Times, October 29, 1956, p. 2.   





     In the case of teachers and students Nuri most likely believed that they all had an 
Achilles heel—their love for learning, teaching, and academia, which would eventually 
keep them from engaging in political activities. The first consequence when students, 
teachers, or junior officials had taken part in communist or Peace Partisan demonstrations 
was expulsion from school or dismissal from work. According to a list published in 
October of 1954, fifty-three arrested demonstrators were junior government officials out 
of a total of 119 and the rest were students. Students were then shipped off to the Army, 
which, however, did not appreciate the presence of unruly elements in its ranks. Special 
units were therefore organized for students.191 Nuri probably argued that what students 
and teachers alike resented the most was a strictly regulated life with the foremost duty 
being to obey orders, which is why military service was the most suitable punishment for 
“freethinkers.”                          
     At the time of the Suez Crisis, however, Nuri had demonstrated that he could resort to 
very harsh measures when he deemed them necessary. His government had sent the 
police into classrooms in Baghdad, al-Najaf, and Mosul to suppress protests with the 
result that several secondary school students had been killed during these operations. The 
                                                          
191 Gallman, pp. 93-94. The majority of persons on three subsequent lists were students. The first list 
mentioned above must have alarmed the authorities since such a large part of the arrested was made up of 
government officials, albeit in junior positions. Gallman makes no attempt to explain the discrepancy 
between the first and the subsequent lists with regard to the considerable drop in numbers of government 
officials. Furthermore, he does not provide any clue as to the time span between the first and the last list, 
which makes it difficult to analyze his data. It is possible that the decrease in arrests and dismissals of 
junior officials could be explained by a deterrent effect the punishment had on junior officials, and that 
those who had not been arrested simply decided to keep a low profile. Conversely, if the Interior Ministry 
drew this conclusion it should have caused even greater alarm. If dissident government officials expressed 
their dissent in public they provided the Ministry with a clue as to their numbers, whereas that would not be 
the case if they decided not to voice their opinion. The first list could have constituted the tip of an iceberg, 
and if that were the case surveillance instead of arrest or dismissal would have provided the authorities with 
better intelligence. Norman Daniel writes that students were often given a second chance. If they had been 
involved in politics and wished to enter college, however, they needed to produce a certificate of “good 
behavior” issued by the police. The same kind of certificate was required for government employment. It 
goes without saying that “good behavior” meant conformity with official policies, Caractacus (Norman 
Daniel), p. 54.      





regime had a network of agents at its disposal, possibly numbering as many as 24,000. 
These informers kept the authorities up to date on what was being discussed in teashops, 
schools, and colleges. The police was considered such an important pillar of the regime 
that its budget (£7.5 million) exceeded that of the Ministry of Education (£6 million).192   
     This part of the chapter has argued that Nuri was quite inventive in formulating 
policies aimed at neutralizing the political opposition, and that the methods he applied in 
this confrontation were not exclusively based on brute force. Nuri often initially resorted 
to less violent means to deal with his political opponents, and then increased the pressure 
when these measures did not yield the desired result. Finally, he could also reverse the 
order by initially taking quite repressive steps, which were then followed by a more 
lenient approach.    
     The chapter as a whole has contended that British and American diplomats were well 
informed of the difficult economic, social, and political situation in Iraqi urban centers 
and of the opposition’s activities in response to Nuri’s policies. Through meetings with 
local officials these diplomats were also aware of the appalling conditions in the rural 
areas and of the inefficient policies aimed at addressing these problems and realized that 
the exodus of fallahin from the countryside would pose a security threat in the cities 
where available employment was seasonal. Finally, Nuri, like the foreign diplomats, was 
aware of the social, economic, and political ills of Iraqi society but was convinced that he 
had the means to deal with these problems—repression against, and persuasion and 
cooptation of the political opposition, and by investing oil revenues in development 
projects in the rural areas. The Development Program proved to have no significant 
                                                          
192 Caractacus (Daniel), pp. 52-53.  





impact on the situation of the fallahin, since the projects did not destroy the shaikhs’ 
economic power and social authority. Nuri believed that he could not eliminate the 




































INDEPENDENT IRAQ AND NURI AL-SA‘ID—DOMESTIC POLICY (2) 
 
This chapter is a continuation of the examination of Nuri al-Sa‘id’s domestic policy in the 
previous chapter. The focus here, however, will be on the Iraqi press and British 
influence in the country. Both these forces in Iraqi politics had important implications for 
the Iraqi Revolution and the latter part of the chapter will address what these implications 
were in the context of the question whether the Revolution could have been avoided. The 
first issue to be addressed is whether the reporting in Iraqi newspapers to a certain extent 
reflected the true state of affairs in the country and if the public and foreign diplomats 
were in a position to draw accurate conclusions regarding the internal situation in Iraq 
based on reporting which was frequently indirect and left it to the reader’s analytical 
skills to interpret the contents of print media. The second question which this chapter will 
provide an answer to is what the extent of British influence in Iraq was prior to the 
Revolution. 
     If this analysis yields the conclusion that Britain exercised strong influence over Iraqi 
domestic policies it would make her partly “responsible” for the Revolution. Should the 
evidence suggest, however, that British leverage with Iraqi governments only went so far, 
it would clearly reduce Britain’s “responsibility” for what happened in 1958. This chapter 
will also analyze what might have been the reason if Western diplomats did not arrive at 
the conclusion that the situation in Iraq was grave. The answer to this question will in 
turn reveal whether alternative policies were available to Nuri, and if so, why he did not 
pursue a less controversial domestic policy to reduce the possibility of revolution. 





The Iraqi Press and Censorship    
     The press appears to have been the political opponent that Nuri had the most patience 
with. Despite restrictions on what could be reported in the press he must have looked the 
other way when newspapers veiled their criticism by suggesting improvements to policies 
instead of criticizing responsible policymakers. Furthermore, journalists were free to 
criticize Israel, and French policies in Algeria, but not the Baghdad Pact or British 
policies towards Iraq. In order to establish whether the Iraqi public and Western 
diplomats were in a position to keep abreast of the true state of affairs in Iraq by reading 
the Iraqi press, reporting in Iraqi newspapers, including the British-controlled English-
language daily The Iraq Times, will be examined briefly. The question that needs to be 
asked is whether newspapers were compelled to completely gloss over social ills in order 
to please Nuri or other leaders, and in order to avoid persecution by the Iraqi 
Government. As has been mentioned above, Nuri revoked the licenses of a large number 
of newspapers and journals during the first month after his return to power in August of 
1954 and promptly re-licensed “a half dozen… on condition that they would exercise 
self-control.”193 Should the findings from reading the Iraqi press suggest that newspapers, 
                                                          
193 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, p. 98. The U.S. ambassador calls the re-licensed journals the more 
responsible and claims without elaborating that the majority of the newspapers and journals whose licenses 
were not renewed had relied on blackmail to continue publication. Gallman does not put “responsible” or 
“blackmail” in quotation marks wherefore it has to be assumed that he has taken Nuri’s words at face value.  
When his Press Ordinance was subjected to criticism in the Chamber of Deputies, Nuri stated that the 
rationale for the Ordinance was to address public complaints “against the ‘confusion’ that prevailed in the 
press. The press had been penetrated by elements which used it as a tool for propagating subversive ideas 
aimed especially at the younger generation. There were also certain persons who had converted the press 
into means for extracting money through blackmail. Previous legislation was inadequate for curbing these 
practices.” Interestingly, Gallman points out that the press was filled with criticism and advice within two 
weeks after Nuri’s resignation in June of 1957. Freedom of expression continued under the new prime 
minister ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, although his minister of the interior, Sami Fattah, tried to rein in the press 
by threatening to withdraw government advertising if newspapers indulged in too much freedom, Gallman, 
Iraq Under General Nuri, pp. 98-99. Norman Daniel evinced considerably more skepticism towards the 
Iraqi press than did Gallman, basically claiming that Nuri’s restrictions deprived the press of any ability to 
present newsworthy material to the public, since they just repeated the official line.     





despite restrictions on what could be printed, presented the public with clear clues to the 
real state of affairs in the country, it can be assumed that British and American diplomats 
were well informed about developments and public opinion in Iraq. The question is 
whether the conclusions they drew in any way reflected the possibility of what would 
happen on July 14, 1958, and whether the contents of Iraqi newspapers indirectly 
suggested such a possibility.  
     Corruption was a subject of interest to journalists and the public alike. In 1956 a 
committee was appointed to address corruption in government and it began work by the 
end of the year. The committee focused initially on the civil service and by the end of 
November, the first month the committee operated, six high-ranking officials in the 
Ministry of the Interior had been dismissed, and thirty-four other officials in the civil 
service had been suspended.194 The right-wing nationalist newspaper Al-Yaqza voiced 
some veiled criticism in December of 1955 before the committee began work. The paper 
criticized some previous governments which had attempted purges, but had not targeted 
“the higherups who should have headed the purge lists.”195 The obvious implication of 
this claim is that the individuals who ought to be targeted were those in powerful 
                                                          
194 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, p. 126. Gallman viewed this as “a healthy beginning.” Norman 
Daniel is not impressed with the committee’s record, however, arguing that it did not touch the senior 
officials in the regime, Caractacus (Daniel), Revolution, p. 34. Daniel gives a detailed account of how the 
corrupt system in Iraq worked on pages 29-35. The Iraq Times reported in December of 1956 that the purge 
committee was touring central and southern Iraq requiring all officials with a monthly income of above 
ID27 to fill out a questionnaire. The last list of names collected by the committee had resulted in the 
discharge of more than 30 officials, The Iraq Times, December 5, 1956, p. 2. The officials discharged are 
most likely the same as those Gallman refers to in his book.  
195 The Iraq Times, December 10, 1955, p. 8. In August moderately leftist Al-Hurriya stated that internal 
reform is not possible without first purging the government machinery of corrupt elements. The reason is 
that there “were many instances where important men were assigned to vital positions which they exploited 
to enrich themselves thus degrading the name of the position they held,” The Iraq Times, August 11, 1955, 
p. 8. This is a very blunt accusation and a very dangerous one at that, since the newspaper states 
unequivocally that there had been instances of corrupt elements in high positions. It is difficult to explain 
why the authorities would allow such candid criticism, but they most likely chose to interpret the editorial 
as critical of high officials who had served in previous non-Nuri governments.     





positions and that this held true for the current government headed by Nuri al-Sa‘id as 
well. Al-Yaqza’s statement corroborates the argument that even though the press was 
subject to restrictions on what could be reported and commented on, veiled criticism was 
possible.  It is not clear, however, why such statements were not censored. They might 
have passed unnoticed, or the regime might have regarded them as innocuous. A third 
possibility is that Interior Ministry officials simply drew other conclusions than the one 
offered here.  
     Another issue which was discussed in the press was the backwardness in rural areas. 
The independent196 newspaper Al-Bilad criticized the unequal conditions in cities and 
rural areas, with the former, Baghdad in particular, being developed, while “some of the 
villages are living in conditions which existed hundreds of years ago…[and] others do 
not even know what modern amenities are.” The paper argues that “revenues should be 
spent equally on Baghdad as on the smallest village in some distant part of the country,” 
the reason for this being that “every one of the five million Iraqis has a right to enjoy the 
benefits that accrue from the oil.”197 It is obvious that the discrepancy between city and 
countryside was a serious problem. How serious an issue this was, is clear from the 
phrase “conditions which existed hundreds of years ago.” This is most likely a reference 
to iqta‘, the prevalent semi-feudal system in rural areas, and a term which was probably 
too “revolutionary” to be used, since it might imply class struggle. The paper thus points 
                                                          
196 Al-Bilad’s status as an independent newspaper was confirmed in an American Embassy report, Nicholas 
G. Thacher, First Secretary of Embassy, to the Department of State, Unclassified, June 26, 1957, 787.00/6-
2657.  
197 The Iraq Times, July, 14, 1955, p. 8. Al-Hawadith, criticized the government indirectly, by urging it to 
introduce economic, administrative, and social reforms, singling out the housing shortage and the high 
costs of living as problems which had to be addressed immediately, referred to in The Iraq Times, 
November 30, 1955, p. 8. Al-Zaman also urged the government to introduce internal reforms, since “there 
was no longer a legitimate excuse for not carrying them out,” quoted in The Iraq Times, December 6, 1955, 
p. 8.    





to two serious issues which the government must address and gives an unequivocal 
indication of how potentially explosive these problems might be by emphasizing that 
villages must have an equitable share in the national wealth.     
     Surprisingly enough, the press also reported in detail about violent demonstrations, 
though the account printed was that of the government. Again, however, the reader could 
form an opinion of what had taken place by reading between the lines.198 Critical remarks 
were also printed with regard to the shortage of schools, a problem which Al-Zaman 
found “strange,” considering the fact that Iraq had “the money and capabilities” to 
eliminate it.199 The newspaper emphasized that the problem needed to be addressed 
immediately.  
     The above brief examination of the Iraqi press suggests that anyone possessing some 
form of analytical skills was in a position to keep himself informed of public opinion in 
the country, even though the Iraqi press often needed to veil its reporting on the true state 
of affairs in the country. One can therefore conclude that a careful study of the Iraqi press 
on a daily basis would provide Western diplomats with sufficient material to arrive at 
                                                          
198 The Iraq Times, November 22, 1956, pp. 1 and 15. According to the newspaper report, which was based 
on a government communiqué, communists and “a group of other subversive elements” had entered a 
secondary school and incited its students to strike, demonstrate, and attack the police. In the ensuing battle 
sixty policemen and nine civilians had been injured. Three things are remarkable about this account. First, 
it does not provide the name of the school where the incident took place. Second, six times as many 
policemen as civilians were injured. Third, nine “civilians” were injured. The reader knows that students, 
communists, and “other subversive elements” participated in the violent demonstration. The name of the 
school was possibly withheld from the public because it could have been a stronghold of leftist 
sympathizers and the police did most likely not want to spread this piece of information. The large number 
of injured policemen does not sound plausible, since they were most likely better prepared for a violent 
confrontation than the students of the secondary school. The figure was therefore probably used to mobilize 
sympathy for the police. The use of the term civilians is most likely a cover up for the more convincing 
possibility that students were injured. Had this circumstance been reported, however, it would have incited 
the population against the authorities. Furthermore, had communists been injured there would have been no 
need for the term civilian; their membership in a banned organization made them criminals anyway and it 
would consequently not have constituted a serious crime in the eyes of the authorities to beat up criminals.      
199 The Iraq Times, October 29, 1956, p. 8. 





accurate conclusions regarding the intensity of the opposition to Nuri al-Sa‘id’s policies. 
Whether they actually drew such conclusions in their reports, however, is another matter. 
 
British and American Intelligence on the Situation in Iraq 
     The present and the previous chapters have already established that the British as well 
as the Americans were well aware of the consequences of the iqta‘ system in the 
countryside, the situation in the sarifas, the opposition’s criticism of official policies, and 
what opposition politicians considered to be problems that demanded immediate action 
by the government. Despite restrictions on what could be reported in the press some of 
this important information was available even to expatriates and diplomats who had no 
Arabic-language skills, since The Iraq Times offered its readers a daily roundup of the 
editorials of the Arabic-language press, including the opposition’s criticism of 
government policies.200 To draw more solid conclusions about the interpretation of 
available intelligence, however, one has to analyze diplomatic correspondence in detail.           
                                                          
200 The Iraq Times itself did not voice criticism of government policies, but to go as far as saying that the 
newspaper was not interested in presenting political information to its readers, as Norman Daniel claims, 
appears to be an exaggeration, though one could argue that he is partly correct, since The Iraq Times itself 
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     The British ambassador to Iraq, Michael Wright, was aware of the problem Nuri’s 
restrictions on civil liberties and political life constituted and that the opposition to the 
latter’s policies gradually increased. The ambassador clearly realized that there was a 
direct link between the growing resentment of Nuri’s policies on the one hand, and on the 
other, the fact that the elections in 1954 had been rigged and the perception among 
opposition politicians that landowners in the Parliament would successfully resist any 
attempt to introduce reforms, which would reduce their influence. Wright was also 
convinced that there was a direct connection between the opposition’s ability “to cause 
trouble for the Government”201 and the extent to which the population would benefit from 
the development program. His conclusion was therefore that “[i]t is in a measure a race 
against time if the political evolution of Iraq is to take place peacefully and an upheaval 
avoided.”202  
     Despite the realization that time was a crucial factor, and that the negative impact on 
social stability would only increase if the benefits of the development program did not 
trickle down to peasants and workers, Wright still concluded that  
[t]hough there are great inequalities of wealth, the gap between the very rich 
and the very poor is less glaringly obvious, and seems to produce less social 
tensions, than in some other Middle Eastern countries...There are…at present no 
real economic reasons for violent discontent which were a big contributing 
factor in touching off the troubles of 1948 and 1952. Nuri said to me the other 
day: ‘Bread is more important than politics.’ He now believes that if the present 
growth and prosperity can continue and spread more widely for another year or 
two, the whole fabric of national life will be immensely strengthened.203  
 
The above quotation is evidence that Nuri believed that economic policies could be 
detached from the issue of civil liberties and foreign policy. Furthermore, Wright’s 
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conclusion that the unequal distribution of wealth in the country did not constitute a 
serious problem shows that he had not visited the sarifas in Baghdad and had no personal 
experience of the situation in the rural areas of Iraq. Finally, Wright concurred with Nuri 
regarding the correlation between economic growth and social stability. 
     Despite the allegedly bright economic prospects, the British ambassador identified a 
number of factors which could cause future problems—the communists; the discontent of 
the intellectuals with the slow speed of social reform; and, anti-West Arab nationalism, 
allegedly encouraged by Egypt and Saudi Arabia. “There are many people who think that 
a show-down with some or all of these forces is inevitable, and might indeed come at 
almost any moment.”204 It appears that Wright placed so much confidence in Nuri’s 
ability to maintain stability that he underestimated the possibility of widespread social 
unrest and therefore did not anticipate any serious problems as long as the latter remained 
alive, though he mentioned, without further elaboration, the possibility of Nuri being 
removed by force.  
     The American Embassy in Baghdad was aware of the opposition’s strong 
condemnation of Nuri’s authoritarian policies and their demands expressed in a petition 
to Prime Minister ‘Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi in 1957.205 An Embassy report written after the 
revolution stated the following:  
We failed in our intelligence, but so did also the previous Iraqi Government…. 
We were quite aware of the criticism… coming from students, adult intelligentsia, 
professional groups, and liberal-minded politicians. We were also aware of 
criticism within army circles which, however, was limited almost exclusively to 
lower officer ranks. We… appreciated, too, [the] fact that basis for this criticism 
within [the] army and among civilians existed. [The] Feeling that Iraq has been 
dominated politically by [the] West has been widespread; …the country’s wealth 
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is concentrated in a relatively small group and…little up to now has been done for 
[the] masses. But what we did not appreciate was [the] fact that one small group 
could have been so well organized as to pull off [a] coup in such classic, 
revolutionary style. I had been assured and reassured by such leaders as Nuri, 
General Rafiz [sic], and [Interior] Minister Qazzaz that [the] army was loyal…I 
feel, though, that if our Service Attaches could have penetrated in their personal 
contacts further down in officer ranks, it might have been helpful, while we 
probably, even so, would not have had forewarning of [the] coup of [the] younger 
officers who have suddenly come forward.206  
 
American diplomats were thus well aware of the ills of Iraqi society, a fact which, 
however, did not alert them to the possibility of a revolution. 
     The above analysis reveals three problematic aspects of U.S. intelligence gathering in 
Iraq in the years preceding the Revolution. These weaknesses were: (a) the taking at face 
value of assurances given by government officials; (b) the lack of contacts with ordinary 
citizens and junior officials; and (c) the lack of reflection on and analysis of possible 
consequences of the state of affairs in the country. It is obvious that at least some 
diplomats in the Embassy were fooled by the over-confidence of senior Iraqi government 
officials despite the information available from interviews with reformist officials such as 
the Mutasarrif of Kut Liwa’,207 and mistook this over-confidence for social and political 
stability. Gallman’s conclusion that the Embassy would not have had any forewarning of 
the coup even if embassy officials had made contact with junior army officers is, 
however, indubitably a correct assessment, since the army officers involved in the 
conspiracy for obvious reasons did not divulge their plans to representatives of Western 
powers. The discussion of the nature of the information available to both the British and 
the Americans has thus provided sufficient grounds to conclude that they were in 
possession of information which reflected the true situation in the country, but drew 
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conclusions from available intelligence which did not give serious consideration to the 
possibility of a military coup or widespread social unrest. The reason for this was that 
they took the regime’s over-confidence at face value and placed too much trust in the 
development program. 
     It can only be speculated whether other Western analysts than those on the spot would 
have drawn conclusions which reflected more urgency. Some Iraqi journalists, on the 
other hand, as implied by the above quotes from the Iraqi press, clearly wished to convey 
to the Iraqi public a picture of the serious conditions in their country, and their great 
concern about the possible consequences of not addressing social, political, and economic 
problems expeditiously.  
  
British Leverage with the Regime 
     A question in need of attention is whether British influence in Iraq would have 
allowed Britain to act differently had she decided to do so. A common perception among 
ordinary Iraqis was that Britain was deeply involved in high-level decision-making.208 
This interpretation of British influence was based on Britain’s two occupations of the 
country and her role as a mandatory power until 1932. Foreign Office documents indicate 
that British leverage with the Iraqi regime during the occupation in the early 1940s 
differed greatly from Britain’s influence in the country in the mid-1950s. In 1943 the 
British ambassador had directly attacked Prime Minister Nuri for his failure to address 
economic problems, for his tolerance of dishonesty in public services, and corruption of 
the police. The ambassador also criticized the fact that the army could not be relied upon, 
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the treatment of the Kurds, “the shameless land grabbing carried on by prominent 
personalities…and the wide gulf between [the] government and the people.”209 The fact 
that Iraq of 1943 was under British occupation is reflected in the ambassador’s 
humiliating treatment of the Prime Minister.       
     By the mid-1950s British influence in Iraq was exercised in a much more subtle 
manner, namely by suggesting improvements and courses of action rather than 
demanding them as earlier. Apparently the issues that concerned the British now were 
more or less the same as in the early 1940s, which suggests that they were able to put 
forward their demands quite bluntly, but that Iraqi leaders ignored British “advice” or 
simply were not in a position to introduce reforms for political reasons, that is, they did 
not want to upset their power base. The British were, however, persistent in their attempts 
to persuade Nuri to heed good advice. By the end of May of 1955 Lord Salter had 
completed his Report on the Development of Iraq, which prompted Ambassador Wright 
to suggest that a committee, including members of the opposition, be appointed “to study 
the Report and make recommendations before October.”210 Wright also informed King 
Faisal of his proposal and made clear to Harold Macmillan that he intended to “maintain 
the momentum of the suggestion.”211 Furthermore, immediately after his arrival in 
Baghdad the Ambassador had worked hard to secure an expedient confirmation of 
Michael Ionides as the British member on the Development Board in order “to promote 
wiser direction of activity on the part of the Development Board.”212  
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     Wright’s efforts underscore a number of important facts. First, they show that the 
British did not hesitate to press for what they believed was important in their dealings 
with Iraqi governments. Second, suggesting a deadline for the forming of a committee 
was quite a bold move, since it could have been interpreted as a blatant attempt to 
exercise pressure on Nuri. Third, the British deemed it important that Nuri reach out to 
the opposition. Fourth, the Embassy did not hesitate to support British citizens in key 
advisory positions. Fifth, the British were apparently sincere in their efforts to bring 
about certain reforms in Iraq, since the Ambassador was prepared to maintain pressure on 
the Iraqi government to achieve this objective. Sixth, British diplomats realized that more 
attention must be devoted to smaller local projects in order to enable ordinary Iraqis to 
reap tangible benefits from investment of the oil revenues.        
     The question of promoting the political careers of the “right” Iraqis was high on the 
Foreign Office’s agenda for Iraq. Furthermore, policymakers in the ministry were also 
concerned with the issue of who might succeed Nuri when he resigned or if something 
unforeseen happened to him. Wright assessed that “[i]t [was] not impossible that in such 
an eventuality we might be able to exert discreet influence on the King and Crown Prince 
in their choice of Prime Minister and on the latter in his selection of candidates for key 
posts.”213  This suggests that the British had retained considerable influence over Iraqi 
politics, or at the very least believed that they did. The quotation further reveals that the 
British did not hesitate to exercise such influence when this would be of benefit to their 
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interests. A number of candidates were considered, including a “soldier…if the situation 
became sufficiently tense.”214 In February 1956 the Foreign Office requested that Wright 
suggest “what we can do to help to see that the right people are coming along in Iraq,” to 
which the Ambassador replied that he maintained contact with Salih Jabr, the former 
prime minister who had had to resign in January of 1948 owing to opposition to the 
Portsmouth Treaty which he had signed. In 1956 Jabr was a critic of Nuri’s policies.215 
Wright reported, however, that Nuri did not appreciate these contacts. From this reaction 
it can be concluded that the issue of grooming an heir was not foremost on Nuri’s mind 
and that he did not plan to retire any time soon. The British objective was obviously to 
make Nuri’s government more representative while he was in office, and to secure the 
cooperation of a capable successor who would pursue pro-British policies after Nuri had 
left the political stage.  
     Like Nuri, the British were concerned about Egyptian propaganda and wanted to 
prove it wrong. The latter claimed that “the Iraqi regime [was] unrepresentative and 
reactionary.”216 If this could be refuted Iraq’s, and Britain’s, standing in the Arab world 
would certainly be strengthened. In June of 1956, however, the Levant Department of the 
Foreign Office seemed to advocate a less conspicuous role in exercising influence in Iraq 
when it stated that “[w]e do not wish to give Nuri any specific advice; but in general we 
think he would be well advised to make his Government as broadly based as possible.”217 
It is possible that the reason for this wish to keep a lower profile in Iraq was the growing 
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tension between Britain and Egypt over the Suez Canal, which was nationalized in July 
of 1956.With their hands full in Egypt the British would certainly wish to avoid upsetting 
nationalists in Iraq as well A year and a half later, however, Wright informs Foreign 
Secretary Selwyn Lloyd that he will do what he can to persuade the new government to 
address the serious problems discussed in a report by the Embassy’s Oriental Counselor 
Sam Falle.218 Wright this time around hopes that “by manifesting interest and 
sympathy…it may be possible to put at least some of the points across without appearing 
patronizing or unkindly critical.”219 One year after the Suez debacle the British 
Ambassador obviously believes that Britain has retained sufficient leverage with the Iraqi 
government to be able to press for necessary reform, albeit in a cautious manner.  
     One source, the Chief of the Royal Palace, ‘Abd Allah Bakr, reports that Ambassador 
Wright had seen him a month before the Revolution and had emphasized the need for 
social and economic reform, and for reducing the influence of tribal shaikhs. Bakr had 
replied that the shaikhs were the foundation upon which the monarchy rested, to which 
Wright replied that “if reforms were not carried out, there would no longer be a monarchy 
or tribal shaykhs.”220 
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     In summary, the evidence presented in this part of the chapter suggests that British 
influence over Iraqi domestic policies only went so far, that the British themselves 
exaggerated their ability to exercise influence in Iraq, and that the perception of the Iraqi 
public that the British were more or less running the country was exaggerated. 
 
Could the July 14 Revolution Have Been Averted?   
     In order to answer the question of whether the Revolution could have been averted 
one has, of necessity, to engage in counterfactual argumentation. This argumentation, 
however, will be exclusively based on the facts and conclusions offered under the above 
subheads of this chapter. A useful point of departure is an article published in The Times 
in February of 1955, which eloquently illustrates Nuri’s record since he returned to power 
the previous year: “Since Nuri Sa’id returned to office all political parties have been 
dissolved, including his own…a new press ordinance has reduced the number of 
newspapers…The colleges and schools have been purged…The dismissed teachers and 
students, and also the civil servants dismissed…have been made liable under an 
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amendment to the army law for nine months’ military service.”221 Like the discussion 
above, the Times article makes it abundantly clear that Nuri alienated large portions of 
Iraqi society—politicians, journalists, students, teachers and civil servants, in addition to 
peasants, farm laborers, workers, unemployed, and sarifa dwellers as indicated 
throughout this chapter. The remaining tiny section of Iraqis who uncritically supported 
him were those who benefited from his policies and would lose their privileged position 
and influence if policies changed, that is the shaikhs, the oligarchs, and the royal family. 
This minimal power base alone would be sufficient to allow one to argue that the 
majority would sooner or later demand their rightful share in the social and political 
destiny of the country.  
     It does not, however, necessarily follow from the fact that Nuri caused a sharp 
polarization of Iraqi society that the revolution was inevitable, the reason of course being 
that the main protagonists—the majority of the Iraqi people, Nuri al-Sa‘id, the British, 
and the Americans—simultaneously constituted, to a lesser or greater degree, variable 
and constant forces. This chapter has shown that the first actor was variable to a lesser 
degree, since the opposition constituted a more or less reactive and frequently united 
force in its struggle with the regime, and would most likely not reduce its resistance to it 
unless Nuri al-Sa‘id and Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah were removed from power. It has 
also been shown that Nuri with his long record of authoritarian rule and strong 
convictions about what policies were in the best interest of Iraq was even less likely to 
change his policies to accommodate the opposition, to which attest his frequent use of 
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force and imposition of various restrictions on civil liberties in order to suppress public 
manifestations of dissent.  
     Of the four actors the two Western powers had a somewhat greater potential to 
constitute variable forces. This argument is based on the fact that both the British and 
American diplomats reported truthfully on the social and political ills of Iraqi society, 
though they underestimated the acute danger posed by these problems. Furthermore, the 
British Ambassador was convinced that the British had retained the power to exercise 
influence over Iraqi policies even to the extent where they believed they could secure the 
appointment of a prime minister who would pursue pro-British policies. It is unclear 
whether Britain really was in a position to exercise such considerable influence over Iraqi 
politics or whether the British were just being over-confident in their own power, but this 
question pales, with regard to importance, in comparison with another question: What 
would have been the consequences of such an action by Britain?  
     In stating that they could influence the appointment of a prime minister and his 
government, some British diplomats evinced a surprising lack of understanding of the 
political realities, which they analyzed and reported to the Foreign Office. They appear to 
have been completely oblivious to the dangers of such a course of action, the obvious 
results of which were already there to see for everyone. Nuri al-Sa‘id was “Britain’s 
man” and every Iraqi who took some interest in politics must have been aware of this 
fact, one of the main reasons why Nuri was so hated. For a second to imagine that the 
Iraqi intelligentsia would not quickly find out whether a prime minister was “Britain’s 
man” and would not take exception to such interference in Iraqi domestic affairs, comes 
across as daydreaming at best, and possibly as serious negligence of duty. One can 





therefore conclude that some British diplomats, despite their sincere wish to press for 
certain reforms in Iraq, were still prepared to follow a course which would to a certain 
extent perpetuate the problems the Iraqi regime was facing. Their obvious refusal to 
accept the conclusion that they were part of these problems indicates that whatever 
measures they would take to ameliorate the situation would only go so far. From this it 
can be concluded that it was impossible for the British to avert the revolution, since they 
did not wish to give up their strong position in Iraq, including their ability to exercise 
influence over Iraqi politics. Even if this influence was limited, it was not perceived by 
the Iraqi public as being limited, and was therefore seriously damaging to any 
government which maintained close ties with Britain. 
     The United States played a secondary role to Britain in Iraq.222 As a result, 
Washington had even less means to effectuate change in that country. Ambassador 
Gallman’s relations with Nuri were friendly, but U.S. political leverage with the regime 
was considerably less than Britain’s. The United States could, however, had it chosen to 
do so, have exercised some influence over Iraqi policies thanks to its position as supplier 
of military equipment to Iraq.223 Had American influence in Iraq been greater and had the 
United States decided to exercise it, it is possible that a less authoritarian prime minister 
than Nuri, such as Fadhil al-Jamali, could have been appointed. The problem of Crown 
Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah would, however, have remained. Whenever he believed that the 
power of the Court was in danger or “chaos” threatened due to restoration of civil 
liberties, he would call in Nuri al-Sa‘id to rectify the situation. It is doubtful whether the 
United States in such an event would have insisted on true democratization of the 
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political system.224 The reason is that ‘Abd al-Ilah and Nuri were known quantities and 
that no one really knew what would come in their stead, possibly a leftist national front or 
a radically nationalist government. This would of course have been a highly undesirable 
outcome for both the British and the Americans, since an Iraq under a pronouncedly 
nationalist or leftist government could opt to follow a Nasserist nonaligned foreign 
policy. In the context of the intense Cold War of the1950s this would have constituted an 
extremely dangerous development in the eyes of the Western powers, which is why it 
was an additional reason for both powers not to exert too much pressure on Nuri and the 
Court to introduce political, economic, and social reforms.     
     The discussion in this chapter of Nuri’s domestic policies suggests that his focus was 
not on reform but on maintaining and making more efficient an existing authoritarian 
system. Due to his strong urge to exercise control over all aspects of government, to 
suppress any public manifestation of opposition to his rule, and due to his disinclination 
to change his policies despite the widespread discontent they gave rise to in the country, 
Nuri could be expected to remain a predictable actor on the Iraqi political stage. He 
argued that the ambitious projects in the development program financed by the oil 
revenues would, within a couple of years, improve the economic situation of the poor so 
much that the risk of violent social unrest would disappear. Nuri’s approach might have 
worked temporarily for the poorer classes, but his almost exclusive focus on economic 
means to maintain stability, when he was not engaged in foreign policymaking, which he 
considered a more important activity, ignored his lack of support among the 
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intelligentsia. The latter would simply not have accepted a continued situation which 
excluded them from political influence due to their opposition to Nuri.225 His record as 
prime minister convincingly supports the argumentation in this paragraph and it can 
therefore with a high degree of certainty be concluded that Nuri was not in a position to 
avert the revolution. The simple reason is that he was convinced that his policies 
excluded the possibility of a revolution. According to this rationale he could disregard all 
opposition, since yielding to its demands would lead to “chaos,” of which Nuri must have 
believed he had ample evidence from post-World War II Iraqi politics.  
     Up to now arguments and conclusions have been offered that all suggest that the Iraqi 
Revolution could not have been averted save by a fundamental but highly unlikely 
change of character and political convictions of the four protagonists referred to above. 
There is, however, one argument which points in the opposite direction, contending that 
the revolution could have been at least delayed. The grave concern of the Free Officers 
organization, which eventually overthrew the regime, about foreign intervention in the 
event of a coup gives the historian a clue. It can therefore be concluded that a strong 
Western military presence in the Middle East would have been the only factor that could 
have delayed the July 14 coup. The coup leader Brigadier ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim’s reply 
to a journalist’s question whether he would have carried out the coup had U.S. forces 
been sent to Lebanon earlier is remarkable.226 His answer was “no.” Qasim himself thus 
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supports the argument that a strong U.S. or British military presence in the Middle East 
would have compelled the Free Officers to postpone their coup.227  
     A final question which remains to be addressed is the following: If Nuri exercised 
almost total control over Iraq, why is it that a revolution could erupt? He had an effective 
network of agents providing him with information on any ongoing subversive or 
opposition activities in Iraq. He also saw to it that the army officers were well paid, a fact 
which convinced him that they would remain loyal to the regime. With the benefit of 
hindsight, this was obviously a serious misperception, which Nuri could not afford to 
have. An even greater mistake was to dismiss warnings and intelligence that the state of 
affairs in the army was not as peaceful as he believed. Nuri had received intelligence on 
Qasim’s suspicious conduct, but had accepted the latter’s protestations of loyalty and 
failed to act. Qasim was regarded as Nuri’s protégé which might explain why the Prime 
Minister took the matter so lightly.  The chief of the general staff, General Rafiq ‘Arif 
had received similar information regarding ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif (no relation), Qasim’s 
co-conspirator, and had dismissed the suspicions equally lightly, since ‘Abd al-Salam 
‘Arif was his protégé.228  A plausible explanation for Nuri’s reaction is that he was over-
confident. His survival record in the face of uprisings and strong political opposition to 
his leadership must have led him to believe that no one could touch him, not even the sole 
force which had the means to do so—the army.229 How dangerous this tendency to 
underestimate his enemies was became clear on July 14, 1958. 
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     It is reported that Nuri, when asked by Arab and foreign journalists about the popular 
discontent with his rule and the possibility of a violent eruption, would laugh out in over-
confidence and reply that “the discontented were just a handful of chattering politicians” 
and that “the Iraqi government had taken necessary steps to prevent them from…causing 
harm to anyone.”230 Nuri would also refer to the loyalty of the army, Faisal’s confidence 
in him, that he was in firm control of the police, and that he enjoyed the support of the 
majority of the Chamber of deputies. The perception of Nuri as an over-confident man is 
also reflected in the various stories about him which circulated after his death. He is 
alleged to have emphasized “that the man who could kill him had not yet been born.”231 
Nuri’s dismissal of the opposition as a few hundred dissatisfied students232 further attests 
to his tendency to underestimate the strength of his political adversaries. It is surprising 
that such an astute and security-aware politician as Nuri would have completely ignored 
the lessons to be learned from the violent unrest and uprisings in recent Iraqi history. He 
most likely interpreted the fact that they had been suppressed as a testimony to the 
incompetence of the opposition and as a confirmation of his own infallibility with respect 
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230 Al-Basam, Mudhakkarat Wa Asrar Hurub Nuri al-Sa‘id,, p. 171. Caractacus (Norman Daniel), 
Revolution in Iraq, p. 43. 
231 Caractacus (Daniel), Revolution in Iraq, p. 133.   
232 Ibid., p. 118. Khadduri claims that Nuri was aware of the opposition among young officers to his 
policies towards the Arab world and the West, but that he ignored it, Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 77.   






INDEPENDENT IRAQ AND NURI AL-SA‘ID—FOREIGN POLICY 
 
Nuri al-Sa‘id’s foreign policy was as controversial, if not more so, in Iraq as his domestic 
policy. The main reason for this was Iraq’s close ties with Britain, a fact which fanned 
revolutionary sentiments in Iraq. As argued in Chapter 3, however, the public perception 
that Britain was deeply involved in high-level Iraqi domestic policymaking was 
exaggerated. This chapter will examine whether there was ground for the same suspicion 
in respect to Iraq’s relations with the Arab World. The answer to this question will be 
found by analyzing Nuri’s vision for the Middle East and Iraq’s role in the area, as well 
as his actual policies towards the region. Furthermore, this chapter will also briefly 
address the following questions: To what extent was Nuri pragmatic about realizing his 
vision? What was the reason for the tension in Iraqi-Egyptian relations? Did Nuri have to 
exploit certain issues in order to be able to divert attention from more controversial 
issues? To what extent did Nuri’s foreign policy isolate Iraq?  In addressing these 
questions this chapter will initially discuss Nuri’s foreign policy vision in general and 
then proceed to analyze in what fashion he implemented his plans and how his initiatives 
affected Iraq’s relations with Syria, Israel, and Egypt.  
 
Nuri’s Vision 
     Foreign policy was Nuri’s preferred area of activity. His international background and 
activities during his formative years and as an officer in the Arab Revolt, as discussed in 
Chapter II, go a long way to explain his continued interest in international affairs in his 





political career. Nuri grew up in the Ottoman Empire and was a product of its educational 
institutions. One result of this experience was his inclination to think in regional and 
strategic, rather than strictly national, terms. Since the Ottoman Empire had comprised 
most of the Middle East, it was natural for Nuri to take the whole region into 
consideration when formulating policies, even after the Empire was long gone. Another 
factor which stimulated such an outlook was the sense, which he shared with other Arabs, 
of being part of a larger Arab umma, or nation. Despite considerable regional differences 
in the Arab world, this term carries powerful connotations of homogeneity and unity, 
although not always existent in reality, and is therefore frequently exploited for various 
political purposes in Arab politics.     
     The Middle East of the mid-1950s was a very diverse region in terms of population, 
economy, and political system. Nuri often found himself at loggerheads with socialist and 
radical nationalist leaders in Egypt and Syria, but relations with Saudi Arabia also 
fluctuated due to historical rivalries creating tensions between the ruling houses in 
Baghdad, Amman, and Riyadh. The lingering imperialist presence in the Middle East of 
European powers and Western support for the state of Israel were complicating and 
embarrassing factors for Arab governments which maintained close ties with Western 
powers. Finally, increasing Soviet influence in the Middle East constituted an alarming 
development in the eyes of conservative Arab regimes. It is against this background that 
Nuri’s foreign policy needs to be analyzed.  
     Nuri’s vision for the Middle East was based on three principles: First, the best way to 
achieve true independence for Arab countries was through close cooperation with Britain. 





Second, Iraq must play a leading role in the Arab World.233 Third, the means to achieve 
leadership in the Arab world was the Fertile Crescent project, a federation primarily with 
Syria and Jordan, but open to accession by other Arab countries. Nuri had set before 
himself the task of implementing this ambitious program, and did not hesitate to go to 
great lengths to achieve his goal. The initial focus in this chapter will be on Syria, an 
example of how far Nuri was prepared to go to realize his dream. Next, Nuri’s pragmatic 
approach to Israel and the Palestinian issue will be analyzed. Finally, the reader’s 
attention will be drawn to Nuri’s confrontational relationship with Egyptian President 
Gamal ‘Abdul Nasser.  
 
Iraqi-Syrian Relations 
     Iraq’s relations with Syria were extremely complicated, even more so than those with 
Egypt. This part of the chapter discusses the reasons for this fact and also addresses the 
question of why the Syrian issue played such a prominent role in Iraqi foreign policy in 
the 1950s. There were several reasons for this. First, Syria was part of Nuri’s strategic 
scheme to create a greater Arab union or federation, the Fertile Crescent, with Syria and 
Jordan. Second, Iraq’s first king, Faisal I, had, before the British made him king of Iraq, 
aspired to become king of Syria. There was thus an emotional link between the 
Hashimites and Syria which went back to the pre-Mandate era.234 This part of the chapter, 
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however, focuses primarily on the reasons of more recent date for the Iraqi regime’s 
interest in Syria’s political leadership. It examines the extent of Iraqi influence over 
political life in Syria, and the methods used to further Iraqi interests in that country. 
Finally, British and American reactions to Iraqi policies towards Syria will be discussed 
and the question of whether differences existed between the two Western powers with 
regard to these policies will also be addressed.   
     Nuri al-Sa‘id viewed with alarm Nasser’s efforts to gain influence in Syria and the 
growing leftist trend in Syrian politics. Cairo and Baghdad both regarded control of or 
close ties with Syria as key to regional hegemony and the ability to isolate the rival for 
leadership in the Arab world.235 As a result, the Nasser-Nuri rivalry turned Syria into a 
battleground for an Egyptian-Iraqi propaganda war and struggle for influence in the 
country. A report by the American air attaché in Baghdad dated April 1955 testifies to 
Nuri’s great concern. According to the attaché, what appears to have amounted to an 
ultimatum to the effect that the proposed Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi defense pact must be 
signed or the government would face a coup d’état was presented to Syrian President al-
Atasi by the Syrian prime minister, foreign minister, chief of staff, and a delegation of 
Leftist army officers. Al-Atasi had requested that Iraq send in troops in the event of a 
coup. The Iraqi government had indicated that it would do so, and had asked for British 
and American views on a possible Iraqi military intervention. London and Washington 
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had discouraged Nuri from taking such action arguing that it would only result in 
increased regional tension.236 The report suggests that both Western powers opposed 
military intervention in Syria, but it is silent on U.S. and British views on a covert 
operation, which was likely their preferred course of action.237      
     Two methods among others which Iraq had applied to influence Syrian politics were 
money and propaganda. This had been the case when President Adib al-Shishakli had 
been overthrown in February 1954. He had been toppled by Syrian army officers, but it is 
clear that Iraqi Prime Minister Fadhil al-Jamali had pursued policies aiming at such 
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action, and leading to pro-Iraqi politicians assuming power in Syria.238 One of these 
politicians was Sabri al-‘Asali, whose conservative cabinet had been sworn in after al-
Shishakli’s overthrow. Having come under attack from the Ba‘thists and communists, al-
‘Asali had turned to the Iraqi government for support. Fadhil al-Jamali had been 
dispatched twice to Damascus for talks with the new Syrian government only to discover 
that the Syrians were not particularly interested in union with Iraq. Their primary 
objective was to persuade the Iraqis to make a commitment to intervene militarily should 
the radicals attempt to topple al-‘Asali’s conservative government. As a condition for any 
commitment, however, al-Jamali had persuaded al-‘Asali to accept an Iraqi-Syrian 
federation with Faisal II as its head.239 Al-Jamali’s condition for a military commitment 
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suggests that other methods than money and propaganda were used as well to influence 
Syrian politicians.      
     This Iraqi success was not of long duration, however, since Shukri al-Quwatli, a 
presidential candidate supported by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, won the elections in August 
1955.240 Al-Quwatli’s victory had prompted Nuri to declare to the British and American 
ambassadors that Syria was controlled by “an evilly-disposed minority”241 and that Iraq 
“could not allow the situation to deteriorate much further.”242 Nuri had further stated that 
Iraq would have to intervene, possibly militarily, if the Syrians did not “get rid of the 
subversive elements and those unfriendly to Iraq.”243 The Foreign Office, however, had 
opposed such action by Iraq at the time. Surprisingly enough, a few months later, in 
October, Nuri had explained to American Ambassador Waldemar Gallman that he did not 
intend to intervene militarily in Syria or “force any particular kind of association with 
Iraq on Syria.”244 He had allowed for the possibility, however, that Syria might ask for 
military assistance or some kind of association with Iraq. Nuri’s statement to Gallman 
was in response to a report that Syria had received arms from Czechoslovakia, a fact over 
which “he [Nuri] expressed great concern.”245 Nuri’s response to Syrian developments 
suggests an increasing frustration on his part until October of 1955. 246   
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     Meanwhile both the British and the Americans, with the former in the lead, had 
adopted the view that more forceful action was needed in Syria to ensure that a pro-West 
regime assumed power, though they still did not endorse overt military intervention by 
Iraq. The main reason for the gradual change in Western attitudes to Syria had been the 
attempts in 1955 and early 1956 to make Nasser’s policies less antagonistic to the West 
and Israel, with the eventual goal of cooperation with the West and a settlement of the 
Palestinian issue.247 These attempts had ended in failure in March 1956 when Foreign 
Secretary Selwyn “Lloyd recommended that Eden give approval to Nuri’s efforts to 
‘create a situation’” in which Syria would appeal for Iraqi intervention.248 It is obvious 
that the British position had moved from opposing to accepting military intervention if a 
pretext was first created.       
     By 1956 the increasing talk of an Egyptian-Syrian union had caused considerable 
alarm in Baghdad. The Nuri-regime’s great concern is not surprising, since such a 
development would have radically strengthened Nasser’s position in the Arab world at 
the expense of Nuri’s. Also, it might have provoked Israel to take action sooner or later, 
and it would have placed an anti-Iraqi regime in control of Syria, a fact which might in 
turn have caused problems along the western border, and increased propaganda against 
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the regime in Baghdad.249 Another important factor influencing Iraqi sensitivity with 
regard to the policies of Damascus was the Iraqi dependence on the petroleum pipeline to 
the Mediterranean; with a Nasserist government in Syria the operation of this pipeline 
could be in danger.250 An Egyptian-Syrian union was therefore an alarming prospect to 
Baghdad. Disruption of the flow of Iraqi oil to Europe during the Suez Crisis had cost 
Iraq considerable loss in oil revenues.  
   The nationalization of the Suez Canal, the Suez Crisis, and the coup attempts sponsored 
by Iraq and the Western powers further increased Egyptian influence in Syria at Iraq’s 
expense.251 These events had also accelerated and facilitated the union of Egypt and Syria 
under Gamal ‘Abdul Nasser’s leadership in the United Arab Republic on February 1, 
1958. The Arab Republic had signified a great propaganda and strategic victory for 
Nasser and a disaster for Nuri who had worked so hard to tie Syria to Iraq.252 Nuri’s 
policies towards Egypt and Syria had only resulted in alienating Syrian military officers 
and politicians, enhancing Nasser’s stature in the Arab world, and increasing Iraq’s 
isolation. The similarity of British and Iraqi policies towards Egypt and Syria in the 
middle of the 1950s had, not surprisingly, had similar effects—both countries’ isolation 
and considerable loss of influence in the region. Furthermore, these same policies had in 
Iraq’s case caused an intifadha against the regime and strengthened the domestic 
opposition to Nuri’s government among Iraqi politicians and military officers, greatly 
contributing to the Iraqi Revolution in 1958.       
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     Leftist Syrian politicians were not interested in closer ties with a monarchical regime. 
Iraqi leaders therefore became more involved in Syrian internal affairs to achieve their 
objectives. This was done both by overt and covert means. The Nuri regime even went as 
far as contemplating resorting to force to realize its Fertile Crescent project. Also, Syria’s 
contiguity with Iraq explains Nuri’s interest in Syrian developments and his sensitivity to 
the policies of its governments. Were a radical party or group of individuals to assume 
power in Syria, this could possibly strengthen the position of the Iraqi opposition, since 
the latter would likely draw inspiration from such a development in Syria, just as it had 
done in the case of Nasser’s policies. Moreover, Syria was of great symbolic and strategic 
importance to Nuri as a battleground for Egyptian and Iraqi propaganda, and as a crucial 
part of Nuri’s containment policy toward Egypt. Consequently, the “loss” of this country 
to Nasserism would considerably reduce Nuri’s standing in the Arab world, and in Nuri’s 
view greatly endanger Iraq’s national security. Finally, Western interests more or less 
coincided with Iraqi interests in Syria, though both Britain and the United States opposed 
an Iraqi invasion of the country, preferring covert means to install a pro-West Syrian 
government. Finally, there were differences between Britain and the U.S. as to the extent 
to which they were willing to endorse Iraqi policies towards Syria. 
 
Nuri’s position on Israel                
     Nuri pursued policies towards Israel on two levels, the official and the unofficial. In 
official statements Nuri could take quite an aggressive stance, depending on what 
political advantage could be derived from such a position, both in the domestic and in the 
greater Arab arena. An example of a firm stance taken on Israel was his first public 





statement after his return to office in 1954, when he had emphasized the need for Arab 
cooperation “[t]o repel the Zionist menace.”253 Following the British-French-Israeli 
attack on Egypt Nuri even went as far as calling for “the elimination of Israel and the 
return of the million Arab refugees to their homeland as the best solution for the Palestine 
problem.”254 The above quotes show that Nuri adapted his position on Israel to changing 
domestic and Middle Eastern developments.  
     Nuri displayed a more pragmatic streak in private conversations. British Ambassador 
Michael Wright reported that Nuri had stated in June 1957 in private conversations 
concerning the Israeli-Palestinian issue that  
one of two solutions ought to be adopted; - either the implementation, more or 
less, of the majority proposals of the United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine of August 31, 1947 which would involve Israel giving up at least much 
of the territory which was not allotted to her by the 1947 Resolution of the 
Assembly, or…a reversion to the…proposals put forward by India, Iran and 
Yugoslavia…for a Federal State in Palestine…both Jewish and Arab. The best 
means of reaching the first alternative would be for the United Nations Force to 
take over the territory now held by Israel which had not been allotted to her by the 
1947 Resolution. As regards refugees, …they must be offered the choice of 
returning to Israel or of being compensated. He [Nuri] believed (as he has often 
stated before) that only a small number would…wish to settle in Israel. 
…[N]either resolution…could…be reached unless the United States were 
prepared to bring sufficient influence and pressure to bear on Israel.255  
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Nuri’s views expressed in private conversations could most likely have been termed 
“pragmatic” in an Arab context, but would certainly not have been regarded as such by 
Israeli politicians.  
     Nuri recognized that Israel constituted a serious problem not only to the Arabs but 
also to Western interests in the Middle East, since the Israel problem “gave communist 
Russia the opportunity of deliberately keeping the waters in the Middle East troubled, and 
of inflaming opinion against the West and the friends of the West.”256 In conversations 
with American Ambassador Waldemar Gallman, however, Nuri was pragmatic, stating 
that “[o]nce an agreement had been reached in principle…between the Arab states and 
Israel]..he would favor lifting the economic boycott. The existence of the state of Israel 
was a fact that had to be accepted.”257 Being the source of the aforementioned problems, 
the Israel issue was at the same time an asset as well to Nuri, in so far as it could be 
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Arab Leaders (Jerusalem: Keter Books, 1972), p. 228. Ben Gurion’s position on the Arab refugees 
expressed in a conversation with an unnamed emissary of President Dwight Eisenhower in January 1956 
had been that if allowed to return Arab refugees would constitute a fifth column that would destroy Israel. 
The Prime Minister had, however, been willing to assist Arab governments in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq to 
resettle the refugees “in the unoccupied empty spaces” of those countries, Ben-Gurion, My Talks, p. 286. 
Ben-Gurion assumed no responsibility for the flight of the Arab refugees but had allowed 40,000 refugees 
to return “to facilitate the reunification of families,” ibid. He compared Israel’s efforts to assist and 
integrate Jewish refugees into Israeli society with the indifference of Arab governments to the Arab 
refugees, dismissing this treatment as exploitation of “them [Arab refugees] as a political weapon against 
Israel,” Ben-Gurion, My Talks, p. 286. Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett had also confirmed in a 
review of Israel’s foreign policy in May of 1955 that Israeli leaders had no intention of allowing the return 
“of tens of thousands of people even as a price for peace,” Itamar Rabinovich, and Jehuda Reinharz, eds., 
Israel in the Middle East: Documents and Readings on Society, Politics, and Foreign Relations 1948-
present (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 96. According to an American emissary to the 
Middle East Nasser took a position on the Arab refugees similar to that of Nuri, emphasizing the two 
problems of repatriation and compensation for refugees. Numbers were not the main issue, but the refugees 
must be guaranteed the freedom of choice. An issue that distinguished Nasser from Nuri, however, was the 
former’s emphasis on territorial continuity of the Arab countries in Africa and Asia. Ben-Gurion’s 
interpretation was that this meant that Nasser was demanding the southernmost part of Israel, including the 
port of Eilat, which was “out of the question,” Ben-Gurion, My Talks, pp. 277 and 284; Ben-Gurion does 
not mention the emissary by name, but Yaacov Herzog states that Secretary of the Treasury Robert 
Anderson had met with Ben-Gurion twice in January 1956 and once in March, Rabinovich and Reinharz, 
Israel in the Middle East, p. 105.       
256 Wright to D.S. Laskey, to the Foreign Office, Confidential, June 12, 1957, FO371/128056.  
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exploited by him to deflect criticism of Iraqi nationalists. Criticizing Israel incurred no 
political costs to Nuri, since the Western powers were informed of his true position. 
Nuri’s hope to distract the attention of the nationalists, however, appears not to have been 
fulfilled due to the opposition’s focus on his relationship with Britain.    
 
Iraqi-Egyptian Relations:  
     Nuri’s was a troubled relationship with Nasser, which was to be expected since the 
two men had diametrically different visions of the future of the Middle East. One of the 
greatest impediments to normal relations between the Egyptian president and the Iraqi 
prime minister was both men’s aspirations to leadership in the Arab world. Iraqi-
Egyptian rivalry, however, did not commence with the Egyptian Revolution in 1952, but 
goes back at least to the end of World War II when the independence of Syria and 
Lebanon from France left a power vacuum in the region.258      
     Nuri was very sensitive to Egyptian criticism, to which testify the numerous occasions 
on which he felt he needed to defend his foreign policy, in public addresses as well as in 
private conversations.259 Egyptian anti-Iraqi propaganda broadcasts from Sawt al-‘Arab 
were a thorn in the flesh of the Iraqi regime.260 Another Egyptian-controlled station, 
Radio Free Iraq, also pursued a strident anti-Nuri line, but the Egyptians denied any 
responsibility for the broadcasts.261 Following Iraqi threats that the Iraqi Ambassador 
might be withdrawn if the issue were not addressed, the station was shut down in June 
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1955.262 Anti-Iraqi propaganda was also broadcast from other Egyptian radio stations, 
with the Egyptians making veiled references to the Portsmouth Treaty riots in January 
1948. In a broadcast on January 26, 1955 the state-controlled Cairo radio indirectly 
incited Iraqis to reject the proposed Turkish-Iraqi Agreement and bring down the Nuri 
regime.263  Iraq’s close military ties with non-Arab countries constituted a major source 
of tension between Cairo and Baghdad, since Nasser’s objective was the opposite to that 
of Nuri, namely to pursue a foreign policy independent of both military blocs and to 
prevent foreign powers from maintaining a military presence or gaining a foothold in the 
Middle East.264 As has been mentioned already, one of the three principles of Nuri’s 
foreign policy was an alliance with Britain, a fact which made an understanding with 
Nasser virtually impossible.      
     One of the few measures Nuri could take to counter Nasser’s aggressive propaganda 
was to demonstrate, whenever an opportunity was offered, that he was a good Arab 
nationalist and champion of the Arab cause by offering assistance to any Arab country 
which was attacked by Israel.265 An example of this was Nuri’s foreign minister Burhan 
al-Din Bashayan’s announcement to the Arab world that Iraq would not hesitate to 
provide “any military aid required…in repelling Zionist aggression,”266 and that his 
country was “prepared to implement its obligations under the Arab League Collective 
Security Pact.”267 Another measure available in Nuri’s foreign policy arsenal and 
frequently resorted to was to publicly express support for Arab liberation movements and 
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Arab states which struggled to achieve independence, such as Algeria.268 The advantage 
of the two measures referred to above was of course that they incurred minimal political 
costs.   
     Despite Nuri’s authoritarian leadership style there was division in his administration 
over what was the best policy to adopt towards Nasser. The former believed that the most 
effective way to deal with the Egyptian leader was to put pressure on him, expecting that 
Britain would join him in pursuing such a policy towards Egypt. Nuri also hoped that 
Saudi Arabia would be drawn away from Egypt by asking the Americans to facilitate a 
settlement of Anglo-Saudi differences.269 Najib al-Rawi, Iraq’s ambassador to Egypt, 
however, held the view that such a policy would prove counter-productive. According to 
the British ambassador in Cairo, al-Rawi argued that “[b]ehind Nasser were the Free 
Officers who were more extremist than he.”270 A consequence of exerting pressure on 
Nasser would be that he would turn to the Russians, and a good reason for the British not 
to put pressure on Egypt was that the Egyptian leader could cause problems for the 
British over the Suez Canal Zone Base Agreement. In al-Rawi’s view, the Saudis would 
not break with Nasser for fear that he could incite Saudi citizens to overthrow the House 
of Sa‘ud.271 For the above reasons the Iraqi Ambassador concluded that “as long as there 
were differences between Egypt and Iraq and it was clear that the U.K. was trying to 
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build up Iraq at Egypt’s expense, the Egyptians would continue to make difficulties for 
the British in Arabia and elsewhere. As an example, the Egyptians had recently sent men 
to Saudi Arabia to stir up guerilla warfare on the frontier.”272 Not surprisingly, Nuri 
persisted in his policies towards Nasser.         
     Nuri also considered aggressive propaganda action to deal with the Egyptian 
president. A British Embassy report states that the Iraqi prime minister was planning to 
release a statement in mid-August of 1956 to the effect that “over the past year Nasser’s 
foreign policy has served the interests not of Egypt and the Arabs but of the Zionists and 
Communists.”273 Furthermore, the statement would reveal that Nasser had responded 
favorably to Anglo-American efforts encouraging him to play a leading role in bringing 
about an Arab-Israeli settlement. The statement would also disclose that the Egyptian 
leader had “asked for and obtained assurance from Nuri that Iraq would not exploit any 
such action by him to his detriment.”274 Nasser’s decision to accept a Soviet bloc offer to 
purchase arms, however,  “had led successively to Communist penetration of Egypt, the 
withdrawal of the Western offer of aid for the Aswan dam, and finally to the seizure of 
the Suez Canal,”275 It is doubtful whether the latter part of the statement would have had 
the intended effect in the Arab world, since the Cold War rhetoric suggests that it was 
directed at a Western audience and not at Arab public opinion.  
                                                          
272 Ambassador Trevelyan, British Embassy Cairo to A.D.M. Ross, the Foreign Office, Confidential, June 
22, 1956, FO371/121651. 
273 British Embassy Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Immediate, Confidential, August 9, 1956, 
FO371/121651. 
274 Ibid. Robert Anderson, Eisenhower’s emissary to the Middle East, confirmed to Ben-Gurion that Nuri 
al-Sa‘id had stated that “if Nasser makes peace he will not use it against him, but will do the same,” David 
Ben-Gurion, My Talks With Arab Leaders, p. 280. Nasser feared that it would have negative domestic 
repercussions for him if it leaked out that he was involved in talks aiming at peace with Israel, Ben-Gurion, 
My Talks, pp. 278-279.     
275 The British Embassy Baghdad to the Foreign Office, Immediate, Confidential, August 9, 1956, 
FO371/121651. 





     Nuri hoped that both the United States and Britain would support the above statement. 
Both countries’ ambassadors agreed that Nuri’s plan might be useful for propaganda 
purposes, but the British Ambassador Michael Wright expressed doubts about the 
wisdom of referring to Nasser’s willingness to bargain with the West over Israel. In 
Wright’s view it would benefit Nuri’s statement if he also pointed out that  
Nasser is interested in the Israeli problem only in so far as it can be used to further 
his own designs of dominating the Arab world; that he is prepared to ditch anyone 
and anything if it suits him; and that while complaining bitterly when any other 
Arab State takes an independent line he never consults the rest of the Arab world 
when acting himself.276 
 
Wright’s suggestion suffers from the same basic flaw as the latter part of Nuri’s proposed 
statement—it was not directed at an Arab audience. What mattered to the latter was 
Nasser’s vitriolic anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist propaganda. Nasser would always 
enjoy superiority over Nuri in the field of propaganda, since the latter could not engage in 
criticism of his British and American allies.    
    Nuri’s plans to issue an anti-Nasser statement discussed in the above paragraph and the 
British and American ambassadors’ reactions to this scheme suggest that the thinking of 
these men, in particular that of Nuri and Wright, bore great similarity to one another. 
Nuri’s plan to emphasize that Nasser’s policies served the interests of Communism 
demonstrates that Nuri and the Western powers shared the conviction that the Soviet 
Union posed a tangible threat to the Middle East. Britain and the United States did not 
take into consideration, however, that Nuri was one of the very few leaders in the Arab 
Middle East who wholly embraced the Western concept of containment. The failure of 
London and Washington to realize or accept the implications of this fact is difficult to 
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explain other than as a consequence of over-emphasis on Cold War strategies, and 
ignorance and disregard of the force of Arab nationalism, which so captivated Arab 
public opinion.277 Nuri’s disregard of this fact, however, is difficult to justify, since he 
was a Middle Eastern and not a Western statesman, and should be viewed in the context 
of his personal rivalry with Nasser.  
     Another significant circumstance is the date Wright’s aforementioned report was sent 
to the Foreign Office, August 9, 1956, which is more than two weeks after Nasser’s 
nationalization of the Suez Canal on July 26. The positive reactions in the Arab world to 
this decision could neither have escaped the attention of leaders in London and 
Washington nor of Nuri in Baghdad. One can therefore conclude that the facts were there 
to see, but policymakers interpreted them in light of prevailing strategic considerations or 
personal antipathies and rivalries. This would explain why Nasser’s obvious popularity 
with Arab public opinion was disregarded and why London, Washington, and Baghdad 
entertained false hopes to denigrate the Egyptian leader. The prospects were bleak that 
Western and Iraqi propaganda would convince Arab public opinion of a communist threat 
to the Middle East which was more serious than the threat to Arab countries posed by 
France, Britain, the United States, and their allies in the region, in particular Israel, but 
also Iraq.  
     The chances of success for Nuri’s project to demonstrate to Arab public opinion a link 
between Zionism and Nasser, which would presumably be disastrous to the latter’s image 
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as the foremost champion of the Arab cause, were most likely negligible. Iraq’s struggle 
against Zionism could not compare favorably with that of Egypt.278 Furthermore, drawing 
attention to policies towards Israel would only bring to the fore Western support for 
Israel, an undesirable consequence for the West as well as for Iraq, since any discussion 
of the Western position on Israel would reflect negatively on Iraq as well, due to its close 
ties with Britain and the United States. Wright’s doubts concerning this aspect of Nuri’s 
plans suggest that the British ambassador was aware of the problems such an attempt 
might cause. Finally, Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad Pact, a defense organization 
highly unpopular in Iraq, was sharply criticized by the Egyptian radio station Sawt al-
‘Arab.279 Had Nuri launched his new anti-Nasser propaganda campaign, his relationship 
with the West would naturally have been subjected to even more violent Egyptian 
attacks, since Nasser’s record of cooperation with “imperialist” powers was much cleaner 
than that of Nuri. This impression had been even further reinforced by the nationalization 
of the Suez Canal.280 For the aforementioned reasons Nuri’s plan would thus quite 
possibly have backfired. It must be said in Wright’s defense, however, that he had 
recognized some of the likely negative consequences of Nuri’s project. 
     According to Wright, Nuri, who was in London at the time, viewed the nationalization 
of the Suez Canal as  
part of the concerted plan between Nasser and the communists to establish Nasser 
as the leader of Arab nationalism and thus to give him a grip over all Arab 
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countries… He urged that his [Nasser] action should be resisted and his 
pretensions deflated…But he warned that if action were at any stage to be taken 
against Nasser it must not be in conjunction with or to the benefit of Israel. He left 
London reassured that this warning should be heeded. The President of Pakistan 
[Iskander Mirza] told him subsequently that he had given a similar warning and 
had received similar assurances. Provided Israel were kept out of the matter Nuri 
was confident that the troubles could be dealt with and that the whole situation in 
the Arab world would thereafter improve again.281    
    
It is clear from Wright’s account that Nuri was not averse to the idea of Britain teaching 
Nasser a lesson, obviously believing that this would benefit his own claim to Arab 
leadership, but that Nuri at the same time feared the dangerous repercussions on the Iraqi 
regime of Israeli involvement in an operation against Egypt. He was obviously under the 
impression that the British would not take joint action with Israel. The impression that the 
British government had made some sort of assurances to this effect is strengthened by the 
Pakistani president’s testimony.282  
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Nuri to return to Baghdad. In both the letter and the memoirs al-Jamali further claims that he had asked the 
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     The previous two chapters have argued that Nuri’s domestic policies were a source of 
concern for the British, while this chapter has contended that British policies towards the 
Middle East also complicated Nuri’s own position both at home and in the Arab world.283 
The Suez Crisis is the most obvious instance of such policies. The Israeli-Anglo-French 
attack on Egypt had exposed the Iraqi monarchy to the danger of being swept away by 
popular unrest.284 How insecure the Iraqi prime minister had felt had been further 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to inform his rival for leadership in the Arab world of the secret plans of a very close ally. Furthermore, 
Wright’s account of the London meeting with Nuri shows that the latter had no objection to overthrowing 
or at least teaching Nasser a lesson, on condition that Israel not participate in such an operation. Israel’s 
participation in a British operation against Egypt had not been discussed during the London meeting. Had 
Nuri known of Britain’s collusion with Israel, he would have had a weighty reason to inform Nasser, since 
such an operation would have had very serious repercussions on Nuri’s own position in Iraq. Still, Nuri 
would not likely have resorted to such drastic action immediately. He would certainly have attempted to 
persuade the British to keep the Israelis out of the plan, as is suggested by the conversation he had in 
London. Also, al-A‘zami has raised a legitimate point above, but one could argue, in al-Jamali’s defense, 
that there was no need for him to inform the Egyptian ambassador of the British plan, since Nuri had 
allegedly decided to dispatch al-Suwaidi to Egypt to convey this information. Based upon the 
aforementioned one can conclude that there was no reason for Nuri to alert Nasser to the impending British 
attack, since the former was not privy to the Israeli involvement in the plan to attack Egypt. The question 
then remains, why would al-Jamali make such a claim? One possible explanation is that he was concerned 
about his political legacy. However, at the time al-Jamali was not a minister in Nuri’s cabinet and what 
Nuri did would therefore not have reflected negatively on al-Jamali. Another possibility is that Nuri 
changed his mind and never sent al-Suwaidi to Egypt, but as has been pointed out already, he never had any 
reason in the first place to send anyone to Egypt on such a mission.  
283 Michael Ionides, British member of the Iraqi Development Board, discusses in a letter dated July 31, 
1956, a few days after the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the probable consequences of the decision by 
the United States and Britain to rescind the loan they had approved for the construction of the Egyptian 
High Dam. He argues that the Arabs will interpret this decision as Western support for Israel, that Nuri’s 
position will be eroded, and that the domestic opposition to Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad Pact will 
increase. Ionides recommends that the British look for a new Iraqi leader to support after Nuri, and that 
they change their policy radically: “Unless that policy includes unequivocal opposition to expansionist 
Zionism it will not be acceptable to the Arabs, and the tale of troubles will go on,” Ionides, Divide And 
Lose, pp. 136-137.  Ionides’s prediction turned out to be surprisingly accurate.   
284 Wright to Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Office, Confidential, February 8, 1957, FO371/128038. Ionides 
describes Nuri’s dilemma as follows: “ If the invasion went on, to Israel’s evident benefit, Nuri would fall 
unless he broke with Britain but then, without British support, Nuri would fall. If the invasion was stopped, 
that would be a victory for Nasser; if the invasion went on, that would be an even greater victory for 
Nasser, for with Nuri the Baghdad Pact would fall too so far as Arabs were concerned, and that was 
Nasser’s primary aim,” Ionides, Divide And Lose, p. 172. Faced with the possibility of his own overthrow, 
Nuri had immediately attempted to exert damage control to preempt criticism that most likely would have 
incited Iraqi public opinion against the regime. Nuri had declared that his government was considering 
extending military assistance to Egypt, and announced that Iraq had severed diplomatic relations with 
France and would boycott Baghdad Pact meetings attended by British representatives, Wright to Selwyn 
Lloyd, the Foreign Office, Confidential, February 8, 1957, FO371/128038; Pravda, October 31, 1956; 
Krasnaya Zvezda, November 10, 1956; both sources referred to in Fedchenko, Irak v Borbe za 
Nezavisimost’, p. 209. On November 9 Iraqi Foreign Minister Burhan al-Din Bashayan had informed the 





accentuated by his crackdown on opposition leaders, several of whom had been 
arrested.285 Nuri had been stunned by the British-French ultimatum to Israel and Egypt on 
October 29, 1956, since he had expected to be consulted prior to any further action by the 
British. Furthermore, the Iraqi prime minister had believed that the ensuing Anglo-French 
operation would be a police action against both the attacking Israelis and the attacked 
Egyptians.286 He had realized he had to act quickly to reduce the damaging impact of the 
crisis and had therefore designed a plan to the effect that when ceasefire was announced  
it should be as far as possible in response to an appeal from the fellow members 
of Britain in the Baghdad Pact. In this way the Moslem members could claim 
credit for a major part in putting an end to fighting, the Pact might be saved, and 
Britain’s position vis-à-vis the Arab world made easier.287  
 
The above discussion shows that it is possible that the British had caused as many 
problems to Nuri with their attack on Egypt, as he had to them with his unpopular 
domestic and foreign policies.        
     Wright states in a report that the situation in Baghdad was so serious that “[i]t was, in 
fact, touch and go whether Iraq would withdraw from the Baghdad Pact unless Britain 
did so, and whether relations with Britain would be broken off.”288 Nuri was not likely to 
take such drastic action, however, since he must have resorted to severing diplomatic 
                                                                                                                                                                             
French ambassador to Baghdad of   Iraq’s decision to sever diplomatic relations with France. The decision 
applied only to diplomatic relations, meaning that France’s consular staff would remain in Iraq, The Iraq 
Times, November 10, 1956, pp. 1 and 23. Iraq’s reaction to the Suez Crisis had come a week later than that 
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relations with France precisely in order to reduce the need for breaking off relations with 
Britain as well. Nuri had most likely calculated that the former measure would satisfy 
public opinion to such an extent that the monarchy could remain in place. Furthermore, it 
is clear that Nuri had believed he could avoid severing relations with Britain by 
introducing a state of emergency. Breaking off diplomatic relations with London and 
withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact would certainly have been very popular initiatives, 
which would have radically improved the regime’s image. Such steps would, however, 
most likely have emboldened the opposition to press for internal reforms as well, and 
Nuri would have found his position eroded without the support from his British ally and 
from the other members of the Baghdad Pact, had he opted to withdraw from the Pact.289  
     Nuri would certainly have attempted to normalize relations with Britain and the 
Baghdad Pact once he thought he had weathered the storm, but resumption of close ties 
with Britain and the Pact would have constituted a formidable task, since there would 
have been little justification for such initiatives in the eyes of the public. Being a shrewd 
and very experienced politician, Nuri had probably anticipated the likely results of the 
“precipitous” action discussed above, and therefore decided against burning his bridges. 
At the same time, it is possible that Nuri had emphasized to Wright how close he had 
been to breaking off relations with London and withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact in 
order to impress on the Ambassador how damaging the Suez operation had been to the 
Iraqi regime in an attempt to achieve concessions from the British government and 
underscore to the British Iraq’s great value as an ally, implying that had Nuri been 
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consulted beforehand the negative fallout of the Suez Crisis could have been minimized. 
Finally, the Suez Crisis had also cost Iraq a great deal economically as a result of the 
Syrian destruction of portions of the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline effectively cutting 
off Iraq’s revenues from the pumping of oil through Syria to the Mediterranean. 
Fortunately for the Iraqi government, however, the loss of oil revenues had been balanced 
to some extent by the huge funds, over £70 million, of the Development Board.290 One 
can conclude from the above discussion that the Suez Crisis incurred great costs to Nuri, 
but that the severing of relations with Britain would have caused even more problems, 
and so the Iraqi leader had never seriously contemplated it.    
     The strained relations with Egypt continued after the Suez Crisis, with the Egyptians 
accusing the Iraqis of supplying British planes with fuel “at Iraqi military air bases during 
the air raids on Egyptian cities and” also claiming “that the wounded of the armies that 
invaded Egypt were transported to Iraqi hospitals for treatment.”291 These accusations 
were dismissed as “fabrications” by the Iraqi government and they were most likely 
unfounded. Britain had bases on Cyprus and it would have been much easier for British 
military aircraft to operate from this island than from distant Iraq. Had British bombers 
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made sorties from al-Habbaniyya and al-Shu‘aiba in Iraq they would have required 
permission to fly over Jordan to reach their targets in Egypt, and it is highly unlikely that 
King Hussein would have granted the Royal Air Force such permission, since he would 
have incurred the wrath of Arab nationalists. The same holds true for Iraq. Furthermore, 
Ambassador Wright’s report discussed above states unequivocally that Nuri had 
complained about not having been consulted by the British. An operation as the one 
described in the Egyptian accusations must have been planned in advance and one can 
therefore conclude that the accusations were mere propaganda.292  
     It has been contended in this part of the chapter that Nuri took the British ambassador 
into his confidence regarding various plans to damage Nasser’s image in the Arab world 
and that Ambassador Wright had tried to dampen Nuri’s enthusiasm when he felt that it 
might have undesirable consequences. It has also been shown that Nuri and Wright 
displayed ignorance regarding Arab nationalism and chose to disregard the possibility of 
other reactions to their plans than those which they themselves anticipated. Furthermore, 
this chapter has argued that the British did not return the confidence Nuri placed in them. 
The obvious instance is the Suez Crisis when the British government had acted without 
consulting Nuri. The argument proposed here is that Nuri had focused more on damage 
control than on reorientation of his foreign policy away from the alliance with Britain. He 
had never seriously contemplated severing diplomatic relations with London or 
withdrawing from the Baghdad Pact, instead focusing on cosmetic changes to his foreign 
policy which would not incur any real political cost, such as breaking off diplomatic 
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relations with France and boycotting Baghdad Pact meetings attended by British 
representatives.         
     This chapter has argued that Nuri’s foreign policy towards Egypt and Syria was based 
on his vision of the Fertile Crescent, a union or federation of Iraq, Syria, and Jordan 
under Hashimite leadership. This vision had brought him into conflict with Egypt, a 
power which had also aspired to Arab leadership. In order to achieve his goal Nuri had 
relied on Western, in particular British, support. The facts presented here clearly suggest 
that London played a very active role in coordinating policies with Baghdad to realize 
Nuri’s project and ensure that Britain would benefit from it. The findings corroborate the 
accusations of the Iraqi opposition that “imperialist” Britain was deeply involved in 
Nuri’s foreign policy. Britain’s interests were not automatically those of Iraq, however, 
as is testified to by the Suez Crisis. Nuri had expected to be consulted by Eden before the 
Israeli-British-French attack on Egypt and was greatly alarmed, since he realized that 
Israel’s participation in the operation would cause unrest in Iraq. The United States had 
initially adopted a more cautious approach to dealing with Nasser before Eisenhower had 
decided to pursue more proactive policies in Syria to bring about regime change. Finally, 
Israel was an enemy in Nuri’s view and had caused serious problems to him during the 
Suez Crisis. Typically, however, he could exploit the Arab-Israeli issue in his efforts to 
appear as a champion of the Arab cause in order to offset criticism regarding his pro-










THE FREE OFFICERS 
 
An anti-regime movement emerged in the Iraqi armed forces in the early 1950s initially 
in the form of cells or groups organized by individual military officers independently of 
one another. These groups later merged into one organization—the Free Officers 
movement—without, however, surrendering their independent thinking, and embracing 
one single ideology, political program, and leader. This chapter will address two 
questions pertaining to this circumstance. First, whether there was a causal connection 
between the deep division and fierce rivalry among different military factions and 
officers after the July 14 revolution and the fact that the Free Officers movement never 
constituted a very cohesive organization with one undisputed leader and an unequivocal 
political, social, and economic program for the post-revolutionary period. Second, 
whether this circumstance also determined the manner in which the coup was executed.  
 
The Iraqi Army and Politics   
     The Iraqi military was not entirely unfamiliar with national politics prior to the July 14 
coup d’état of 1958. The most important coup was the one which brought Rashid ‘Ali al-
Gailani back to power on April 1, 1941.293 This coup compelled ‘Abd al-Ilah to leave the 
country. When he returned to Iraq some of the leaders of the 1941 movement were 
executed,294 many military units were disbanded, and a large number of lower-rank 
                                                          
293 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 439, 453; Malik Mufti, Sovereign Creations, pp. 32, 35.  
294 Husain ‘Abd al-Khaliq, Thawrat 14 Tammuz 1958 al-‘Iraqiyya wa ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim [14 July 1958 
Revolution of Iraq and ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim] (Dimashq: Dar al-Hassad lil-Nashr wa al-Tawzi‘, 2003), p. 
75.  





officers were forced to retire.295 The memory of 1941 remained with both the military 
and the civilians involved in the events.  
     The resentment the above developments caused in the military and among Iraqi 
nationalists had apparently not been forgotten in the late 1950s and most likely explains 
the display on July 14, 1958 of Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah’s mutilated body in front of 
the Ministry of Defense on the site where one of the leaders of the May movement of 
1941, the 1941 military coup, had been executed.296 There is no evidence, however, that 
this bitterness precipitated any attempts at organizing a secret anti-regime movement in 
the Iraqi officer corps, or that officers critical of ‘Abd al-Ilah’s role in the executions of 
army officers in 1941 would be prepared to go as far as their colleagues did in 1958. If 
this assumption is correct, one should be able to point to factors or events which occurred 
between the early 1940s and 1958 which could have prompted a radicalization of military 
opposition to the regime.  
 
Origins of the Free Officers Movement 
     Opinions vary on the origins of the Iraqi Free Officers movement, but it is clear that 
Engineer Major Rif‘at al-Hajj Sirri was active proselytizing within the armed forces in 
September of 1952, a few weeks after the Egyptian Revolution of July 23 had overthrown 
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the monarchy.297 It appears that ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim was another officer who while in 
Palestine in 1948 entertained plans to create an officers organization because of the Iraqi 
government’s alleged “collusion with the imperialists and its lack of allegiance to Arab 
nationalism.”298 Qasim himself, most likely wishing to settle the question of leadership of 
the Free Officers movement and his revolutionary credentials once and for all, claimed at 
a press conference in Baghdad that “the revolution that has taken place in Iraq had been 
uppermost in his mind ever since he graduated from the Military College in 1934.”299 
This claim was difficult to surpass, since Qasim was older than the other officers on the 
Supreme Committee, and more importantly, impossible to verify.300  
     It is quite possible that the creation of Israel on May 14, 1948, with the ensuing Arab-
Israeli military conflict initiated on May 15, the subsequent defeat of the invading armies 
of Egypt, Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, and the loss of Palestine, even prior to 
the Egyptian revolution had instilled into the minds of certain Iraqi army officers a wish 
to engage in secret political activities against the Iraqi regime.301 Furthermore, it is not 
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unlikely that the defeat on the battle field had fanned their resentment and incited them to 
attempt to rid their country of a government perceived of as not having done enough to 
prevent the nakba, the disaster (the creation of Israel and the permanent refugee status of 
a large number of Palestinians). The successful Egyptian coup four years later 
indubitably served as a source of direct inspiration for Sirri and other Iraqi officers.302 At 
the same time, however, the perception of many Iraqi officers that Arab governments 
could have done more to prevent the nakba was based on their belief that their own 
government had prevented them from playing an effective role in the Palestinian war.303  
     Two other events which most likely also reinforced the determination of Iraqi officers 
to remove the regime in Baghdad were the so-called wathba—the Leap—of 1948, and the 
intifadha—the uprising—of November 1952.304 The first event had been sparked by the 
extremely unpopular Anglo-Iraqi Portsmouth Agreement, signed on January 15, 1948, 
and by the government’s rejection of the opposition’s demands for civil liberties and 
changes in the electoral system which would guarantee free and direct elections.305 
Interestingly enough, even in a crisis which was caused by domestic factors, such as the 
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intifadha, an international element was also present as demonstrated by the burning of the 
American Information Office in Baghdad during the November riots, which was most 
likely an expression of resentment at U.S. support for Israel.306  
     The wathba erupted in January of 1948 after the Iraqi government had held a meeting 
without inviting the opposition to discuss the Portsmouth Treaty, which Prime Minister 
Salih Jabr had gone to London to negotiate. Demonstrations in early January against the 
treaty were ignored and it was signed in Portsmouth on January 15 by the two 
governments. This event was followed by two bloody demonstrations later the same 
month, during which many protesters were killed when the police opened fire to disperse 
the crowds. The wathba brought down the Jabr government and prevented the Treaty’s 
ratification by the Iraqi parliament.307  
     From an Iraqi perspective, two other milestones in Middle East history must be 
viewed in the context of the wathba and the intifadha—the loss of Palestine, the nakba, 
and the Egyptian Revolution of July 1952. Both these events stirred up popular passions 
in the Arab world, the former because it was seen by the Arabs as a disaster, and the latter 
due to its pan-Arab implications. In a sense, developments of 1948 and 1952 
strengthened the sentiments of unity and a common destiny in the Arab world, at least 
among intellectuals and military officers.  
     In 1955 and 1956 external events again acted as a catalyst for anti-British and anti-
regime sentiments in Iraq both among civilians and military officers. Their country 
acceded to the Baghdad Pact in February of 1955 despite domestic opposition.308 This 
was regarded by the Iraqi public as just another attempt by Britain to perpetuate its 
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influence in Iraq and achieve through the Pact what London had failed to realize with the 
rejected Portsmouth Agreement of 1948.309 Gamal ‘Abdul Nasser’s nationalization of the 
Suez Canal on July 26, 1956 also contributed to a rise in nationalist sentiments in the 
Arab world, which in turn translated into the forming of new Iraqi Free Officers cells in 
the army and air force.310 The intensely anti-Hashimite and anti-Nuri broadcasts of the 
Cairo-based radio station Sawt al-‘Arab played an important role in confirming the Iraqi 
public’s suspicions about the new military alliance as well.311 The reaction of military 
officers to these events again suggests that they took a keen interest in political 
developments in Iraq and largely shared the sentiments of Iraqi intellectuals with regard 
to the policies of the regime.     
     The event which was most detrimental to the regime’s pro-British policies, however, 
was the Suez Crisis of November 1956.312 The Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt 
made it very difficult for Nuri to justify Iraq’s close ties with Britain: A nation which was 
Iraq’s partner in the Baghdad Pact, the goal of whose purported policy was to defend the 
Middle East against Soviet expansion, had itself proved guilty of the very same 
aggression which it claimed threatened the region from its northern neighbor. The fact 
that an Arab country was allied to a Western power which had attacked the Arab umma, 
nation, was simply unacceptable to Iraqi and Arab opinion, and demonstrated how wide a 
chasm separated the regime from the Iraqi people.   
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     Partly as a result of developments in the mid-1950s a tendency towards proliferation 
and merging of Free Officers cells became pronounced. In November of 1956 ‘Abd al-
Karim Qasim was stationed in Jordan, where he had been dispatched with Iraqi units to 
assist the Jordanian army in the event of an Israeli attack during the Suez Crisis. In 
protest against Iraqi policies at the time, Qasim had informed Syrian army units, which 
were stationed in Jordan for the same purpose as the Iraqis, that he would not use his 
troops against Syria. He had also confided in his subordinate, ‘Abd al-Salam Muhammad 
‘Arif, that he had formed an organization, the purpose of which was to overthrow the 
Iraqi regime.313 Also, there are indications that two major Free Officer groups merged 
during the Suez Crisis. One, including prominent Free Officers such as Rif‘at al-Hajj 
Sirri and Nazim al-Tabaqchali, had been joined by the end of 1954 by Qasim’s group. 
The other major cell led by Brigadiers Muhyi al-Din ‘Abd al-Hamid and Naji Talib, and 
including other prominent Free Officers such as Lieutenant Colonel ‘Abd al-Karim 
Farhan and Lieutenant Colonel Wasfi Tahir had been formed early in 1956.314 These two 
main groups had merged during the Suez Crisis at which time Qasim had been elected “to 
preside over the central committee of Free Officers which led the united movement.”315 
Also, the large number of new members who joined the movement at this time is ample 
evidence of the widespread frustration with Nuri’s regime in the armed forces.316   
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     Once the Free Officers had elected a Supreme Committee consisting of fourteen 
members and invited Qasim to chair its meetings the movement was given a firmer 
organizational structure, although this did not necessarily translate into a more centralized 
manner of operation.317 The Supreme Committee made several decisions which appeared 
on the surface to aim at increased centralization, but individual officers often disregarded 
these decisions and acted on their own. Other decisions seem to have been implemented 
more scrupulously. Thus, e.g., the Committee agreed upon that each committee member 
organize other officers in a network of cells, each consisting of three-five officers who 
were to maintain contact with the Committee or other cells through one of the members 
of each individual cell. Individual cells had no knowledge of membership or activities of 
other cells.318 Furthermore, sub-committees were created to deal with issues such as 
planning, propaganda and organization, collection of information, and financial 
matters.319 The structure of the movement thus resembled that of a secret organization, 
but without a strictly implemented discipline and hierarchy at the top.          
     Scholars and Free Officers are at variance over how the chairman of the Supreme 
Committee was elected and what his role was originally intended to be. This issue is of 
great import for the understanding of developments after the July Revolution. According 
to one version, the Committee agreed that Qasim chair its meetings by force of his 
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seniority with respect to his service.320 His intended function on the Supreme Committee 
appears to have been that of a primus inter pares. The different interpretations of the role 
assigned to Qasim, and the deteriorating relations between him and the Supreme 
Committee’s secretary, Engineer Lieutenant Colonel Rajab ‘Abd al-Majid, even led to an 
unsuccessful attempt by the latter to have Qasim replaced with Naji Talib.321 According 
to another account, however, one officer suggested at a S.C. meeting that the leadership 
issue be discussed, whereupon two proposals were submitted for a vote. One proposal 
advocated collective leadership of the Supreme Committee, while the other favored the 
role of a chairman of the Committee. The proposals were discussed and it was decided 
that the latter was preferable. Upon this, three candidates were nominated for the post, 
Brigadier ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, Colonel Muhyi al-Din ‘Abd al-Hamid, and Colonel Naji 
Talib. Qasim was elected chairman by force of his position as the oldest officer on the 
Committee, and in accordance with the military protocol of the organization.322 The 
different accounts of Qasim’s role on the Supreme Committee clearly suggest that he 
lacked the authority of a Sole Leader, his preferred title used by the press after July 14, 
1958.         
     From the outset one of the major concerns of the Supreme Committee was secrecy. 
Meetings therefore took place in the guise of dinner parties or regular visits in the houses 
of individual members. All S.C. members were rarely present at any one of these 
meetings. As a result of the need for complete secrecy the Committee maintained no 
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records of the names of the Free Officers.323 Fortunately for the Free Officers their 
clandestine activities were facilitated by the Free Officers cell active in the Directorate of 
Military Intelligence, which provided crucial information to the movement.324  
 
Social Background and Political Affiliations 
     A brief discussion of the social background of the Free Officers on the Supreme 
Committee and their political and religious affiliations will shed light on why they shared 
the sentiments of ordinary Iraqis and to what extent they were representative of the armed 
forces at large.  
     Most Supreme Committee members did not come from wealthy families. Of the 
fourteen members all but one, Naji Talib whose father was a wealthy landowner, came 
from families who lived in relatively modest circumstances. Most officers had grown up 
in Baghdad, and only Talib, Farhan, and Tahir Yahya were born outside Baghdad. The 
social background of the majority of the S.C. members reflected the officer corps in 
general, most of which came from middle-class or lower middle-class background.  All 
Committee officers except Naji Talib and Muhsin Husain al-Habib were Arab Sunni. 
Talib and al-Habib were Shi‘is. Qasim whose mother was a Shi‘i, grew up in a mixed 
Sunni-Shi‘i family. The number of Kurds (none) and Arab Shi‘is (two) on the Committee 
reflected the small number of these two groups in the officer corps in general, in 
particular in the higher ranks. The admission of Kurds into the Staff College had been 
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greatly reduced since the Kurdish rebellion in the mid-1940s.325 The religious affiliation 
of the Supreme Committee reflected that of the army at large but not of the Iraqi 
population, the majority of which were Shi‘is. Furthermore, the fact that a majority of the 
Committee officers lived in the capital did not reflect the reality that most Iraqis did not 
live in Baghdad. On the other hand, they were representative of those who carried out the 
revolution, since it took place in the capital. More importantly, however, despite the fact 
that the Supreme Committee members did not represent the Iraqis in several respects, 
they were representative of the population at large, since they did not belong to the 
wealthy families who ruled and controlled the country.    
     With respect to their political affiliations, the Supreme Committee officers were 
nationalists of one shade or another. Scholars term Rif‘at al-Hajj Sirri, Naji Talib, Rajab 
‘Abd al-Majid, Muhsin Husain al-Habib, ‘Abd al-Karim Farhan, ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-
Amin, Tahir Yahya, ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Arif, and Muhammad Sab‘ nationalists. Wasfi 
Tahir and Sabih ‘Ali Ghalib had communist leanings, and ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Shawwaf 
and Muhyi al-Din ‘Abd al-Hamid leaned towards the moderate socialists, the National 
Democratic Party. ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif was a pan-Arab nationalist with strong religious 
convictions, advocating union with the United Arab Republic. Qasim was influenced by 
the National Democratic Party’s political program. Neither he nor Muhyi al-Din ‘Abd al-
Hamid, however, embraced pan-Arabism. Isma‘il ‘Ali was influenced by communist 
ideas and Salih Mahdi ‘Ammash displayed Ba‘thist leanings. Sirri, who was not on the 
Supreme Committee due to the authorities’ suspicions regarding his political views, and 
Rajab‘Abd al-Majid strongly espoused pan-Arabism. The former also leaned towards 
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conservative ideas and Islam. The concept of an Islamically based pan-Arabism was 
common among Sirri’s associates, such as Nazim al-Tabaqchali.326 The circumstance that 
the Free Officers were fervent nationalists, however, did not facilitate unanimity, since 
they espoused other ideologies at the same time.  
     The array of political ideologies on the Supreme Committee represented a potential 
recipe for future disaster. Nevertheless, it was a true reflection of the diverse political 
landscape in Iraqi society and in this sense it faithfully mirrored popular sentiments in the 
country. The reason that the Free Officers were able to reach a certain degree of 
consensus despite profound differences is that no one exercised real power. The situation 
changed radically with Qasim’s self-proclaimed role as “Sole Leader” following the 
revolution. Most likely he had this role in mind for himself shortly prior to the July 14 
coup, when he realized that he or his subordinate co-conspirators would command the 
units which could enter Baghdad, and most likely much earlier than that, while awaiting 
an auspicious moment to strike. This conclusion is based on the fact that he concealed his 
coup plans from most of his fellow Free Officers.      
 
Contacts with Political Leaders 
     The need for strict secrecy meant that information about the Free Officers’ activities 
was principally restricted to the Supreme Committee and that external contacts must be 
kept to a minimum in order to reduce the risk of exposing the movement to the regime’s 
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intelligence network. Information about what was going on within the movement was 
also at times withheld by certain Committee members from other Committee officers. 
The reason for this was the disregard of individual officers of Supreme Committee 
decisions which they themselves had voted to implement. The Supreme Committee had 
decided on the first day of its existence to ban all contacts between the Free Officers and 
civilians. It did not take long for the Committee to realize, however, that its decision 
would have proven counter-productive had it been enforced, due to communist and 
Ba‘thist activities among military officers.327 The Supreme Committee was concerned 
about these civilian activities, since they posed a security threat for at least two reasons: 
civilians were not proficient in the art of conspiracy, and they did not know whether the 
military officers they cultivated were trustworthy.328 Most likely there was one more 
reason for the Committee’s concern about these contacts, possibly of equal significance 
as the two mentioned above: namely, that they took place outside the control of the Free 
Officers since they were initiated by political organizations and not by the Officers 
themselves. The contacts were therefore incompatible with the role of the Committee, 
which was to plan and carry out a coup and a revolution.  
     As a result of the Supreme Committee’s concerns about the activities of civilian 
political organizations in the officer corps it asked that these activities be suspended. The 
organizations in question complied, but the Committee denied the request of the Front of 
National Union that one of its members be allowed to attend S.C. meetings. In early 
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1958, however, the Committee and the Front agreed that contacts be initiated on the basis 
of necessity and that these contacts take place between Colonel Rajab ‘Abd al-Majid, 
secretary of the Supreme Committee, and Siddiq Shanshal on behalf of the Front. Qasim 
did not regard himself bound by this agreement and maintained connections with both the 
Communist Party of Iraq and the National Democratic Party. He met on several occasions 
in the months before the July 14 coup with Kamal ‘Umar Nazimi, Communist member of 
the Supreme National Committee of the Front of National Union, without informing the 
Free Officers Supreme Committee of these meetings.329 It is quite possible that the 
“private” contacts of certain officers with civilian leaders reflect the existence of personal 
agendas among these officers.   
     Contacts between Free Officers and politicians had been initiated as early as 1953, 
when Rif‘at al-Hajj Sirri sought the counsel of Siddiq Shanshal, Secretary of the Istiqlal 
Party, and attempted through Shanshal to persuade other politicians to cooperate with 
him, that is Sirri. Shanshal had tried to dissuade him from undertaking such a venture, but 
Sirri had then turned to Fa’iq al-Samarra’i, vice-president of the Istiqlal Party, who had 
agreed to provide advise to Sirri. At the same time Mahdi Kubba, leader of the same 
party, also maintained connections with other Free Officers.330 Fa’iq al-Samarra’i’s 
contacts with the Free Officers also date back to 1953. Over the years he had met with 
Sirri, Rajab ‘Abd al-Majid, and other officers, providing advice to them. During the 
contacts al-Samarra’i prepared a draft for an agrarian reform law to be announced after 
the coup, and also suggested that a Sovereignty Council be formed.331 The fact that the 
purpose of several of the contacts with party leaders was of a consultative nature suggests 
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that the Supreme Committee were preparing an action program for the future and were 
soliciting advice in areas where they possessed no expertise.                 
     Qasim’s willingness to take the risk of meeting Kamal ‘Umar Nazimi, suggests that he 
attributed great value to these personal contacts with the communist leader. This is also 
confirmed by the fact that the Supreme Committee chairman took Nazimi into his 
confidence on July 11 regarding the exact date of the coup, while withholding this 
important piece of information from his fellow Free Officers on the Committee. Siddiq 
Shanshal, the secretary of the Istiqlal Party and the Ba‘thist leader Fu’ad al-Rikabi 
received the same information.332 Qasim’s friend Rashid Mutlaq, on behalf of the former, 
had also approached Husain Jamil, secretary of the National Democratic Party, in 
October of 1956, right before the tripartite attack on Egypt, and conveyed to him that 
Qasim wished Jamil to form the first civilian government after the revolution. The latter 
had excused himself, however, since he did not wish to “be a tool in the hands of the 
military.”333 According to another account, Mutlaq had conveyed to Jamil that Qasim 
wanted him to cooperate with the army, which planned to carry out a revolution and then 
hand over power to the political opposition. Jamil had declined to get involved and had 
suggested that Mutlaq contact the party’s leader, Kamil al-Chadirchi instead.334 Rajab 
‘Abd al-Majid in his capacity of secretary of the Supreme Committee also maintained 
contacts with several nationalist leaders such as Siddiq Shanshal, Fa’iq al-Samarra’i, and 
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Muhammad Mahdi Kubba.335 Qasim’s secret contacts with party leaders suggest that he 
thought these were more important for his plans than his fellow officers or that he placed 
more trust in these civilians than in his potential military rivals, or both.          
     The civil-military contacts revealed differences between the two parties with regard to 
the question of what tactic should be adopted for the revolution. The civilians advocated 
organizing demonstrations in preparation of an army coup, while the Free Officers 
favored a coup with simultaneous manifestations of popular support.336 This shows that 
the military and civilian opposition had different assessments of the ability of the political 
organizations to effect an overthrow of the regime. The Free Officers obviously believed 
that the political organizations could only initiate a revolution if they acted in unison and 
simultaneously with army units controlled by the Free Officers. The military 
revolutionaries had indubitably arrived at this conclusion based on two previous instances 
of the tactic advocated by the civilians. The Officers had contacted one of the communist 
leaders, Zaki Khairi, in order to incite demonstrations which would serve as a pretext for 
the army to enter Baghdad and thus provide an opportunity to carry out a coup. Two 
minor demonstrations were organized, but both were easily suppressed by the police.337 It 
was most likely due to the fear of a repetition of this failure and the obvious weakness of 
the popular forces that the Free Officers insisted on a tactic which emphasized 
simultaneous popular support for a military-led operation.   
     It appears that some of the civilians who knew of the Free Officers movement in turn 
conveyed this information to non-Iraqi politicians abroad.338 One non-Iraqi politician 
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who claimed that he had been aware of the Free Officers’ plan to topple the regime prior 
to July 14 was the Syrian Ba‘thist leader Michel ‘Aflaq, who conveyed this piece of 
information to the Japanese consul general in Damascus. Considering the close ties 
between the Iraqi and Syrian Ba‘th parties, and the Iraqi Ba‘th leader Fu’ad al-Rikabi’s 
knowledge of the coup plans, this claim appears quite plausible.339 Also, Siddiq Shanshal 
allegedly informed President Nasser personally of the existence of the Free Officers 
movement during a visit to Cairo in 1957.340 Furthermore, Qasim himself, while stationed 
in Jordan, had informed Jordanian and Syrian officers of the existence of his 
organization.341 He had also via a friend asked National Democratic Party secretary 
Husain Jamil to solicit Nasser’s view in July of 1957 about the possibility of foreign 
military intervention in the event of a revolution in Iraq. Nasser believed that neither the 
Western powers nor the Baghdad Pact, nor Jordan would intervene, should a revolution 
take place in Iraq.342 It appears remarkable that despite the fact that several Iraqi and non-
Iraqi civilians knew of the Free Officers movement, the Iraqi government was not in 
possession of much intelligence regarding the Officers’ plans. 
     It is worth mention with regard to the contacts described in the above paragraph that 
the Supreme Committee had made no decision to sanction contacts with foreign 
nationals, not even non-Iraqi Arabs. Interestingly enough, one source claims that the   
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leaders of the United Arab Republic knew of the Free Officers movement, but had no 
detailed information on it.343 The explanation is most likely that the Supreme Committee 
members were reticent with the civilians they met with about detailed information on 
plans, other activities, and names which could have seriously compromised the 
movement. One can thus conclude with confidence that non-Iraqis were not in possession 
of better intelligence than the Iraqi civilians with whom they met. Finally, the lure of 
establishing a spurious connection with a historical event of such magnitude as the Iraqi 
Revolution was probably irresistible to many individuals.        
 
Political Program and Division    
     For reasons of secrecy the Supreme Committee had decided not to keep records of 
who attended its meetings and what was discussed. Not surprisingly, however, one of the 
officers, Staff Colonel ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Amin decided to ignore this decision and kept 
diaries in which he recorded who had been present and what issues had been discussed 
when the Committee convened. Al-Amin’s diary reveals that the Supreme Committee 
focused on the following issues in particular: The establishing of (a) an Iraqi Republic 
based on parliamentary democracy; (b) a Revolutionary Command Council after the 
revolution; and (c) a transitional period with a civilian provisional government supervised 
by the Revolutionary Command Council. Furthermore, the Free Officers had agreed that 
no officer was to be a minister in the civilian government, belong to a political party, and 
that political agitation in the armed forces would be banned. They had, however, made no 
decision on whom to nominate to head the future government. The Free Officers had also 
agreed upon setting up a provisional Sovereignty Council with three members, holding 
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elections to a national assembly during the transitional period, framing a constitution, and 
electing a president of the republic. The Supreme Committee.was also agreed that the 
Revolutionary Command Council be dissolved after the transitional period, and that Free 
Officers who wished to engage in politics retire from the army.344 Several of these 
decisions were ignored by Qasim after the July 14 coup. 
     An issue which was of particular concern to the Supreme Committee was how foreign 
powers, especially members of the Baghdad Pact, would react to a revolution in Iraq. The 
Committee also feared that a negative Western reaction could have a detrimental impact 
on Iraq’s economy due to the Iraqi dinar’s link to the pound sterling and the country’s 
dependence on oil revenues. In general the Free Officers opposed Iraq’s close ties with 
the West and wished to replace this policy with positive neutralism and a foreign policy 
based on the principles of the Bandung Conference of 1955, and the charters of the Arab 
League and the United Nations. Also, the Committee agreed that an agrarian reform law 
and the abolition of feudalism were necessary, and that poverty, ignorance, and disease 
must be eliminated.345 The generality of the social program most likely reflects the 
officers’ lack of expertise in non-military affairs and their intention to let the politicians 
they were in contact with weigh in on these matters, or simply to let the future civilian 
government address these issues. The absence of a clear decision on the Baghdad Pact 
suggests a wish not to complicate relations with the West unduly. The controversial issue 
of the Baghdad Pact had a great symbolic value in Iraq owing to the strong opposition to 
the Pact from many quarters of Iraqi society. Not making a decision was most likely a 
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wise approach, since the situation after the coup could be expected to be unclear for some 
time.346 
     The question of union with the United Arab Republic, which became the most divisive 
issue after July 14, was handled in a surprisingly diplomatic manner by the Supreme 
Committee. The Committee did not make a decision with regard to immediate accession 
to the United Arab Republic. As a result of the concern about foreign intervention, 
however, the Committee was agreed that Iraq would join the Arab Republic if the 
revolution came under threat, but the decision does not appear to have translated into any 
requests for external support for the movement prior to the revolution.347 This decision 
suggests that the issue could have been handled differently after the revolution. The Free 
Officers could have agreed upon a formula which would have satisfied both pan-Arabists 
and Iraqi nationalists. Such a solution could have envisioned a referendum, a federation 
with the United Arab Republic, or some temporary form of close cooperation awaiting a 
later decision. Had the Committee reached a compromise instead of leaving the field 
open to violent rivalries after the coup, the rebellions which followed might have been 
averted.     
     Given the deep divisions among the Free Officers, a certain skepticism is justified 
with regard to their ability to rally around a united program. The political, social, and 
economic program they formulated was not adequate to serve as a basis for the future 
revolutionary state due to its lack of specificity. Conversely, the program’s usefulness lay 
in its generality, because this quality enabled the Free Officers to maintain some 
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semblance of unity. The key to the usefulness of the Free Officers’ program was that it 
focused exclusively on issues upon which the officers were more or less agreed, without 
stating in detail their plans for a revolutionary society. The great disadvantage of this 
approach was that every Supreme Committee member read his own ideas into the 
program, a fact which would later prove to have far-reaching consequences.       
     The circumstance that the Free Officers constituted a politically very diverse and 
loosely organized movement sometimes led to friction among them with respect to 
tactics, political program, and authority within the movement. One example of such 
division is the group of junior officers who joined the organization in November of 1957. 
Their leading committee served as a committee-in-reserve of the Free Officers.348 In late 
1957 the committee requested that three of its members be allowed to attend Supreme 
Committee meetings but, this wish was not granted. Under the circumstances, such a 
request was fully legitimate, since the committee’s task was to lead the movement in the 
event of the arrest of the Supreme Committee. The junior officers must have argued that 
they would not be able to fulfill this function if they were not informed about the 
activities of the Committee Another instance of friction between the two committees 
occurred in the middle of 1958 when the junior officers’ committee went as far as to 
threaten to break off relations with the Supreme Committee due to frustration with what 
was perceived as lack of progress with respect to initiating the revolution, and alleged 
excessive caution on the part of the Committee. The latter, for its part, regarded the junior 
officers as too impatient and was concerned that this attitude could jeopardize the 
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revolution. It is quite possible that this impatience with the Committee’s leadership 
played a major part in its decision not to allow junior officers to attend its meetings.    
     Impatience, impulsiveness, and irascibility were not characteristics of the junior 
officers only.  ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif’s inclination towards rash action was demonstrated 
when he at a meeting of the Supreme Committee held on a Thursday suggested that the 
revolution be carried out on the following Saturday.349 Naji Talib, who had attended the 
meeting, later recalled that he and most other officers had protested and warned that they 
would not participate in such an enterprise. Naji Talib, Muhyi al-Din ‘Abd al-Hamid, and 
‘Abd al-Wahhab Amin, had offered their resignation but had withdrawn their offers 
under pressure from colleagues on the Supreme Committee.350 There was also friction 
between cells and the Committee.351 The friction was the greatest, however, between 
‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and Rajab ‘Abd al-Majid. The lack of personal chemistry between 
the two men had once been witnessed by Naji Talib at a dinner party and resulted in such 
a heated debate that both men had left the event without touching the food. The fact that 
this incident occurred at their last meeting before the July 14 coup is a clear indication 
that the Revolution was not destined to be a smooth endeavor.352 Another serious rival of 
Qasim’s was ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Shawwaf who had insisted on carrying out his own plot 
in May 1958, but he seems to have been dissuaded by Qasim because the latter had 
realized that the leadership of the movement would pass to al-Shawwaf if he was 
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successful.353 Likewise, it is possible that Qasim offered Naji Talib a seat on the 
Sovereignty Council in order to eliminate him as a rival for power, since Talib would not 
have retained his position in the army had he accepted Qasim’s offer.354  
     The friction described above suggests an ongoing power struggle within the movement 
at different levels: between senior and junior officers, between the Supreme Committee 
and other Free Officers, between factions on the Committee, and among individuals on 
the Supreme Committee. One can further conclude from the evidence presented that the 
profound divisions within the ranks of the Free Officers originated in ideological and 
tactical differences, with the result being a struggle for influence and control over the 
movement in order to prevent rival factions and individual officers from making certain 
important decisions. As a consequence, there was no one overarching plan to carry out 
the July 14 coup, but several competing plots presented by different groups with the tacit 
understanding that if one group was successful the others would support it.355   
     There are different accounts as to how many aborted coup attempts and abandoned 
plans there were prior to July 14, 1958, with different sources enumerating between three 
and eleven. According to one source, the first plan had been presented in the winter of 
1956 by Rif‘at al-Hajj Sirri, who had asked another officer to convey to ‘Abd al-Karim 
Qasim that the Free Officers wanted to use his brigade for the task of occupying Baghdad 
upon his return from Jordan, where he was stationed with his unit during the Suez Crisis. 
The Free Officers were prepared to join the brigade when it approached Baghdad or its 
camp in the vicinity of the city. Qasim had declined to participate in this scheme, 
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however, and it had come to naught.356 It is possible that Qasim decided against the plot, 
since he would not be in complete control of its execution due to the involvement of other 
leading Free Officers. The second plan, Qasim’s own, had been aborted.357 The third plan 
was to have been executed in 1957 during the army’s annually held large-scale military 
training exercise at the end of the year. The exercise was scheduled to take place in 
November in the Rawanduz area in northern Iraq, and the King, Crown Prince, and high 
government officials were to attend a conference at the end of the maneuver. The plan 
was to assassinate the aforementioned individuals at the conference.358  
     At least one plan could have led to considerable loss of life, had it been carried out. 
The fourth attempt to overthrow the regime was to have taken place on Army Day, 
January 6, 1958 with the King, Crown Prince, and Nuri present at the celebrations at 
Camp al-Rashid. The Supreme Committee had studied this opportunity and Qasim had 
presented a plan, which briefly consisted in having two tanks open fire on the dignitaries 
on the raised platform. A majority of the Supreme Committee had rejected the plan due to 
the numerous risks involved and the great likelihood of loss of innocent lives. Another 
reason for the rejection had been that the Committee had previously opposed the 
assassination of the King. Naji Talib had then proposed a plan in lieu of Qasim’s, 
according to which an armored battalion under the command of Staff Colonel ‘Abd al-
Rahman ‘Arif was to encircle Rihab Palace, the radio station, and assume control over the 
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bridges across the Tigris River, and announce the revolution, whereupon the units 
stationed at Camp al-Rashid were to march on Baghdad. The battalion in question left 
Abu Ghuraib every morning for parade practice at Camp al-Rashid and would therefore 
not raise suspicion. Talib’s plan was, however, rejected as well, and the parade took place 
as intended.359 It is clear from the Supreme Committee’s rejection of Qasim’s plan that a 
majority of its members did not condone indiscriminate taking of life. 
     The sixth plan was to have taken advantage of the return of army units to their camps 
after the completion of a large-scale military maneuver in Rutba. The 15th infantry 
brigade had reached Abu Ghuraib at a distance of six miles from Baghdad and the plan 
was to use only one of its regiments under the command of Colonel ‘Abd al-Ghani al-
Rawi to act in concert with units in Baghdad. On the night between March 15 and 16 the 
Free Officers had met in separate groups. One group, including Sirri, had met at the home 
of Lieutenant Colonel Wasfi Tahir and another at the home of Colonel ‘Abd al-Latif al-
Darraji. Colonel al-Shawwaf had met at another house together with two other officers. 
After midnight a group of engineer officers had left for the engineer camp to take control 
of the warehouses. About three o’clock a.m. the news had arrived that al-Rawi had not 
been able to take action with his regiment owing to the absence of the regiment’s officers. 
At this point many officers had demanded that the plan be executed without al-Rawi, but 
a majority had finally decided to abort the coup attempt.360 The seventh plot was to have 
been carried out on May 11 during maneuvers in al-Rutba, but had not taken place since 
Nuri al-Sa‘id had not attended the exercise together with the King and the Crown Prince. 
                                                          
359 Farhan, Thawrat 14 Tammuz, pp. 62-63. Batatu claims that the plan had been abandoned because 
Colonel ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Arif, commander of the main force in the plot—the Faisal Armored Regiment—
had maintained that he did not have enough ammunition, and that he could not trust his subordinate 
officers, Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 797.   
360 Ghalib, Qissat Thawrat 14 Tammuz, pp. 57-58; Farhan, Thawrat 14 Tammuz, p.63.  





This plan reveals the Free Officers’ emphasis on secrecy and the importance of the 
simultaneous presence in one location of the regime’s three pillars.  
     According to the eighth plan the Basra Brigade under the command of Ahmad 
Muhammad Yahya was to have initiated a revolt during a stop at Abu Ghuraib en route 
from al-Rutba on May 12 with al-Shawwaf and other Free Officers taking action in 
Baghdad. Yahya had not started the revolt, however, and the Free Officers in Baghdad 
had not supported al-Shawwaf. It is possible that this plot had failed because of 
differences of opinion. Qasim is said to have discouraged al-Shawwaf from implementing 
his plan, since he had already designed his own plan for July 14. The ninth plot had been 
laid down by ‘Abd al-Ghani al-Rawi and was to have been carried out in Baghdad on 
May 29 at the celebrations of the anniversary of the establishment of the Staff College. 
The Crown Prince and Nuri were to have been assassinated, but not the King who would 
have been used by the army to seize power. The plan had been rejected by a number of 
Free Officers as suicidal and had never been carried out.361 It can be concluded from the 
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nor Ghalib mentions the condition that the King was not to be hurt. Al-Zubaidi credits Sirri and al-Rawi 
with one plan each for carrying out a coup at the Staff College, giving the same date as Khadduri, al-
Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 Tammuz 1958, pp. 400-401. Sirri’s plan was for a small group of armored personnel 
carriers belonging to an engineer unit stationed at Camp Abu Ghuraib to occupy key points in Baghdad 
such as the radio station, the Ministry of Defense, the electric power plant, the Royal Palace etc. Other 
armored personnel carriers were to surround the guests at the College and arrest them, after which the 
revolution would be announced on the radio. Sirri first traveled to Kirkuk and Mosul to mobilize Free 
Officer support in the north for his endeavor. Reassured of this support he returned to Baghdad but the plot 
was not carried out because neither Nuri nor ‘Abd al-Ilah attended the celebration at the Staff College. Al-
Rawi’s plan was laid down with his fellow Free Officers in Basra and presented to the Supreme 
Committee. His plot aimed at the assassination of ‘Abd al-Ilah and Nuri al-Sa‘id, and the arrest of the King 
and the guests during the celebration at the Staff College by a group of Free Officers armed with pistols on 
a suicide mission. Other units under the command of Free Officers were to occupy key positions in the 
capital and announce the revolution, al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 Tammuz 1958, pp. 400-401, Ghalib, Qissat 
Thawrat 14 Tammuz, pp. 59 and 62.         





above that disagreements within the Supreme Committee at least in one case had led to 
an aborted coup attempt.   
 
The Coup within the Coup 
     Like the discussions above of political affiliations, decisions made by the Supreme 
Committee, and the organizational structure of the Free Officers movement, an 
examination of the coup plans of the S.C. members is crucial to understanding post-
revolutionary developments. A careful analysis of the different plans briefly described 
above will yield a number of conclusions about the personal relations among the 
Committee members, the manner in which they laid down their coup plans, the 
importance of the element of chance in these schemes, and the personality of the authors 
of the plots. For obvious reasons most coup plans focused on Baghdad, but in certain 
cases the support of officers in the North or South was solicited. This does not necessarily 
mean, however, that regional Free Officers were taken into the confidence of the 
Supreme Committee regarding the details of conspiracies, since the officers contacted 
appear to have been members of the Committee who for one reason or another were 
stationed outside Baghdad. Conversely, in the case of al-Rawi there are indications that a 
number of southern Free Officers had been informed of his plan, since they would assist 
him in executing it.     
     The fact that Qasim was the author of only two of the numerous plots prior to July 14, 
1958 suggests that he was facing serious competition from other Free Officers for the 
leadership of the revolution; at least five other Supreme Committee members designed 
plans of their own for a coup. The normal procedure among the Committee Free Officers 





was to design a plot, solicit support for it among other officers, and then submit the plan 
to the Supreme Committee for discussion. All coup plans appear to have been presented 
to the Committee for discussion except the one which succeeded on July 14. The answer 
to the question why this was not done in the case of the July 14 plot will most likely 
contribute to shedding light on developments after July 14. It is quite possible that Qasim 
had made up his mind as early as January of 1958, which is when he presented his second 
plot to the Supreme Committee, to withhold his subsequent intentions from the 
Committee. Two reasons for such a decision could have been that he considered his plans 
better than those of his rivals, and resented the Committee’s rejection of his second plot, 
and therefore decided to rely only on his closest associates in the future.     
     Another possible reason for Qasim’s failure to present his last coup plan to the 
Committee could have been that the profound divisions and rivalries in the Supreme 
Committee had convinced him that the stakes were too high to risk involvement of fellow 
Free Officers who might withdraw their support at the last moment. Qasim could 
therefore have concluded that he had to act unilaterally to achieve what he considered to 
be the objectives of the revolution. It is possible that this also explains his reluctance to 
endorse other officers’ coup plans, as suggested by the failure of al-Shawwaf’s plot in 
May 1958. A third possibility is that he was biding his time until circumstances would 
offer him an opportunity to control the course of events by enabling his units and those of 
his co-conspirators ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif and ‘Abd al-Latif al-Darraji to play the leading 
role in the great revolutionary endeavor.   
     The brief description of the plots under the previous heading above facilitates making 
a number of observations and also to draw a final conclusion regarding the July 14 coup. 





First, the following three circumstances explain why so many coup plans and attempts 
failed: (1) the plan was rejected by the Supreme Committee, (2) one or more of the 
regime’s three pillars was absent from a targeted event, and (3) one or several of the Free 
Officers who had pledged their support for a particular plan withdrew this support. 
Second, there seems to have been some concern among the S.C. members about the 
King’s safety and the likelihood of the loss of innocent lives. The Committee even went 
as far as rejecting a plot because the King would most likely be killed and loss of 
innocent life incurred. The November 1957 coup plan, however, suggests that the safety 
of the King was not always an overriding concern. On the other hand, it is not clear why 
the plot was not carried out, and it is not impossible that the anticipated assassination of 
Faisal II could be the explanation. Third, the fact that one of the rejected plans involved a 
suicide mission shows that some Free Officers considered paying the ultimate price to 
initiate a revolution, but that the majority of the S.C. members considered this price too 
high to pay.    
     A fourth observation is that Qasim was not reluctant to use excessive force to achieve 
his objectives, testified to by his proposal that two tanks open fire on the dignitaries 
present on a raised platform during the celebrations of Army Day. The use of such 
firepower against human targets would invariably have incurred loss of innocent lives. 
This seeming disregard for human life appears to be contradicted, however, by Qasim’s 
lenient treatment of political prisoners and many of his enemies after the revolution. 
Fifth, when several Free Officers were involved in the planning of a plot they met in 
separate small groups at separate locations, a fact which suggests that the risk of 
detection by the regime’s agents was considerable. Sixth, the reason Batatu gives for Naji 





Talib’s failed plot of January 1958, that ‘Abd al-Rahman ‘Arif, one of the commanders, 
could not trust his officers, appears to be a mere excuse for not participating, since ‘Arif 
must have known long before the planned coup attempt whether his subordinate officers 
could be relied upon. 
     The above discussion has paved the way for the final conclusion regarding Qasim’s 
role in the July revolution. The argument proposed here is that Qasim carried out a coup 
simultaneously against the regime and against his Free Officer colleagues within a 
general conspiracy of the Free Officers. The validity of this argument is primarily 
substantiated by Qasim’s disregard for the democratic procedure to present his third plot 
to the Supreme Committee for discussion. Qasim never attempted to explain or justify 
this decision, but, considering the practice of discussing coup plans at S.C. meetings for 
general approval or rejection, it can be concluded that Qasim had ulterior motives when 
violating this tradition. In view of the Free Officers movement’s long record of rejected 
coup plans and aborted coup attempts, he most likely considered himself to have the best 
chance of carrying out a successful coup, and he probably also regarded himself as the 
sole guarantor that the goals of the revolution would be achieved. Leaving the leadership 


















THE JULY 14 COUP AND POPULAR REACTIONS 
 
As has been argued in previous chapters a revolutionary situation fuelled by widespread 
discontent with the regime among the urban and rural population, and the armed forces 
had been building up during the decade prior to the July 14, 1958 coup. Iraqi society had 
been increasingly polarized during the violent demonstrations against the unratified 
Portsmouth Agreement of 1948, the intifadha of 1952, the strong opposition to the 
formation of the Baghdad Pact in 1955, and the explicit public support for Egypt during 
the Suez Crisis of 1956, which compelled Nuri al-Sa‘id to take certain measures to 
distance himself from France and Britain. Nuri had efficiently eliminated domestic 
opposition by way of rigged elections in 1954, censorship, laws forcing students who 
opposed his pro-West policies to enlist in the army, and by way of denationalization of 
communists.362 This left the army the only force in society sufficiently well organized 
and powerful to effectuate long overdue political and social change in Iraq. Individual 
younger military officers concluded that due to the prevailing constraints on normal 
political activity such change could only be brought about by the forceful removal of the 
unpopular regime. As argued in the previous chapter, however, the opposition to the 
regime among military officers was never a unified force with a single agenda.  
     The eruption came on July 14 when the military executed a coup d’état. Within a few 
hours the rebellious army units led by a small group of Free Officers had swept away the 
                                                          
362 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, pp. 6, 79. 





monarchy and Nuri’s government, and established control over Iraq.363 This chapter 
examines why the monarchy collapsed like a house of cards, why the coup was actually 
the initial phase of a revolution, and why the Free Officers had not taken action earlier. 
Another question which is discussed is why the coup was relatively bloodless, with the 
exception of the siege of the Rihab Palace and a few other casualties including three 
American fatalities.364 The question as to why Westerners were not, as a rule, attacked, 
the burning of the British Embassy of course being the foremost exception, is also 
addressed. Furthermore, this chapter also attempts to find answers to the questions of 
who ordered the murder of the royal family and the attack on the British Embassy, and of 
the possible motives behind these acts of violence. Finally, the question of to what extent 
developments in northern and southern cities differed from those in Baghdad and what 
the reasons might be for these differences will also be addressed.      
     Having repeatedly changed the date of their coup for various reasons the conspirators 
under Brigadier ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, commander of the 19th Brigade, eventually 
decided to take action on the night of July 13 and 14, 1958 when the 20th Brigade, 
numbering approximately 3,000 troops, had received orders to deploy to Jordan.365 This 
                                                          
363 The coup leader, ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, claimed during a conversation with reporters on July 24, 1958, 
published in the Iraqi Arabic-language newspaper Al-Zaman on July 25, 1958 and in The Iraq Times the 
following day, that the coup was over by 6:00 a.m. The British ambassador to Iraq, Sir Michael Wright, 
states in a telegram to the Foreign Office that the “[c]oup d’état took place between 6:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m. 
on July 14,” Wright to the Foreign Office, Confidential, 6:30 p.m. July 15, 1958, FO371/134199. Uriel 
Dann asserts in Iraq Under Qassem that the insurgents had not taken full control of the Rihab Palace until 
7:30 a.m., but ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif, Qasim’s second in command, had already announced over the radio at 
6:30 a.m. that the monarchy had ceased to exist, Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, pp. 30-31. Al-Ahram 
states that ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim  was the commander of the 20th Brigade and his co-conspirator deputy 
commander of the 19th Brigade, Al-Ahram, July 29, 1958, p. 3.  
364 Gallman, Iraq Under General Nuri, p. 211. 
365 Ghalib, Qissat Thawrat 14 Tammuz, pp. 52-62; Farhan, Thawrat 14 Tammuz, pp. 60-64. The Iraq 
Times, July 26, 1958, p. 2; Majid Khadduri, Republican ‘Iraq, p. 38. Ghalib, Qissat Thawrat 14 Tammuz, 
p. 76; Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 800. The 20th Brigade set out towards Baghdad at 9:00 p.m. on 
July 13, al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 Tammuz 1958, p. 448. The brigade consisted of three regiments, with the 
first regiment under the command of lieutenant colonel ‘Abd al-Latif al-Darraji and the second under 





was a unique opportunity the officers could not afford to miss. Owing to the nature of its 
mission the army unit had been issued with live ammunition, which happened only on 
rare occasions due to the risk of coups.366 Moreover, the route to the Jordanian border 
would bring the troops within close proximity of the capital without arousing suspicions. 
An additional factor of great significance—a precondition in the conspirators’ plan for a 
successful coup attempt—was the simultaneous presence in Baghdad of the three pillars 
of the regime—King Faisal II, Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, and Prime Minister Nuri al-
Sa‘id.367   
     Having entered Baghdad early on the morning of July 14 the insurgents swiftly 
occupied key buildings in the city.368 One unit targeted the left bank of the Tigris where 
several important government centers such as the Ministry of Defense were located. 
Another unit under the command of Colonel ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif set out for the Rihab 
                                                                                                                                                                             
lieutenant colonel ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif, both free officers. The second regiment was commanded by an 
officer who was not part of the conspiracy.    
366 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 796. Batatu claims that two-thirds of the approximately 3,000 troops 
that carried out the coup possessed no ammunition, Batatu, The Old Classes, p. 805.  
367 Ghalib, Qissat Thawrat 14 Tammuz, p. 76; Khadduri, Republican ‘Iraq, p. 38; Batatu, The Old Social 
Classes, p. 797. Al-Zubaidi’s account of the movements of the king, the crown prince, and the prime 
minister during the days prior to the coup testifies to the extent to which it depended on chance. Originally 
the date for the deployment of 20th Brigade had been set for July 3. When the Free Officers’ Supreme 
Committee learned that Nuri and ‘Abd al-Ilah would be abroad on that date the Free Officers managed to 
have the deployment postponed until July 13, the day when the two men were scheduled to return to 
Baghdad in order to accompany King Faisal to a Baghdad Pact meeting in Istanbul the following day. 
There were, however, factors outside the control of the Free Officers which coincided to make their 
undertaking possible. Faisal had originally planned to leave for Europe on July 8 to meet with his fiancée, 
but was persuaded on July 7 by a minister to postpone his departure until July 9 in order to sign two new 
laws of the Iraqi-Jordanian Arab Union before his journey. On July 8 a fateful telegram arrived from the 
Shah of Iran who was visiting the United States at the time. The Iranian monarch suggested that the leaders 
of the Baghdad Pact countries meet in Istanbul on July 14 to be briefed by him on his talks with President 
Eisenhower. The telegram made Faisal postpone his departure a second time, a circumstance which played 
directly into the hands of the conspirators, al-Zubaidi, Thawrat Tammuz 1958, pp. 438-439, 463-464. 
368 Before noon Qasim had established himself in the Ministry of Defense and the successful coup was a 
fact. The task of Qasim, commander of the 19th Brigade, had been to cover the rear of the units advancing 
on Baghdad. Having taken up positions in the city they had asked the 19th Brigade to enter Baghdad. Qasim 
had refused, however, stating that he would enter the city only after Nuri’s death had been confirmed. 
Having learned that Nuri had escaped, the 19th Brigade finally marched into the capital at 10:30 a.m., 
interview with Lieutenant Colonel Fadhil Jasim al-Mukhtar on May 4, 1977, quoted in al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 
14 Tammuz, p. 481. 





Palace and Nuri al-Sa‘id’s residence situated on the right bank of the river. ‘Arif installed 
himself in the radio station and dispatched a unit to assume control of the Palace.369 There 
are several divergent accounts of what happened after the Palace came under fire. 
According to a British Embassy report dated August 4, Brigadier Naji Talib, who had not 
been present at the Rihab Palace on July 14, told Falle, the Oriental Counselor at the 
British Embassy that the insurgents had not intended to kill the royal family. Surprisingly 
enough, he asserted that the Crown Prince had died honorably.370  
     Naji Talib’s claim that the Free Officers had not intended to kill King Faisal II 
confirms an earlier assertion by the Minister of Guidance Muhammad Siddiq Shanshal in 
a conversation with the British ambassador on July 27. The Free Officers had not 
                                                          
369 Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, pp. 28-30; Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 802; Khadduri, Republican 
‘Iraq, p. 42. It was also ‘Arif’s task to take control of the camp of the motorized police force. It was crucial 
for two reasons to subdue this force quickly: a) it was equipped with modern weapons and armored 
personnel carriers; and b) it constituted a formidable fighting force numbering 3,500 men well experienced 
in urban operations against demonstrators. With regard to al-Darraji, he was to occupy the Ministry of 
Defense and the telegraph building. The insurgents entered the capital at 5:00 a.m., al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 
Tammuz, pp. 450, 467.   
370 Wright to the Foreign Office, Confidential, August 4, 1958, FO371/134201. Ghalib, himself a Free 
Officer, writes in his Qissat Thawrat 14 Tammuz, p. 84 that a military intelligence officer told him two 
weeks after the revolution that three officers had entered the Rihab Palace to inform the royal family that 
resistance was futile and that they had to surrender. Shortly afterwards the Palace had come under artillery 
fire and the royal family had exited through a backdoor. They had been surrounded by Free Officers, who 
had informed them that they would be taken to the Ministry of Defense, when the King’s adjutant had 
opened fire and injured two officers. A third officer had returned fire on the adjutant and members of the 
royal family standing nearby. According to Falih Hanzal a unit under the command of Captain Mandhar 
Salim had arrived to surround the Rihab Palace where Faisal and ‘Abd al-Ilah had spent the night. Due to 
the insufficient number of troops available, however, the unit had been able to control only one-eighth of 
the area surrounding the Palace. Having informed the Royal Guard that a revolution had taken place, the 
unit had opened fire on the Palace at approximately 6:15 a.m., Hanzal, Asrar Maqtali al-‘Aila al-Malika, 
pp. 98-99. A 106mm anti-tank gun had soon been provided by officers from the nearby Camp al-Washash. 
When it became clear that Faisal and ‘Abd al-Ilah could not escape, the royal party agreed to surrender and 
to be transported to the Ministry of Defense. As the royal family was passing through the palace garden, 
Captain ‘Abd al-Sattar Sab‘ al-‘Abusi entered through the main gate and opened fire on the party killing 
Faisal, ‘Abd al-Ilah, queen Nafisa,  ‘Abd al-Ilah’s mother, and princess ‘Abadiyya. Princess Hiyam, ‘Abd 
al-Ilah’s consort was wounded. The bodies of the royal family had then been taken to the Ministry of 
Defense, interview with Muhammad ‘Ali Sa‘id on August 8, 1960, quoted in al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 
Tammuz, p. 458.The vehicle in which they had been transported, however, had been apprehended by 
demonstrating masses who had seized ‘Abd al-Ilah’s body and hanged it in front of the gate of the Ministry 
of Defense. This act had a symbolic significance since the Crown Prince had ordered, in 1945, the hanging 
in this place of one of the leaders of the 1941 coup, al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 Tammuz, pp. 455-459.      





intended to kill the royal family but had been forced to open fire when the Royal Guard 
had offered resistance.371 The insurgents’ plan had been to persuade the King to abdicate. 
Furthermore, on July 14 they had taken the ministers of the old regime into custody in 
order to save them from the mobs.372 Naji Talib stated in an interview that the members 
                                                          
371 The Egyptian daily Al-Ahram reported on July 21, 1958, that a Free Officer with a microphone had 
demanded that King Faisal and Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah surrender. In response ‘Abd al-Ilah had fired a 
submachine gun and killed an officer. During the ensuing exchange of fire the crown prince had killed one 
more officer and two soldiers before he himself had been killed, Al-Ahram, July 21, 1958, p. 3.  
372 Wright (Emergency Headquarters) to the Foreign Office, Secret, July 27, 1958, FO371/134201. 
Khadduri discusses two possibilities: a) that the officers had received orders to kill the royal family, and b) 
that the intention was to arrest the King and the Crown Prince, Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp. 44-46. 
Batatu’s account, based on the reminiscences of a Free Officer, concurs with that of Naji Talib: It had not 
been the intention of the officers to kill the royal family, Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p. 795. Hanzal 
argues that the royal family had been killed while being escorted by Free Officers through the Palace 
garden together with a number of officers from the Royal Guard. His account of what had happened is as 
follows: “Meanwhile, Captain ‘Abd al-Sattar Sab‘ al-‘Abusi was inside the Palace. He left it descending the 
stairs outside the entrance with the submachine gun in his hands. He turned to the right and saw the whole 
royal family walking in a file leaving the [royal] kitchen. After less than half a minute Captain al-‘Abusi 
was standing right behind the royal family, a line of low trees separating him from them. Instantaneously, 
he opened fire from behind [the royal family] with his submachine gun  [with a] sweeping [movement] 
from right to left. The eighteen shots which he fired hit Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah in the back, the King in 
the head and neck, and the queen and princess ‘Abadiyya in the back. After that it did not take long before 
Mustafa ‘Abd Allah opened fire from the front on the person in front of him and the rest of the officers 
forming a semicircle opened fire from their submachine guns, with the fire coming from the front, from 
behind, and from the sides, from every hand that held a gun at this moment!” Hanzal, Asrar Maqtal al-‘Aila 
al-Malika, p. 125. It appears highly unlikely that anyone would survive such a massacre, but Hanzal claims 
that Princess Hiyam was hit in the thigh and carried by an officer (presumably from the Royal Guard), 
obviously unseen by the Free Officers, to a room where he hid her, Hanzal. Asrar Maqtal al-‘Aila al-
Malika, p. 126. Considering the intensive shooting, with the Free Officers surrounding the prisoners in a 
semicircle, this is not a very convincing claim. It can be concluded from Hanzal’s account that the royal 
prisoners, officers and servants were walking in a line side by side, and not in a file, one behind the other. 
Had the latter been the case, the natural position of the escorting Free Officers would have been on either 
side of the prisoners, which would have prevented al-‘Abusi’s sweeping movement unless he intended to 
kill his fellow officers together with the royal party. The conclusion that the prisoners were walking side by 
side is, however, problematic as well, since it would probably place the escorting officers either in a line 
behind the captives, or, much less likely on either side of the prisoners, in the case of which they would not 
have been in a position to keep an eye on the captives in the middle. From the above analysis it can 
therefore be concluded that neither scenario is plausible, unless the escort had been removed to a safe 
distance from the prisoners to enable al-‘Abusi to open fire. Nothing in the above quotation suggests this, 
however, and the only indication that the execution of the royal family was a premeditated act is that the 
other Free Officers joined al-‘Abusi in the massacre. Hanzal’s account is somewhat convincing at a 
superficial level due to the great detail, but does not survive closer scrutiny because of the many 
inconsistencies. One of these inconsistencies is that Hanzal places a row of bushes between al-‘Abusi and 
the royal party. This claim has no credibility (unless al-‘Abusi was standing at a bend of a garden path with 
the party suddenly changing direction and therefore facing the bushes and al-‘Abusi with their backs), since 
the party was moving in one direction. The argument proposed here, however, only invalidates details in 
Hanzal’s account and not the possibility that the royal family was killed in the palace garden. The reason is 
that al-‘Abusi had opened fire with a sweeping movement, and that he would have caused the death of Free 
Officers as well, unless his colleagues had been privy to his plan and let al-‘Abusi take the lead in front of 





of the Free Officers High Committee had agreed to get rid of ‘Abd  al-Ilah, Nuri al-Sa‘id, 
and King Faisal II.373 They were agreed upon putting the two former on trial and then 
upon executing them. As for the King there had been, according to Naji Talib, divergent 
opinions about his fate. A majority had wished to spare his life, but no final decision had 
been reached.     
     One source states that “[I]t appears that ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim and ‘Abd al-Salam 
‘Arif had decided before the revolution to kill the three in order to remove [the 
possibility] of any foreign intervention to restore the monarchy, or [reinstall] the 
reactionary regime, or carry out an internal counter-revolution aiming at restoring the 
monarchy and the old regime. ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim had contacted civilian politicians 
asking for their opinion on the fate of the three. They had agreed on executing Nuri and 
‘Abd al-Ilah, killing them, or assassinating them, but their views had differed on the fate 
of the King.”374 The same source also claims that Husain Jamil, Secretary of the National 
Democratic Party, had revealed to him that he had recommended eliminating Nuri and 
‘Abd al-Ilah when asked by Rashid Mutlaq, a friend of Qasim’s, about his opinion on 
their fate. Husain Jamil had also recommended that the King be compelled to accept a 
new government. The monarchy should be left in place for the first few days after the 
revolution, the King then deposed, and the monarchy eventually declared abolished.375        
                                                                                                                                                                             
them before he had opened fire. Such an important detail, however, would not have escaped Hanzal’s 
attention, since it would have emphasized the nefarious intentions of the Free Officers. Hanzal’s account is 
confusing which is somewhat surprising, since it must be based on eyewitness reports by the royal guards 
who survived the massacre. Finally, it goes without saying that the conflicting accounts discussed above of 
what transpired in the palace garden only add to this confusion.        
373 Fadhil Husain, Suqut al-Nizam al-Malaki, pp. 69-70.  
374 Fadhil Husain, Suqut al-Nizam al-Malaki, p. 70. Khadduri states that it is reported that Qasim had 
contacted one civilian politician regarding this issue, but that this is not certain, Khadduri, Republican Iraq, 
p. 46.  
375 Fadhil Husain, Suqut al-Nizam al-Malaki, p. 70. Conversely, al-Zubaidi argues, based on an interview 
with Husain Jamil, that the decision to kill Faisal, ‘Abd al-Ilah, and Nuri had been made long before the 





     A further account of the events in the Rihab Palace is found in a dispatch from David 
Mark, First Secretary of the American Embassy in Moscow to the Department of State.376   
The source, introduced as Mr. Stupak, a TASS correspondent who had given a semi-
public lecture in the Soviet capital in December of 1958 on the Iraqi revolution, had 
claimed that he had been present in Baghdad together with 3-4 other Eastern European 
correspondents on July 14 interviewing Free Officers as the coup evolved. According to 
his informants the detachment which had surrounded the Palace had sent word to the 
King that the royal family would be spared if they surrendered. When the King, who had 
at first agreed to surrender, was told by ‘Abd al-Ilah, however, that only a small military 
unit had surrounded the Palace, he ordered the royal guards to open fire. The detachment 
then opened artillery fire on the Palace, which caught fire. The royal family escaped into 
the garden and hid behind some bushes. When the besiegers entered the garden they 
opened machinegun fire on the bushes “as a precautionary measure” and found upon 
examining the bushes that the entire royal family had been killed. According to this 
account the bodies, with the exception of that of ‘Abd al-Ilah, were buried outside 
Baghdad the following day. 
     Whatever the reasons were for the killings of the royal family they were embarrassing 
to the new regime, since the deaths, in particular those of the female members of the 
family and the desecration of ‘Abd al-Ilah’s and Nuri’s bodies, shocked the international 
                                                                                                                                                                             
July 14 coup. Husain Jamil had claimed that ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim’s friend, Rashid Mutlaq, had informed 
him (Jamil) in November of 1956 that the Free Officers had decided to kill the three. Furthermore, Husain 
had asserted that Rashid Mutlaq had contacted him on behalf of Qasim in July 1957, asking him to inform 
Gamal ‘Abdul Nasser that the Iraqi revolution would commence with the killing of the King, the Crown 
Prince, and Nuri, interview with Husain Jamil on April 19, 1973, quoted in al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 
Tammuz, p. 459. 
376 Mark to the Department of State, Confidential, December 12, 1958, Despatch 331, 787.00/12-1258.  





community.377 In a conversation with Siddiq Shanshal, Minister of Guidance, in August 
1958 Ambassador Wright conveyed the shock of “British and world opinion of the 
bloodshed and violence of the first two days of the revolution and of the advisability, if 
only for Iraq’s good name, of fairness and just treatment of the persons now awaiting trial 
and above all of the absence of any further bloodshed or vindictiveness. He gave me 
every assurance, within his own power, that there was no intention of any further 
bloodshed, injustice or political vengeance.”378 The absence of official attempts to justify 
or explain the deaths could indicate that they were not accidental. Had the Free Officers 
in the Rihab Palace indeed opened fire in self-defense, this would certainly have been an 
extenuating circumstance that the new regime would have been quick to seize upon. 
Accidental or not, however, it is difficult to justify killings of women under any 
circumstances.        
     The accounts of Nuri al-Sa‘id’s end are slightly less divergent than those of the end of 
the royal family. The general picture that emerges is that Nuri had managed to escape 
across the Tigris River before the insurgents entered his residence to arrest him. He hid 
with friends but was apprehended on July 15, wearing women’s clothing, while 
attempting to reach another hiding place.379 This dissertation will spare the reader the 
gruesome details of what happened to the bodies of Nuri al-Sa‘id and ‘Abd al-Ilah after 
they had been killed. The interested reader can find the details in the aforementioned 
dispatch from the American Embassy in Moscow and in the following report. A detailed 
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account, based on a conversation Johnston had on July 23 with Lieutenant Colonel Musa 
‘Adil, former aide-de-camp to several Jordanian prime ministers, who had been in 
Baghdad during the coup, is given in an Embassy report. ‘Adil’s informant was an Iraqi 
Colonel, who claimed to be one of a group of three who had killed the royal family.380  
     It is no easy task to establish whether what happened to the royal family and Nuri was 
the fate the coup leaders had had in mind for them. It has been argued above that the lack 
of official attempts to justify the killings might indicate that they were not accidental.381 
As to the fate of the ministers of the ancien régime, they were arrested and put on trial, 
which is what Qasim himself had had in mind for them, although it is doubtful whether 
Nuri and ‘Abd al-Ilah would have received a fair trial, since the public would probably, 
and the President of the People’s Court, Colonel Fadhil ‘Abbas al-Mahdawi, would 
certainly have demanded death sentences in their cases. On the other hand, Qasim’s 
record clearly shows that he preferred reform to death sentences, since he commuted 
many death sentences to prison terms, and even released prisoners, such as ‘Abd al-
Salam ‘Arif, accused of serious crimes.382 One can thus conclude that Qasim was not a 
bloodthirsty but an exceptionally lenient dictator. In light of this there may be grounds for 
arguing that the coup leaders did not plan to kill the royal family. One thing is fairly 
certain, however, and that is that had Qasim or the other leaders explicitly given the order 
that the members of the royal family must be captured alive, and that the commander at 
the lower end of the chain of command would be held responsible if they were harmed, 
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then they would most likely have been captured alive. In consideration of the foregoing, 
one may therefore with reasonable certainty conclude that no such order was issued.   
 
Peaceful and Violent Popular Reactions  
     The population of Baghdad and other cities took to the streets in celebration of the 
overthrow of the old regime and their newly won freedom. Some scholars and analysts 
have argued that the crowds that filled the streets in Baghdad were “a mob of hundreds of 
thousands,,,milling through the streets screaming its joy and its thirst for vengeance…The 
revolutionaries were apparently unprepared for this reaction…”383 The Baghdadis had 
been encouraged earlier in the morning in ‘Arif’s radio address to come out into the 
streets and watch the revolution unfold. A report from the American Embassy in Baghdad 
refers to another public announcement, the issuance by the Military Command on July 15 
of Republic Order No. 8. The Order can without too much stretch of the imagination be 
interpreted as inciting the Baghdadis, since it promised a reward of ID10,000 ($28,000) 
“to whomever arrests the traitor Nuri al-Sa‘id who escaped from the people’s anger.”384 
A third instance of the Free Officers inciting the population occurred later the same day 
after Nuri al-Sa‘id had been killed and ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif called on Baghdadis to “come 
and see the body of the ‘enemy of Allah’ and the people”.385 “The enemy of Allah,” 
‘adu’l-Ilah is a pun on ‘Abd al-Ilah, the meaning of which is “servant of god.” The 
American Embassy report from Baghdad also states that “[s]ome reliable sources 
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reported that the larger mobs and groups were harangued and incited to specific action by 
known Ba‘thists.”386  
     One can infer from the account referred to in the above paragraph that the 
demonstrators had evil intentions and that they appeared to have been “organized” by the 
insurgents to a certain extent over the radio; the latter assertion is confirmed by the 
Embassy report quoted above. This does not exclude the possibility that some crowds 
could have been organized or incited by other forces. The report, written by the Second 
Secretary at the American Embassy in Baghdad, also states the following: “[T]he mob 
was called out, assisted with transportation, and incited to action early on the morning of 
July 14.”387 The secretary further states that the task of mobilizing mob support had been 
“sub-contracted” by the Free Officers to Ba‘thist leaders. This was confirmed by reliable 
sources who had identified some of the agitators inciting the mob as individuals 
“associated with the local Ba‘thist organization.”388 Furthermore, the Iraqi Army had, 
according to Embassy witnesses, been directly involved in transporting young men early 
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on the morning of July 14 from outlying areas of Baghdad in military vehicles; other 
young men were transported in civilian vehicles. 
     Norman Daniel, an eye-witness to the Iraqi revolution, gives an account of the first 
hours of the revolution diametrically opposite to that of Dann and the second secretary at 
the American Embassy, emphasizing: ”No one who was on the streets that morning will 
doubt the cheerful air of spontaneity with which this celebration of sudden freedom 
began…There was no sign that these crowds had been organized.”389 Given the fact that 
the exchange of fire between insurgents and loyalists was minimal, the Baghdadis would 
most likely have taken to the relatively safe streets to celebrate their joy at the fall of the 
old regime even without ‘Arif’s prompting. Furthermore, instances are not unheard of 
when people exploit revolutionary situations intent on looting or settling old scores 
without the need of being organized for this particular purpose. This leads one to 
conclude that the above contradictory accounts are not mutually exclusive but can both 
be correct.  
     As a matter of fact, the physical location of eyewitnesses could have played a role in 
producing seemingly contradictory accounts, since the situation might vary from one part 
to another of such a large city as Baghdad. Furthermore, one can safely conclude that 
only a minority of the demonstrators was transported to the city center, since it would 
have been too time-consuming and would have required thousands of trucks to move 
hundreds of thousands of people. Moreover, an operation on such a scale would have 
required preparations before the coup, which would in turn, of course, have attracted the 
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attention of the authorities. The majority of the demonstrations were thus more or less 
spontaneous, or, possibly, organized locally by agitators.  
     One argument, based on interviews with several party leaders, contends that these 
were privy to Qasim’s plan and therefore in a position to take necessary steps to mobilize 
vindictive demonstrators. According to this argument, a spirit of vengeance permeated 
the crowds, which are estimated at least at one hundred thousand in Baghdad on July 14, 
and this movement “was like a tide…and became so terrible and overwhelming in its 
sweep that the military revolutionaries…declared a curfew and later…martial law.”390 A 
somewhat different picture emerges, however, when a report of the American Embassy in 
Baghdad is juxtaposed with the above argumentation. The report states that “mob 
violence” was limited: “One of the most significant aspects of the recent mob action in 
Baghdad was that there was no large-scale, uncontrolled and indiscriminate destruction 
and looting. There was no general wrecking of buildings, looting of stores, or attacking of 
minority group establishments.”391  
     As has been pointed out above there were instances of violence directed at 
individuals—Iraqis and foreigners—and at institutions, such as the British Embassy. 
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During the siege and burning of the British Embassy one member of the staff was killed, 
and two were injured.392 In the afternoon an army officer arrived, assuring the British that 
the Army would protect the Embassy. Before leaving, he assigned eight soldiers to guard 
it. What Ambassador Wright then describes rather matter-of-factly must in reality have 
been a nightmare experience, which could have ended with the death of twenty-eight 
people in addition to Iraqi deaths outside the embassy had the British opened fire:  
Soon one of the soldiers shot himself in the foot. The other soldiers said he had 
been shot by someone from the Embassy. Thereafter [the] soldiers became 
sullen… Neither the soldiers nor the police made any serious attempt to prevent 
[the] large crowd from breaking into [the] Embassy compound. Some of the 
crowd had rifles. I was shot at myself by a man in uniform at short range. We 
were soon obliged to withdraw to the registry where we remained for about an 
hour and a half while [the] Embassy was being looted and set on fire…Eventually 
[a] large mob said they would set fire to [the] registry unless those within came 
out unarmed. This we did, and a soldier led us through the crowd into the garden 
and gathered a few soldiers around him. About twenty minutes later three 
armoured cars arrived and chased the looters away.393     
    
This account shows that the British Embassy staff could have been attacked and killed 
after they surrendered. The question is why they were not.      
     The above report ends with a comment which testifies to how exposed the position of 
the Embassy staff was, and how fatal an impact decisions made in London and 
Washington could have on the situation of British and American diplomats in Iraq: “If 
American and perhaps British forces enter Lebanon the situation could become ugly…If 
necessary, I may ask for safe conduct for wives, children and perhaps others to 
Habbaniya or to [the] Persian border, or possibly by train to Basra.”394 British and 
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American diplomats had reason to be concerned about the safety of their compatriots. 
According to a British estimate there were as many as 2,000 British subjects and 1, 400 
American citizens in Baghdad alone at the time of the revolution.395 Only a small number 
of Westerners, however, were killed or injured during the July 14 events.  
     As early as July 14 Western diplomats believed they had a clear picture of who had 
perpetrated violent acts during the day. The “mob” which burned the British Embassy, 
the British Consulate, and the British Information Office “was made up of boys and 
young men between the ages of 12 and 20. The same is true of the groups which 
mutilated the bodies of various individuals…A good portion of the mob was made up of 
youths who had been specially imported.”396 This information came from eyewitnesses to 
the “mob action”, regarded by the American Embassy as reliable sources, including 
Western diplomats.   
     By the late evening Ambassador Gallman felt certain enough about the success of the 
coup to report to the Department of State that the enthusiasm for it in Baghdad was 
considerable and that he believed it would prove as popular in the provinces.397 Three 
weeks later his impression had not changed. The Ambassador confirmed that the public’s 
and army’s support for the coup had been immediate and complete. His private research 
into how widespread the support for the new regime was “in the labor, domestic servant, 
and chauffeur class” yielded the following findings: “When I asked them if they regretted 
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the death of [the] King, the majority promptly replied: ‘No. He did nothing for the 
poor.”398  
     The British Ambassador, Wright, appeared not to be convinced that the military was 
in complete control during the first days after the coup, and had no illusions about what 
the result would be if the “mob” took over the streets: “If [the] army lost control, there 
would be nothing to restrain the mob who might kill and loot indiscriminately.”399 
Considering the burning of the British Embassy on July 14, it comes as no surprise that 
Wright’s assessment of the situation in Baghdad appears somewhat more pessimistic than 
that of American diplomats in the city. An American Embassy analysis of the events of 
July 14-16 concludes that the police and the military protected Western Embassies, and 
European stores and homes. In addition to this, beginning at 9:00 a.m. the new regime 
also issued repeated orders on the radio that foreigners and their property must not be 
molested, announcing that “[a]ll foreigners in Iraq are to be treated as friends and 
guests.”400 A weighty reason for not harming Westerners was that this would likely 
weaken the case for foreign intervention in Iraq.   
     The American analysis is evidence that the new regime did not incite the population 
with xenophobic statements and actually went to great lengths to protect all foreigners in 
the country and to dissuade the public from attacking non-Iraqis. Furthermore, at 11:00 
a.m. a curfew was announced effective from 1:00 p.m. July 14 to 7:00 a.m. July 15. The 
analysis states: “The main streets were almost empty of all but official vehicles and it 
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appears as if all of the shops in the city remained closed.”401 This picture is confirmed by 
Wright on July 16, 1958. He writes that martial law and a curfew have been imposed, and 
that the army is determined to protect foreign lives and property.402 On July 15 the 
American Embassy reported at 11:00 p.m. that the city, under a curfew 7:00 p.m. July 15 
to 5:00 a.m. July 16, seemed quiet, but that there had been sporadic gatherings of people 
throughout the day, apparently in violation of orders banning meetings. Some of these 
gatherings seemed, according to the report, to have been encouraged by soldiers.403 By 
the evening of July 16, however, what American diplomats called “mob action” had been 
effectively suppressed, and the authorities had even started to remove revolutionary 
graffiti from building walls in Baghdad.404  
     With Western documents having cleared the new regime’s name regarding the attack 
on British institutions in the city, it is time to address the following question: If the 
military did not incite the population to attack the British Embassy, who ordered and 
carried out the attack, and for what purpose? The above argumentation has established 
that the insurgents themselves attacked certain targets, such as the Rihab Palace and 
Nuri’s residence, and by radio incited the population to capture Nuri al-Sa‘id by putting a 
prize on his head.  
     Left-wing parties, especially the Iraqi Communist Party, known for their hatred of 
imperialism could very well have organized the burning of the British Embassy. Two 
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other parties that harbored strong anti-British feelings were the Ba‘th Party and the 
National Democratic Party. The former could have organized the attack on the British 
Embassy on account of its support for the anti-British Egyptian leader Gamal ‘Abdul 
Nasser. One circumstance that could point in the direction of the Ba‘thists as the 
perpetrators of the attack on the British institutions is the fact that the American Embassy 
was not attacked. With the Americans being perceived, especially by communists, as 
being in the process of gradually replacing the British as the paramount imperialist power 
in the Middle East, it would make sense to attack American interests as well, despite the 
fact that Nuri al-Sa‘id and ‘Abd al-Ilah were primarily identified by Iraqis with British 
interests.  
     The above paragraph shows how difficult it is to establish with exact certainty who 
attacked British institutions in Baghdad on July 14. Furthermore, it is also no easy task to 
attempt to determine why there was only one fatality at the Embassy, in particular in view 
of the strong anti-British sentiments in Iraq. Why were not more people killed in the 
attack? One possible explanation is that whoever organized the attack was more 
interested in destroying symbols of British influence in Iraq, rather than killing British 
subjects. The fact that the attackers chose the “symbolic” approach rather than the latter, 
strongly suggests that the purpose of the attack was to destroy buildings, in particular 
since neither the police nor the soldiers posted to guard the British Embassy compound 
took any action to stop the attackers and nothing prevented the demonstrators from 
killing every one inside the Embassy.405 As has already been stated, the possibility that 
there was a link between the attackers and the leaders of the Free Officers is remote. The 
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reason is that the new regime would not have sanctioned an act which would have so 
drastically increased the risk of foreign intervention at a moment when the former had far 
from consolidated its position. It is indubitable that the last thing the insurgent leaders 
wanted to happen was the burning of the British Embassy, since such an act might quite 
possibly provoke a British military response and an attempt in cooperation with Jordan or 
Britain’s allies in the Baghdad Pact to restore the Iraqi monarchy.  
     An American analysis of the identity of the Baghdadis who attacked the British 
Embassy states that “it is believed on fairly good authority”406 that the targeting of the 
British Embassy, the British Information Office, and the British Consulate occurred “at 
the instigation of Ba‘thist and Communist leaders and speakers.”407 Furthermore, the 
American Embassy advanced the theory that “one of the principal reasons why there was 
little or no use of force by the military or police against Baghdad mobs was that, almost 
without exception, the mobs attacked ‘acceptable targets’”408 It has been argued in the 
two previous paragraphs that British institutions were not “acceptable targets” because of 
the likely consequence of foreign military intervention. A possible counter-argument is 
that the new regime feared the “wrath of the people” and therefore conceded the British 
Embassy as an “acceptable target”. This argument is not convincing, however, since it 
can be refuted by the fact that the Free Officers had since early in the morning repeatedly 
declared on the radio that foreign lives and property must be protected. Thus there could 
have been no doubt in the minds of Iraqis that the new regime was determined to protect 
foreign interests.         
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     The Embassy analysis quoted in the above paragraph draws a surprising conclusion 
having laid out the case for the theory of “acceptable targets.” It states the following:  
Relatively rapid measures to control the mobs were apparently undertaken by the 
new regime for two principal reasons: a) the new authorities soon realized that if 
immediate and strong steps were not taken great damage to foreign lives and 
property might ensue, and this would result in vast problems…with foreign 
governments, and it might cause the flight of…foreign technicians whose 
assistance was greatly needed—particularly the Americans who operate the 
government oil refinery; and b) it soon became apparent that Ba‘thists and, 
probably, communists would use the mob for their own purposes and that these 
purposes were not at all the ones of primary concern to the revolutionary 
authorities.409  
 
The first part of the conclusion is difficult to reconcile with the theory of “acceptable 
targets”, since it simultaneously argues that such targets are not acceptable, whereas the 
second part concurs with the argument laid out above. In spite of this inconsistency the 
analysis is an ambitious attempt to analyze the revolution within three weeks of its 
eruption.     
     It can be concluded from the arguments laid out in this part of the chapter that there 
were at least three groups of Baghdadis taking to the streets: the organized demonstrators, 
inter alia, those transported from the outskirts of Baghdad to the city center; Baghdadis 
who had followed ‘Arif’s call to come out and watch the revolution unfold; and people 
who needed no prompting to celebrate the fall of the monarchy. The question is whether 
it is possible to establish the strength of each group, and whether this is necessary in 
order to determine the nature of the takeover—a coup, a revolution, or some other form 
of violent change of government. In order to find the answer to the second part of this 
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question it is necessary to address another question first—to what extent popular 
participation played a role for the outcome of the overthrow of the old regime. 
     The analysis in the above paragraphs of the nature of popular involvement in the 
events of the first day suggests that the majority of the crowds were not organized, and 
that the foreign interests targeted on July 14 were attacked by organized groups. 
Furthermore, the majority of demonstrating Baghdadis did not have evil intentions, of 
which the limited number of casualties is a clear indication. Had most demonstrators been 
organized—a highly remote possibility among other things due to logistical obstacles and 
security concerns—the indications are that they would have had “evil intentions”, that 
there would have been many more fatalities, and that foreign interests would have been 
exposed to much more destruction on July 14. If the Free Officers’ measures between 
July 14 and July 16—curfews and a high-profile troop presence in the streets of 
Baghdad—indicated that they believed that the crowds had to be restrained, what might 
then have been the motive for calling them out in the first place? The reason was most 
likely that the Free Officers needed to call out the people in order to obtain legitimacy in 
the eyes of the Iraqis and the world. The new regime needed to demonstrate to hostile 
domestic and external forces that Iraqis stood firm behind the new regime, and that any 
attempt to overthrow it would be doomed to failure because of the massive popular 
support the regime enjoyed, testified to by the hundreds of thousands of Baghdadis 
demonstrating in the streets for one purpose or another.    
     It has been argued in the previous chapter that the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy on 
July 14, 1958 constituted a coup within a larger conspiracy due to the fact that the limited 
number of Free Officers who planned and carried out the coup did not share their plan 





with the Supreme Committee of the Free Officers. The arguments advanced in this 
chapter, however, strongly suggest that the events which took place on July 14 were not 
simply a coup replacing the old government with a military government with the rest of 
the population constituting passive spectators. The fact that large numbers of Baghdadis 
took to the streets to demonstrate their support for the regime change is clear evidence 
that the military operation was a popularly supported coup. The coup was to a certain 
extent a joint venture between military and civilian anti-regime forces. This contention is 
supported by the fact that the Free Officers exchanged views with leading Iraqi 
politicians and received feedback from them.410 Furthermore, the fact that leading free 
officers took civilians into their confidence regarding the coup date also suggests that the 
coup was not an exclusive military operation. Finally, the insistence of certain free 
officers that the Ba‘thist and communist party organizations be prepared to assist in the 
overthrow of the monarchy testifies to the extent that the Free Officers believed they 
might have to depend on popular support.411 This fact is of particular importance since it 
without doubt supports the argument that at least part of the population would have 
actively assisted the conspirators had pro-regime forces offered widespread resistance to 
the coup, reinforcing the contention that the coup was not an exclusive military affair, but 
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The Situation in the North and South 
     Outside of Baghdad the revolution manifested itself differently than in the capital. An 
American Embassy analysis gives an indication of in what manner, by posing the 
important question “Why was mob action limited to Baghdad?” The answer according to 
the analyst is threefold: (1) “Baghdad is the locus of a large poverty ridden, easily 
organized and available mob”; (2) The Ba‘thist and communist organizations of the 
capital “provide agitators and leaders for the mob”; (3) The capital has a great number of 
targets suitable for “mob action.”412 Americans and Britons in the northern and southern 
parts of Iraq indubitably stood out more than their compatriots in Baghdad where a much 
larger number of foreign diplomats and expatriates resided. Naturally American and 
British diplomats were concerned about the safety of their nationals in the provinces, but 
diplomatic correspondence shows that Westerners were safer in the provinces than in the 
capital. On July 16 the British Ambassador reported that no information about the 
situation outside Baghdad was available except that British lives and property were safe 
so far, and that operations at the Iraq Petroleum Company were continuing without 
disruption.413 This was confirmed by an American report from the north that Americans 
in Kirkuk were safe and that I.P.C. pumping stations were operating normally.414  
     The situation in Basra on July 14 was much more reassuring for British subjects than 
it was in Baghdad. The only anti-British incident reported on that day was an “occasion 
when transport belonging to a British company was slightly stoned by a crowd.”415 As for 
demonstrations of joy in the streets in the early morning, they remained orderly. Local 
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authorities issued assurances to the British Embassy that they would protect British lives 
and property, which they did by posting guards at sensitive points. Local authorities 
headed by Brigadier Naji Talib, Minister designate of Social Affairs, evinced interest in 
continuity in certain fields of activity. In a conversation with the General Manager of the 
Basra Petroleum Company, Talib asked that the production of oil be continued and 
promised cooperation. Curfew hours from 7:00 p.m. July 15 to 5:00 a.m. July 16 
remained in force until July 18, when the evening hours were put forward until 9:15 p.m. 
in connection with a Shi‘i religious festival.416 According to the American Vice Consul in 
Basra one of the minor demonstrations in the city on July 14 had briefly threatened the 
United States Information Service building, but “this threat [had] soon [been] dissipated 
both by the police and by some Iraqis who [had] told the crowd that the new government 
had ordered that foreign property was not to be disturbed.”417 The latter circumstance 
had, according to the Vice Consul, been as important as the police presence in preventing 
an attack on the building. Unfortunately, there is no indication as to the identity of these 
presumably civilian Iraqis, and whether they had any links to the new regime or any 
affiliation with a political party.  
     Americans who experienced the coup in Basra, Kirkuk, and Mosul reported that there 
had been only a few minor demonstrations with the exception of a fairly large and noisy 
one in Mosul. The latter had not resulted in any destruction of property or loss of life. No 
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“mob action” had occurred during the first days of the revolution. A minor demonstration 
in Kirkuk, however, had “briefly threatened the USIS [United States Information Service] 
building,”418 but this threat had “soon [been] discouraged by police guards.”419 The 
British Vice Consul in Kirkuk confirms in a report dated August 8, 1958 that the police 
had taken prompt action on July 14 and had the situation under control before 11:00 a.m. 
Minor demonstrations had taken place early in the morning during which two British 
vehicles had been attacked and damaged. Later during the day army units had been 
detailed to guard I.P.C. installations. This goes to show that uninterrupted production of 
oil was a priority to the new regime. Not until much later in the afternoon did the army 
take over the airfield and dispatch patrols into the city. The police had, however, acted 
promptly at the request of the British Consulate in the morning and posted guards at 
houses occupied by Britons.420  
     Based on the above accounts of the situation in Basra and in the northern cities one 
can conclude that the police and the army acted more effectively in northern and southern 
cities than in Baghdad to maintain order and protect foreign lives and property. This was 
most likely a consequence of the much smaller demonstrations in these cities, which were 
in turn probably a result of a less polarized political discourse prior to the revolution than 
was the case in Baghdad. Furthermore, it is quite possible that the Free Officers in 
provincial cities, unlike their colleagues in Baghdad, had not been in contact with 
political leaders regarding their plans, and that the coup therefore came as a complete 
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surprise to political agitators who had not had an opportunity to make preparations for 
such an event.   
     This chapter has argued that accidental factors outside the control of the conspirators, 
such as the simultaneous presence of the three pillars of the regime in Baghdad, greatly 
played into the hands of the Free Officers. Another important argument is that the 
overthrow of the monarchy was not a regular military coup due to the close ties between 
the Free Officers and leading politicians, and the decision to solicit assistance from the 
Ba‘thist and communist party apparatuses in case of widespread resistance to the coup. In 
the case of the deaths of King Faisal and Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah the contention in this 
chapter is that this incident could have been avoided had Qasim cared to give 
unequivocal orders about their fate. With regard to the purpose of the attack on the 
British Embassy, the argument has been advanced that it was not to kill Westerners, but 
merely to attack symbols of Western imperialism. This incident had not been encouraged 
by the revolutionary government which had gone to great lengths to protect Westerners 
and Western interests. Finally, this chapter has established that the revolution in the 
North and South was a more “orderly” event than in Baghdad, with the main issues in the 
North and South being to ensure the safety of Westerners and safeguard the continued 












THE REVOLUTIONARY STATE: STRUCTURE AND REFORM 
 
The above chapters have argued that the military-led overthrow of the monarchic regime 
on July 14, 1958 could be termed a coup. It was, however, not a military coup where the 
old regime was simply replaced by a military regime which more or less retained the old 
system of government and pursued similar policies. Another argument that has been 
advanced above contends that the military operation carried out on July 14 was a coup in 
the context of a wider military conspiracy, since the three coup leaders withheld the 
details of the coup plan from the majority of their colleagues in the army.421 A third 
important characteristic of the coup was that several leaders of Iraqi opposition parties 
were better informed of the coup plan than most of ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim’s fellow 
officers.422 A fourth feature of the coup was that Qasim had asked the communist and 
Ba‘thist party organizations to be prepared to support the coup should regime loyalists 
offer stiff resistance. A fifth characteristic of the coup was the popular celebration on the 
streets in the early hours of the coup, demonstrating the strong support of the population 
for the overthrow of the monarchic regime.423 These five features of the coup, however, 
do not necessarily make it a revolution, although characteristics three through five 
strongly suggest that the coup was a revolution. This chapter will therefore contend that 
the features enumerated above, reinforced by the intentions of the coup leaders, their 
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actual policies, social, political, economic, and psychological change differed from Iraqi 
society under the old regime to such a high degree that they constituted a revolution. The 
chapter will also initially analyze the rationale for the new institutions introduced and 
how the new regime consolidated its control over the country.  
 
Structure and Consolidation    
     A main objective of the revolutionary regime following the events of July 14 was to 
consolidate its control over Iraq.424 The country was facing a number of serious 
challenges such as the threat of an imminent invasion by the members of the Baghdad 
Pact, and the likelihood of agitators inciting mobs to exact retribution on representatives 
of the old regime for past injustices. There was also the possibility of an economic crisis 
if the export of oil was discontinued by the British-run Iraq Petroleum Company, and the 
likelihood of Iraqi assets in British banks being frozen if relations with Britain 
deteriorated.425 Also, the possibility of forfeiting the support of the population was 
imminent if steps were not taken immediately to rectify some of the worst policies of the 
old regime. In addition to the aforementioned threats, the Free Officers were a potential 
source of discontent, since the majority of them had not been privy to Qasim’s coup plan. 
Finally, the lack of expertise and experience of the coup leaders in fields such as 
economics, agriculture, law, and government in general, made close cooperation with 
politicians a prerequisite to a successful and stable rule of the new regime.  
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     The first opportunity to address a number of the challenges referred to in the above 
paragraph came on the morning of July 14 when the occupation of Radio Baghdad gave 
the conspirators access to the air waves. Colonel ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif seized the 
opportunity to read Proclamation No.1 to the nation. The first three paragraphs of the 
Proclamation are important enough to be quoted in full, since they show how the coup 
leaders addressed some of the potential problems indicated above:      
In the name of God the Beneficent, the Merciful. By the help of God and the 
assistance of the sincere people of Iraq and members of the National Armed 
Forces, we have undertaken to liberate our dear Country from the domination of 
the corrupt clique installed by imperialism to rule over the people and to play with 
its destiny for the rulers’ personal interests and advantages.426 
 
This short paragraph gave the Baghdadis and foreign diplomats who were listening to 
Radio Baghdad on the morning of July 14 several clues as to what policies the new 
regime intended to pursue.  
     In the first paragraph of the Proclamation the coup leaders explicitly acknowledge the 
role of the Iraqi people in the overthrow of the monarchic regime and criticize the 
policies of the old regime.427 The recognition of the role of the people is important since 
it claims that the Iraqi people and the armed forces are working towards achieving the 
same goal. The evil which the revolutionaries have just swept away had originally been 
installed by and served Western imperialism. This is a clear warning to the Western 
powers that they should expect fundamental change in their relationship with Iraq. The 
phrase that the corrupt Iraqi rulers played with the people’s destiny for their “personal 
interests and advantages,” clearly refers to the old regime’s foreign policy towards Syria 
and Egypt, and Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad Pact, and is a further indication of 
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what Britain and the United States can expect from the new leaders in Baghdad. 
Furthermore, these warnings are also intended to dispel any possible doubts among the 
population as to whether the new regime serves the Iraqi people, and to mobilize the 
intelligentsia, workers, and peasants in support of the government. The first paragraph 
thus brought good news for those who had opposed the old regime’s policies and a clear 
warning for Britain and the United States. 
     The second and third paragraphs of Proclamation No. 1 read as follows:   
Brothers: The army is from you and for you. It has achieved what you desire and 
eliminated the tyrants who played with the rights of the people. You need only 
support the army, and know that victory cannot be achieved without consolidating 
it and protecting it from the conspiracies of imperialism and its agents. We 
therefore ask you to inform the authorities of every corrupt, harmful and 
traitorous element, so that they may be eliminated. We require you to stand united 
in uprooting these elements and overcoming their evils.  
Citizens: Whilst we appreciate your patriotic spirit and wonderful achievements, 
we ask you to be calm and orderly, and to co-operate in productive work for the 
benefit of the country.428  
 
These paragraphs establish the special bond that allegedly exists between the Iraqi 
people and the country’s armed forces and that their objective is one and the same. 
The population is encouraged actively to fight the enemies of Iraq so that they can be 
eliminated. This ominous phrase is a warning both to supporters of the old regime and 
to those of pro-Western policies, that there is no turning back and that they will be 
dealt with severely. Again the people are accorded a role in the struggle against these 
elements. Having announced the role of the Iraqi people in the struggle against their 
enemies, however, the new leaders must have realized that the situation could get out 
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of hand if the pent-up hatred of the old regime was unleashed without any restraint, 
and therefore addressed this issue in the third paragraph.      
     The first three paragraphs of the Proclamation must have greatly alarmed Iraq’s 
former allies and the fourth paragraph adds one more devastating blow to Western 
policies by stating that Iraq “will act in accordance with…the principles of the Bandung 
Conference,” an indication that the new regime intended to pursue a neutralist foreign 
policy. The coup leaders certainly realized, however, that they needed to alleviate the 
alarm which Proclamation would give rise to in London and Washington, and therefore 
stated that the new regime would “abide by all pledges and pacts consistent with the 
interests of the country.” This was an ingenious formula, since it did not establish a fixed 
policy with regard to Iraq’s international obligations. The formula left the option open to 
the regime to revise its policy at a later point in time by enabling it conveniently to 
refer—should need be—to the excuse that the national security interests immediately 
following the Revolution had dictated that certain policies be pursued.   
     The fourth paragraph also caters to an audience which might not have been 
comfortable with the army leading the country. Most likely the coup leaders for this 
reason stated that “The rule must be entrusted to a government emanating from the 
people and inspired by them…In accordance with the wishes of the people we have 
temporarily entrusted its presidency to a Sovereign Council enjoying all the powers of the 
President of the Republic, until a plebiscite is carried out for the election of a 
President.”429 This possibly reassured some politicians eager to return government to 
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civilian hands. At the same time it enabled Qasim to postpone such a development until a 
date which he would find suitable for such a transition.   
     The above analysis of the revolutionaries’ first detailed broadcast to the population 
has established that the former were well aware of the challenges facing them and that 
they attempted to address a number of these issues in a systematic manner sending clear 
signals to the intended audience about their intentions. One can therefore conclude that 
the Proclamation is a well thought out document, which the author or authors must have 
put some effort into formulating prior to the July 14 events.      
     Following the announcement of Proclamation No. 1, the next step for the new regime 
was to establish a governmental structure and power hierarchy. Proclamation No. 2 
announced the names of the three members of the Sovereignty Council.430 Additional 
proclamations announced the formation of a government and the positions of the 
revolutionary leaders in the governmental and state hierarchy. An order signed by the 
Sovereignty Council appointed Qasim as Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, and 
Commander in Chief of the armed forces. ‘Arif was appointed as Deputy Prime Minister, 
Minister of Interior, and Deputy Commander in Chief.431 These appointments were a 
clear indication that the coup leaders intended to concentrate as much power as possible 
in their hands. Furthermore, the fact that Qasim made the Ministry of Defense the seat of 
the government also underscored the weight of the military in the Cabinet. On the other 
hand, there was only one more Free Officer, Brigadier Naji Talib, Minister of Social 
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Affairs, in the Cabinet, but altogether ten civilian ministers.432 The civilian majority was 
most likely intended to create an illusion of real civilian influence, and mask the fact that 
power was more or less exclusively concentrated in military hands.433  
     Qasim also took a number of additional steps to bring the whole country under control 
and secure support for the new government. Martial law was imposed on July 14 and 
Brigadier Ahmad Salih al-‘Abdi was appointed Military Governor-General. The Iraqi 
police were placed under the command of another military officer, Colonel Tahir Yahya, 
and Mutasarrifs, provincial governors, appointed by the old regime were replaced by 
army officers. Furthermore, officers were appointed to head the directorates general of 
ports, supply, prisons, and the civilian airports. A number of other measures taken, such 
as the confiscation of royal property, and the arrest of ministers and politicians who had 
served the old regime had a high propaganda value, and certainly contributed to 
mobilizing support for the revolutionary regime.434 Finally, the new regime also lowered 
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housing rents and rents for business by 20 percent. Prices on meat and bread were 
reduced by 20-40 percent, and on fruits and vegetables by 50 percent.435 The considerable 
rent and price reductions were most likely partly undertaken in order to further enhance 
the government’s support among the poor majority of Iraqis, but these actions certainly 
also reflected Qasim’s concern for the welfare of the common people. These steps taken 
by the government in the initial phase of the Revolution thus suggest that the new regime 
wished to impress on the Iraqi people both that it was in control and that it safeguarded 
their interests.   
     Qasim’s attempt to appoint a government which was acceptable both to the Free 
Officers and the politicians proved a failure, however, and a source of dangerous 
instability. Politicians resented military control and Qasim’s fellow Free Officers 
opposed his authoritarian rule. The Supreme Committee had neither appointed Qasim as 
Prime Minister nor appointed ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif as his deputy, for which posts they had 
no pertinent experience.436 Conversely, it has been argued in Chapter VI that Qasim 
thought he had good grounds for doubting the ability of his fellow Free Officers to 
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cooperate, since he had witnessed so many aborted coup attempts and so much division 
within the Supreme Committee. The ban on political parties during the transitional period 
and his repeated argument that he himself was above party politics are clear indications 
that he entertained serious doubts regarding the wisdom of entrusting the fate of the 
nation to the politicians.437 Furthermore, the inability of the opposition parties to 
overthrow the monarchy provided another good reason for concentrating so much power 
in his own hands. His remarkable confidence in himself reinforced by the repeated 
failures of Free Officers who opposed him to topple him, and his miraculous escape from 
an attempt on his life, all seem to have confirmed to Qasim that he was the right man for 
the difficult task of stabilizing Iraq and raising the standard of living for the great 
majority of the people. Finally, his popularity with the poorer strata of Iraqi society must 
have convinced him that he enjoyed the support of most Iraqis.  
     Qasim further incurred the ire of the members of the Supreme Committee due to the 
fact that some of his actions and decisions were in direct conflict with the guidelines laid 
down by the Committee before the Revolution. The Free Officers had decided not to 
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appoint any military officers as ministers unless they first retired from the army.438  The 
Supreme Committee had also proposed the creation of a Revolutionary Command 
Council, which would include all members of the Committee and be announced 
immediately after the overthrow of the monarchy. The Command Council would have 
legislative and executive power during a transitional period.439 Qasim downplayed the 
threat to stability posed by the serious differences between himself and many Free 
Officers. In the end, the latter would prove the main threat to his regime: Qasim was not 
arrested and executed because the Iraqi people opposed his policies, but due to strong 
opposition to his regime among Free Officers and the Ba‘thists.  
     A further step in the efforts to consolidate the new regime’s power was the 
establishing of the Special Supreme Military Court, which also filled several additional 
important functions. The Court, popularly called the People’s Court, was formed twelve 
days after the Revolution, on July 26, 1958, a fact which testifies to the great importance 
attributed to it by the new regime. Colonel Fadhil ‘Abbas al-Mahdawi, Qasim’s cousin, 
was appointed as the Court’s president and Colonel Majid Muhammad Amin as military 
prosecutor. The purpose of the Court was to prosecute officials of the previous regime 
accused of corruption, endangering Iraq’s national security, interference in the internal 
affairs of other Arab states, or conspiracy to overthrow their governments.440 In view of 
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these tasks, it is obvious that the People’s Court was also formed in order to calm popular 
sentiments, which were still very anti-monarchic. The importance of the aspect of 
entertainment and the exposal of widespread corruption under the previous regime was 
further accentuated by the fact that most convicted officials were released, even those 
considered to have committed serious crimes. Three were, however, executed.441    
 
Reform 
     A complete break with the past had already been announced to the nation when ‘Abd 
al-Salam ‘Arif read Proclamation No.1 on the Baghdad Radio on July 14. First, the 
elimination of the previous regime was manifested in a change in system of government, 
a republic had been proclaimed in lieu of the monarchy. Second, the Proclamation held 
out the promise of real participation of the Iraqi people in shaping the future of their 
country. Third, a complete reorientation of Iraq’s foreign policy from a close alliance 
with the West and an anti-Soviet position in the Cold War, to a neutralist approach to 
relations with other powers was also announced. The first and third breaks with the past 
became facts as they were announced. As to popular participation, it was only the stated 
intent of the new regime and not yet a fact, since the government had not been elected by 
the Iraqi people. The fact that ten civilian ministers had been appointed to head ministries 
in the first cabinet, and that they represented—directly or indirectly—all parties which 
had opposed the Nuri regime, however, was a clear indication that the military leaders 
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were eager to confer upon the new regime a degree of popular legitimacy. This part of the 
chapter will discuss to what extent the intentions and actual policies pursued in various 
fields by the Qasim regime constituted a revolution or were largely a continuation of the 
old regime by different means.  
     The new regime’s efforts expeditiously to present a provisional constitution to the 
people should be interpreted as part of a wish to emphasize the watershed between the 
old and the new era and thereby further enhance the goodwill the new government 
already enjoyed among the population. The new leaders were certainly well aware of 
Nuri’s failure to create a state, with which a majority of Iraqis could identify, and 
therefore strove to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that the new regime was building an 
inclusive state which would bring justice, democracy, and prosperity to all Iraqis, in 
contrast to the old regime which largely benefited a very limited stratum of the 
population.442 It therefore comes as no surprise that the Provisional Constitution was 
promulgated on July 27, 1958, less than fourteen days after the overthrow of the 
monarchy. The Provisional Constitution, drawn up by a Cabinet Committee, was 
intended to be replaced by a permanent constitution, which would be prepared by a 
National Assembly elected by the people after the unspecified end of a transitional 
period.443     
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     The individual articles of the Provisional Constitution manifest a real effort to create 
an Iraqi identity and national unity by emphasizing the partnership of different ethnic 
groups, the role of the people in national life, and civil liberties, all of which Iraqis had 
been unfamiliar with under the monarchy. Article 7 states that “the people are the source 
of [all] power.”444 Article 3 acknowledges for the first time the national rights of the 
Kurds, and states that the Kurds and Arabs are partners in the homeland. In Article 10 of 
the Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression and Article 9 provides for 
equality before the law, stating that “there shall be no discrimination against them [the 
citizens] because of race, language, religion, or belief.”445 Finally, Article 14 of the 
Constitution addressed the serious problem of landownership in rural areas which the old 
regime bequeathed to the revolutionaries, stipulating that “agricultural ownership shall be 
limited and regulated by law” and that existing rights would be preserved “until such time 
as legislation is enacted.”446 It is clear from the above articles of the Constitution that the 
new regime had gone to great lengths to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that it intended to 
address the serious political, social, and economic problems it had inherited from Nuri al-
Sa‘id, and that the path to national unity led through an Iraqi identity.   
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      The Popular Resistance Forces, a militia ostensibly formed for the purpose of 
providing local security, can be viewed, due to the fact that recruitment was done on a 
voluntary basis, to a certain extent as part of a process aimed at increasing popular 
participation in the nation’s political life, albeit to consolidate the government’s grip on 
power. The regime’s intention with the force, organized on August 1, 1958, was at least 
twofold—to mobilize popular support for the government through a militia of volunteers, 
and to use it as a tool to suppress opposition. The volunteers were trained in civil defense, 
and were used to guard important installations in various parts of the country and to 
provide security to citizens. Gradually, however, the militia’s arbitrary use of 
intimidation and arrest caused resentment among the population.447 An interesting 
characteristic of the Force is the volunteer basis of the organization, which distinguishes 
it from organizations during the previous regime. It would certainly have been difficult to 
find such a significant number of volunteers to organize a similar force in support of the 
Nuri regime. Furthermore, Nuri would most likely never have allowed the formation of 
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such an organization, since he trusted only the police and the armed forces with the task 
of maintaining order and stability in the country.448   
     Despite other attempts at reform, it was in the field of agriculture that the new regime 
took the boldest action to achieve fundamental change in Iraqi society. The first step was 
made on July 27, 1958, when the government abolished the tribal jurisdictions, whereby 
“the legal basis for ‘feudalism’ [iqta‘iyya] in Iraq was destroyed.”449 With the majority of 
Iraqis dependent on agriculture, approximately 4,500,000 individuals, or 70 percent of 
the total population, experiencing total, partial, or seasonal unemployment, radical reform 
was long overdue. One government source estimated unemployment at about 40 percent 
of the agricultural population.450 Such a state of affairs naturally led to considerable 
migration to the cities. According to a Soviet source 50,000 persons left rural areas 
annually for what they believed was a better life in the cities. At the time of the July 
Revolution this had resulted in 300,000 migrants living in Baghdad without permanent 
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employment.451  In order to alleviate the difficult conditions in rural areas and the 
concomitant migration to the cities, Prime Minister Qasim proudly announced the 
Agrarian Reform Law No. 30 on September 30, 1958 and “the end of feudalism.”452     
                 The objectives of the Agrarian Reform Law were, according to the Minister of 
Agriculture Hudaib al-Hajj Hamud, threefold:  
(1) To eliminate the feudal estates as a means of production and as an imperialist 
asset, and to put an end to the political influence, enjoyed by the feudalists as 
a result of their large landed property, and exercised in a negative manner over 
the state and political apparatus in accordance with their interests and the 
interests of imperialism, and [for the purpose of] obstructing the governmental 
administration. All this [is done] for the purpose of providing the ability to 
watch over the common interest.  
(2) To raise the standard [of living] of the fallah stratum and to offer them the full 
opportunity to raise their social status. 
(3) To raise the agricultural production in the country by making an efficient 
contribution to raising the national income and strengthening the national 
economy.453    
 
The above objectives are a clear indication of the new regime’s intention to achieve 
change in Iraqi society and that this change would result in a society fundamentally 
different from that of the Nuri era. The question whether this good intention was 
translated into tangible results in the agricultural sector will be discussed below.                     
     The Agrarian Reform Law consisted of four sections dealing with the size of land 
holdings, agricultural cooperative societies, relations between landowners and fallahin, 
                                                          
451 Pravda, August 27, 1958.  
452 14th of July Celebration Committee 1958-1959, The Iraqi Revolution, p. 22.  
453‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Hilali, Qissat al-Ardh wa al-Fallah wa al-Islah al-Zira‘i fi al-Watan al-‘Arabi [The 
Story of the Land, the Fallah, and the Agrarian Reform in the Arab Homeland] (Bairut, al-Qaahira, 
Baghdad: Manshurat Dar al-Kashaf, first edition, 1977), p. 419; see also Khah Bat, no. 70 (January 2, 
1959), both sources quoted in ‘Ali, Al-‘Iraq fi ‘Ahd ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, p. 107. In his announcement of 
the Agrarian Reform Law to the nation Qasim said: “…The Revolution, which erupted from the will of the 
people, is a political and social revolution. Its objective is to liberate the individual from feudal control and 
to guarantee the people full justice, to liberate it from poverty, and to deliver it from ignorance and disease. 
In order to attain to these goals, it is absolutely necessary to raise the standard of living of the poor to a 
level appropriate for a decent human life, without interfering with the just standard of the rich,” Al-Ahram, 
October 2, 1958, pp. 1-2.  





and agricultural laborers. The first section stipulated that no landowner hold more than 
1,000 dunums (618 acres) in irrigated land, or 2,000 dunums in rainfall land. The excess 
land, starting with the largest holdings, was to be expropriated by the state within five 
years, and a valuation committee would determine the compensation that was due to the 
owner. The latter would receive compensation in three percent government bonds. Both 
seized land and state land were to be distributed within five years among peasants by 
occupation only, with the minimum and maximum size in irrigated land being 30 and 60 
dunums respectively, and the double in rain-fed land. The price of the received land was 
to be paid within 20 years. Recipients could not sell their land before they had paid their 
debt in full.454 As to Agricultural Cooperative Societies, membership was required for 
fallahin who had taken over distributed land. The task of the Cooperative Societies was, 
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inter alia, to provide the fallahin with loans, seed, fertilizer, agricultural machinery, to 
organize the cultivation of land, and to market the crops of the peasants.455  
     The Agrarian Reform Law brought a degree of security into the lives of tenants and 
sharecroppers, and also improved conditions for agricultural laborers. The Law stipulated 
that contracts between tenants and landlords be honored for at least a period of three 
years following the promulgation of the Law, a provision which prevented arbitrary 
eviction of cultivators. Section III also stipulated that landlords provide lands with 
irrigation water. The purpose of the last section of the Agrarian Reform Law was to 
improve conditions for agricultural laborers. It stipulated that the minimum wage for the 
agricultural workers be determined annually by a five-member committee headed by a 
government official and also including two representatives of the landlords, and two 
members representing the laborers. Furthermore, the Law guaranteed the agricultural 
workers the right to form their own unions and, for the first time in Iraq, to engage in 
collective bargaining.456 It is evident from the stipulations of the four sections of the 
Agrarian Reform Law that the main objective of the Law was radically to improve the 
situation of the poorest strata of Iraqi society in the rural areas, which was in radical 
contrast to the policy of the monarchy.  
     For a number of reasons the Agrarian Reform Law did not become the great success it 
was intended to be. As has been argued above, the intention was to implement a 
revolutionary change in the rural areas, once and for all eliminating the power of the large 
landowners and radically improving the situation of the poor fallahin. The reform 
program, however, proved more difficult to realize than to draw up. The plan was to 
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implement the Law in three stages: expropriation, administration, and distribution. The 
first two stages were implemented without major difficulties. The last stage, however, 
turned out to be a very time-consuming process. As a result, between September 1958 
and the end of 1960 only three percent of the land expropriated was actually distributed 
among the fallahin. In order to silence critics, the Ministry of Agrarian Reform began to 
expedite the distribution of land, but this only gave rise to further problems due to lack of 
classification and schemes for irrigation and drainage.457 The extremely slow progress in 
land distribution led to chaos in the countryside and significant migration to the cities. 
This in turn prompted Qasim to issue orders to prevent fallahin who had received a loan 
from the government from migrating to urban areas.458Also, in order to encourage 
migration in the opposite direction the government offered land and capital to inhabitants 
of the sarifas, slums, of Baghdad who had migrated there from rural areas.459   
     A lack of resources and skilled administrators and professionals were the main reasons 
for the problems with which the Agrarian Reform Law was afflicted. The absence of 
maps and the shortage of surveyors, engineers, and agricultural and land specialists, 
agronomists, cooperative supervisors, and accountants made rapid implementation of the 
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Agrarian Reform Law an impossible task. These problems also meant that the fallahin 
were not provided with adequate technical support, irrigation and drainage facilities and 
assistance to market their crops.460 As a result of the lack of adequate resources described 
above, by the end of September 1963—Qasim was overthrown on February 8, 1963—
only 35, 104 fallahin had received land, the total area of which was 1,800,461 dunums, 
though the government had seized a total of 4, 602,827 dunums of excess land, and 
leased out 4,237,498 dunums of state-owned land to 244,691 peasant families.461 
     The Agrarian Reform Law and its inefficient implementation have been criticized 
from many quarters. Being in control of the Ministry of Agrarian Reform the communists 
were blamed for the extremely slow distribution of land. This criticism was based on the 
argument that the communists had “intentionally and deliberately sabotaged the process 
of land distribution,” owing to their alleged opposition to landownership.462 Another 
source points out, however, that due to the shortage of professionals the distribution of 
land could hardly have been accelerated. Furthermore, less land was distributed during 
four years of Ba‘thist rule 1963-1967 than under Qasim 1959-1962, suggesting that the 
Ba‘thists were even more inefficient than the Qasim regime.463 A third source draws 
attention to the significant difference between maximum limits for landowners’ and 
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fallahin holdings of irrigated land 1,000 and 60 dunums respectively, and 2,000 and 120 
dunums respectively of rain-fed land, a fact which perpetuated a considerable difference 
in income between the two groups, and also the landowners’ influence over the 
fallahin.464 Furthermore, the law made no distinction between low-yielding wheat and 
barley land, and high-yielding rice land, the fertility of the soil, and the lands proximity to 
sources of water.465 Finally, the communists also criticized the Agrarian Reform Law for 
granting too much land to landlords.466 In their view, the upper limit for the holdings of 
landlords should be reduced to 200 dunums in irrigated land and 400 dunums in rainfall 
land.467 The communists were also critical of the stipulation that landowners receive 
compensation for expropriated land.468     
      Despite the problems with the Agrarian Reform Law, Qasim’s concern for the poorer 
strata of the population resulted in important improvements in their situation, though less 
so for the fallahin. He saw to it that the hours for night work were limited to seven hours, 
and for day work to eight hours, and that workers were allowed to organize in unions. 
Qasim also ordered industrial enterprises with more than a hundred employees to build 
houses for their workers, and ordered that existing provisions for social insurance be 
observed. The Prime Minister shares much of the credit for these improvements with the 
communists, who were influential until mid-1959. Furthermore, in 1959-1960 Qasim 
built a whole town with 10,000 houses and public services for inhabitants of Baghdad’s 
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sarifas.469 He also introduced an element of popular participation into the economic 
planning process which Iraqis had not experienced under the previous regime: before 
final decisions were made on whether to implement plans for economic projects the 
opinion of various popular organizations was sought.470 Despite his concern for the poor, 
however, Qasim left no doubt in the minds of Iraqis regarding his rejection of economic 
class war. In his speeches he repeatedly emphasized his opposition to division among 
different social strata:471 Qasim’s dream was to build an Iraq for all Iraqis without siding 
with any one group, class, or party. This was truly a revolutionary idea and a radical 
departure from the policies of the previous regime, which largely promoted the interests 
of a limited, conservative group of oligarchs.  
     It is possible that the Iraqi government could have implemented the Agrarian Reform 
Law more efficiently had they hired a number of foreign experts to assist the Iraqi experts 
in the difficult distribution process. The government certainly had the financial resources 
to do so, but national pride and the anti-imperialist rhetoric at the time made the hiring of 
Westerners—a procedure which the previous regime had been sharply criticized for—a 
delicate matter. In retrospect, however, a more expeditious and well thought out 
implementation of the Reform Law would certainly have outweighed any negative 
                                                          
469 Government statement in Al-Waqa’i‘ al-‘Iraqiyya, no. 14 (August 1958), p. 7; Article 7 of Law No. 82 
of 1958 Amending Labor Law No. 1 of 1958, in Al-Waqa’i‘ al-‘Iraqiyya, no. 99 (December 24, 1958); 
Article 2 of Law No. 84 of 1958 Obliging Owners of Industrial Establishments to Build Houses for 
Workers, Al-Waqa’i‘ al-‘Iraqiyya, no. 101 (December 28, 1958); Iraq, The July 14 Revolution in its First 
Year, pp. 320ff; speech by Qasim on July 14 1960; Abdul Karim Qassim, Principles of 14th July Revolution 
[in Arabic] (Baghdad: The Times Press, n.d.), p. 281. Qasim stated that in 1958-1960 25,000 houses had 
been built for the poor; all sources referred to in Batatu, The Old Social Classes, pp. 841-842.  
470 The Iraq Times, August 6, 1959, p. 3.  
471 “Formerly, the employer used to fear for his life and for his property. Now, the employer and the worker 
are brothers working together in both prosperity and adversity to protect the gains of the Iraqi Republic. 
They work constantly not for any transient selfish interest but for the interest of the people.” In the same 
speech, on May Day 1959, Qasim emphasized “As to these traitors, their days are gone and they have been 
dwarfed in front of the people. The people have become armed with patience and faith. I insist on the co-
operation and tolerance among the people. As to the execution or non-execution of the traitors, this is a 
matter which is left for us to decide,” both quotes, Qasim, Principles of the 14th July Revolution, pp. 13-14.    





consequences of hiring foreign experts. Whatever one may think of the less than 
successful record of the Law and his exaggerated confidence in his own ability, it is 
difficult not to sympathize with Qasim’s efforts to improve the situation of Iraq’s poor.       
     The foreign-owned oil companies were another sector of the economy which the new 
regime strove to reform. The British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company had several 
branches both in the northern and southern parts of the country. It had been operating in 
Iraq since the early Mandate years. The Company enjoyed a central position in the Iraqi 
economy, which would collapse without the oil revenues, worth over ID80 million.472 
When the Qasim regime assumed power, one of its major concerns was therefore to 
guarantee an unimpeded flow of oil.473 In order to achieve this goal Qasim had to steer 
clear of nationalization, since the British were extremely sensitive to threats to their 
economic interests in the Middle East. On two previous occasions, 1953 in Iran and 1956 
in Egypt, Britain had demonstrated that she was prepared to fight to maintain her 
economic position in the Middle East. What Qasim obviously did not suspect, was that 
                                                          
472 The Iraq Times, August 2, 1958. In the first quarter of 1958 Iraqi oil production was about 625,000 
barrels per day, which constituted 4 percent of “free world” output and 15 percent of Middle East oil 
production. Most of Iraq’s oil was exported to Western Europe which was dependent on the Middle East 
for approximately 70 percent of its oil supplies, Office Memorandum from J. Bruce Hamilton, IRA/DFI to 
Cumming, INR, July 14, 1958, Secret, 787.00/7-1458, Subject: The Iraq Crisis, Part II: Implications for Oil 
supplies. Iraq’s total oil revenues for 1958 amounted to a record ID83,812,423 compared with 
ID48,916,685 for 1957 and ID68,858,777 for 1956. The annual average export of oil from the northern 
oilfields amounted to 28 million tons, and 12 million tons from the southern fields and the oil revenues for 
1959 were expected to reach ID100,000,000. The explanation for the record level of revenues for 1958 
were successful negotiations with the oil companies which established additional installations enabling the 
northern fields to increase exports and improvements made by the Iraqi government at the Fao terminal to 
receive heavy tankers. A deep-water terminal being constructed near Fao, expected to be completed by the 
end of 1960 would further increase oil exports, The Iraq Times, January 12, 1959, pp. 1 and 3. The decline 
in oil revenues in 1957 was caused by the Suez Crisis of the previous year.  
473 Al-Ahram, July 20, 1958, p. 7, Juily 24, 1958, p. 9.. 





the British were as concerned about potential problems in their relations with the new 
Iraqi regime.474          
     Nationalization of the oil industry was not an option at the time, since it would most 
likely have jeopardized national security, which is why the Qasim regime strove to bring 
about gradual change in the relationship with the Iraq Petroleum Company to enable Iraq 
to exercise increased influence over company policies. Furthermore, this approach was 
important due to the propaganda value tangible results of negotiations with the Company 
would have. Talks were therefore initiated with the oil companies in early August 1958, 
emphasizing an increased Iraqi share of oil revenues, extension of Iraqi jurisdiction to the 
companies, and retrieval of unexploited concessions.475 There were several achievements 
during the first months of negotiations: First, the oil companies agreed to relinquish some 
concession areas. Second, 153 foreign experts at the Dura refinery were replaced by Iraqi 
experts, a step which added ID1 million annually to the Iraqi treasury’s coffers.476 Third, 
                                                          
474 This is evidenced by a “placatory statement pledging complete cooperation with new authorities and 
wishing ‘continued prosperity to Iraq and her people,’” issued by the Iraq Petroleum Company’s 
spokesman in Kirkuk, Gallman to the Secretary of State, no. 277, confidential, 787.JO/7-2158.    
475 Ibrahim Kubba, Hadha Huwa Tariq 14 Tammuz [This is the Way of the Iraqi Revolution] (Bairut: Dar 
al-Tali‘a, 1969), p. 41. Also, on August 2, 1958 The Iraq Times reported that the government had begun 
negotiations with the oil companies regarding an increase to 75 percent of Iraq’s share of oil profits. The 
paper further stated that adjacent oil producing countries had already concluded agreements with foreign oil 
companies to this effect, The Iraq Times, August 2, 1958. An official Iraqi source emphasizes that though 
the government’s objective was to increase Iraq’s share of the oil revenues to 75 percent, this must not 
result in “hindering production processes,” The Iraqi Revolution, p. 51. Negotiations about increased Iraqi 
influence over the Iraq Petroleum Company’s policies were crucial to the Qasim regime The British-owned 
Company and its subsidiaries were a symbol of British imperial policy in the Middle East, and as such, an 
institution which in Iraqi eyes must be profoundly reformed to reflect Iraq’s national sovereignty and 
control over her natural resources.  
476 14th July Celebrations Committee, The Iraqi Revolution, p. 53; Kubba, Hadha Huwa Tariq 14 Tammuz, 
pp. 42-44. 14th July Celebrations Committee, The Iraqi Revolution, a government source, states that some 
of the 153 American and British experts “did not possess high technical qualifications. Ninety Iraqi 
engineers, all holders of high degrees, were given trivial and unimportant jobs, despite the fact that the 
terms of contract of foreign experts compelled them to give technological training to all Iraqis, so at any 
time a quick transfer can be made from foreign to Iraqi management.” The government source further 
claims “that purchases made after the Revolution were at prices from 22 to 25 percent less than the prices 
paid on the last purchase made during the old regime, ” both quotations from 14th July Celebrations 
Committee, The Iraqi Revolution, p. 53. Claims that the Western powers, Western companies, and the old 





the Khaniqin Oil Company’s concession was terminated on January 1, 1959 after the 
Company had informed the government that it was unable to fulfill its obligations under 
the concession.477 Fourth, the new regime also asserted its control over the hiring policy 
of the foreign oil companies, having them extend the one-month period for finding an 
Iraqi to fill an open position in a company to two months. Furthermore, the hiring of a 
foreign national by an oil company required approval by the Ministry of Economics and 
his contract was not to be renewed upon expiration. 478 The advantage of the process 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regime had exploited Iraq were a recurrent theme in Iraqi mass media following the July 14 Revolution.  
Interestingly enough, the same source states that the refinery had hired twelve Soviet engineers “to 
complete the changeover to Iraqis,” and intended to employ twelve more Soviet experts. The expenses of 
employing these 24 Soviet experts would not exceed ID60,000 per annum as compared with ID1 million 
for the 153 Western experts, 14th July Celebrations Committee, The Iraqi Revolution, p. 54. The Iraq Times 
states that the number of Western experts working at the Dura refinery had been 144, but that they had been 
replaced by Iraqi experts with Soviet experts in an advisory capacity numbering 21, The Iraq Times, 
September 1, 1959, p. 7.   
Pursuant to an agreement concluded between the oil companies and the old regime in 1952 the former were 
under obligation to inform the Iraqi government of vacancies and “the qualifications required to fill each 
one of them,” whereupon the government advertised these vacancies. Since the new regime found that the 
agreement did not lead to the employment of a satisfactory number of Iraqis it decided to seek amendments 
to the agreement. Furthermore, the agreement with the oil companies also entitled the Iraqi side to appoint 
two Iraqis to the Board of Directors in London. It was the view of the new regime, however, that Iraq 
needed to be actively involved in “directing the affairs of the oil companies,” and therefore demanded that 
one of its directors be appointed as an executive director. During the negotiations the companies undertook 
to study the Iraqi request “in the near future.” Finally, the oil companies also agreed to supply necessary aid 
to a government project to establish an institute for oil studies in Baghdad, The Iraqi Revolution, pp. 51-52. 
The policy of replacing American and British experts by Iraqi experts is contradicted by an American 
Embassy report of July 21 which claims that the Iraqi ”Government [was] deeply concerned lest foreign 
experts and technicians leave the country. Every effort is being made to reassure them and persuade them 
to remain,” Gallman to the Secretary of State, No. 277, Confidential, 787.JO/7-2158. The explanation is 
most likely that immediately following the Revolution the new regime was wary to undertake any action  
which could be perceived as “unfriendly” towards the United States or Britain. Furthermore it was possibly 
not clear which of the foreign experts were dispensable at such an early stage. Finally, when the 
negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum Company commenced in early August, the Republic of Iraq had 
already been recognized by the Western powers and must therefore have been emboldened to change its 
policy with regard to foreign experts in the country.         
477 Ibrahim Kubba, Hadha Huwa Tariq 14 Tammuz, pp. 42-44; The Iraqi Revolution, p. 49. This 
government source gives the date of the termination of the concession as December 30, 1958. At Khaniqin 
the government dispensed with the services of all 48 British technicians who were employed by the 
Khaniqin Oil Company, saving the Company ID150,000 annually, The Iraq Times, September 1, 1959, p. 
7. In an interview with Iraqi journalists Qasim stated in December 1959 that his government was 
negotiating with the oil companies asking them to relinquish 60 percent of their concessions, since these 
had been given to the companies when Iraq was “fettered,” The Iraq Times, December 11, 1959, p. 9.    
478 Ibrahim Kubba, Hadha Huwa Tariq 14 Tammuz, pp. 44-46; The Iraqi Revolution, p. 51. 





discussed above was that it was acceptable to both sides, guaranteed a stable flow of oil 
revenues, and could be exploited for propaganda purposes by the Qasim regime. 
     The guiding principle for the Iraqi side in the negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum 
Company was Iraqization. The Iraqi objective was to increase Iraq’s role in company 
activities and Iraqi influence over company policies. Since national security was a major 
concern of the new regime, immediate nationalization of the oil companies was not an 
option. Such a policy would most likely have triggered a British response in the form of 
an economic boycott of Iraq, which would have compelled the Iraq Petroleum Company 
to cease activities in Iraq, or worse—resulted in a Western invasion of the country. With 
the Suez Crisis in fresh memory the Company opted to assure the new Iraqi government 
of its cooperation from early on. Baghdad thus stopped short of pursuing a forceful 
revolutionary policy towards the oil companies, but made clear its intention to change 
fundamentally the previous Iraqi regime’s relationship with the companies as has been 
argued above. The advantage of such a policy was that the flow of oil was not interrupted 
at the same time as the government could actually demonstrate to the Iraqi public that it 
was increasing Iraqi control over the country’s resources through negotiations.  
     This chapter has argued that Proclamation No. 1 was a well thought out document 
prepared some time before July 14, and evidence that the leaders of the military operation 
were well aware of the challenges facing them in the early hours of the Revolution. This 
is obvious from the fact that the Proclamation reassures foreign powers and asks the 
people to remain calm and refrain from violence. It has further been contended in this 
chapter that the policies pursued by the Qasim regime aimed at a fundamental change of 
Iraqi society focusing on improving the standard of living for the poor majority of Iraq’s 





population eliminating the power of large landowners in the rural areas and in national 
politics, and empowering workers in the cities. Based on the evidence presented in the 
chapter, the conclusion is that the events of July 14 were the initial phase of a social, 
economic, and political revolution and not merely a military coup. The circumstance that 
the reforms introduced by the new regime were not always very successful does not 
change the revolutionary character of and intention with the reforms. Furthermore, this 
argument is supported by the truly revolutionary changes in Iraq’s foreign policy and 


































INTERNATIONAL REACTIONS TO JULY 14  
 
This chapter will analyze in detail the reactions of the Western powers, their allies in the 
Baghdad Pact, and the socialist countries to the Iraqi Revolution. These early reactions to 
the Revolution to a certain extent determined Iraq’s foreign relations. Previous chapters 
have argued that in the years leading up to the Iraqi Revolution, Britain and the United 
States had pursued similar but not identical policies towards Iraq. The main difference 
between the two powers had been in the field of military aid where the British had 
insisted on retaining as much influence as possible, while the American military had 
attempted to increase its influence. Differences between the two allies persisted after the 
Revolution, but they were of a more fundamental character than they had been under the 
old regime. This chapter will analyze the reasons for these differences. Furthermore, the 
chapter will also examine the Anglo-American approach to the policies towards Iraq of 
Western allies in the Middle East. To what extent did the latter policies differ from those 
of Britain and the United States, and why did Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan not adopt a 
united approach to the Iraqi Revolution?   
 
U.S. and British Reactions    
     American and British initial reactions to the fall of Nuri al-Sa‘id and the Iraqi 
monarchy were that it constituted a cataclysmic event with serious consequences for the 
West’s position in the Middle East. A major early concern of the U.S. government was         





the possibility of a disruption of the flow of Iraqi oil to Western Europe. A U.S. 
government office memorandum argued that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, and 
the United States could make up for this shortfall.479 The possibility of the Iraqi crisis 
spreading to Saudi Arabia was, however, cause for greater concern, since over 10 percent 
of Western oil was produced in the two countries. Furthermore, the rise in oil prices as a 
consequence of such a disruption would put a serious strain on Western European foreign 
currency reserves in U.S. dollars. The office memorandum even analyzed the 
consequences of a worst-case scenario—a complete disruption in the flow of oil from the 
Middle East to the West. Such a disruption would amount to the loss of 25 percent of 
“total free world oil supplies.” The United States and Venezuela would be able to make 
up for half of this loss, but the Western European importers would not be able to finance 
emergency imports for long. An analysis done with such urgency—on the very first day 
of the revolution—of a possible disruption in oil supplies to Western Europe, testifies to 
how seriously the U.S. government took the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy.         
     Another concern of the Western powers was the possibility of communist involvement 
in the July 14 revolution. The reason for this fear in Washington and London was that 
communist control of Iraq would entail, it was believed, Soviet control of the country and 
its oil fields. The lack of detailed information on the political affiliation of the leading 
Free Officers in the new government made it difficult to assess communist influence over 
the regime. Six days after the revolution the British Ambassador Sir Michael Wright, 
reported that “[t]he role of the Communists cannot yet be assessed beyond the fact that 
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they will do their best to exploit the situation.”480 By August 23, however, after Wright 
had met with some of the ministers, he felt confident enough to report to the Foreign 
Office that the administration was one of “liberal reformers,” and that there was no better 
alternative, at least not for the moment. Wright therefore concluded that the best course 
was as soon as possible to extend some form of recognition to the new regime.481 On 
August 27 he argued that recognition was an issue which had to be addressed urgently 
since it “would strengthen [the] new regime in withstanding inevitable attempts by 
communists and others to gain control of it.”482 The British ambassador further 
underscored the danger of not extending recognition in an expeditious fashion, as this 
might cause the regime to seek support from the communists or Nasser, or weaken its 
position. Wright’s assessment of the situation suggests that from the British perspective 
there was no easy or obvious approach to dealing with the new regime in Baghdad.     
     Despite Wright’s reassuring reports to London the British were still concerned about 
the possibility of the Iraqi revolution spreading to neighboring Kuwait, to which testifies 
the British order of battle in the Persian Gulf. Britain planned by July 27 to deploy three 
infantry battalions with five to six frigates and one aircraft carrier to Bahrain to protect 
Kuwaiti oil fields in the event of an emergency. When military planners requested 
permission to fly in an advance unit of paratroops to Kuwait, however, the Political 
Agent in Kuwait and the Political Resident in Bahrain turned down the request, arguing 
                                                          
480 Wright (Emergency Headquarters) to the Foreign Office, July 20, 1958, no. 15, Secret, FO371/134200. 
The Emergency Headquarters refers to the hotel which housed the embassy staff after the burning of the 
British Embassy.  
481 Wright (Emergency Headquarters) to the Foreign Office, July 23, no. 24, Secret, FO371/134200. 
Furthermore, Wright pointed out that the British had a clear advantage in any negotiations about 
recognition, owing to the Iraqis’ “real anxiety about intervention by Hussein with our support…,” ibid. On 
July 22 Al-Ahram had reported that diplomatic circles in London had intimated on the previous day that the 
United States and Britain would shortly recognize the Republic of Iraq, Al-Ahram, July 22, 1958, p. 1.   
482 Wright (Emergency Headquarters) to the Foreign Office, July 27, 1958, no. 34, Secret, FO371/134201.  





that the arrival of British troops in Kuwait would only stir up sentiments there.483 
Furthermore, Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak al-Sabah of Kuwait had evinced no enthusiasm 
for the idea of dispatching an advanced British contingent to Kuwait when the Political 
Resident had raised the issue with him a few days earlier.484 It is also possible that the 
Resident had been impressed by the demonstrations of the Kuwaiti public in support of 
the new regime in Iraq and therefore insisted that no advance unit be dispatched to 
Kuwait.485        
     The landing of U.S. Marines in Lebanon on July 15 was not primarily a result of U.S.  
concern about the constitutional crisis and the civil war in this country. The fact that U.S. 
troops had landed in Lebanon within 48 hours of the Iraqi Revolution suggests a causal 
relationship between the two events, that is, that the Iraqi Revolution functioned as a 
catalyst for the American intervention in Lebanon. Furthermore, what establishes an even 
                                                          
483 The Political Resident was Britain’s representative in the Persian Gulf area between 1763 and 1971. He 
was British India’s senior official and policy coordinator in the Gulf. The Resident was appointed by the 
Government of India until 1946, and then by the British government. The Political Resident was 
represented by Political Agents in Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, and number of other shaikhdoms. The 
Resident handled political relations with these sheikhdoms. He supervised Political Agents, whose policy 
until World War II was to avoid intervening with the local administration of the shaikhdoms as far as 
possible. In the post-World War period, however, due to increased oil revenues and the transfer of 
responsibility for the Persian Gulf states under British influence from the Government of India to the 
Foreign Office, Simon C. Smith, Britain’s Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the 
Trucial States, 1950-1971 (London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), p. 3; Simon C. Smith, 
Kuwait, 1950-65: Britain, the al-Sabah, and Oil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 15; Britain and 
the Middle East Up Tp 1914, available from http://www.answers.com/topic/britain-and-the-middle-east-up-
to-1914 ; “The Bahrain Public School Scheme, 1941,” in Education Research and Perspectives, The 
University of Western Australia, Vol. 14, No. 2, December 1987, available from 
http://www.paulrich.net/publications/edu_research_2.html ;  Persian Gulf Residency, available from 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Persian_Gulf_Residency ; James Onley, Britain’s Native Agents in Arabia and 
Persia in the Nineteenth Century, available from 
http://www.huss.ex.ac.uk/iais/downloads/Britain_s_Native_Agents_2004.pdf ; all Internet sources accessed 
at 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. on March 10, 2008.   
484 Consul Talcott W. Seelye, Kuwait to the Department of State, July 22, 1958, Despatch 18, Secret, 
787.00/7-2258 Subject: British order of battle in Persian Gulf. 
485 Seelye, Kuwait to the Department of State, July 21, 1958, Despatch 15, Confidential, 787.00/7-2158. 
Consul Seelye had reported that the “Iraqi coup d’état caused popular elation in Kuwait,” on July 14. 
Young men had expressed their joy by shouting “long live the Iraqi Army” on Kuwait’s main street and 
celebrated the overthrow of Nuri al-Sa‘id. Three days later the Consul had reconfirmed these reactions 
reporting that the “Kuwaiti public including other Arabs was still immensely pleased with [the] Iraqi 
revolt,” Seelye, Consul Kuwait to the Secretary of State, July 24, 1958, no. 16, Secret, 787.00/7-2458.    





more convincing linkage between the U.S. military operation in Lebanon and the 
overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy is the fact that Eisenhower and Dulles had persistently 
turned down Lebanese President Camille Chamoun’s requests that U.S. troops intervene 
in the Lebanese civil war, emphasizing that the Lebanese themselves first had to make an 
effort to resolve the crisis. Secretary of State Dulles had stated in a telegram to 
Ambassador Robert M. McClintock in Beirut that Chamoun “should be under no 
misapprehension that U.S. forces can be counted upon to intervene in circumstances 
where Lebanese forces are unwilling to fight.”486 Dulles’s telegram of May 23 is a clear 
indication that the United States would not intervene in the Lebanese crisis. The key 
words are “circumstances where Lebanese forces are unwilling to fight.” The U.S. 
position was that the crisis could be resolved by military force, whereas the Lebanese 
commander in chief General Fouad Chehab emphasized that the Army should not 
intervene militarily in the constitutional conflict and the civil war. Ambassador 
McClintock took the position that the United States should not intervene in the crisis.487 
American policies towards Lebanon prior to July 15 thus clearly suggest that the United 
States did not wish to get involved in the Lebanese civil war.   
     If the American intervention in Lebanon was a reaction to the Iraqi Revolution, as 
argued in the above paragraph, there were weighty reasons for not invading Iraq. In a 
report to the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research section   the case 
is laid out against an invasion: 
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and Jordan (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1992), Document 49, Telegram From 
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There is…almost nothing left of the Royal regime in Iraq around which opponents 
of the new Republic could rally…Under these circumstances, …any move by 
force from the outside into Iraq would meet with very little Iraqi support and its 
success would be highly unlikely. Furthermore, since the signing of the Mutual 
Defense Agreement yesterday, Nasser and the Syrians would promptly come to 
the aid of the Republic of Iraq. Lastly, Soviet or Bloc reaction…would 
undoubtedly take more concrete form depending upon the type of the invasion. 
Although avoiding the serious risk of a general war, the results of this would be of 
the utmost seriousness in the Near East, and might well spread elsewhere.488 
 
The report presents a number of compelling arguments against an invasion, the foremost 
of which suggests that within less than a week after the revolution U.S. analysts had 
realized that the Qasim regime enjoyed popular support and that the insignificant number 
of loyalists to the old regime remaining in Iraq were not in a position to mount a counter-
coup.    
     The U.S. fear of an escalation of the tense situation in the Middle East in the event of 
an American invasion of Iraq, was reinforced by the likely reactions of the United Arab 
Republic and the Soviet Union, which played an important role in reducing the feasibility 
of an American military operation to restore the Iraqi monarchy to power. The Mutual 
Defense Agreement signed by the United Arab Republic and Iraq on July 19, 1958 is 
referred to in the above U.S. analysis as a fact which constituted a threat to any American 
military action in Iraq.489 Furthermore, Washington feared that the Soviet Union would 
not constrain itself to mere diplomatic protests in the event of a U.S. invasion and that the 
                                                          
488 Hugh S. Cumming to Mr. Reinhardt, Department of State, the Director of Intelligence and Research, 
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mounted by Jordan with any prospect of success,” The Immediate Outlook in Iraq. FO371/134201. 
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tension which the military option would cause, “might well spread elsewhere.”490 The 
American analysis appears to be convincing, but an in-depth assessment of the 
enumerated threats might yield other conclusions.   
     The military threat to the stability in the Middle East from the United Arab Republic 
and the Soviet Union in the event of an American invasion of Iraq would most likely 
have been of a limited nature, whereas the real threat to the region and to Western allies 
in the Middle East would have emanated from public opinion in these countries.491 
Egyptian military units had been deployed to northern Syria as early as October 1957.492 
These units in combination with Syrian forces could have provided assistance across the 
Syrian-Iraqi border to the Qasim regime against invading U.S. forces. Conversely, the 
absence of contiguity between the northern and southern regions of the United Arab 
Republic would, however, deprive these forces of strategic depth due to hostile 
governments in the states which separated these two regions from one another. 
Furthermore, the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean and the British Royal Navy in the 
Persian Gulf would be in a position to prevent any Egyptian or Soviet ships from 
reaching Syrian and Iraqi ports. This would certainly have resulted in an escalation of a 
local crisis into a regional one, and a confrontation with the Soviet Union. The latter 
power had demonstrated during the Suez Crisis, however, that it was not able to back up 
its verbal warnings to Britain and France with military power. A problem for the Kremlin 
was that the absence of contiguity between the Soviet Union and Iraq made it almost 
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impossible for the U.S.S.R. to intervene militarily in Iraq or supply Qasim with military 
equipment.493 The conclusion is therefore that it was the prospect of widespread support 
for Qasim in the Middle East in general, and in Iraq in particular, which convinced the 
American leaders that invasion was not a feasible option.494     
     The decision of the United States and Britain to take action in Lebanon and Jordan 
suggests a common approach to what was perceived as a crisis in Iraq, but there were 
clear differences in the two powers’ appraisal of the situation in Iraq. As late as during a 
conversation in Washington in December of 1958 between British Embassy officials and 
Stuart Rockwell, the head of the Near East Office in the Department of State, the former 
expressed concern “lest the U.S. and the U.K. might be differently appraising the 
situation in Iraq.”495 A Foreign Office analysis referred to by the British officials argued 
that it was important to Western interests that Qasim pursue policies, the aim of which 
was to prevent communist or Nasserist control of Iraq. In the eyes of the Foreign Office 
Nasserist control would not be better than strong communist influence over Iraqi 
policymaking. Fully aware of the grave implications of communist control in the long 
run, the British contended that “a UAR.-controlled Iraq Government would be ‘hardly 
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494 Furthermore, the disastrous consequences of the Suez Crisis for Britain’s standing in the Middle East 
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less dangerous’ than a Communist-controlled one.”496 Rockwell entirely disagreed with 
this assessment, arguing that “UAR control would be greatly preferable, especially since 
short runs have the habit of turning into long runs when the Communists get their hands 
on a country.”497 Rockwell stated that the more the communists consolidated their 
position in Iraq, the more difficult Qasim would find it to assert himself. This 
conversation between representatives of the two Western allies revealed a fundamental 
divergence of opinion with respect to the Iraqi situation.  
 
Reactions in the Region 
     Official reactions to the Iraqi Revolution from the Northern Tier and Jordan were 
considerably more alarmist than those in London and Washington. The response of Iraq’s 
former Baghdad Pact allies to the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy was generally that the 
Pact should adopt interventionist policies in order to remove the new regime. Turkey, 
Pakistan, and Jordan, Iraq’s former partner in the Arab Union but not in the Baghdad 
Pact, pressed so eagerly for military intervention that the Turkish government had to be 
restrained by Washington.498 On July 24 a number of Middle Eastern ambassadors 
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498 In a telegram to the American Embassy in Teheran Secretary Dulles informed the Ambassador that the 
United States had expressed its concern, shared by the Iranian shah and Pakistani President, Iskander 
Mirza, to the Turkish government regarding possible Turkish military intervention in Iraq, Dulles to the 
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expressed to the American Ambassador to Spain that the United States ought to have 
allowed the Baghdad Pact countries to reinstate the old Iraqi regime within 24 hours after 
the coup. The Turkish ambassador even boasted that the armed forces of his country 
could have undertaken this task single-handedly.499 The assessment of the Middle Eastern 
ambassadors was that the Soviet Union would not have resorted to force to assist the new 
government in Baghdad in the event of an invasion, since no vital Soviet interest would 
have been at stake and Soviet power was inferior to that of the United States. The 
ambassadors also argued that this still held true, ten days after the coup. Furthermore, the 
diplomats informed the U.S. ambassador that the prestige of the United States and Britain 
was low in the Middle East due to doubts about their sincerity to protect their allies in the 
region against “Russian domination.”500 The assessment referred to in this paragraph 
suggests that Allied and American views on what should be done with respect to Iraq 
differed radically.501  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Ambassador to the United States, Ali Urguplu, and American diplomats in Washington, revealed that 
Egyptians, according to Urguplu, were inciting a Kurdish movement for independence in northwestern 
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government, this threat must be eliminated by any means, including “decisive action,” J. F. O’Grady, 
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787.00/7-2458. 
500 Ibid. In the case of one Iranian general the doubts about the sincerity of Western powers even went as 
far as suggesting that “the British had engineered the Iraqi coup d’état and the new Government were the 
newly chosen instrument of the British,” Stevens, Teheran to the Foreign Office, July 26, 1958, No. 607, 
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     Pakistani intelligence, which apparently was advocating a line different from that of 
President Mirza, and Jordanian diplomats actively supported intervention. Pakistani 
intelligence recommended that Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran intervene militarily in Iraq—a 
course of action fully supported by the entire Pakistani Army—at the same time 
emphasizing the negative Arab reactions which would result from a Western military 
operation. The American army attaché in Karachi doubted that Pakistan possessed the 
required logistic capability to carry out the above recommendation, but believed that the 
sentiments in the Pakistani Army could be exploited, if provided logistic support, to 
restore the monarchy in Iraq by proxy.502 Jordanian diplomats were as active as the 
Pakistani Army in advocating a military operation against the Qasim regime, however, 
without concurring in the Pakistani assessment of the detrimental consequences of 
Western participation in such action against Iraq. The Jordanian chargé d’affaires in 
Teheran suggested to American diplomats that the United States and Britain provide air 
cover to a Jordanian operation across the Iraqi-Jordanian border in conjunction with 
similar Iranian and Turkish moves, and that the British send troops to their bases in al-
Habbaniyya and Basra.503 It is obvious from the Turkish, Pakistani, and Jordanian 
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assessments above that these were considerably more optimistic with regard to the 
feasibility of intervention than those made by British and American diplomats.504  
      While Britain and the United States had moved away from the idea of a Western 
military operation in Iraq at an early stage, the interventionist stance of some of Iraq’s 
neighbors changed little during the fall of 1958.505 In November two of Iraq’s neighbors 
still advocated interference in Iraq’s domestic affairs to save the country from falling 
under total communist control. The Turkish ambassador and Iranian chargé d’affaires in 
Baghdad argued that outside powers must take action soon, recommending that the 
position of Muhammad Najib al-Rubai‘i, President of Sovereignty Council, be built up.506 
In Karachi a month later President Muhammad Ayub Khan and Foreign Minister Manzur 
Qadir of Pakistan echoed the above Turkish-Iranian sentiments to the American 
Ambassador James Langley.507 The Pakistani government had a plan, which consisted in 
                                                                                                                                                                             
long before the Free Officers were overthrown by the communists. Furthermore, he was convinced that the 
Shah would soon meet the same fate, Wailes, Tehran to the Secretary of State, August 7, 1958, no. G-16, 
Confidential, 787.00/8-758.    
504 It is possible that the rationale for the hard line against Qasim advocated by the Pakistani Army and 
Jordanian diplomats in part was the hope that the situation in Iraq would produce U.S. supplies of military 
equipment to Karachi and Amman. Furthermore, for the Jordanian government more than arms was at 
stake, since the restoration of the Iraqi monarchy and the Arab Union between Jordan and Iraq would 
guarantee resumption of Iraqi economic assistance to Jordan.  
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Eastern allies to the extent that policymakers both in the West and in the Middle East, with the exception of 
Jordan, wished to avoid a Western intervention. This testifies to the fact that the objectives of Washington, 
London, Ankara, Teheran, and Karachi were more or less the same, that is, to prevent destabilization of 
Middle Eastern pro-West regimes and Soviet inroads into the region. Furthermore, as suggested in the 
footnote above, most likely West’s Middle Eastern allies saw in the Iraqi Revolution an opportunity to 
exploit West’s Cold War preoccupation to their own advantage, meaning demands for military equipment. 
To a certain extent, the different regional and extra-regional readings of the Iraqi Revolution show that to a 
certain degree both the Western powers and the Middle Eastern states had their own specific agendas.     
506 Chargé d'Affaires David Fritzlan, Baghdad to the Secretary of State, November 22, 1958, no. 1655, 
Secret, 787.00/11-2258. Fritzlan doubted the feasibility of this plan and argued that the best policy to 
follow was the present one, which aimed at maintaining “friendly relations with Qasim’s government and 
refraining from any activity whatsoever which could give grounds for charges of intervention or exercise of 
improper influence.” 
507 Langley, Karachi to the Secretary of State, December 22, 1958, no. 1481, Secret, 787.00/12-2258. The 
two argued that some counter action must be taken to stop the communists in Iraq. Pakistan and its allies, 
including the United States, must prevent the situation from deteriorating further. 





encouraging Nasser to intervene, but it needed the moral support of the United States, 
Turkey, and Iran to approach Nasser with such a proposal. Karachi did not have in mind 
an approach in concert with the other three powers, however, contending that intervention 
by these powers would “only cause [the] wrong reaction in [the] circumstances,” 
although Ayub and Qadir conceded that U.A.R.-Pakistani relations left much to desire.508 
The fact that the government of Pakistan insisted on relegating other powers to a 
secondary role combined with the circumstance that relations with Nasser were not at 
their best at the time suggest that the plan was not well thought out and that Pakistan’s 
motives might not be entirely altruistic.509  
     In contrast to the stance taken by Turkey, the Pakistani Army, and Jordan, some Arab 
states made efforts to downplay the threat posed to Western interests by the Iraqi 
Revolution. An American Embassy report dated July 19 states that Moroccan ambassador 
to Iran El Fassi had expressed approval of the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy, 
emphasizing that the leaders of the old regime, “as criminals to the people,” had deserved 
to be killed. Furthermore, the ambassador had made clear that the United States should 
not be concerned about developments in Iraq, since the new regime had announced that 
the oil industry would not be nationalized.510 Similarly, President Nasser reassured the 
West during a visit to Syria on July 20 that the new Iraqi government had no intention to 
stop the flow of oil and that Western interests, thus, were not endangered. At the same 
time he tried to mobilize international sympathy for the Iraqi Revolution hinting at the 
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possibility of Western interference.511 Thus, in contrast with the governments of Turkey 
and Jordan, and the Pakistani Army, there were other governments in the region which 
argued that the Qasim regime constituted no threat to vital Western interests, since it had 
publicly announced that it would neither nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company, nor 
discontinue the flow of oil to the West, apparently regarding oil as the sole Western 
legitimate interest in Iraq.                
 
Other Western and Soviet Reactions 
     At least one Western European ally of the United States was clearly concerned about 
the belligerent stance on the Iraqi Revolution taken by certain quarters in Turkey, Jordan, 
and Pakistan. A telegram from the U.S. permanent representative to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization in Paris dated July 21, 1958 reports that Bonn was concerned about a 
possible Western or proxy action against the new regime in Baghdad. The German 
assessment was that the new Iraqi regime was pro-Nasser but not pro-communist. The 
“rebels” could, however, “be pushed into communist arms by calling them pro-
communist.…”512 The alternate German permanent representative, Herbert Schworbel, 
had stressed that “There must be no action by anyone against Iraq unless [they were] 
ready to risk [a] major war with Russia.” Schworbel had also stated that the West must 
avoid forcing the Qasim regime to request Soviet military assistance, since Western 
support for Jordanian military action against Iraq would give the latter the right to request 
Soviet help, probably in the form of air intervention. The German concern described 
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above is an indication that one of America’s important allies feared that Anglo-American 
policies in the Middle East risked increased tension in East-West relations, which would 
most likely affect Germany. It is obvious from the above that West Germany’s position 
as a “front state” in the Cold War influenced her policies not only towards neighbors but 
also towards distant geographic regions.     
     German concerns with respect to military action against Iraq had been conveyed to the 
Department of State as early as July 18, when the Department had denied that the United 
States was under pressure from Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Israel to intervene in Iraq.513 
The American denial was disingenuous, since it has been established above that the 
Turkish government and the Pakistani Army strongly advocated intervention, albeit 
without U.S. involvement and against the wishes of the Eisenhower administration. On 
this occasion the German Minister in Washington, Franz Krapf, had told William 
Rountree, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African 
Affairs, that the German government fully understood the American position in Lebanon, 
despite the critical stance of the German press, but was concerned lest the area of conflict 
be extended to Iraq. Rountree concluded the conversation by emphasizing that the United 
States “had been for some time sympathetic to Arab nationalism, ” but was “opposed to 
actions by Arab nationalists, which exposed the area to Communist penetration.”514 
Rountree’s comment reveals a more nuanced view on Arab nationalism than in 1957 
when the United States had made efforts to overthrow the Syrian government. This 
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reevaluation of Arab nationalism only went so far, however, since Washington still 
assessed all Arab nationalist actions in Cold War terms, which is obvious from 
Rountree’s statement.                    
     As could have been expected, the Soviet Union welcomed the Iraqi Revolution, since 
it held out the prospect of reorienting Iraq’s domestic and foreign policies and weakening 
the Western position in the Middle East due to Leftist influence in the new government. 
This interpretation of the events of July 14 was clearly reflected in a comment in the 
Soviet newspaper Pravda of August 2, 1958:  
The victory of the national revolution in Iraq cannot fail—in a profound 
manner—to disrupt the control of imperialism over all of the Middle East…The 
victory of the national revolution in Iraq has again shown that in the present 
conditions of existence of the mighty socialist camp, the revolutionary forces 
which come out against imperialism by far surpass the reactionary forces of 
imperialism…[T]he revolutionary movement in colonies and dependent countries 
is part of the world socialist revolution.515  
 
This quotation establishes that the Iraqi Revolution was regarded in Moscow as 
strengthening the socialist camp at the expense of “imperialist,” that is Anglo-American, 
forces in the Middle East.516  
     The American intervention in Lebanon, a result of serious concern about the 
possibility of widespread instability in the Middle East, Soviet condemnation of the U.S. 
military operation, and Israeli concern about instability in Jordan all contributed to 
strident rhetoric. On August 15 the U.S.S.R. made a thinly veiled threat with regard to the 
American military presence in Lebanon:        
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But now every one knows that the true objective of the imperialists is to suppress 
the national liberation movement in the Middle East…Our state cannot be 
indifferent to the source of a serious military threat emerging in the direct vicinity 
of its borders. It is natural that, under such conditions countries adjacent to the 
Near and Middle East must take measures to insure their own and the common 
security.517 
 
It is not clear what measures Moscow had in mind, and it is possible that the Soviet 
Union was merely attempting to repeat its propaganda victory from the Suez Crisis, when 
the Russians had issued warnings to the effect that they might use missiles against Paris 
and London, without, however, backing these threats up with any military preparations. 
The serious military threat referred to in the above quotation was the landing of U.S. 
Marines in Lebanon, but this force numbering 15,000 troops did not in itself pose a threat 
to the Soviet Union.518  
     Other air force and naval movements in the region, however, appeared more menacing 
to the Soviet Union. A Bulgarian intelligence report of July 21 states that a substantial 
part of the American Sixth Fleet, including aircraft carriers, had anchored off the coast of 
Lebanon, and U.S. fighters and bombers had flown in to the Turkish airbase of Adana 
from Spain and North Africa. Part of the British Mediterranean fleet had also sailed for 
the coast of Lebanon, and British paratroops had been deployed to Jordan. Turkey had 
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carried out a partial mobilization and prepared to deploy 8th Army Corps to the Syrian 
border. The Israeli Defense Force had been placed on alert and a partial mobilization had 
been carried out on July 17. In Italy no leaves were granted to military personnel and 
anti-American and anti-British demonstrations took place following the intervention in 
Lebanon. The United Arab Republic carried out a partial mobilization as well, and Egypt 
deployed an armored division to the Israeli border.519 The Israeli government’s concern 
referred to in the Bulgarian report was confirmed when Israeli Foreign Minister Golda 
Meir told reporters at a press conference in London on August 11 that Israel would take 
“serious steps” if the Arab Republic or Iraq “interfered in” Jordan.520 The intelligence and 
newspaper reports painted a picture of nervous tension and rhetoric, with the two Western 
powers and their allies preparing for a worst-case scenario.     
     The above analysis of international reactions to the Iraqi Revolution has so far 
established that a decision was made early on in Washington and London not to intervene 
in Iraq against the new regime. This decision grew out of a realization that the overthrow 
of the monarchy was a political, economic, and social revolution supported by most 
political parties and an overwhelming majority of the population. Early diplomatic 
reports from Baghdad and official statements by the Qasim regime confirmed this picture 
and reinforced the impression that a Western military invasion was not feasible. Since the 
conclusion was that the new regime in Baghdad would not easily be unseated, a 
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pragmatic approach to dealing with the revolutionary government had to be worked out. 
This process ended in recognition of the Republic of Iraq less than three weeks after the 
July 14 revolution. Iraq’s neighbors and former allies generally took a more aggressive 
stance on intervention than the United States and Britain, but they also gradually moved 
towards recognition.   
 
Recognition 
     Despite the initially belligerent stance taken by some of Iraq’s former Baghdad Pact 
allies they gradually, like Britain and the United States, moved towards extending 
recognition to the new regime in Baghdad, however, only after a great number of non-
Western states had already recognized the Qasim regime.521 By the end of July Turkey, 
Iran, and Pakistan had indicated at a Baghdad Pact meeting in London that they “favored 
early recognition” of the Qasim regime, about July 31, news which had come “contrary 
to” Secretary Dulles’s “expectations.”522 As late as July 24 several Middle Eastern 
ambassadors had expressed views regarding the desirability of intervention in Iraq. 
American concerns about such views conveyed to at least one Middle Eastern 
government, might have contributed in part to the decision by the three allies to recognize 
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the new regime in Baghdad.523 Interestingly, this “unexpected” decision suggests that 
Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan had acted to a certain extent independently of the United 
States and Britain. Furthermore, they had acted contrary to the wishes of the Eisenhower 
administration which initially had not favored early recognition. Their recognition of the 
Iraqi government was announced on July 31.524 This seemingly unified approach was, 
however not the result of shared conviction, since the Shah had expressed doubts about 
the wisdom of early recognition. Furthermore, his opposition to Turkish military action 
against Iraq also illustrates the fact that all three Baghdad Pact allies acted according to 
their own agendas.               
     From early on the British and American approaches to recognition of the Qasim 
regime differed. As early as July 23 a British official in the Commonwealth Relations 
Office had expressed in a conversation with an American Embassy officer the view that 
“early recognition [of] the Iraqi regime [was] highly desirable.”525 The reason for the 
British position on recognition was that the regime appeared to be in firm control of Iraq 
and that there was no discernible internal challenge to its authority. Generally, Britain 
and the United States followed two different policies regarding recognition of 
governments. The British had traditionally extended recognition regardless of whether 
they approved of a regime. Conversely, to the Americans the question of whether they 
approved of a regime was crucial for recognition. Furthermore, the British official had 
                                                          
523 See the discussion above under the heading “Reactions in the Region.” 
524 Embassy Tehran to the Secretary of State, July 30, 1958, No. 291, Secret, 787.00/7-3058. In a 
conversation with the American Ambassador to Iran on the previous day, the Shah had expressed that he 
had only reluctantly decided to go along with recognition, so as “not to be left behind Turkey and 
Pakistan.” The Shah would have preferred to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. With regard to Turkish 
intervention, the Iranian monarch had based his opposition to the Turkish plans on doubts about whether 
the Turks possessed the capability to carry out a military operation, and on the conviction that they were 
thoroughly disliked by Iraqis and would encounter stiff opposition, predicting that such an operation would 
be similar to the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian uprising in 1956.  
525 Whitney, London to the Secretary of State, July 23, 1958, no. 516, Secret, 787.00/7-2358 





argued that delay in recognition would increase the “prospect [of] communist or UAR 
orientation [of the] Iraqi government.”526 Also, recognition would strengthen the hands of 
the moderate individuals within the regime who “are not unfavorable to [the] West.”527 In 
addition to the above arguments, the British also appeared to have other weighty reasons 
for early recognition, such as continued Iraqi commercial and financial relations with 
Britain and a possible arrangement at the air base of al-Habbaniyya on the same basis as 
before. The above arguments for recognition suggest that much more was at stake for 
Britain than for the United States in Iraq, and that the British were hoping to achieve 
some form of continuity in their relations with Baghdad.528       
     The Eisenhower administration placed considerably less trust in the Iraqi government 
than the British did. The American Embassy in London assessed that the new Iraqi 
regime was extreme and Nasserist in nature, that it would join the United Arab Republic. 
in the immediate future, and that it would emulate Nasser’s cooperation with the Soviet 
Union. Furthermore, American diplomats in London were seriously concerned about “the 
decrease in life expectancy of [the] remaining pro-West Arab regimes,” and were 
convinced that Nasser and Khrushchev were the new regime’s mentors.529 Conversely, 
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528 Gallman to the Secretary of State, July 27, 1958, no. 442, Secret, 787.00/7-2758. For the Foreign Office 
from Ambassador Wright. The British ambassador stated in the telegram that “If some form of recognition 
either complete or progressive is accorded soon it is possible if not probable not only that commercial and 
financial relations with Britain and with the West will continue but that arrangements at Habbaniya and for 
BLPI may settle back onto something like same basis as before.” His optimism with regard to al-
Habbaniyya appears, even without the benefit of hindsight, completely unwarranted in view of official 
declarations of the new regime and the “anti-imperialist” rhetoric in Iraqi newspapers.  A meeting between 
the Oriental Counselor at the British Embassy, Samuel Falle, and Muhammad Mahdi Kubba, member of 
the Sovereignty Council, on the following day most likely further encouraged the British to extend early 
recognition to the Qasim regime. Kubba had stated with respect to communist influence that “the Arabs had 
no intention of exchanging one form of Imperialism for another,” Wright to the Foreign Office, July 28, 
1958, No. 1301, Confidential, FO371/134201. Falle’s assessment was that “the new Administration are 
keen to establish normal friendly relations with the West.”     
529 Whitney, London to the Secretary of State, July 22, 1958, no. 481, Secret, 787.00/7-2258.  





British analysts believed that the Iraqi communists were disorganized, lacked strong 
leadership due to the previous regime’s suppression of their party, and that their position 
in Iraq would be similar to that of Egyptian communists who were persecuted by Nasser. 
Furthermore, there was no evidence that the Qasim regime was “taking directions from 
Nasser,” but Foreign Office officials assessed that the U.A.R. president would attempt to 
“make every effort to achieve a dominating influence.”530 Also, the British believed that 
the £96 million of Iraqi sterling balances in London were an excellent incentive for the 
new regime to maintain good relations with Britain. Finally, the fact that the Iraqi Army 
was British trained and equipped was believed to play into the hands of London.531 
Juxtaposed the American and the British analyses show fundamental differences in the 
assessment of the Iraqi regime, largely due to the different nature of the two Western 
powers’ relations with the previous regime.532  
     American and British assessments of the situation in Iraq continued to be at variance 
during the spring of 1958. In April 1959 Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs stated that the British feared an Iraq controlled by Nasser as much as 
one controlled by the communists, with London arguing that the West should continue to 
extend support to Qasim, even considering the possibility of arms aid, in order to reduce 
his dependence on the communists. Washington believed, however, that Qasim’s regime 
                                                          
530 The Immediate Outlook in Iraq. FO371/134201 A draft analysis of the situation in Iraq dated about July 
24.  
531 This circumstance later proved to be a minor consideration when Soviet advisors and arms began to 
arrive in Iraq, although it might have had an initial significance.   
532 Despite these differences American recognition of the Republic of Iraq on August 2, 1958, came only a 
day after that of the British, The Iraq Times, August 2, 1958, p. 1. It is quite possible that the sheer number 
of governments, including the British, (30 in all by August 1 according The Iraq Times, August 1, 1958, p. 
2), which had recognized the new republic, contributed to the American decision. The British argument that 
Western refusal to recognize the new regime would eventually drive it into the arms of the Soviet Union 
most likely also played a role in the American decision. For this British argument, see the second paragraph 
above under the heading “U.S. and British Reactions.”     





already was “almost completely under Communist control.”533 It was therefore deemed 
necessary to take a firmer line to prompt him to take action against the communists 
before it was too late. Rountree did not elaborate on what type of action he had in mind, 
but he believed that the influence of Nasser and Arab nationalism could undermine the 
position of the communists. Rountree’s assessment testifies to the fact that the American 
crusade against communism and Britain’s troubled relationship with Nasser largely 
dictated their policies in the Middle East and to a certain extent constituted an obstacle to 
complete agreement on what should be done about the Iraqi regime.            
     Despite Anglo-American differences with regard to the best approach to dealing with 
the Qasim regime and communist influence over Iraqi policies both powers subscribed to 
the conviction that the West should not intervene in Iraq. Ambassador John D. Jernegan 
illustrated this point in a telegram dated January 13, 1959: 
 2) If…we admit that Q is [a] Communist or that [a] “point of no return” has been 
reached, there would seem to be little…capability on [the] part of [the] US or UK 
to take effective countermeasures in Iraq. 3) We must recognize that Iraq has 
become almost entirely an Arab problem and that its solution must rest essentially 
with Iraqis and other Arabs.…[A]ny solution must be compatible with Arab 
nationalism. However, we doubt that in the long run integration into [the] UAR 
and control by Nasser would be [an] acceptable solution to Iraqis generally. 4) … 
[W]e should be careful not to appear to oppose any moves Nasser may make to 
correct matters….At the same time we should avoid becoming identified with or 
involved in any maneuvers Nasser may undertake as regards Iraq.534        
 
This passage is evidence of the realization that direct or indirect Western intervention in 
Iraq would be highly counterproductive. The preferred American approach to Qasim 
constituted, however, a delicate tightrope act, since it involved both supporting Nasser 
and not being identified with his anti-Qasim policies.      
                                                          
533 William M. Rountree, NEA, the Department of State to Assistant Secretary Mr. Greene, April 23, 1959, 
Secret, 787.00/4-2359. 
534 John D. Jernegan to the Secretary of State, January 13, 1959, no. 2057, Top Secret, 787.00/1-1359.  





     This chapter has advanced the argument that there were fundamental differences 
between U.S. and British reactions to the Iraqi Revolution. Both powers were agreed that 
a continued and unimpeded flow of oil from the Middle East was crucial to Western 
Europe’s economic survival. American access to alternative oil fields made it less 
dependent on the Middle East in this respect. Britain’s position as a key ally to the United 
States, however, made her economic survival an American concern as well. At the same 
time the British dependence on oil also prompted Britain to adopt a more pragmatic 
position than the United States on policies towards the Qasim regime. Recognition of the 
new government in Baghdad therefore became less of an ideological Cold War problem 
to London than to Washington, since the former wished to return to business as usual as 
soon as possible. Furthermore, Britain’s considerable economic and military presence in 
Iraq forced her to seek an expeditious accommodation with the revolutionary regime. The 
debacle at Suez also made London less hesitant to work with a government which was 
suspected of communist leanings. In British eyes Nasser and not Qasim was the main 
threat to Britain’s position in the Middle East. Diplomatic traditions also enabled the 
British to take a less ideological approach to Iraq than the United States. The suspicion of 
communist influence in Baghdad made Washington wish to withhold recognition for the 
time being.   
      Despite her reluctance to extend recognition to the new regime in Baghdad the United 
States ended up recognizing the Republic of Iraq less than three weeks after the 
revolution following the same decision by the Northern Tier and Britain. There were a 
number of reasons for this about turn. First the British pushed ahead with recognition on 
August 1, 1958. Second, the remaining allies in the Baghdad Pact had extended 





recognition to the new Iraqi regime on July 31, a measure which, however, did not make 
Turkey and Pakistan less inclined to advocate intervention in Iraq. Third, all socialist 
states had already recognized Iraq and the West risked to lose what little influence it still 
had in Baghdad to the Soviet Bloc. Jordan, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan adopted a more 
aggressive stance than their Western allies with regard to intervention than the Western 
powers. There were several reasons for this position. The geographic proximity to Iraq 
made them more sensitive to developments in a neighboring state. This was the case in 
Turkey, Iran, and Jordan. All three countries had minorities which might prove 
susceptible to political propaganda emanating from the nationalist regime in Baghdad. 
Second, Jordan had lost crucial economic aid from Baghdad when the Arab Union was 
dissolved as a result of the Iraqi Revolution. Third, The members in the Baghdad Pact 
saw in the Iraqi Revolution an opportunity to exercise pressure on the United States to 


















THE QASIM REGIME’S FOREIGN RELATIONS 
 
 
The paramount position of the British in Iraq prior to July 14, 1958, the increasing 
American involvement in Middle Eastern affairs, and Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad 
Pact made the possibility of Western intervention and disruptive activities a primary 
concern of the new republic.535 The task of eliminating this threat was therefore crucial to 
Qasim, to which fact testifies the first public address of the new regime to the people of 
Iraq and to the world. For this reason Proclamation No. 1 of July 14, 1958, the first 
message from the leaders of the revolution read to the Iraqi public on Radio Baghdad, 
had stated unequivocally that Iraq “will abide by all pledges and pacts consistent with the 
interests of the country,” a subtle message to the Western powers that Iraq would not 
withdraw from the Baghdad Pact or nationalize the oil industry.536 At the same time, 
however, the new regime had to take into consideration the sentiments among the Free 
Officers, in the population at large, and in the political parties which had cooperated with 
the Free Officers prior to the July 14 events. Considering the above, the questions posed 
and addressed in this chapter are: Was there a reorientation of Iraq’s foreign policy 
following the July 14 Revolution? If there was, did it constitute a gradual or immediate 
change, and a radical departure from the foreign policy of Nuri al-Sa‘id?537 Iraq’s 
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536 14th of July Celebrations Committee, 1958-1959, The Iraqi Revolution: One Year of Progress and 
Achievement (Baghdad: The Times Press, n.d.), p. 7.  
537 The foreign relations of the Qasim regime have not played a prominent role in Western or Arab 
scholarship on the Iraqi revolution. The exception is Norman Daniel who devotes fifteen pages to Iraq’s 
foreign relations in his Revolution in Iraq. Daniel’s analysis is not very detailed, however, since his book 
was published in January of 1959. An example of an Arab scholar who has discussed the Qasim era’s 
foreign policy is Muhammad Husain al-Zubaidi in his work on the Iraqi revolution Thawrat 14 Tammuz 
1958. Al-Zubaidi’s focus is on trade and relations with Kuwait. Former Minister of Economy Ibrahim 





diplomatic, trade, and military relations with foreign powers in 1958-1959 will be 
analyzed, with an emphasis on the first in the context of the foreign policy principles of 
neutralism and anti-imperialism, which guided Iraq’s foreign relations during the Qasim 
era.   
     Soviet primary sources suggest that Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev induced Qasim 
to decide not to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact and not to nationalize the Iraq 
Petroleum Company.538 Soviet sources indicate that Khrushchev’s recommendations 
were conveyed by Nasser to the new Iraqi regime on July 17 or 18. The analysis in 
Chapter VIII shows that Qasim’s decision had been announced on the morning of July 
14. The two dates clearly cast serious doubts on the Soviet claim. Qasim’s announcement 
on July 14 is completely consistent with his subsequent policies, which reflect a 
personality eager to avoid conflict and taking extreme positions. The Iraqi leader was not 
in need of Soviet advice to realize that serious consequences would result from 
challenging Britain. Furthermore, Qasim was not the only Free Officer convinced of the 
importance of maintaining good relations with Britain. Naji Talib had assured the British 
in Basra on July 14 that the new regime did not intend to disrupt the flow of oil to the 
West. He had even arranged transportation for oil workers to get safely to their work 
place.539 Talib had received no orders from Qasim to take such steps, since 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Kubba’s book Hadha Huwa Tariq 14 Tammuz: Difa‘ Ibrahim Kubba Imama Mahkamat al-Thawra [This is 
the Way of July 14: Ibrahim Kubba’s Defense before the Revolutionary Court] (Bairut: Dar al-Tali‘a lil-
Taba‘awa al-Nashr, 1969), which is the defense transcript from his trial, is a detailed analysis of Iraq’s 
foreign trade during his time as minister of economy. Several Western works analyze relations with the 
United Arab Republic in the context of Arab unity, Nasser’s anti-Qasim policies, and attempts to overthrow 
the Qasim regime.  
538 Extract from Protocol 169, Presidium meeting of July 26, 1958, Archives of the President of the Russian 
Federation, referred to in Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, pp. 170.  
539 Basil Judd, Consul General, Basra to Wright, July 24, 1958, FO371/134202; al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 
Tammuz 1958, p. 476. 





communications with Baghdad had been severed. Khrushchev’s recommendations could 
thus not have been conveyed to Talib.   
     The fact that the situation in the northern oil fields was similar to that in the South 
strongly suggests that there was a consensus among certain Free Officers that Britain 
should not be unduly challenged, and there is nothing to suggest in Western or Arab 
sources that the Free Officers had been persuaded by Khrushchev to take such steps. 
There is a remote possibility that Soviet recommendations had been conveyed to Qasim 
by the Communist Party of Iraq prior to the Revolution, but there is no evidence to this 
effect in available Arab, Western, or Soviet sources. Furthermore, Hanna Batatu, who 
argues in The Old Social Classes that Iraqi communists played a prominent role in 
overthrowing the monarchy, makes no reference to the existence of such Soviet 
recommendations to Qasim with regard to future policies towards Britain. In view of 
Batatu’s argument, and based on his unprecedented access to Iraqi communist leaders 
and the leaders of the new regime, Batatu would certainly have provided such evidence in 
support of his argument. The conclusion here is therefore that Qasim’s and a number of 
Free Officers’ position on relations with Britain predated Khrushchev’s 
recommendations, which merely concurred with the views Qasim and these officers 
already held.    
     The Qasim regime’s relations with the communist countries started off on a positive 
note, while the opposite was the case with Britain and the United States. By July 23, 1958 
most communist countries, the United Arab Republic, Sudan, and Yemen had recognized 
the new government in Baghdad.540 By July 26 as many as 21 states had recognized the 
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new republic.541 Neither Britain nor the United States, or any other Western country for 
that matter, were among these states.542 The fact that the socialist countries were among 
the first to extend recognition to the republican government was therefore a clear signal 
that the former were interested in establishing friendly relations with the new Iraqi 
government. Nuri had severed diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the 
reestablished relations with the socialist countries were therefore a policy which took Iraq 
in a direction opposite to that of the Nuri regime. Furthermore, a British Embassy report 
dated July 23 is evidence that the Iraqi government was eager to establish normal 
diplomatic relations with Britain as well and regretted the fact that London had not yet 
extended recognition to the new government.543 It should therefore not have come as a 
surprise to the Western powers that this circumstance was added to the grievances of 
“imperialism” and “exploitation” which the Iraqis felt they had, primarily against Britain, 
and to a somewhat lesser degree against the United States. As a result of opposition to 
Nuri’s policies, what was perceived as British and American support for these policies, 
the strong British presence in Iraq under the previous regime, and the delay in British and 
American recognition, the new government decided to reorient Iraq’s traditionally pro-
West foreign policy.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
Union and twelve other communist states. The first Western government to extend recognition to the new 
regime in Baghdad was Greece, 14th of July Celebrations Committee, The Iraqi Revolution: One Year of 
Progress and Achievement, Baghdad: The Times Press, 1959, p. 101.  
541 Gallman to the Secretary of State, July 26, 1958, no. 437, Confidential, 787.00/7-2658.  
542 14th of July Celebrations Committee, The Iraqi Revolution, p. 101.  
543 Ambassador Wright quoted the ministers with whom he had met as follows: “They were sorry that 
Communist countries had recognized and Britain had not and asked me to represent to you how desirable 
British recognition was since only on this basis could firm friendship and cooperation be established,” 
Wright (Emergency Head Quarters) to the Foreign Office, July 23, no. 24, Secret, FO371/134200. The term 
Emergency Headquarters refers to the hotel the Embassy staff was housed in following the burning of the 
British Embassy on July 14.  





     Proclamation No. 1 had stated that anti-imperialism and the principle of neutralism 
adopted at the Bandung Conference in April 1955 would constitute the two pillars of 
Iraq’s relations with foreign powers. This announcement did not signify that Iraq’s new 
leaders intended to redirect its foreign policy away from a pro-West orientation to a pro-
Soviet one. The significance was much more subtle, namely that Qasim intended to 
pursue a truly neutralist foreign policy, the purpose of which was to maintain friendly 
relations with all nations, testified to by the British Embassy report referred to above.544 It 
took more than two weeks for Britain and the United States to recognize the new regime. 
It appears that one reason for the delay could have been lack of information about the 
new leaders in Baghdad, but recognition could have come earlier, since the new regime 
had stated unequivocally on the morning of July 14 what policies it intended to pursue. 
The new regime’s acceptance of neutralism as a foundation for its foreign relations was a 
radical departure from the previous regime’s pro-West and anti-Soviet Cold War foreign 
policy, which had firmly anchored Iraq to the Western camp.  
      The republican government continued to emphasize to the British ambassador the 
non-communist nature of its policies in order to bring about early British recognition. 
Minister of Guidance (Information) Siddiq Shanshal had stressed on July 27 that the new 
                                                          
544 Al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 Tammuz 1958, p. 512; ‘Abd al-Karim Qassim, Press Interviews Granted by 
Major-General Abdul Karim Qassim, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Iraq, to Mr. R Karanjia, Mr. 
Peter Worthington and Mr. Anthony Nutting at the Ministry of Defense, Baghdad (Baghdad: The Times 
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social strata, ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, Principles of the 14th July Revolution (Baghdad: The Times Press, 
n.d.), pp. 13-14. In a letter to the Iranian, Turkish, and Pakistani Embassies in Baghdad dated March 24, 
1959 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed this official line stating that it was the desire of the Iraqi 
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of friendship, equality and mutual interests, to work towards preserving peace in the world in a way 
consistent with the principles of the United Nations Charter by adopting a policy of positive neutrality and 
non-alignment to either the East or the West,” 14th of July Celebrations Committee, 1958-1959, The Iraqi 
Revolution, p. 104. The intention of the new government to “remain genuinely neutral” was also conveyed 
to the British Embassy by the leader of the National Democratic Party, Kamil al-Chaderchi, Wright to the 
Foreign Office, August 9, 1958, no. 1346, Confidential, FO371/134201.       





government encouraged private ownership, which was true, and had argued that “the new 
régime’s firm intention to resist Communism would be immeasurably strengthened if the 
West were prepared to cooperate with them.”545 Furthermore, Shanshal had told Wright 
that he hoped the foreign experts would remain in Iraq, a clear hint that the new 
government wished to maintain friendly relations with Britain, since most foreign experts 
working in Iraq were British.546 There could thus be no doubt in the minds of British 
diplomats that the Qasim regime wished to maintain continued friendly relations with 
Britain. This wish might appear somewhat surprising, but the reason was that both the 
British and the Iraqis would benefit economically from a pragmatic approach to their 
relations, as neither side wanted to disrupt the flow of oil to the West. The problem from 
London’s perspective was that it was difficult to assess the extent of Nasserist and 
communist influence in Baghdad and whether closer ties with the communist countries 
would materialize from this influence.547 
     Iraqi leaders did not fail to emphasize to the British that present Iraqi policies were a 
result of earlier Western policies in the Middle East. In a conversation recounted by the 
British Oriental Counselor Samuel Falle in August 1958, Kamil al-Chadirchi, the leader 
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of the National Democratic Party, had given him, Falle, a lecture on the Arab 
interpretation of recent developments in the Middle East:    
(A)…The fact that the Arab nationalist movement under the leadership of Nasser 
inclined towards the Soviet Union was the result of mistaken Western policy, and 
for example, Suez and Algeria. More recently the landing of American troops in 
the Lebanon and British troops in Jordan were regarded as acting hostile to Arab 
nationalism while the Soviet attitude had been one of friendship towards the 
Arabs. (B) On the Lebanon, Chaderchi was unable to understand why America 
continued to send troops after the election of General Chehab. Such action only 
increased the tension in the M.E. and Arab suspicions of Western motives. (C) As 
for Jordan, it was most desirable that British forces should withdraw and allow a 
plebiscite to take place in order to decide the future of the country.548  
 
Al-Chaderchi had further stated that the presence of British troops in Jordan was 
considered by Iraqis as a threat to their country. The arguments made by al-Chaderchi 
were certainly not just his personal opinion but views shared by most Iraqi and Arab 
nationalists at the time. It is obvious from this conversation that American and British 
actions in Lebanon and Jordan, intended to stabilize the situation in the Middle East, had 
had the opposite effect, at least from an Iraqi perspective.549   
     The Qasim regime’s relations with the United States were not without problems. The 
main obstacle to good relations was Prime Minister Qasim’s conviction that Washington 
was involved in subversive activities in his country. U.S. protestations of its innocence 
did not convince Qasim, who placed more faith in “intelligence” reports.550 A State 
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(independent): “The repeated delays in the withdrawal of the Anglo-American forces from Jordan and 
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550 It is possible that this intelligence had originated in the Soviet Union. In a conversation with the Soviet 
ambassador to Iraq Qasim had requested that the Soviet Union provide him with intelligence on “the 
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Department memorandum reports that Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and 
South Asian Affairs William Rountree had expressed concern to an Iraqi diplomat in 
Washington regarding “certain elements…feeding Prime Minister Qasim and the Iraqi 
public with so-called intelligence reports alleging various US activities against the 
present regime.”551 Rountree had told the diplomat that the reports were “completely 
without foundation.” A few days later Rountree had informed the Embassy in Baghdad 
that Radio Moscow’s Arabic service had referred to reports in a Beirut newspaper to the 
effect that a “special American center in Iran has been carrying out large scale activities 
among Kurds to prepare for [a] Kurdish revolution in Iraq against Qasim’s 
government.”552 As long as Qasim believed that the Central Intelligence Agency. had a 
thousand agents in the area working to overthrow his regime, it would be extremely 
difficult for U.S. officials to dispel his suspicions.553 There were, however, positive signs 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Baghdad on August 5, 1958, to take up his post as ambassador to Iraq, The Iraq Times,  August 6, 1958, p. 
3.  
551 Richard B. Parker, NE, the Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, January 1, 1959, no. M-
621, Confidential, 787.00/1-759 Subject: Iraq, Participants: Mr. Salih Mahdi, Departing Charge D’affaires, 
Iraq Embassy; Mr. William M. Rountree, NEA; Mr. Richard B. Parker, NE.  In a meeting with State 
Department officials Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rustu Zorlu had indicated that the Soviet Union was 
sharing intelligence with the Qasim regime, A. Guy Hope, GTI, the Department of State, Memorandum of 
Conversation, April 3, 1959, NATO ministerial meeting April 2-4, 1959, Secret, 787.00/4-35 Subject: Iraq 
and Iran, Participants: H. E. Fatin Rustu Zorlu, Turkish Foreign Minister; Ali S. H. Urguplu, Turkish 
Ambassador; the Acting Secretary of State; William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary, NEA; A. Guy Hope, 
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552 William Rountree, NE, the Department of State to American Embassy Baghdad, January 7, 1959, 
Secret, 787.00/1-759.  
553 A. Guy Hope, GTI, the Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, April 3, 1959, NATO 
ministerial meeting April 2-4, 1959, Secret, 787.00/4-35 Subject: Iraq and Iran, Participants: H. E. Fatin 
Rustu Zorlu, Turkish Foreign Minister; Ali S. H. Urguplu, Turkish Ambassador; the Acting Secretary of 
State; William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary, NEA; A. Guy Hope, GTI. U.S. attempts to dispel Qasim’s 
suspicions about American intentions with regard to Iraq were not made easier by anti-American articles in 
the Iraqi press. An example is an article originally published in the Soviet newspaper Pravda on January 8, 
1959 and referred to in Al-Zaman on the following day. The article leveled unspecified accusations against 
American imperialists who under the cover of the anti-communist struggle were attempting to “destroy the 
achievements of the Iraqi revolution, Al-Zaman, January 9, 1959, p. 1. Two days later an article under the 
caption “The Objectives of the Neo-Imperialist American Policy in the Arab Countries after the Failure of 
the Eisenhower Doctrine” argued that “America had not been able to suppress the Arab liberation 
movement” and “the victory of the Iraqi people in the immortal July 14 revolution and the victory of the 





as well. According to a State Department memorandum dated April 2, 1959, “We found 
in Iraq that we met with apparent good will at the top, as in the Ambassador’s talks with 
Q[asim] and the Foreign Minister, but that lower down our Embassy continued to be 
subject to harassment in its operations.”554              
     American attempts to improve relations with Iraq were impeded by the U.S. 
intervention in Lebanon on July 15, 1958. Opinion pages in the Iraqi press took a firm 
anti-American position, interpreting the American military operation in Lebanon as a 
continuation of earlier policies: 
The attack on Egypt in 1956 and the intrigues woven in Syria in the past prove 
that the Anglo-US bloc is not to be trusted, despite its smooth talk and apparently 
peaceful intentions…The occupation by U.K. and U.S. troops of Lebanon and 
Jordan…is not only interference in these nations’ internal affairs but also a 
challenge to the United Nations itself…We are sure that our Army will hit back 
hard at any aggressive attack which might be carried out against us.555 
  
The view that the American intervention constituted a serious obstacle to improved U.S.-
Iraqi relations was also expressed by official Iraqi quarters. On August 19 Foreign 
Minister Abu al-Jabbar Jumard had told an extraordinary session of the United Nations 
General Assembly that the American and British troops in Lebanon and Jordan 
constituted a threat to Iraq’s national security and to world peace. The minister 
concluded: “The pretence that the landing of troops was merely to protect the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Lebanese people in its revolution were the most obvious signs of the failure of the Eisenhower Doctrine.” 
Furthermore, the United States was accused of attempts to sow division in the ranks of the Arab states, Al-
Zaman, January 11, 1959, p. 2. A third article published two days later in the same newspaper contended 
that the real motive behind America’s professions of friendship towards the Arabs was the elimination of  
“emancipated Arab nationalism,” Al-Zaman, January 13, 1959, p. 8. The unrealistic claim that the C.I.A. 
had one thousand agents proficient in Arabic should have alerted Qasim to the spurious nature of this 
“intelligence.” It is possible, however, that the “intelligence” claimed that the agents were locally recruited. 
Still, it would have been difficult to run undetected an intelligence gathering operation on such a scale.       
554 R. B. Horgan, the Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, April 2, 1959, no. M-642, 
Confidential, 787.00/4-259 Subject: The Situation in Iraq, Participants: Parker T. Hart, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary; D.N. Chatterjee, Minister, Embassy of India; R. B. Horgan, India Desk Officer. Furthermore, the 
memorandum stated that “our aid technicians were encountering difficulties; companies with contracts 
were having difficulty getting paid.” 
555 Al-Yaqza (nationalist), August 6, 1958, quoted in The Iraq Times, August 7, 1958.  





independence of Lebanon and Jordan convinces no one.”556 Such open criticism of both 
the United States and Britain in an international organization would have been almost 
unthinkable under the Nuri regime.557  
     Despite the troubled relationship discussed above, the American recognition of the 
Republic of Iraq on August 2, 1958 served to reduce tension somewhat between the 
United States and Iraq but suspicions of American motives still persisted in Baghdad.558 
According to an Iraqi diplomat in the United Nations the American recognition “had 
served to lessen the suspicion that the US landings in Lebanon were directed against 
Iraq.”559 Suspicions would, however, persist as long as American troops remained in 
Lebanon. The U.S. participation in the plot against Syria was an additional reason for 
Iraqi distrust, and it “would take time to overcome these revelations.”560 In the Iraqi 
diplomat’s view, the U.S. involvement in this conspiracy had been a major mistake. This 
is evidence of the negative impact on U.S.-Iraqi relations of previous U.S. policies in the 
Middle East.  
                                                          
556 The Iraq Times, August 20, 1958, p. 1. The view that the Western military operations in Lebanon and 
Jordan made it difficult to improve relations between “liberated Arab counties” and the West was echoed 
by Al-Zaman, October 9, 1958, quoted in The Iraq Times, October 10, 1958, p. 4. Furthermore, the press 
voiced the opinion that Asian and African countries maintaining close ties with the United States were only 
nominally independent, since they were “in every sense subordinate to the dictates of the U.S. policy,” Al-
Ahali (organ of the National Democratic Party), December 20, 1958, quoted in The Iraq Times, December 
21, 1958.   
557 Nuri had expressed comparatively mild criticism of Britain during the Suez Crisis of 1956.  
558 For a detailed analysis of the U.S. and British recognition of the Qasim regime, see Chapter 9.  
559 David D. Newsome, Department of State, Memorandum of Conversation, August 30, 1958, M-546, 
Confidential, 787.00/8-3058. Subject: Policies of Iraq Under New Regime. Participants: Mr. Adnan 
Pachachi, Member Iraqi Delegation, United Nations General Assembly, David D. Newsome, NE. 
560 Ibid. Also, see Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria, pp. 289-296. Due to Leftist successes in by-
elections in May, and increasing Soviet influence, inter alia in the form of an economic and technical 
agreement of August 6, 1957, the U.S. government had decided that the Syrian government must be 
overthrown. This had resulted in the expulsion of three American diplomats on August 13 accused of 
having conspired with Syrian military officers against the government of Syria, Seale, The Struggle for 
Syria, pp. 290-291, 293-294.     





      Criticism of Iraqi foreign policy did not only come from Britain and the United States 
but from members of Qasim’s cabinet as well. The Marxist Minister of Economy Ibrahim 
Kubba had attempted a Marxist critique of Qasim’s foreign policy during his trial.561 
Commenting on the Qasim regime’s foreign policy during the period under discussion, 
1958-1959, Kubba had argued that the centrist forces in the government had formulated 
the foreign policy and that this policy had failed to adopt a decisive anti-imperialist 
stance, with the result that it had been swinging back and forth between this or that camp, 
attempting to accommodate one or the other. Not surprisingly, in the eyes of Kubba—a 
Marxist by conviction—Qasim’s foreign policy had not been revolutionary.562 Kubba’s 
analysis of Qasim’s policy towards foreign powers was correct from a Marxixt 
perspective and his criticism of Qasim’s policies only meant that they were not 
revolutionary in a Marxist sense. Qasim’s intention had never been to pursue Marxist 
policies in the first place. Kubba fails in his analysis to compare the foreign policy of the 
new regime with that of Nuri. The basic argument of this chapter is that in this context 
Qasim’s foreign policy was a radical, or even revolutionary, departure from the past. It 
appears that Kubba postulated that a revolutionary foreign policy could only be Marxist 
in nature. As has been contended in this chapter, it was Qasim’s intention to establish 
friendly relations with all countries, including the imperialist powers, if they committed 
themselves to abandon the unequal relationship of the past. In a sense this inclusive 
                                                          
561 Ibrahim Kubba, Hadha Huwa Tariq 14 Tammuz: Difa‘ Ibrahim Kubba Imama Mahkamat al-Thawra 
[This is the Way of July 14: Ibrahim Kubba’s Defense before the Revolutionary Court], Bairut: Dar al-
Tali‘a lil-Taba‘awa al-Nashr, 1969, p. 5. A reason for the sharp criticism was most likely the fact that he 
was facing a court controlled by Qasim’s enemies. Kubba’s trial lasted two and a half months, February-
April, 1964. The new regime, which had overthrown Qasim in February 1963, had put Kubba on trial for 
his participation in the implementation of Qasim’s policies, and it was in his own interest to insure that the 
judge would hand down a light sentence. 
562 Kubba, Hadha Huwa Tariq 14 Tammuz, p. 26. 





approach was more revolutionary than a Marxist approach, which would have resembled 
the exclusive approach of Nuri, only inverted in the Marxist case.    
     The re-establishment of diplomatic relations with the socialist countries did not signify 
a desire on the part of the new Iraqi regime to emulate the Soviet system.563 It was partly 
the result of previous Western policies towards Iraq, Nuri’s foreign policy, and a natural 
urge to look for new friends in the international community.564 Of equal importance was 
the strong desire to pursue an independent foreign policy for the first time since the 
creation of Iraq after World War I. The Qasim regime saw Nuri’s severing of relations 
with the Soviet Union in January of 1955 as “[a] feature of the submission of the old 
governments to imperialism.”565 Considering the fact that one of the principles of Iraq’s 
new foreign policy was anti-imperialism, the re-establishment of relations with the 
socialist countries should simply be seen as the manifestation of a new independent 
foreign policy. The regime’s claim that the severing of relations with the Soviet Union 
was the result of “submission to imperialism” was, however, mere propaganda. This was 
far from a condition imposed by Britain or the United States. Both powers had embassies 
in Moscow and the decision was Nuri’s own.          
                                                          
563 Qassim, Press Interviews Granted by Major-General Abdul Karim Qassim, p. 24. In an interview with 
Peter Worthington on May 20, 1959 Qasim had stated that relations with the Soviet Union only went so far: 
“There can be no doubt that Russia is a friendly country. I shall, personally, build up my friendship with 
her on the basis of mutual benefits between the two peoples. Absolute sovereignty is for Iraq. Russia cannot 
interfere in Iraqi affairs.” The Soviet Union had shown its friendly intentions with respect to the new Iraqi 
regime by recognizing it on July 16, 1958, Izvestiya, July 17 and 19, 1958, referred to in Aryeh Yodfat, 
Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1973), p. 146. The U.S.S.R. had 
also concluded a trade agreement with Iraq on October 13, 1958, an agreement on economic and technical 
cooperation on March 16, 1959, and an agreement on cultural cooperation on May 9, 1959, Yodfat, Arab 
Politics in the Soviet Mirror, p. 148. Furthermore, Moscow showed its preference for moderate policies in 
Iraq and support for the Qasim regime, when an extremist wing, which advocated more radical reforms, 
gained control over the Communist Party of Iraq, Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror, p. 154.   
564 See footnote 544.  
565 14th of July Celebrations Committee, 1958-1959, The Iraqi Revolution, p. 103.  





     Relations with Arab states changed radically in some respects and remained the same 
in other respects. The greatest change took place in relations with the United Arab 
Republic, which underwent a transformation from very tense under Nuri to very close in 
the beginning of the Qasim era. Conversely, relations with Jordan went the opposite 
direction, from very close—both states had been united in the Arab Union under the 
previous regime—to very tense under Qasim.566 A Qasim era government publication 
emphasized the fundamental character of the change in relations with the Arab world 
with the following claim: “The old policy of plotting against the Arab neighbors, 
especially Syria, was completely changed after the Revolution.”567 After accusations of 
Egyptian interference in Iraq’s internal affairs, however, relations with Egypt reverted to 
the pre-revolutionary state with mass media in both countries waging a fierce propaganda 
war. Relations with the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (F.L.N., or Jabhat al-
Tahrir al-Watani in Arabic) had been friendly under Nuri and the only change under 
Qasim was probably the greater amounts allocated by the regime to the liberation of 
Algeria, ID2 million in the first year after the revolution. Furthermore, the Qasim 
government had severed economic relations with France and imposed a total boycott 
against this country.568 In the case of France relations did not undergo a significant 
transformation, since Nuri had resorted to similar policies during the Suez Crisis.569 The 
above discussion of the changes in relations with the Arab world suggests that these 
                                                          
566 For a discussion of Jordanian reactions to the Iraqi Revolution and the reasons for these reactions, see 
Chapter 9.  
567 14th of July Celebrations Committee, 1958-1959, The Iraqi Revolution, p. 102.  
568 Ibid., pp. 102-103. Al-Zubaidi states that the economic aid went to the support of the provisional 
Algerian government and that an Iraqi aircraft departed once or twice per week with weapons and military 
equipment for Algeria, al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 Tammuz 1958, p. 515.    
569 For a detailed discussion of Nuri’s foreign policy, see Chapter 5.  





changes were more diverse and fluctuated more than Iraq’s relations with nations in other 
regions.   
 
Trade Relations     
      The trade relations of the republican regime underwent radical change as well. 
Following the re-establishing and establishing of diplomatic relations with European and 
Asian socialist states trade, cultural, scientific, and educational relations quickly 
developed between Iraq and the communist and non-aligned countries, many of which 
had not had trade relations with the old regime due to the ban on such ties.570 
     The minister of Economy, Ibrahim Kubba, identified the weaknesses of the old 
regime’s trade policies. He drew attention to three major problems regarding Iraq’s 
foreign trade prior to July 14. The first problem was the lack of direction with respect to 
imports. There were almost no restrictions on goods which could be imported, and import 
licenses were only needed for 62 articles. In Kubba’s view, none of these licensed goods, 
such as tobacco, cigarettes, blankets, soap, windows, and iron doors, should have been 
allowed to be imported in the first place, since they were manufactured locally as well. 
The lack of restrictions with regard to imports had a number of negative effects: 
importers focused on luxury goods; the large importers acquired what can be termed 
monopolies and engaged in price speculation, in particular foreign companies; these 
imports constituted a lethal threat to the domestic industry; industrial capital was reduced 
and capital which could otherwise have been invested was directed to imports; and 
                                                          
570 14th of July Celebrations Committee, 1958-1959, The Iraqi Revolution, p. 60. The countries which had 
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Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, the People’s Republic of 
China, and India. 





finally, due to the above practices Iraq incurred a considerable trade deficit. The second 
problem with the trade policies of the old regime was that they caused a constant 
decrease and imbalances in Iraqi exports. Iraq’s exports to Britain, which amounted to 
ID2.5 million, and its imports from her, which amounted to ID32.25 million, clearly 
illustrate the dimension of the problem. The last major problem was the complete lack of 
trade with the socialist countries. Thus, the problems inherent in the trade relations of the 
monarchy explain the new policies of the republic.571   
     According to an official source three new objectives of Iraq’s trade relations were laid 
down by the Ministry of Economics in order to carry out a complete reorientation of the 
nation’s trade relations with the outside world. The first objective aimed at boosting the 
local industry and protecting it from foreign competition. This was to be achieved 
through the banning of and imposition of restrictions on the import of certain goods 
which could be locally manufactured. As a result of this new policy the imports of 
machinery was emphasized. A second concern which needed to be addressed was the 
mounting trade deficit. This was to be achieved through increasing Iraqi exports, finding 
new markets, and reducing the import of luxury goods. Finally, the third objective 
consisted of encouraging trade with socialist and neutral countries.572 In the view of the 
new government in Baghdad the previous regime had neglected Iraq’s interests and 
subjected Iraqi trade relations to the requirements of the Western world.573  
     Another primary source adds the following measures taken to address the problems 
inherited from the monarchy. The new government decided that Iraq would enter only 
                                                          
571 Kubba, Hadha Huwa Tariq 14 Tammuz, pp. 52-53.  
572 14th of July Celebrations Committee, 1958-1959, The Iraqi Revolution Ibid., pp. 56 and 59. Also, see 
Muhammad Kazim ‘Ali, Al-‘Iraq fi ‘Ahd ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, p. 295.   
573 14th of July Celebrations Committee, 1958-1959, The Iraqi Revolution, p. 58. 





into equal trade agreements with other states. These agreements would state 
unequivocally the mutual obligations of the contracting parties, and the principles of 
relative and barter trade. Iraq would pursue import policies compatible with the new 
economic and financial policies in other fields. Finally, a public trade sector would be 
created, the purpose of which would be to direct the new trade policy.574 The last step 
taken to address what was perceived as the mistakes of the old regime in its trade policies 
testifies to the important role assigned to the state in rectifying these mistakes. The 
measures described above are a clear indication that the new system introduced by the 
Qasim regime constituted a fundamental change and radical departure from the old 
regime’s foreign trade policy.  
     It did not take long before the new trade policy manifested itself. When the Soviet 
Ambassador Grigori Titovich Zaitsev arrived in Baghdad on August 5, 1958, he 
immediately offered to extend Soviet technical aid to Iraq.575 The arrival of Zaitsev later 
resulted in two Iraqi-Soviet agreements—a trade agreement signed in Baghdad on 
October 11, 1958, and an Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation signed on 
March 16, 1959.576 These agreements and subsequent visits by officials from socialist 
countries show that the latter seized upon the new opportunities following Iraq’s 
reorientation of her trade policies. Furthermore, the Iraqi-Soviet trade agreement is also 
an indication that visits of these delegations were welcomed in Baghdad and that both 
parties perceived them as beneficial.  
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575 The Iraq Times, August 6, 1958, p. 3.   
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     There were several reasons for the great appeal trade with socialist countries exerted 
on the new Iraqi regime. When an Iraqi economic delegation had visited Damascus and 
Cairo in early September 1958 it had had the opportunity to acquaint itself with the role 
of the socialist states in the expansion of the Egyptian economy. U.A.R. experts, 
ministers, and Nasser himself had emphasized the important role the socialist countries 
played in expanding the U.A.R. economy.577 Furthermore, trade with the Soviet bloc was 
for the mutual benefit of the parties, and it enabled Iraq to free herself from subjugation 
to the “imperialist economic system” and the capitalist market. Also, trade relations with 
the socialist and non-aligned states opened up new markets for Iraqi exports. Last but not 
least, trade agreements with the aforementioned countries held out the promise of barter 
trade.578 It is thus not difficult to see why the new leaders in Baghdad preferred to do 
trade with socialist and non-aligned countries.579     
     The part of this chapter analyzing Iraq’s trade relations has established that the foreign 
trade policy introduced by the Qasim regime after the July 14 revolution differed 
radically from the one in place under the monarchy. The republican regime introduced a 
certain degree of state control of imports and exports, emphasized barter trade and 
agreements with no strings attached. The latter two reasons in particular lead to a radical 
reorientation of Iraqi foreign trade towards socialist and non-aligned states.     
               
                                                          
577 Kubba, Hadha Huwa Tariq 14 Tammuz, p. 78. 
578 Ibid., p. 73. Agreements with the Soviet Union allowed Iraq to barter sugar for cotton, with 
Czechoslovakia dates were bartered for automobiles, and with India dates were bartered for tea.   
579 Kubba claims that the reason why Iraq rejected to sign a trade agreement with the United States was that 
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Military Relations  
      
     During the Nuri regime Iraq had maintained close military ties with Britain and to a 
lesser degree with the United States. Through the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of 1955 and the 
Mutual Security Agreements with the United States of 1954 and 1955, and the 
membership in the Baghdad Pact Iraq had received military aid from both Western 
powers. Following the revolution the close military relations with the West became 
problematic owing to the principle of neutralism to which the republican government had 
subscribed.  
     Despite Iraq’s continued nominal membership in the Baghdad Pact this “imperialist” 
defense organization and the two “imperialist” states Britain and the United States were 
subjected to sharp criticism in the Iraqi press.580 A case in point is the Iraqi daily Al-
Zaman. The two main objectives of the Pact, according to the newspaper, of which the 
first was indirect and the second direct, were allegedly (1) encirclement of the Soviet 
Union and the socialist states, and preparation for a world war; and (2) to consolidate the 
shaky position of the imperialist powers in the Middle East, to combat national liberation 
movements in the region and to exploit its natural resources in the interest of imperialism. 
Another alleged objective was subversive activities in Syria. Furthermore, following the 
Iraqi Revolution, Iraq had, according to Al-Zaman, become a potential target for military 
operations and sabotage actions. The first American and British reactions to the Iraqi 
revolution, the “occupation” of Lebanon and Jordan, had been interpreted by the new 
Iraqi regime as part of a plan, the objective of which was a military attack against Iraq. 
                                                          
580 The Qasim regime did not announce its official withdrawal from the organization until March 24, 1959, 
but ceased all cooperation with the Pact and participation in its activities following the revolution. The 
reasons for the delayed decision to withdraw from the Pact have been analyzed in Chapter 8 and will not be 
repeated here. The decision was based on national security considerations.   





Imperialism was also blamed for attempting to sow division in Iraq and in Arab ranks, 
especially between the United Arab Republic and Iraq. One newspaper even 
recommended that Iraq declare officially its withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact and the 
abrogation of all agreements and secret protocols entered into by the previous regime.581  
     The official view was similar, albeit somewhat more moderate in tone. Iraq’s 
membership in the Baghdad Pact was described as follows:  
Iraq’s relations with Western states, especially Britain and the United States of 
America, were unequal under the old regime. Iraq, then, had no independent 
internal or external policy, but was rotating in the imperialist orbit, and 
reconditioning its policy according to its strategic needs and interests. This 
subordinated relation was clearly illustrated in the agreements signed during the 
old regime….”582  
 
The quote reflects the widespread perception in the ranks of the opposition and the 
Free Officers that Iraq had been in a position of almost complete subjugation to 
Western interests under the monarchy. This perception eventually resulted in the 
official withdrawal of Iraq from the Baghdad Pact on March 24, 1959, with the 
simultaneous abrogation of the Anglo-Iraqi Agreement of 1955 and the ensuing 
complete evacuation of British military personnel from the air bases of al-Habbaniyya 
and al-Shu‘aiba. With the decision to withdraw from the Pact Iraq’s unofficial and 
official policies had become identical.583          
                                                          
581 Al-Zaman, March 1, 1959, p. 3. It is possible that the government had somehow given the press advance 
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582 14 July Celebrations Committee, The Iraqi Revolution, p. 103.   
583 Ibid., pp. 103-104. According to the same government publication source an official letter from the Iraqi 
government to the embassies of Iraq’s former allies in the Pact informs the latter that “…the presence of 
Iraq as a partner in the Baghdad Pact is incompatible with the policy of positive neutrality which was 
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people….[T]he Iraqi Government is of the opinion that its withdrawal from the membership of the Pact is a 
basic means for strengthening and developing amity and friendship between Iraq and the other states of the 
world,” ibid., pp. 103-104.   





     There were several reasons for not announcing the decision to withdraw from the 
Baghdad Pact until March of 1959. First, for national security reasons it appeared crucial 
not to announce a withdrawal immediately following July 14. The American and British 
military operations in Lebanon and Jordan clearly constituted a potential threat to the new 
Iraqi regime. Any additional challenge to the West’s position in the Middle East might 
provoke a military response. Second, the new regime’s efforts to gain diplomatic 
recognition, including from Britain and the United States, and the Asian members of the 
Baghdad Pact, dictated that “non-offensive” policies be pursued by the Qasim regime. 
Third, the consideration that Iraq might be able to purchase arms from the West most 
likely was a reason for remaining a member of the Pact. Fourth, the government in 
Baghdad feared that a precipitous decision to sever all ties to the Pact might provoke 
Britain to take measures which would have averse effect on Iraq’s economy, in particular 
if the British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company suspended the export of oil. Fifth, owing to 
divisions among the political parties and the Free Officers, Qasim needed time to create 
stability in the country, and therefore refrained from taking action which would distract 
him from this primary objective.584 Sixth, Iraq had huge sterling reserves in British banks, 
and British displeasure with Iraqi policies could have led to the freezing of these reserves. 
There were thus compelling reasons for not announcing an immediate withdrawal from 
the Baghdad Pact.       
     Simultaneously with keeping all options open to the West, the Iraqi government 
explored the possibility of military relations with the Soviet Union. As early as 
November 18 Israeli foreign ministry officials had reported that there were indications 
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that either the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia had offered Iraq an arms deal, but that 
there was no conclusive evidence as yet. In the opinion of the Israeli officials, an Iraqi 
decision to withdraw from the Baghdad Pact would be an indication of the existence of 
such an arms deal.585 In early December a State Department memorandum appeared to 
provide hard evidence that some kind of arms deal had been concluded between the 
Soviet Union and Iraq. According to the Department’s source a Soviet freighter had 
unloaded “a cargo of military equipment.”586 This intelligence had in turn been 
corroborated by British Ambassador Humphrey Trevelyan at the end of January in a 
report which stated that “[a] military agreement with the USSR [had begun] to produce a 
flow of Soviet arms into Iraq.”587 The intelligence referred to above suggests that there 
might have been some merit to the Israeli speculations that an official Iraqi withdrawal 
from the Baghdad Pact would indicate a successfully concluded agreement on arms 
transfers from the “Soviet Bloc” to Iraq. The intelligence discussed in this paragraph 
pertains to a period of a few months preceding the Iraqi withdrawal from the Pact at the 
end of March 1959.588 
     Telegrams from the U.S. Air Attaché in Baghdad confirm frequent arrivals in Basra of 
East European ships carrying military supplies. The Air Attaché stated as early as 
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November 21, three days after the Israeli report referred to above, that rumors were 
circulating in Baghdad about a Soviet delegation holding talks regarding an agreement 
for the supply of military equipment.589 In December the Air Attaché reported that the 
Iraqi Air Force Commander Jalal al-Awqati had visited Czechoslovakia to negotiate 
procurement of Soviet MiG aircraft for the Iraqi Air Force, with probable arrangements 
for Iraqi pilots to be trained in Czechoslovakia.590 The same month the U.S. military 
official reported that the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were not the only sources of 
Iraqi arms purchases, stating that a Yugoslav shipment of arms had arrived in Iraq.591 
Furthermore, between December 21, 1958 and May 30, 1959 the Attaché reported the 
arrival of five Soviet arms shipments at Basra.592 A sixth ship had arrived with a possible 
cargo of Soviet MiG 15 aircraft.593 These U.S. Air Attaché reports suggest that Iraq had 
signed agreements with at least the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and possibly other East 
European countries, for the supply of military equipment.      
     Despite the official Iraqi abrogation of its membership in the Baghdad Pact on March 
24, 1959, and the reports of an Iraqi-Soviet arms deal, the Department of State was 
considering the possible effects of U.S. arms transfers to Iraq. In a telegram to the 
Embassy in Baghdad Acting Secretary of State Christian A. Herter had solicited the 
Embassy’s view on the “purely exploratory” question of whether it would be “helpful to 
approach Qasim again regarding the Government of Iraq’s attitude to [the] US military 
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aid agreement, with a view to [the] possible release of [the] remainder of [the] items in 
[the] pipeline. Herter’s own answer to his question had been that he doubted that “such 
[a] release would have noticeably constructive effect in Iraq and it would certainly have 
negative results on [the] current valuable UAR anti-Communist campaign.”594 Herter had 
also stated that it would have been difficult to justify such an offer in view of Iraq’s 
recent withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.595 Herter’s question testifies to the fact that 
U.S. diplomats deemed it important to dispel Qasim’s suspicions with respect to U.S. 
intentions in the Middle East, and that they even considered unorthodox methods in order 
to prevent that the Iraqi leader became dependent on the Soviet Union.596  
     This part of the chapter has provided evidence supporting the argument that the 
reorientation of Iraqi foreign relations following the July 14 revolution holds true for 
military relations with foreign powers as well. Iraq’s movement away from close military 
relations with Britain and the United States, and membership in a West-sponsored and -
led defense organization did not end in a military alliance with the Soviet Union. The 
new Iraqi regime took the country in a direction, however, which involved arms 
purchases from and training of Iraqi military personnel in the U.S.S.R. Needless to say, 
Nuri would never have pursued such a policy, since Nasser and not the British was his 
main adversary in the Middle East, which is why one can conclude that the Qasim 
regime’s military relations with foreign powers constituted a radical departure from those 
of the previous regime. These relations differed to such a degree from the policies 
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pursued by the Nuri regime that they constituted a revolutionary development in Iraq’s 











































ARAB UNITY AND DISCORD IN 1958 
 
 
The idea of Arab unity, which had enjoyed widespread support among Iraqi intellectuals 
and opposition politicians in the Nuri era, appeared to be much closer to realization when 
the Iraqi Revolution erupted on July 14, 1958. With the most important Arab countries, 
the United Arab Republic and Iraq, under nationalist regimes the proponents of Arab 
unity seemed poised to realize their dream. Efforts in the Arab world to attain Arab unity 
prior to the Iraqi Revolution had not been successful. The reason is that they resulted in 
disunity, as manifested in the proclamation of the Syrian-Egyptian United Arab Republic 
followed by the formation of the Jordanian-Iraqi Arab Union. With respect to Arab unity, 
the Iraqi Revolution turned out to be an anti-climax. Previous chapters have argued that 
the events of July 14 and the subsequent policies of the Qasim regime constituted a 
social, economic, political, and psychological revolution. The only important area where 
the revolution did not lead to radical change, however, was Arab unity. U.A.R.-Iraqi 
relations had been very tense before the Revolution, and after a short initial 
rapprochement following the Iraqi Revolution, relations between the two states 
deteriorated to a point where the U.A.R.-government sponsored coup attempts against the 
Qasim regime. In this sense “business as usual” is an accurate expression to describe 
U.A.R.-Iraqi relations. The irony of the Iraqi Revolution was thus that it seemingly 
offered the Arabs a better opportunity than at any point of time since the Great Arab 
Revolt in 1916 to attain Arab unity, whereas in reality it turned out to be an event which 
effectively prevented Arab unity.  





     Transjordan-Jordan’s and Iraq’s search for unity was not realized until February of 
1958. The efforts to achieve the coveted unity, however, actually produced disunity, in 
particular after the Iraqi Revolution. The Iraqi-Jordanian Arab Union was formed two 
weeks after the Egyptian-Syrian United Arab Republic. To what degree was the Arab 
Union a reaction to the merger of Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic in 
February of 1958? Furthermore, this chapter will address the struggle between the two 
major competing interpretations of Arab unity—that of Qasim and that of the pan-
Arabists—which led to instability in Iraq, and the reason why the relationship between 
Egypt and Iraq became even more acrimonious than that between the Egyptian President 
Gamal ‘Abdul Nasser and Nuri al-Sa‘id.597 Was this an inevitable outcome of the 
struggle? The chapter will primarily focus on the period from February to December 
1958, but also discuss Iraqi-Jordanian efforts to achieve unity prior to this period and the 
British role in these endeavors. 
     Prior to the Iraqi Revolution Transjordan-Jordan and Iraq had both made several 
successive efforts to establish closer bilateral ties, but Britain had consistently opposed 
too close a relationship between Baghdad and Amman. During 1950 and 1951 Jordan and 
Iraq exchanged several proposals as to forming a union between the two states, similar to 
what was eventually agreed upon in February 1958.598 These efforts to form a union were 
reinforced following the assassination of King Abdullah on July 20, 1951 but eventually 
thwarted due to British pressure following intervention in the Jordanian elections by the 
                                                          
597 The tense relations between Nasser and Nuri al-Sa‘id had produced a bitter propaganda war between the 
two rivals for leadership of the Arab world. This war was effectively waged over the air waves by the 
Egyptian radio station Sawt al-‘Arab, al-A‘zami, Nuri al-Sa‘id wa al-Sira‘ ma‘a ‘Abd al-Nasir, p. 72.  
598 Prior to these proposals Transjordan and Iraq had signed an Agreement for Alliance and Brotherhood on 
April 15, 1947, ‘Abd al-Fattah, Siyasat al-‘Iraq al-Kharijiyya, p. 465. A problem during the discussions was 
the position of head of the proposed union. The objective of the Iraqi side was to insure that King Faisal II 
would become head of the union, thus guaranteeing Iraqi leadership.  





British commander of the Arab Legion, Brigadier Sir John Bagot Glubb.599 This is 
evidence that the British as late as 1951 successfully intervened to prevent too close a 
political relationship to develop between Iraq and Jordan. It is quite possible that the 
rationale for such an approach was that pressure could more easily be exercised on 
smaller political units than on larger ones.  
     Conversely, Britain appeared to take a different position on Iraqi-Syrian union in 1955. 
A high official in the Foreign Office believed the “incorporation of Syria into Iraq” might 
be a “tempting” idea, considering the political situation in Syria.600 The pre-condition for 
such action, however, was that if an imminent serious risk of Soviet domination of Syria 
were to occur, it would be appropriate to “encourage the liquidation of the country.”601 
The official only anticipated two possible problems with such action—Israeli opposition 
and Iraqi failure to maintain control of Syria. It is clear from the above that the Foreign 
Office official’s stance on Syria did not constitute a fundamental shift in Britain’s 
position on Arab unity. This only indicated a possible reaction if a situation developed in 
Syria which would pose a serious threat to British interests in the Middle East.602   
 
 
                                                          
599 According to an Arab source, the rigging of the elections was undertaken by Glubb in collaboration with 
Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda who had initially endorsed the union plans, in order to prevent 
nationalists to be elected to the Jordanian Parliament. Furthermore, Israel had allegedly exerted pressure on 
the British to prevent an Iraqi-Jordanian union, Wizarat al-Difa‘, Muhakamat al-Mahkama, vol. iv, (n.d.), p. 
1622, referred to in ‘Abd al-Fattah, Siyasat al-‘Iraq al-Kharijiyya, pp. 466-471; Al-Yaqza, February 6, 
1950, referred to in Mutawalli al-‘Arabi, Nuri Basha al-Sa‘id, p. 243. For British pressure in 1946, see 
Watha’iq al-Kharijiyya al-Misriyya  (Arshif Sirri Jadid) mafhaza 3, Baghdad, Millaf 1/7/217 Madhlura ila 
al-Sayyid al-Safir Wakil Wizarat al-Kharijiyya ‘an Mashru‘ Ittihad baina al-‘Iraq wa al-’Urdunn, 10/6 104 
referred to in Mutawalli al-‘Arabi, Nuri Basha al-Sa‘id, p. 240. 
600 Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, Permanent Under Secretary in the Foreign Office.  
601 Kirkpatrick, Memorandum, 31 October 1955, FO371/115469, quoted in Saunders, pp. 45-46.   
602 Saunders, however, argues that Britain had long accepted an Iraqi-Syrian union, Makins to the Foreign,   
Office 28 October 1955, FO371/115954, quoted in Saunders, p. 46.  





The United Arab Republic       
     Syria’s official efforts to promote Arab unity at least go back to 1951. Early in 1951 
the Syrian Prime Minister Nazim al-Qudsi had presented a proposal to the Council of the 
Arab League in which he called for a plan to realize Arab unity. The so-called al-Qudsi 
Plan mentioned three types of unity relations: a confederation, a federation, and a union, 
stating that Syria preferred a “full union.” The fact that the plan originated in Syria did 
not come as a surprise. At the time Syria was the only Arab state with a constitution 
which stipulated that the country’s president and members of parliament work for Arab 
unity. Reactions to the al-Qudsi Plan were mixed. A majority of the newspapers in Syria, 
Iraq, Jordan, and Palestine welcomed the Plan, whereas Egyptian and Lebanese 
newspapers were far from positive.603 Al-Qudsi’s initiative and the Syrian Constitution 
reveal that Syria was the driving force behind Arab unity.  
     Several years of political instability and infighting in the officer corps eventually led 
to, in the summer and fall of 1957, Syrian politicians and officers alike turning to the 
Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser for rescue. The Ba‘thists and many army 
officers in particular saw union with Egypt as the best means to reintroduce stability into 
their nation’s political life. Furthermore, the Ba’th Party believed that union with Egypt 
could be exploited to defeat political rivals and some high-ranking military officers were 
hoping that Nasser would empower them to form a Council of the Revolution. On 
January 12, 1958, the Chief of Staff of the Army, General ‘Afif al-Bizri, accompanied by 
13 high-ranking officers traveled to Cairo to meet with Nasser and ask the Egyptian 
                                                          
603 Al-Husri, Al-‘Uruba Awwalan, pp. 141-144. The Syrian Constitution also stated that Syrians worked for 
the unification of all Arabs in one state, Abu Khaldun Sati‘ al-Husri: Ara’ wa Ahadith fi al-Qawmiyya al-
‘Arabiyya [Speeches and Views on Arab Nationalism] (Bairut: Dar al-‘Ilm lil Malayin, 1956, second 
edition (first printed in 1951), p. 9.    
 





leader to save Syria. The mission had not been sanctioned by the Syrian government, 
which in turn dispatched Foreign Minister Salah al-Din Bitar to Cairo. The Syrian 
officers had discussed union with Nasser and Bitar returned to Damascus to report on 
Nasser’s terms: the withdrawal of the Syrian army from politics and the dissolution of 
political parties. Furthermore, Nasser had demanded a free hand in Syria. Following 
several unsuccessful attempts to negotiate these terms the Syrian government had yielded 
and the United Arab Republic had been proclaimed on February 1, 1958.604 The above 
account of Egyptian-Syrian developments reveals that Nasser was not interested in 
sharing power with any Syrian political force.605 It also shows that the Syrian Ba‘th Party 
was the driving force behind the formation of the United Arab Republic.606     
 
The Arab Union 
     Jordanian and Iraqi leaders reacted with dismay to the proclamation of the United 
Arab Republic and in turn formed the Arab Union.607 There are a number of reasons for 
the formation of the Union on February 14, 1958, two weeks after the proclamation of the 
                                                          
604 Seale, The Struggle For Syria, pp. 307-322; Kerr, The Arab Cold War, pp. 11-12; Ashton, Eisenhower, 
Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, pp. 142-143.     
605 From Nasser’s perspective his demands must have appeared quite reasonable: If he was asked to assume 
control of an unstable state, it would have to be on his terms only, and eliminating the roots of the 
instability—the Syrian army’s role in politics and the political parties—were necessary steps to increase 
Egypt’s regional role.     
606 Nasser had initially been opposed to an Egyptian-Syrian union, a fact which explains his demands 
regarding the Syrian army and political parties. Nasser’s objective prior to the union with Syria had been to 
control Syria’s foreign policy, which could be done without an Egyptian-Syrian merger. Despite his 
reluctance to form the United Arab Republic, he had agreed to do so in order to “preserve his prestige and 
position in the country,” Briefing by General Cabell, NSC 353rd meeting, January 30, 1958, Eisenhower 
Papers, referred to in Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, p. 144. Syrian opposition 
to the union was voiced in particular by the communists, who realized it would mean the end of party 
activities in Syria.   
607 According to a former minister of the monarchic era Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah was “in a state of great 
fear and panic” emphasizing that “ the UAR “constituted a dangerous challenge to Iraq and a threat to its 
existence,” ‘Abd al-Karim al-’Uzri, Tarikh fi Dhikrayat al-‘Iraq 1930-1958, [History in Reminiscences of 
Iraq] (Bairut: Markaz al-Abjadiyya li al-Saff al-Taswiri, 1982), p. 550. 





United Arab Republic. Many works argue that the Arab Union was formed as the direct 
result of the proclamation of the United Arab Republic.608 There are, however, 
indications that other forces as well contributed to the seemingly abrupt decision to form 
a counter-union to the Arab Republic. The evidence provided above of a successful 
British attempt to prevent the formation of an Iraqi-Jordanian political union as late as in 
1951 reveals that British opposition was a force to be reckoned with for any union 
project. 
     King Hussein played a leading role in the efforts to form the Arab Union. He had 
originally wished to include Saudi Arabia in the Union but had received a discouraging 
reply from King ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Ibn Sa‘ud when the Jordanian Foreign Minister Samir al-
Rifa‘i had been dispatched to Riyadh in November of 1957 to inform the King of 
Hussein’s proposal for an alliance or a union. One reason for Ibn Sa‘ud’s lack of interest 
was Iraq’s commitment to the Baghdad Pact, which, in his view, would have needed to be 
abrogated.609 Conversely, had Ibn Sa‘ud reacted positively to Hussein’s overture, the 
                                                          
608 A secret session of the Baghdad Pact Council held in Ankara on 28-29 January to discuss the 
forthcoming Egyptian-Syrian union appears to substantiate this argument. At the meeting the following 
measures had been agreed upon:  “(1) A restrained cautious public reaction to the Egyptian-Syrian union by 
the members of the Baghdad Pact. (2) ‘Active operation’ by Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon ‘in 
promoting opposition to union inside Syria.’ (3) Support by all the members of the Pact as well as the 
United States for any ‘Arab initiative in the direction of forming an alternative expression of Arab unity,’” 
J. Bowker, Embassy Ankara to the Foreign Office, 30 January 1958, FO371/134386, quoted in Mufti, 
Sovereign Creations, pp. 100-101). 
609 Alan de Lacy Rush, Records of the Hashemite Dynasties: A Twentieth Century Documentary History, 
Jordan, vol. ix (Archive Editions, 1995), p. 6, Embassy Amman to the Foreign Office, No. 13, February 19, 
1958, FO371/132854, referred to in Ibrahim Fa‘ur al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi 1958 [The Arab Union 
1958] (Amman: al-Lajna al-‘Ulya li Kitabat Tarikh al-’Urdunn, 2004), p. 108. Malik Mufti states that 
Hussein sent al-Rifa‘i to Riyadh on February 1, 1958, Malik Mufti, Sovereign Creations (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 103. The two different dates are confusing. Why would al-
Rifa‘i return to Riyadh a second time if Ibn Sa‘ud had already stated his view unequivocally on an Iraqi-
Saudi-Jordanian union? On the other hand, it is not plausible that British diplomats had made such a glaring 
error in their correspondence. A third source argues that the United States had exercised pressure on Ibn 
Sa‘ud not to accede to a union with Iraq and Jordan and not to extend financial aid to such a union, since 
this would have affected American interests, that is, Saudi oil, Al-Wandawi, Britaniya wa Siyasa Fasl al-
Kuwait ‘an al-‘Iraq [Britain and the Policy of Separating Kuwait from Iraq], p. 43, referred to in al-Shar‘a, 
Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, p. 291.  





latter had planned to visit Riyadh in December of 1957. The real significance of al-
Rifa‘i’s visit to Riyadh is that it took place before the proclamation of the United Arab 
Republic on February 1, 1958. This fact supports the argument that the idea of forming 
the Arab Union had been on King Hussein’s mind more than two months before the 
Syrian-Egyptian merger, which in turn weakens the contention that the Arab Union was 
the result of a decision made in great haste following the proclamation of the United Arab 
Republic on February 1, 1958.610  
                                                          
610 Benjamin Shwadran contends in an article in Middle Eastern Affairs that King Hussein had begun in 
November of 1957, when Syria and Egypt had signed a Trade and Financial Agreement, to perceive the 
Syrian- Egyptian rapprochement as a threat to Jordan, Benjamin Shwadran, “Union of Jordan with Iraq and 
Recoil,” Middle Eastern Affairs, vol. ix, no. 12 (December 1958), p. 377, referred to in al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad 
al-‘Arabi, p. 108. An American Embassy report dated January 27, 1958, that is four days before the 
proclamation of the United Arab Republic, states that al-Rifa‘i had had several conferences with King 
Hussein, and that both were concerned about the propaganda victory Nasser would win in the Arab world 
with a Syrian-Egyptian federation. Hussein had therefore instructed al-Rifa‘i to prepare a plan to counter 
such a possibility. In order to frustrate Nasser’s ambitions Hussein proposed that the kings of Iraq, Jordan, 
and Saudi Arabia meet before February 15 The intention was most likely to announce an Iraqi-Jordanian-
Saudi federation prior to the proclamation of a Syrian- Egyptian federation, which according to Jordanian 
intelligence would be announced not later than March 1, 1958. Hussein’s plan revealed that the element of 
depriving Nasser of a propaganda opportunity was important for the timing of an Iraqi-Jordanian-Saudi 
federation, suggesting that the threat a Syrian-Egyptian federation would pose to Jordan was one among 
several reasons, albeit the most important, for Hussein’s federation initiative. In a conversation with an 
American diplomat al-Rifa‘i had stated that he would explain the plan as based on “[the] revival of treaties 
of friendship and brotherhood between Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia…Inasmuch as treaties have been in force 
more than ten years and already renewed for additional periods [of] five-ten years [the] plan cannot be 
called [a] response to or in competition with the Egyptian-Syrian proposal but rather as the next logical step 
toward greater unity among Arab states sharing common borders,” Chargé d’Affaires Thomas K. Wright, 
Amman to the Department of State, January 27, 1958, Secret, 786.00/1-2758, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1958-1960, vol. xi, Lebanon and Jordan (Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1992), p. 268. The report further stated that a meeting was anticipated between the three kings 
within ten days of receipt of letters outlining al-Rifa‘i’s plan and that Hussein had requested that the United 
States provide assistance in convincing King Faisal and King Sa‘ud of the urgency of a an Iraqi-Jordanian-
Saudi federation. It is clear from this that Hussein doubted that he could present a convincing case to the 
two monarchs without U.S. support, which in turn suggests that Iraqi and Saudi leaders might not have 
been enthusiastic about a federation with Jordan. Finally, the American Embassy report stated that plans for 
a meeting between the rulers of Jordan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia might leak out and result in a proclamation 
of an Egyptian-Syrian federation earlier than expected. It appears, however, that the Iraqi Parliament took 
steps towards promoting Arab unity before the Jordanian and Syrian initiatives discussed above. As early 
as December 15, 1956, Al-Zaman reported that 15 deputies of the Iraqi chamber of deputies had prepared a 
proposal to the effect that Jordan join Iraq in a union. A significant number of deputies were expected to 
support the proposal, which had been prepared in view of the dangers the Arab umma was facing, Al-
Zaman, December 15, 1956, p. 6. It is obvious that the Suez Crisis had prompted the deputies to take this 
initiative. It is unclear, however, what Nuri’s position was on the issue. He was the prime minister at the 
time and the proposal would not have seen the light of day without his approval. The question is whether 





     The outcome of al-Rifa‘i’s visit to Riyadh most likely increased the chances for a 
rapid proclamation of a Jordanian-Iraqi union. Three kings all insisting on becoming the 
head of the Union might have constituted an insurmountable obstacle to the negotiators. 
There would have been little room for maneuvering in such a situation, since King Ibn 
Sa‘ud would most likely not have accepted Hashimite primacy in the Union. One 
possible solution to this dilemma would have been a royal council consisting of the three 
kings, but this would likely have entailed a looser political entity than what King Hussein 
and Nuri al-Sa‘id on the Iraqi side had in mind. In view of the Syrian-Egyptian 
negotiations for a united republic, however, the pressure in Jordanian and Iraqi ruling 
circles would have been strong to match the Syrian-Egyptian united republic. The 
Jordanian-Iraqi political entity must appear to the Arab public as a competitive alternative 
to the United Arab Republic. This is why a loose federation would not have been a 
feasible option to the rulers in Amman and Baghdad.611               
     The proclamation of the United Arab Republic on February 1, 1958, triggered fervent 
activity in Amman and Baghdad to rapidly form a union.612 When King Faisal II arrived 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the initiative was meant to deflect the public’s attention from the fact that Iraq’s ally Britain had attacked 
Egypt, by enhancing the regime’s Arab nationalist credentials.      
611 On the other hand, had a large number of Arab states expressed interest in joining a looser political 
entity, this might have persuaded the Jordanians and Iraqis to reconsider their plans for an arrangement 
based on closer ties, since it would have resulted in a great propaganda victory over the United Arab 
Republic, which only had two members. The problem with this argument is that such a federation would 
have had to include states with different systems of government, such as Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan, 
Lebanon, and Libya, of which only Morocco and Libya were monarchies. Furthermore, the majority of 
Arab territories with a monarchic system of government were still controlled by Britain. Also, none of the 
aforementioned countries were contiguous to Iraq or Jordan, a fact which would have presented logistical 
and strategic problems in a military conflict, and would of necessity have imposed limits on how effective a 
federation would have been. The circumstance that a competing revolutionary political entity—the United 
Arab Republic—would have separated the eastern part from the western and southern parts of the 
federation would certainly also have complicated relations within such a federation.    
612 Unlike the proclamation of the United Arab Republic, which was received with euphoria in Iraq and 
elsewhere in the Middle East, the formation of the Arab Union evoked only indifference among Iraqis, 
Ismael Ahmad Yaghi, Al-‘Alaqat al-‘Iraqiyya al-Urdunniyya, 1941-1958 [Iraqi-Jordanian Relations, 1941-
1958 (al-Qahira: Dar al-Sahwa li al-Nashr, 1988), p. 55, referred to in Dawisha, Arab Nationalism, p. 206.  





at Amman on February 11, at the invitation of King Hussein, in the company of the Iraqi 
Minister of Finance and the Minister of Justice, the pressure was great on the Jordanian 
and Iraqi delegations to prepare the ground for an expeditious decision with respect to the 
Union.613 The fact that the Arab Union was proclaimed on the following day is a clear 
indication that the forming of the United Arab Republic on February 1, 1958 was one, but 
not the only, reason for the Arab Union project. One would assume that much time-
consuming preparatory work by legal and other experts would have been necessary 
before the Union could be announced and that the process of preparing a Jordanian-Iraqi 
union had begun much earlier owing to other developments than the formation of the 
United Arab Republic.           
     One problem the Jordanian and Iraqi delegations struggled to solve during the 
negotiations for the Arab Union was the question of political hierarchy. The fact that both 
sides wished their respective king to become the head of the Arab Union appeared to set 
the stage for difficult negotiations. The solution which satisfied both sides stipulated that 
King Faisal of Iraq become the head of the Union and that King Abdullah of Jordan be 
the head in Faisal’s absence.614 The rapid proclamation of the Arab Union on February 
14, shows that the desire for compromise was strong.  
     There were also military issues which the delegations had to address. One of the main 
problems was Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad Pact. During the bilateral negotiations 
                                                          
613 Al-‘Arabi, Nuri Basha al-Sa‘id, p. 258; Fikrat Namiq ‘Abd al-Fattah, Siyasat al-‘Iraq al-Kharijiyya Fi 
al-Mintaqa al-‘Arabiyya 1953-1958 (Baghdad: Dar al-Rashid lil-Nashr, Manshurat Wizarat al-Thaqafa wa 
al-I‘lam, al-Jumhuriyya al-‘Iraqiyya, Salsala Dirasat (248), 1981), p. 472. Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah 
arrived on February 13. Al-Fattah argues that the reason for ‘Abd al-Ilah’s late arrival was his lack of 
enthusiasm for the whole Union project with Jordan.   
614 Ahmad al-Tarawana, Mudhakkirat Ahmad al-Tarawana: Rihlati ma‘ al-Urdunn (Amman: Matabi‘ al-
Dustur al-Tijariyya, 1997), p. 77; Bahjat al-Talhuni, “Mudhakkirat Bahjat al-Talhuni, al-Majallat (London), 
no. 195 (November 5-11, 1983), p. 31, referred to in al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, p. 130; al-‘Arabi, Nuri 
Basha al-Sa‘id, p. 259.  





Iraq’s commitment to the Pact had constituted a problem, since Jordan was not a party to 
the Pact. A solution had been found, however, owing to the fact that the Arab Union 
would not accede to the Baghdad Pact and that Iraq’s obligations under the Pact would 
not extend to Jordan.615 Another issue was Jordan’s precondition that Hussein retain his 
position as commander in chief of the Jordanian armed forces. In the eyes of the 
Jordanian negotiators this would include the Iraqi units which were to be stationed in 
Jordan. The Iraqis had initially opposed this demand but eventually relented when the 
Jordanians persisted.616 The two military issues referred to above testify to the 
importance of the military aspect of the Union.   
     A third category of problems addressed during the negotiations in Amman was the 
Union’s financial resources and how these resources would be allocated. According to 
Nuri the main issue had been allocations to the armed forces. Iraq’s annual military 
expenditures totaled  £25 million while those of Jordan amounted to approximately half 
of this sum. Whereas Iraq’s customs duties more or less balanced the military budget, 
Jordan’s amounted to £1 million only. This clearly constituted a problem for Iraq, and 
Nuri had therefore expressed his hope to the American Ambassador Gallman that the 
United States and Britain would continue their financial aid to Jordan.617 On June 21, 
1958, the Union’s Finance Minister stated that the deficit in the Union’s budget amounted 
                                                          
615 Falhut, Nahwa al-Wahda al-‘Arabiyya, pp. 117-118; Michael Ionides, Divide And Lose: The Arab 
Revolt of 1955-1958, pp. 234-235; al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, Mudiriyya al-Tawjih wa al-Idha‘a al-‘Amma 
(Baghdad: Matba‘a al-Hukuma, 1958), p. 10, referred to in al-Fattah, Siyasat al-‘Iraq al-Kharijiyya, pp. 
473-474.    
616 Alan de Lacy Rush, ed., Records of the Hashemite Dynasties, A Twentieth Century Documentary 
History, Iraq: The Reign of King Faisal II, vol. 14, p. 688, the British Embassy, Baghdad to the Foreign 
Office, no. 427, March 13, 1958, FO371/134026, referred to in al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, p. 129.  
617 Ibid.  





to approximately ID1.8 million.618 One explanation for the deficit may have been the fact 
that the Union Ministry of Defense received the lion’s share of the budget, ID30.6 
million, whereas ID1.5 million was allocated to the rest of the Union’s government 
administration.619 It is clear from these statistics that the United States and Britain, 
despite the Arab Union’s considerable emphasis on military expenditures, considered the 
role of the Union so important in the strategic landscape of the Middle East that it 
warranted such support. 
     Generally speaking, the Union Treaty constituted an attempt to implement a far-
reaching program of integration of the two kingdoms. Diplomatic relations between 
Jordan and Iraq ceased since the Union made them more or less redundant, but the two 
kingdoms’ diplomatic representation in other states would remain. Furthermore, the 
Union Treaty stipulated that a united foreign policy be pursued, that the two armies be 
united, that customs barriers between the two regions be abolished, that the educational 
system be standardized, that financial and economic policies be coordinated, and that the 
federal government make efforts to introduce a united currency for the Union. In view of 
the great discrepancies between the two states’ revenues, it was decided that Iraq would 
be responsible for 80 percent of the Union’s budget, and Jordan 20 percent during the 
first fiscal year. The Union also introduced regulations to facilitate the life of ordinary 
                                                          
618 Filastin, June 22, 1958, pp. 1, 4, referred to in al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, p. 153. Al-Zubaidi 
suggests that the deficit must have been higher than ID1.8 million. He quotes one source as stating that he 
had learned that the United States had decided to contribute $25 million and Britain $4 million towards 
balancing the Union’s budget, Muhadir Jalasat, vol. iii, p. 1146, quoted in al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 Tammuz, 
p. 80. The following statistics illustrate how important foreign aid was to Jordan’s survival as a state: 
Between 1951 and 1958 annual American aid to Jordan increased from $1.4 million to $34 million, Naseer 
H. Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development (1921-1965) (The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1972), p. 63, 
referred to in Lawrence Tal, “Jordan,” in Sayigh and Shlaim, The Cold War and the Middle East, p. 104. 
Furthermore, between 1952 and 1966 “[a]id accounted for up to one-third of Gross Domestic Product,”  
Tal, “Jordan,” in Sayigh and Shlaim, The Cold War and the Middle East, p. 105.   
619 Al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, p. 152.  





Iraqis and Jordanians. Union citizens were not required to carry a passport for travel 
between the two kingdoms, and they enjoyed the right to work in any part of the Union 
they chose.620        
     The new Union meant a number of constitutional changes for the two member states, 
but it did not constitute a complete change. The seat of the federal government, the 
Supreme Council of Ministers, would alternate between Baghdad and Amman for a 
period of six months at a time. Furthermore, a new Parliament with 40 members was 
elected, 20 Iraqis and 20 Jordanians. Each province of the Union’s two regions would be 
represented by at least one deputy elected by and from among the deputies of the two 
Parliaments. The members of the federal Parliament were thus not elected directly by the 
people, but they were not allowed to retain their seats in the regional parliaments. Foreign 
relations did not undergo change to the extent that international agreements previously 
entered into by the individual regions remained in effect for the contracting party only.621 
Finally, the premiership of the federal government did not entail change, at least not for 
the Iraqis, since Nuri al-Sa‘id was appointed prime minister. This had not been done 
without opposition, however, since the Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister Samir al-Rifa‘i had expressed concern about Nuri’s appointment. In his view a 
Jordanian was entitled to the premiership, since the Iraqi King was the head of state.622 
                                                          
620 Falhut, Nahwa al-Wahda al-‘Arabiyya, p. 117; al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, p. 139; al-Ittihad al-
‘Arabi, Mudiriyya al-Tawjih wa al-Idha‘a al-‘Amma, pp. 8-11, referred to in al-Fattah, Siyasat al-‘Iraq al-
Kharijiyya, p. 473. Al-‘Arabi emphasizes the fact that the two states retained the right to pursue an 
independent foreign policy, al-‘Arabi, Nuri Basha al-Sa‘id, p. 259.   
621 Falhut, Nahwa al-Wahda al-‘Arabiyya, pp. 116-121; al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, p. 138; al-Ittihad al-
‘Arabi, Mudiriyya al-Tawjih wa al-Idha‘a al-‘Amma, , pp. 8-11, referred to in al-Fattah, Siyasat al-‘Iraq al-
Kharijiyya, p. 473; al-‘Arabi, Nuri Basha al-Sa‘id, p. 259.     
622 Rush, Records of the Hashemite Dynasties, Iraq, vol. 14, pp. 659-660, British Embassy Amman to the 
Foreign Office No. 198, February 20, 1958, FO371/134025, referred to in al-Shar‘a, p. 141. Nuri appointed 
six Iraqis and six Jordanians as ministers in his cabinet, al-‘Arabi, Nuri Basha al-Sa‘id, p. 260. See also 





The Constitution testifies to the fact that Iraq played the leading role in the Arab Union, 
but this was balanced by the sovereignty each king retained in his own kingdom.  
     American reactions to the proclamation of the Arab Union were positive. The United 
States emphasized its positive reaction to the Arab Union by pledging £9 million in 
economic aid to the Union and a plan for the solution of its economic problems 
consisting in the joint British-American establishment of a Union Development Bank. 
Furthermore, the United States continued its economic aid to Jordan, which amounted to 
$7.5 million for the second quarter of fiscal year 1958 in accordance with the Point IV 
program and also extended jointly with Britain military aid to the Union and Lebanon in 
the form of 50 military jet aircraft.623 Despite the initial positive reactions the Eisenhower 
                                                                                                                                                                             
‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wizarat al-‘Iraqiyya (Sida, Lebanon: Matba‘a al-‘Irfan, 1968), vol. x, 
pp. 257-258.  
623 Report about the Middle East, February 1958, FO371/133823; Filastin, May 18, p. 1, and June 12, 1958, 
pp. 1 and 4; both sources referred to in al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, pp. 291, 292, and 295. In a telegram 
dated February 6, 1958 Dulles had instructed Chargé d’Affaires Thomas Wright in Amman to convey to 
Hussein that the United States would regard any step towards closer ties between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
Iraq, and Lebanon as a positive development. Washington would, however, not comment publicly on 
Hussein’s proposal until substantial progress had been made towards realizing the plan. The United States 
would also from fiscal year 1958, beginning on July 1, 1958, make $20 million available to support the 
Jordanian budget and probably further assistance later. Finally, Dulles had instructed Wright to inform 
Hussein that Jordan’s essential needs would be met, Dulles to the American Embassy, Amman, February 6, 
1958, Secret, 785.5-MSP/2-458, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. xi, p. 273. Four months after 
the above pledge Dulles instructed Chargé d’Affaires Wright to inform Nuri, who was in Amman at the 
time, that the U.S. Government had raised the U.S. aid to the Union budget to $25 million for the period of 
July 1, 1958 to March 31, 1959, subject to congressional approval. Of this amount $18.75 million would be 
allocated to meet the whole of Jordan’s share of the budget, and the remaining $6.25 million to meet the 
Iraqi deficit. Britain’s contribution would amount to $4 million, Dulles to the American Embassy, Amman, 
June 12, 1958, Confidential, 786.5-MSP/6-1258, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. xi, p. 290. The 
following day Wright reported that Nuri had reacted with disappointment and said that he would submit his 
resignation. Wright commented in his report: “It is now clear as it has been to [the] Embassy for some time 
that AU [the Arab Union] will only become viable if US/UK, mostly US, [are] prepared to foot the bill, 
Wright, Embassy Amman to the Department of State, 786.5-MSP/6-1358, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, vol. xi, p. 291. It is obvious that Nuri had expected a larger American contribution to the Union 
budget and quite possible that his enthusiasm for the Arab Union was in direct proportion to external 
contributions to the Union budget. In mid-June Nuri had expressed his despondency about the Arab Union 
by emphasizing that “he was too old to preside over a non-viable state,” and that he would resign unless the 
West made a long-term commitment to provide financial aid, Waldemar Gallman, Iraq Under General 
Nuri: My Recollections of Nuri al-Said, 1955-1958 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964), p. 146. 
Gallman points out, however, that Nuri’s despair was most likely only momentary, since he never repeated 
his wish to resign. Paradoxically, despite its considerable size, U.S. aid to Jordan was not popular among 





administration did not extend official recognition to the Arab Union until May 28, 
1958.624 It is possible that the delay in official American recognition was linked to the 
fact that the Union’s Constitution was not ratified by the Iraqi Parliament until May 12.                                             
     The British reaction to the Arab Union was a radical departure from its established 
policy. Britain had previously opposed all Iraqi-Jordanian union plans, but had adopted a 
new approach to Iraqi-Jordanian efforts to form a union, following the initiation of 
Syrian-Egyptian unity talks. This about-turn, which consisted in encouraging King Faisal 
and King Hussein to meet to discuss a union between the two states, was the result of 
British fears that Jordan would come under Egyptian influence which would in turn lead 
to continued erosion of the British position in Jordan. Furthermore, the British believed 
that both countries’ military cooperation with Britain would lead to a merger of their 
military staffs and that this would enable London to retain its influence in the Middle 
East.625 Finally, a Syrian-Egyptian Union might affect adversely British trade and oil 
interests in the Middle East—one possibility was sabotage against pipelines in Syria—
and Britain’s position in Iraq and the Persian Gulf.626 It can thus be established that the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Jordanians due to the strings they perceived the American Government attached to the aid. This applied to 
financial aid, projects, and technical assistance alike, since American advisors “appear[ed] to be forcing 
their methods and ideas on Jordanian officials,” Wright to the Department of State, June 28, 1958, Secret, 
785.00/6-2858, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. xi, p. 292.              
624 Al-‘Arabi, Nuri Basha al-Sa‘id, p. 261. It is worth mention that it took the United States 19 days to 
extend diplomatic recognition to the revolutionary government, which had overthrown the Iraqi monarchy. 
Britain recognized the Arab Union on February 20, that is a week after its formation, ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-
Hasani, Tarikh al-Wizarat al-‘Iraqiyya (Sida, Lebanon: Matba‘a al-‘Irfan, 1968), vol. x, p. 258.  
625 Antuni Idin, Mudhakkirat 1951-1957 [Recollections 1951-1957], transl. Khairi Hamad (Bairut: Dar 
Maktaba al-Hayat, n.d.), pp. 137-138, referred to in al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, p. 272-273. The military 
aspect referred to in the Arabic translation is not discussed in the English original of Anthony Eden’s 
memoirs. See Anthony Eden, Full Circle (Cambridge, MA: The Riverside Press, 1960), pp. 394-395.   
626 Rush, Records of the Hashemite Dynasties, Iraq, vol. 14, pp. 644-646, Draft Brief for Secretary of State, 
Cabinet Meeting, February 18. 1958, FO371/134024, referred to in al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, p. 274. 
British concerns about the pipelines passing through Syria were based on facts, since the Iraq Petroleum 
Company pipeline had been blown up during the Suez Crisis in 1956, Majid Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A 
Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 13.   





proclamation of the United Arab Republic directly influenced Britain’s policy towards 
the formation of an Jordanian- Iraqi union.         
     In the eyes of the Israeli government the forming of the Arab Union was an 
unwelcome event, as had been the proclamation of the United Arab Republic. By mid-
February Israel was suddenly surrounded by two hostile unions, both of which shared 
borders with Israel. The forming of two powerful Arab unions was perceived as a serious 
menace to Israel’s national security, since it was in her interest that the Arab world 
remained fragmented, weak, and unable to coordinate its military, economic, and human 
resources against the Jewish state. Some analysts argue that Israel did not view the Arab 
Union as a serious threat and therefore did not react as violently as she had to the Iraqi-
Jordanian military cooperation in 1956.627 The facts speak to the contrary, however, as is 
illustrated by official statements by Foreign Minister Golda Meir and Prime Minister 
David Ben Gurion. At a press conference in Paris in February 1958 Meir had expressed 
concern about the forming of the Arab Union since it shared borders with Israel. In the 
foreign minister’s view the Union harbored hatred against Israel and the objective of both 
the United Arab Republic and the Union was to increase tension in the region. An 
additional problem was the fact that Iraq was not party to the Arab-Israeli cease-fire 
agreement of 1948. Meir’s concerns were echoed by Ben Gurion who stated that Israel 
would take appropriate action were Iraq to deploy troops to the Israeli-Jordanian 
                                                          
627 Michael Ionides, Divide And Lose: The Arab Revolt of 1955-1958 (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1960), p. 
238. Al-‘Arabi agrees with Ionides that the Israeli reaction was considerably less violent in 1958 than it had 
been in 1956. He concurs with the author of an article in the Times (of London) of February 15, 1958 that 
the reason for Israel’s relatively mild reaction in 1958 was her fear that Jordan would accede to the United 
Arab Republic thereby increasing the threat to Israel’s national security. Conversely, the Arab Union would 
focus its efforts on opposing the United Arab Republic and not Israel, al-‘Arabi, Nuri Basha al-Sa‘id, pp. 
261-162. This argument is indeed valid to a certain extent, but it disregards the fact that many Arab leaders, 
including Nuri al-Sa‘id, were prepared to play the Israel card whenever they could divert attention from 
domestic problems.     





border.628 Ben Gurion’s warning is a clear indication that Israel did not view the Arab 
Union as a benevolent political entity.      
     One would expect the Egyptian and Syrian reactions to the forming of the Arab Union 
to have been negative, or at least cautious, since the United Arab Republic would most 
likely have perceived the Arab Union as a rival. On the contrary, initial reactions in Cairo 
and Damascus were positive with Nasser extending recognition to the Union and sending 
a congratulatory message to King Faisal, who, however, did not respond in kind.629 On 
February 16, 1958 the Syrian minister of justice stated that  
We find that the formation of the Arab Union between Jordan and Iraq is a step towards 
closer ties between the two separate parts of the Arab world and that every 
rapprochement of this type will facilitate the unification of different parts of the Arab 
nation and the forming of the great Arab state.630   
  
The Egyptian and Syrian reactions to the forming of the Arab Union are ample evidence 
that Cairo and Damascus initially perceived the Union as a step in the right direction with 
                                                          
628 Al-Zaman, no. 6179, February 25, 1958, p. 1; Al-Sha‘b, no. 4098, February 25, 1958, p. 1; Filastin, May 
27, 1958, pp. 1,4; all three sources referred to in al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, pp. 300-301. Britain made 
efforts to alleviate Israeli concerns by promising to protect Israel and insure that no Iraqi troops were 
stationed along the Israeli-Jordanian border, Rush, Records of the Hashemite Dynasties, Iraq, vol. 14. pp. 
644-646, Draft Brief for Secretary of State, Cabinet Meeting, February 18. 1958, FO371/134024, referred 
to in al-Shar‘a, p. 274. Ben-Gurion’s and Meir’s position on the Arab Union was in sharp contrast with the 
official American view which was “that a strengthening of ties among friendly Arab states would be a 
favorable development…We shall continue as circumstances warrant to take this position with the Israel 
Government…We believe that [the] last thing Iraq and Jordan want is trouble with Israel, and hope that 
Israel will take no action re [the] new association which will cause it difficulties in its formative stage,” 
Under Secretary of State Christian Herter, Department of State to Embassies in Amman, Baghdad, Jidda, 
and Tel Aviv, Secret, 685.87/2-1358, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. xi, p. 275.    
629 Al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wizarat al-‘Iraqiyya, vol. x (Sida, Lebanon: Matba‘a al-‘Irfan, 1968), p. 203. In his 
reply Faisal did not refer at all to the United Arab Republic and the Arab Union extended recognition to the 
Arab Republic only after a union government had been formed three months later, al-Fattah, Siyasat al-
‘Iraq al-Kharijiyya, p. 474; Ionides, Divide And Lose, p. 235. Ionides further claims that it looked for a 
time as if Egyptian-Iraqi relations would improve with the creation of the United Arab Republic and the 
Arab Union.  
Iraq had pursued a similar course on February 1 by refusing to recognize the United Arab Republic. During 
a visit to Amman the Iraqi Foreign Minister Burhan al-Din Basha A’yan stated on February 12, 1958 that 
the reason for this policy was that the United Arab Republic had been formed “by force,” whereas the Arab 
Union, proclaimed two days later, was a “natural” union, al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wizarat al-‘Iraqiyya, vol. x, 
pp. 199-200. President Nasser’s retorted that the Iraqi decision was based on the fact that Crown Prince 
‘Abd al-Ilah “regarded Syria as his possession.”          
630 Al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wizarat al-‘Iraqiyya, vol. x, p. 202, referred to in al-‘Arabi, Nuri Basha al-Sa‘id, p. 
263. 





respect to Arab unity, which would later result in a merger between the two unions.631 
Conversely, Faisal’s response is a clear indication that neither he nor King Hussein 
entertained any such plans.           
     Reactions in Turkey and Iran, both Iraq’s allies in the Baghdad Pact, could have been 
expected to be similar but they were not. In the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan 
Menderes’s view the Arab Union would promote peace and stability in the Middle East. 
Conversely, official Turkish circles were also concerned that the Union might affect 
Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad Pact adversely, since Jordan was not a party to the 
Pact. It was important to Turkish leaders that Iraq remain in the Pact, since they 
perceived the United Arab Republic as a threat to Turkey’s national security.632 Iran’s 
reactions were similar to those of Turkey to the extent that Teheran shared Baghdad’s 
concern about Iraq’s membership in the Baghdad Pact. Iran also had the additional 
concern that the forming of the Arab Union might fuel Arab nationalism in the Persian 
Gulf which might cause problems for Iranian interests in the Gulf Emirates.633 Turkish 
                                                          
631 In the view of American diplomats in Baghdad there was little support among “literate” Iraqis for Arab 
unity in the form of “submission to [a] foreign power which Syria has chosen.” Furthermore, Iraqis loyal to 
the regime believed that the likelihood was strong of dissatisfaction among Syrians once they realized that 
Egypt’s interests would take precedence over those of Syria, Embassy Baghdad to the Department of State, 
February 21,1958, Confidential, 786.00/2-2158, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. xii, p. 293. A 
National Intelligence Estimate dated February 20, 1958 appears to have concurred in the Iraqi belief that 
discontent would grow in Syria, stating that Nasser would encounter “formidable problems in keeping the 
union together and maintaining stability within the two component states,” Special National Intelligence 
Estimate 30-58, February 20, 1958, Secret, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. xii, p. 41. The. 
Intelligence Estimate assessed that the United Arab Republic would last at least a year. British diplomatic 
reports suggest that Nasser took a negative stance on the Arab Union. The former was quoted as having 
stated with regard to the Arab Union that “the collaborators of imperialism are even more dangerous than 
imperialism,” Minute on “Nasser’s open declaration of war against the Arab Union,” 27 Feb. 1958, 
FO371/134026; also Tel Aviv to the Foreign Office, 12 Mar. 1958 1958, FO371/133876; both sources 
referred to in Tal, “Jordan,” in Sayigh and Shlaim, The Cold War and the Middle East, p. 115.     
632 Al-Difa‘, no. 6704, February 17, 1958, p. 1; Al-Zaman, no. 6173, February 18, 1958, p. 1, both sources 
referred to in al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, p. 309; al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, p. 311.  
633 Al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, p. 317. Substantial Iranian minorities lived in Bahrain and Kuwait and 
Iran even claimed these territories as part of Iran. Furthermore, Iran did not necessarily wish to see a 
strengthened Iraq due to the fact that Baghdad and Teheran were at variance over the international border in 
the Shatt al-Arab. 





and Iranian reactions to the proclamation of the Arab Union show that geographic 
location and different agendas caused Iraq’s allies to take somewhat different positions 
on how the Union would affect the political and strategic situation in the Middle East.           
     Popular reactions in Iraq to the Arab Union were mixed. According to the British 
Ambassador to Iraq, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, “[m]ost of them [Iraqis] distrusted the 
magnitude of the financial burden on Iraq which the Union would represent.”634 Unlike 
the proclamation of the United Arab Republic, the news of the formation of the Arab 
Union was received with indifference by the Iraqi and Jordanian public. No 
demonstrations took place, neither in support of nor in opposition to the Union. It is quite 
possible, that had the Iraqi government held a referendum offering the Iraqis a choice 
between accession to the United Arab Republic or to the Arab Union, the educated 
classes would have cast their vote for the Syrian-Egyptian union.635 Tribal and municipal 
leaders, some politicians, and newspapers not affiliated with a political party supported 
the Union, whereas the Ba‘th Party, the Communist Party of Iraq, the Istiqlal Party, the 
                                                          
634 Ambassador Trevelyan, Baghdad to Selwyn Lloyd, no. 9, January 29, 1959, Confidential, 
FO371/140896. Subject: Annual Report 1958, Iraq. Report written by R. S. Crawford. A U.S. intelligence 
estimate dated February 20, 1958 stated that the Arab Union would face serious internal problems due to 
opposition among Jordan’s Palestinian population and to Jordanian budget deficits, Special National 
Intelligence Estimate 30-58, February 20, 1958, Secret, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. xii, p. 
41. The estimate predicted, however, that the long-term prospects of the Union would be good, if it 
overcame initial difficulties.             
635 George Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (London: Bradford and Dickens, 1961), p. 299. A 
national intelligence estimate of February 1958 assessed that the United Arab Republic exerted a greater 
appeal on Arabs in the Middle East than the Arab Union and that the Arab Republic would continue to 
enjoy support among radicals in the conservative states, Special National Intelligence Estimate 30-58, 
February 20, 1958, Secret, Foreign Relations of the United States, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian 
Peninsula, vol. xii (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1993). p. 41. ‘Abd al-Razzaq 
al-Hasani states that there was strong opposition to the Arab Union in Iraq, to which testifies an attempt on 
the Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Samir al-Rifa‘i’s life when he was visiting 
Baghdad to frame a constitution for the Iraqi-Jordanian union, ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, Tarikh al-Wizarat 
al-‘Iraqiyya (Sida, Lebanon: al-‘Irfan, 1955-1958), vol. x, p. 212.  





Kurdish United Democratic Party, students and the Kurds opposed the Arab Union.636 It 
is obvious that large parts of Iraqi and Jordanian society either opposed or were 
indifferent to the Union. This underscores the elite nature of the project, since ordinary 
Iraqis and Jordanians were not consulted or allowed to participate in the decision-making 
process.637  
     Nuri’s position on the Arab Union was ambiguous. On the one hand he must have 
relished the fact that Jordan, unlike Syria, had not been lost to Nasser. On the other hand, 
he was more reactive than proactive with respect to the Arab Union until he was 
appointed prime minister of the Union. As established above, Hussein took the initiative 
to the Union and continued to play a proactive role by sending delegations to Iraq and 
inviting Iraqi delegations and King Faisal II to Amman. Nuri’s reactive role was most 
likely explained by misgivings about the feasibility of the Union, in particular due to 
Jordan’s budget deficit. These concerns had been explicitly stated when the British 
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd had visited Baghdad in March. The Iraqi leaders had 
                                                          
636 Al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-‘Arabi, pp. 205, 210. The Jordanian supporters of the Union were found among 
tribal and municipal leaders, and a large part of the population on the East Bank, whereas a large part of the 
population in the West Bank and the Palestinian refugees opposed the Union, al-Shar‘a, Al-Ittihad al-
‘Arabi, p. 193. The British Consul in Jerusalem reported that there were no expressions of enthusiasm for 
the Arab Union among the Arabs in the city, A. C. Stewart to E. M. Rose, 19 February 1958, Confidential, 
FO371/134025, quoted in Wm. Roger Louis, “Britain and the Crisis of 1958,” in Wm. Roger Louis and 
Roger Owen, A Revolutionary Year (London, New York, and Washington, D.C.: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd. In 
association with Woodrow Wilson Center Press), p. 29.     
637 Despite popular opposition to the Union in Iraq and Jordan, all Arab states and the Arab League 
declared their support for it. No Arab state, however, expressed interest in joining the Union, al-Shar‘a, Al-
Ittihad al-‘Arabi, pp. 270-271. The British Ambassador Michael Wright confirmed in a report to the 
Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd that the Union enjoyed support neither in Jordan nor in Iraq, Wright to 
Lloyd, February 25, 1958 FO371/134025, referred to in Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem 
of Nasser, p. 146. An American Embassy report dated February 21 confirms the lack of popular 
demonstrations in support of the Union. The dilemma of the government was that “popular dislike for [the] 
present regime is sufficiently strong so that it is hard for it to do anything which will incur public approval 
rather than suspicion,” Embassy Baghdad to the Department of State, February 21, 1958, Confidential, 
786.00/2-2158, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. xii, p. 292. Conversely, the American Embassy 
did not believe that the few anti-Union demonstrations meant that it was unpopular.  





been very nervous and had acted “as though they expected to be gone in six months.”638 
Lloyd had left Iraq with the impression that the Arab Union “needed bolstering.” Such 
pessimistic sentiment among Iraqi leaders less than a month after the formation of the 
Arab Union are a clear indication that Nuri agreed to the Union with doubts in his mind, 
since nothing suggests that the situation in the Union had deteriorated to such an extent in 
less than one month that Nuri had changed his mind about the Iraqi-Jordanian Federation.   
     Nuri had played a secondary role to King Hussein with respect to the formation of the 
Arab Union, but once the Union had been proclaimed Nuri became the driving force 
behind the efforts to balance the Union’s budget. He was persistent in his requests for 
U.S. and British contributions to meet the budget deficit. In April 1958 State Department 
analysts anticipated that Nuri would request additional financial support, since Iraq’s 
predicted budget deficit for the fiscal year beginning on April 1, 1958 would amount to 
$10 million.639 Nuri and Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah were not convinced that Western 
support would meet the whole deficit and therefore attempted to persuade Kuwait to join 
the Union in order to resolve its financial difficulties. ‘Abd al-Ilah had explained to the 
British ambassador Wright at the end of February 1958 that in order to prevent a disaster 
                                                          
638 Dulles to the Department of State, March 11, 1958, Top Secret, 786.00/3-1158, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, vol. xii, pp. 294-295. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Gerald Templer, 
however, saw the Arab Union in a different light: It offered the British their last chance of a continued 
strong presence in the Middle East, Chiefs of Staff Meeting, Confidential Annex, 7 May 1958, DEFE 
4/107, referred to in Wm. Roger Louis, “Britain and the Crisis in 1958,” in Louis and Owen, eds. A 
Revolutionary Year, p.23.       
639 The Iraqi Government was prevented by law to divert funds allocated to the Development Board to 
budget purposes. Furthermore, the blowing up of the Iraq Petroleum Company’s pipeline in Syria during 
the Suez Crisis in 1956 had resulted in a sharp reduction in oil revenues, Memorandum from the Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs, William Rountree to Dulles, April 
16, 1958, Secret, 611.80/4-1658, Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. xii, p. 58. The fact that Nuri 
exerted pressure on Kuwait’s ruler to join the Arab Union and not to visit Syria and Egypt reveals how 
important this issue was deemed to be in Baghdad.  As to Britain’s opposition to Kuwait’s accession to the 
Arab Union, Ambassador Wright informed the Union’s Foreign Minister Tawfiq al-Suwaidi on July 11, 
1958 that London had decided to agree to Kuwait’s accession to the Union after independence and that the 
details would be discussed by Prime Minister Nuri and the Foreign Office in London on July 24, al-Hasani, 
Tarikh al-Wizarat al-‘Iraqiyya,  vol. x, p. 220.   





before the end of the year the West would have to provide financial support, Kuwait 
would have to join the Union for financial and psychological reasons, and Syria would 
have to be brought over by force if need be.640 This conversation illustrates how 
desperate the Union’s position was in the eyes of ‘Abd al-Ilah and supports the argument 
that the Iraqi leaders had accepted to form a Union with Jordan only with reluctance, 
since both the Crown Prince and Nuri indubitably had been aware of the financial strains 
to which the Union would subject Iraq.        
     The unofficial objectives of the Arab Union, that is the strengthening of the Hashimite 
dynasty, eventually led to the destruction of both the Union and the Iraqi monarchy. The 
direct reason for this was the unstable domestic state of affairs in Jordan, which had 
prompted King Hussein to request that Iraq send troops to assist him in gaining control of 
the situation.641 As a result, two brigades of the Iraqi Army controlled by Free Officers 
were ordered to deploy to Jordan. This fateful order enabled the army units to enter 
Baghdad and overthrow the Iraqi branch of the House of Hashim on July 14, 1958. The 
July 14 Revolution thus testifies to the fact that the policies of Nuri and the Hashimites 
achieved exactly what they had intended to prevent—the fall of the Iraqi branch of the 
Hashimite dynasty. The reason for this disaster was the marked discrepancy between the 
unstated objectives of the Arab Union—to strengthen the Hashimite dynasties—and the 
real need for economic, social, and political reform.642  
                                                          
640 Report from Michael Wright in Baghdad to the Foreign Office on his conversation with Crown Prince 
‘Abd al-Ilah on 25 February 1958, FO371/134198, referred to in Mufti, p. 104. ‘Abd al-Ilah had argued that 
at least the first two steps were required in order to save the Arab Union.  
641 Fathi al-‘Arabi, ‘Abd al-Nasir wa Tahrir al-Sharq al-‘Arabi, p. 299.  
642 Fathi al-‘Arabi argues that “The proclamation of the Arab Union was not received with satisfaction by 
the masses in the two states. It was perceived as a Hashimite conspiracy aiming at complete control of the 
situation in the two countries for the benefit of the ruling Hashemite House at the expense of the interests of 
the people,” ibid. Furthermore, he contends that the instability in Jordan was caused by popular rejection of 
the Hashimite Union. ‘Abd al-Fattah concurs in this assessment of the objectives of the Arab Union‘Abd 





     Many historians, Arab and Western, argue that the Arab Union was mainly formed in 
reaction to the proclamation of the United Arab Republic on February 1, 1958, but there 
were two other reasons for the formation of the Union as well. The Arab Union was 
partly a result of an historical process which went back at least to the Iraqi-Jordanian 
Agreement for Alliance and Brotherhood of 1947 and the discussions between the two 
sides in the early 1950s. The Agreement of 1947 and the discussions of 1950-1951, 
analyzed above, had already provided a blueprint for a union when Egypt and Syria 
merged in the United Arab Republic.643 Furthermore, Britain exercised a restraining 
influence over any Iraqi-Jordanian attempt at unity. In reaction to the Syrian-Egyptian 
negotiations about a union treaty the British reversed their previous opposition to an 
Iraqi-Jordanian union. One can therefore conclude that the United Arab Republic was the 
principal reason for the formation of the Arab Union in February of 1958. The other two 
historical forces referred to—British opposition to an Iraqi-Jordanian union and an 
already existing Iraqi-Jordanian blueprint for such a political entity—constituted the 
historical continuum in which the United Arab Republic acted as a catalyst. Had the 
British not opposed the Iraqi-Jordanian project, a federation might have been formed as 
early as 1947 based on the Agreement for Alliance and Brotherhood, although the 




                                                                                                                                                                             
al-Fattah, Siyasat al-‘Iraq al-Kharijiyya, p. 479. Also, the official announcement of Iraq’s withdrawal from 
the Arab Union supports the above interpretation. For the Arabic text of the announcement, see Al-Waqai‘ 
al-‘Iraqiyya, 1, July 23, 1958, p. 15, referred to in al-Fattah, Siyasat al-‘Iraq al-Kharijiyya, p. 479.     
643 This blueprint enabled Iraq and Jordan to almost immediately follow suit with their own union, which 
would most likely not have been possible without the many years of preparatory work. 





Arab Unity and Disunity 
     The failure of Nuri and the Hashimites to pursue policies which would have 
strengthened the Iraqi regime and prevented a revolutionary situation to build up in the 
country resulted in the Iraqi Revolution of 1958. The first steps of the new regime 
revealed the degree to which Iraqis were opposed to Hashimite rule and that the Arab 
Union was among the symbols of the old regime whose demise the Iraqis celebrated.          
     The Qasim regime’s rapid decision with respect to the Arab Union reflected popular 
sentiments. During the first two days following the July 14 coup the military leaders 
announced a series of decisions doing away with unpopular policies and institutions of 
the old regime.644 When the new regime therefore announced on July 15 that Iraq had 
withdrawn from the Arab Union it certainly reflected popular opposition to the Union and 
its policies. The reason given for the decision was that the Union had not pursued the 
interests of the Iraqi and Jordanian peoples and that its intention had been to fragment 
Arab unity and represent the interest of the ruling clique.645 Furthermore, the early 
decision to withdraw from the Arab Union demonstrates how important this 
announcement was deemed to be by the new regime. The significance of the decision not 
to remain a party to the Arab Union treaty is that the Qasim government, unlike other 
Arab governments, adopted an approach to the Union which reflected popular sentiments 
in Iraq.      
                                                          
644 For a detailed analysis of these proclamations, see Chapter 8. 
645 Al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 Tammuz 1958, pp. 80, 513; Uriel Dann, Iraq Under Qassem: A Political 
History, 1958-1963 (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1969), p. 52. The full text of the announcement 
was printed in Al-Waqai‘ al-‘Iraqiyya, no. 1, July 23, 1958, quoted in al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 Tammuz 
1958, pp. 513-514. King Hussein waited until August 2 to acknowledge Iraq’s withdrawal from the Arab 
Union, Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 52.     





     In the first days and months following the Iraqi Revolution the relations between Iraq 
and the United Arab Republic appeared to have improved radically with the two states 
signing a number of bilateral agreements. Nasser had demonstrated his support for the 
Iraqi Revolution by placing the armed forces in both U.A.R. regions on highest alert, 
declaring that the Arab Republic was prepared to respond immediately to any Iraqi 
request for help, including military units, arms, ammunition, and aircraft.646 A meeting in 
Damascus between an Iraqi delegation headed by Qasim’s deputy, ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif 
and President Nasser apparently went very well judging from the agreements signed on 
July 19: a cultural agreement, an agreement for complete military cooperation, and 
agreements for economic, trade, and technical cooperation.647 The U.A.R.-Iraqi Defense 
Agreement of July 19, 1958, stated that the two parties were bound by the Charter of the 
Arab League and the Arab League Cooperation and Security Pact and that they would 
stand united in the face of aggression against one or both of them.648 The Defense 
Agreement also stipulated that Iraq and the United Arab Republic cooperate fully in the 
international field to protect their rights. The U.A.R.-Iraqi Defense Agreement, in 
particular, demonstrated both sides’ determination to establish close ties.       
     Despite the promising rapprochement between Iraq and the United Arab Republic one 
incident which took place during the meeting between Nasser and ‘Arif would have 
serious repercussions on U.A.R.-Iraqi relations. On July 18 Nasser had delivered a speech 
in which he had emphasized ‘Arif’s leading role in the Iraqi Revolution.649 This would 
                                                          
646 Fathi al-‘Arabi, ‘Abd al-Nasir wa Tahrir al-Sharq al-‘Arabi, p. 302.   
647 Al-Zubaidi, Thawrat 14 Tammuz 1958, p. 515. An agreement for cultural unity was signed by the two 
sides on October 28. Fathi al-‘Arabi, ‘Abd al-Nasir wa Tahrir al-Sharq al-‘Arabi, p. 302.   
648 Falhut, Nahwa al-Wahda al-‘Arabiyya, pp. 144-145.    
649 Fathi al-‘Arabi, p. 302. Al-‘Arabi gives a very pro-‘Arif account of his role in the Revolution, accusing 
Qasim of being an opportunist by not exposing his own life to danger, while letting ‘Arif carry out the 





have been a natural thing to do but for the fact that ‘Arif was not Iraq’s leader. It is quite 
possible that Qasim’s suspicions of Nasser’s motives began with this incident and that it 
was one of the reasons why the two men never met. Nasser’s failure to refer to Qasim’s 
role in the Revolution, while praising the latter’s deputy, was obviously an insult to 
Qasim. Nasser had clearly for one reason or another chosen to offend Qasim. It is simply 
not convincing that a leader of Nasser’s caliber would have acted unintentionally in this 
manner. One possibility is that ‘Arif had impressed Nasser with his staunch support for 
unity with the United Arab Republic, and that Nasser for this reason had decided to 
support ‘Arif in a situation which the U.A.R. leader believed would soon develop into a 
power struggle in Iraq. According to one account of the meeting between Nasser and 
‘Arif the latter had referred to Qasim in deprecating terms, a circumstance which might 
have prompted Nasser to emphasize ‘Arif’s leadership.650 Whatever the explanation 
might be of Nasser’s praise for ‘Arif, it is clear that much of the blame for the subsequent 
tension between the United Arab Republic and Iraq must be placed at the feet of Nasser 
and ‘Arif.     
     ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif’s activities in Iraq following his return from Damascus confirmed 
his opinion of himself as the leader of the Revolution and precipitated a confrontation 
with Qasim. Back in Iraq ‘Arif made great efforts to spread Nasser’s version of his role in 
the Revolution. In an interview which he granted to Radio Cairo on July 24 ‘Arif called 
                                                                                                                                                                             
dangerous part of the coup plan. Al-‘Arabi relegates Qasim to a secondary role. He fails, however, to 
address the question of what was Nasser’s motive when he praised a subordinate to Qasim, both in military 
and political rank. Naturally this was interpreted as a slight by Qasim.   
650 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 87. During their meeting in Damascus Nasser had asked ‘Arif what role 
Qasim would play if Iraq joined the United Arab Republic, whereupon the latter had answered that 
“Qasim’s fate would be like that of General Neguib,” Muhakamat al-Mahkama al-‘Askariyya al-‘Ulya al-
Kubra [Proceedings of the Special Supreme Military Court] (Baghdad, 1959-1962, vol. v), pp. 247-70. 
Neguib had become President of Egypt after the Egyptian Revolution in July 1952, only to be 
outmaneuvered by Nasser in November 1954.       





himself the “leader of the command.” During the interview Qasim was not mentioned by 
name one single time.651 ‘Arif’s activities must thus have corroborated Qasim’s 
suspicions raised on July 18 by Nasser’s speech in Damascus. Furthermore, ‘Arif went on 
a speaking tour of the country which he used as a platform to eulogize Nasser.652 This 
was a situation Qasim could not condone for long. His deputy was challenging his 
position as the leader of the Revolution and advocating objectives which were equally 
challenging to his position as Sole Leader.  
     Paradoxically, the issue of unity was the major reason for disunity in Iraq. The tension 
between Qasim and ‘Arif in the first months after the July 14 Revolution was 
symptomatic of the issue of Arab unity which had for so long eluded the Arabs. The 
formation of the United Arab Republic in February 1958 had kindled the hope of pan-
Arabists in the Middle East, but some Arab leaders, such as ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, had 
their own view of what Arab unity entailed. Qasim was the Sole Leader and would for 
this reason not tolerate competition from Nasser. A second reason for Qasim’s opposition 
to union with the United Arab Republic was that he did not wish to turn Iraq into a 
province ruled from Cairo, which many believed was the case in Syria.653 A third likely 
consideration which influenced Qasim’s decision not to accede to the United Arab 
Republic was the strong opposition to such a union in certain parts of Iraqi society. Thus, 
                                                          
651 Radio Cairo, July 24, 1958, quoted in Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 78. 
652 Batatu, The Old Social Classes, p.817; Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 88.  
653 Mahmud Riyadh, Egyptian ambassador to Syria, stated in 1961 that Egypt had not wanted union with 
Syria, in order to avoid accusations of annexing the Arab state, “which is exactly what happened,” Seale, 
The Struggle for Syria, p. 314.   





when pan-Arabists and the Ba‘th Party lent their support to ‘Arif, he became a serious 
threat to Qasim’s authority.654  
          Qasim’s view on Arab unity differed radically from that of the Ba‘thists and pan-
Arabists whose goal was immediate union with the United Arab Republic. An Arab 
nationalist, Qasim wished to establish close ties with the United Arab Republic, and he 
might even have accepted a Sovereignty Council with the Arab Republic and Iraq 
alternately presiding over the council. He would never have accepted renouncing Iraq’s 
sovereignty, however, as Syria had done upon her merger with Egypt.655 Unlike the pan-
Arabists and Ba‘thists who advocated wahda fawriyya, immediate union with the 
Egyptian-Syrian Republic, Qasim repeatedly emphasized the concept of national unity in 
his speeches. According to Qasim himself, his personal role in the effort to achieve such 
unity consisted in being above political trends and working for the whole nation, not for 







                                                          
654 ‘Arif was accompanied on his speaking tour by Fu’ad al-Rikabi, the Ba‘thist leader and Minister of 
Development who encouraged the former’s advocacy of Arab unity, Khadduri, Republican Iraq, pp. 88, 91. 
Khadduri writes that ‘Arif’s speeches were enthusiastically received by the public. The reason for this, 
however, was not necessarily the demand for unity, but most likely his unrealistic promises regarding an 
Iraqi welfare state.   
655 Khadduri, Republican Iraq, p. 92; 14 July Celebration Committee 1958-1959, The Iraqi Revolution, p. 9.  
656 ‘Abd al-Karim Kassem, Principles of 14th of July Revolution, pp.5, 13; Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, p. 64. 






     During the last decade before the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 a 
revolutionary situation built up in the country, in part because of internal reasons such as 
suppression of opposition to unpopular economic policies and the rigging of 
parliamentary elections. The semi-feudal conditions in rural areas with tribal shaikhs 
controlling tribal lands resulted in a continuous migration of destitute but hopeful 
peasants and farm laborers to the cities. Once in the cities, however, these rural migrants 
discovered that they had traded their misereable existence under large landowners for an 
equally difficult life in the squalid conditions of the slums of Baghdad and other Iraqi 
cities where they joined the armies of their unemployed urban brethren. One reason that 
the migrants ended up in the sarifas was the chronic insufficient construction of new 
affordable housing. These conditions were fertile ground for growing revolutionary 
sentiments among the poorer strata of the population. In addition to the discontent among 
the poor, the authoritarian domestic policies of and constraints on civil liberties imposed 
by Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa‘id greatly contributed to alienating the intelligentsia. 
Students in particular voiced their discontent with the slow economic progress in the 
country in demonstrations which were often brutally suppressed by the authorities. This 
violent response to public dissent only increased strife in Iraqi society.        
     Revolutionary sentiments were also fanned in part by external influences such as close 
ties with Britain, membership in the Baghdad Pact, and the Suez Crisis. Arab 
nationalism, and in particular its corollary, Arab unity, was the prism through which these 
relations and events were seen. Most Iraqi politicians and intellectuals strongly opposed 
the pro-West policies of the Nuri regime, since these policies resulted in Iraq’s isolation 





in the Arab world. The Suez Crisis underscored Nuri’s dilemma: How could he continue 
pro-British policies against the backdrop of the French-British-Israeli attack on Egypt? 
Nuri settled for half-measures such as severing diplomatic relations with France instead 
of with Britain.  
     This dissertation has argued that developments in Iraq and the Middle East following 
the end of World War II, despite their seemingly unique character, generally manifested a 
continuation of historical processes which had begun earlier, or even much earlier in 
some cases. An example of an event which was a reflection of such processes was the 
creation of the state of Israel in 1948. This seemingly new development was, however, 
merely a manifestation of the strong British presence in the region, which had begun 
much earlier. Likewise, the Suez Crisis was a continuation of the tradition of heavy-
handed British or American interference in regional affairs: In 1941 Britain had deposed 
Iran’s ruler Reza Shah because of his pro-German leanings. The same year Britain had 
reoccupied Iraq due to that country’s pro-German policies. In the following year the 
British had compelled King Faruq of Egypt to appoint a prime minister of their liking, by 
surrounding his palace with tanks. In 1953 the Central Intelligence Agency had 
sponsored the overthrow of Prime Minister  Muhammad Musaddeq’s government in Iran. 
Finally, in the early 1950s Britain and the United States had actively sought to create a 
Western-led Middle East Command or Middle East Defense Organization despite the 
strong opposition of the Egyptian President Gamal ‘Abdul Nasser. The formation of the 
Baghdad Pact in 1955 came at the very high cost of intensified Arab disunity and a strong 
Soviet presence in the region, both of which results the Pact had purportedly been created 





to prevent. These events all reflected the historically heavy-handed Western presence in 
the Middle East            
     Iraq’s economy in the 1950s was based on oil revenues, which increased dramatically 
in 1952 with the signing of a new agreement between Iraq and the British-run Iraq 
Petroleum Company, stipulating that Iraq would receive 50 percent annually of the 
company’s profits in Iraq. Nuri believed that he could resolve the country’s economic and 
social problems by investing the oil revenues in long-term large-scale projects in the 
areas of irrigation and dam construction. The problem with this strategy was that the poor 
fallahin did not benefit from these investments, because irrigation canals were controlled 
by the large landowners. Furthermore, some canals had fallen into disrepair and could 
therefore not be used. Another disadvantage with these projects was that they would only 
bear fruit in several years. Both Nuri and his Western allies were convinced, however, 
that the Development Board, which administered the allocation of the oil revenues to 
development projects, was the best way to save the regime. In February of 1956 the 
prime minister believed this could be done within a period of two years.  
     Baghdad, London, and Washington erred, however, in believing that economic 
reforms could mollify the political opposition to the regime. The influx of oil revenues 
made Nuri less inclined to introduce political reforms in Iraq, since he became less 
dependent on taxes for this purpose, a fact which convinced those opposed to Nuri’s 
policies of his inflexibility and determination to restrict civil liberties. An estimated 
network of 24,000 agents reporting on conversations from teashops to colleges and the 
fact that the budget of the police exceeded that of the Ministry of Education served to 





reinforce the impression that Nuri was running a police state. It is difficult to see how 
Nuri could possibly have coopted the political opposition.       
     Despite the curtailment of civil liberties the press occasionally criticized corruption 
and backwardness in rural areas, and even reported anti-government demonstrations.  
Furthermore, a person familiar with Iraqi history and politics could thanks to veiled 
criticism and by reading between the lines get a good idea of the sentiments of the Iraqi 
public. British and American diplomats were therefore able to to draw fairly accurate 
conclusions about the true situation in the country. Most British and American analysts, 
however, downplayed the ominous signs in Iraqi newspapers more or less subscribing to 
Nuri’s assessment that bread is more important than politics. The problem was that these 
Western diplomats took Nuri’s over-confident assurances regarding the stability of the 
regime at face value and placed too much trust in the development program. 
     Had Western diplomats realized how serious the situation was in Iraq, they would 
most likely still not have been able to exert sufficient pressure on Nuri to introduce long 
overdue political reforms. British and American influence in Iraq only went so far. 
Evidence to this effect is the fact that the British had failed to compel Nuri to introduce 
necessary reforms in the early 1940s when they were in control of Iraq due to the 
occupation of the country in World War II. The fact that the social ills besetting Iraq in 
the 1950s were still the same as a decade earlier was ample evidence that Nuri had not 
heeded the advice of the British, not even when they were in control of the country. This 
leads one to conclude that the British and the Iraqi public over-estimated Britain’s ability 
to exert influence over Iraqi politics. Another reason for the limited British and American 
influence was the fact that neither power wished to press too hard for reform, since such a 





course of action could have unforeseen results such as a nationalist government assuming 
power and reorienting Iraqi foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Finally, Nuri’s 
hands were tied to a certain extent by his conservative power base. Understandably he 
was reluctant to run the risk of upsetting his constituency by introducing reforms which 
would reduce their influence.   
     Nuri’s foreign policy greatly contributed to destabilizing the Middle East. His primary 
objective was to secure the leading position in the Arab world for Iraq. This goal was to 
be achieved in two ways: (a) through an alliance with Britain, the military cooperation 
with which was subsequently expanded to the Baghdad Pact in 1955; and (b) through the 
realization of his Fertile Crescent project, an Iraqi-Syrian-Jordanian federation. These 
objectives clashed with the interests of Egypt. The importance of Syria is reflected in 
Nuri’s and Nasser’s belief that Syria was key to the ability to isolate the rival. President 
Gamal ‘Abdul Nasser strove to be the leading player in the Arab world, pursued 
neutralist policies aiming at eliminating the military presence and influence of the 
Western powers in the Middle East, and unleashed a violent propaganda campaign 
against Nuri al-Sa‘id. The campaign was highly embarrassing to Nuri because it largely 
advocated policies which the Iraqi opposition had long embraced, thus securing the 
support of Nuri’s enemies for Egypt’s position. In all fairness, however, it should be 
pointed out that Nuri’s policies were not the only factors which destabilized the Middle 
East and led to his undoing. The British attack on Egypt in 1956 created considerable 
instability in the region and weakened Nuri’s position as much as any of his own policy 
decisions.        





     Nuri’s attempt to realize the Fertile Crescent project led to interventionist policies in 
Syria. The Iraqi prime minister firmly believed in the idea of regime change in Syria in 
order to enable Baghdad to form a federation with Damascus, and supported pro-Iraqi 
forces in Syria with money and propaganda, conspiring against the Syrian government. A 
plan was even drawn up in 1954 to use military force to topple the Syrian government. 
London and Washington, however, discouraged Nuri from using military force to achieve 
his objectives, preferring covert action to bring about a change in Syria’s leftist policies. 
Nuri’s attempts to destabilize Syria were a challenge to Nasser’s position in the Arab 
world. The former’s policies towards Egypt and Syria in the mid-1950s eventually led to 
an uprising against him, and the strengthening of the domestic opposition, greatly 
contributing to the Iraqi Revolution in 1958. The Iraqi-Egyptian rivalry in Syria ended 
with the proclamation of the United Arab Republic in 1958 and Nuri’s complete defeat.    
     Nasser was a difficult target for Nuri’s propaganda. The reasons for this were Nasser’s 
anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist propaganda, with which Nuri could not compete. The 
former could attack with impunity the Western powers. Conversely, Nuri could only 
attack France for its policies in Algeria, but not his allies, Britain and the United States. 
With regard to Israel, Nuri could not match Nasser’s cross-border raids. The Iraqi leader 
thus had a clear disadvantage in the Iraqi-Egyptian propaganda war, since Nasser’s acts 
and propaganda were much more appealing to Arab public opinion.         
     Considering the aforementioned situation in Iraq the question which needs to be asked 
is whether, inspite of all the serious problems which Nuri was facing, the Iraqi 
Revolution could have been averted. Having a background as an officer in the Ottoman 
army Nuri was prone to seek authoritarian solutions to political problems. His basic 





approach to Iraqi politics was therefore not to introduce reform but to maintain and make 
more efficient an already existing authoritarian system.  Nuri had alienated a majority of 
the population with his policies and enjoyed support from only a tiny minority of wealthy 
Iraqis. This circumstance combined with his dismissal of threats to the regime made it 
highly unlikely that he could have averted the revolution by changing his policies.  
     Diplomatic reports reveal that some British diplomats in Baghdad believed Britain 
could influence the appointment of a pro-British but more reformminded prime minister. 
This conclusion reflected wishful thinking. The reason is that the public would sooner 
rather than later have discovered that their new prime minister was Britain’s man, which 
would effectively have reduced his standing to that of a collaborationist. The British 
diplomats should have realized that their approach to Iraqi politics was that of a bygone 
era and that the Suez Crisis served as an example of this truism. British policies in Iraq 
thus made Britain part of the problem instead of part of the solution. The reason was that 
the British wanted to retain their position as a major player in Iraqi and Middle Eastern 
politics. 
     The Americans possessed even less ability than the British to change the direction in 
which Nuri’s policies were moving due to their deference to the British on matters 
concerning Iraq. The former could possibly have threatened to discontinue U.S. military 
aid to Iraq, but they feared that “too much change” in Iraq could possibly strengthen the 
Soviet position in the region. According to the coup leader ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim himself, 
however, one thing could have prevented the July 14 coup—a strong Western military 
presence in the Middle East. This implies that had U.S. Marines landed in Lebanon 
before July 14, 1958, the coup would most likely have been postponed.   





     Nuri’s persecution of the civilian political opposition left the army the only 
sufficiently powerful and well-organized force which could bring about change in Iraq. 
Opposition to the Iraqi monarchic regime in the officer corps originated in the Arab-
Israeli war of 1948, which in the eyes of some Iraqi officers had been prosecuted poorly. 
The first Free Officers cells emerged in the early 1950s when several groups 
independently of one another formed around a small number of officers, and coalesced in 
a Supreme Committee in November of 1956. The question here is: Why was the Free 
Officers movement more successful than the civilian opposition in escaping the attention 
of the regime? First, the civilian opposition operated openly much of the time by 
organizing demonstrations, whereas the Free Officers movement was a clandestine 
organization. Second, Nuri dismissed intelligence reports to the effect that the Free 
Officers were plotting against him. He clearly over-estimated the loyalty of mid-rank 
officers. 
     One major problem of the Free Officers movement was that it was not a cohesive 
movement. The Free Officers on the Supreme Committee were at variance on many 
issues. They were, however, agreed upon the necessity of an Iraqi revolution and of 
postponing making decisions on issues upon which they disagreed. This circumstance 
produced an action program which had two consequences: (a) prior to the Revolution it 
held the Free Officers together; and (b) after the Revolution it allowed each one of the 
officers on the Supreme Committee to read their own personal agendas into the 
movement’s program, which eventually led to rebellions and coup attempts.  
     The divisions within the Supreme Committee also led to a coup within the military 
conspiracy against the Nuri regime. The coup leader Brigadier ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim 





made a decision to conceal his coup plan for July 14 from most of his fellow Free 
Officers. This fact inscensed many of his colleagues who rapidly found themselves 
outmaneuvered from all positions of influence after the coup. The manner in which 
Qasim executed the coup thus served to destabilize Iraq following the July 14 events. 
There were at least three reasons for Qasim’s decision not to involve other Free Officers 
than his closest confidants: (a) he had seen too many coup plans fail already, some of 
which due to personal rivalries among the officers; (b) Qasim did not trust some of the 
other members on the Supreme Committee; and (c) he saw himself as the most qualified 
candidate for the post as coup leader, and the only officer who was above political 
rivalries. In his mind there were thus a number of weighty reasons for not taking other 
Free Officers on the Supreme Committee into his confidence. 
     The events of July 14 constituted the initial phase of a revolution. It is clear from what 
transpired on July 14, prior to this date and after this date, that the coup executed by the 
Free Officers was not a typical military coup. It was a coup supported by the 
overwhelming majority of Iraqis. The presence in the streets of Baghdad of at least 
100,000 demonstrators supports the argument that the events of July 14 constituted a 
revolution. These huge numbers of Baghdadis would have prevented any loyalists from 
gaining access to the key buildings occupied by the insurgents, since the demonstrators 
filled the streets in the center of the capital. Their support for the new regime also 
discouraged any intervention which Western powers might be contemplating. Finally, the 
majority of the demonstrations were spontaneous, which further underscores the 
importance of popular participation in the coup. 





     The conspirators’ contacts with political leaders prior to July 14 and the former’s 
actions during the following several days further testify to the revolutionary character of 
the coup. Furthermore, the coup leaders had solicited the assistance of opposition leaders 
for the eventuality that the loyalist would offer resistance. Qasim also consulted civilian 
leaders and included leading opposition politicians in his first cabinet although he 
reserved the key posts for himself and his deputy ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif. A change in the 
system of government from monarchy to republic, and a declaration on the morning of 
July 14 to the effect that the semi-feudal economic relations which ruled economic and 
social life in rural areas had been abolished testify to real and intended revolutionary 
change in Iraqi society.  
     Domestic policies of the new regime constituted such a radical departure from those of 
the Nuri regime that they can be termed a revolution. An Agrarian Reform Law limited 
the size of land holdings. It had limited success in redistributing land holdings from the 
large landowners to poor fallahin, however, due to the time-consuming procedures and 
shortage of skilled professionals to implement the Law. Civil liberties such as freedom of 
expression, freedom of the press, and the right for workers to organize in trade unions 
also constituted a fundamental change. Furthermore, the right to participate in 
demonstrations gave the poorer strata of the population a sense of empowerment, which 
they had never enjoyed under the old regime when the interests of the wealthy few had 
been the priority of policymakers.  
     The complete reorientation in the foreign relations of the Republic of Iraq can also be 
termed revolutionary. On the first day of the revolution the pro-West policies of the Nuri 
regime had been replaced with the principle of neutralism. Qasim expanded political, 





economic, and military relations with the socialist countries. All such relations had been 
banned under the previous regime. Relations with the socialist countries held out the 
possibility of barter trade, and the aquisition of inexpensive arms These prospects 
appealed to the new regime, which was making efforts to reduce Iraq’s dependence on 
the West.   
      International reactions to the Iraqi Revolution were mixed. The United Arab Republic 
and the socialist countries welcomed the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy. The former 
saw this event as a victory for anti-imperialist forces in the Middle East, and the latter 
interpreted the revolution as a victory for the socialist camp. Britain and the United States 
quickly realized that the coup leaders enjoyed strong popular support and therefore 
abandoned initial plans to intervene militarily. Conversely, Jordan and Iraq’s regional 
allies in the Baghdad Pact took a much more aggressive stance on military intervention. 
They even had to be restrained by Washington. There were obvious reasons for King 
Hussein of Jordan to take a firm stance on Iraq: The revolution meant that financial aid, 
to which Jordan was entitled as part of the Arab Union, would be cut.         
      One area in which the Iraqi Revolution did not constitute a fundamental change was 
the realization of Arab unity. The Syrian-Egyptian United Arab Republic proclaimed on 
February 1, 1958 had been received with great enthusiasm in the Middle East. In the eyes 
of Prime Minister Nuri and Crown Prince ‘Abd al-Ilah, and King Hussein of Jordan, 
however, the Arab Republic posed a serious threat to Iraq’s national security and to 
political stability in Jordan. As a result the Jordanian-Iraqi Arab Union was formed two 
weeks after the proclamation of the Syrian-Egyptian merger. Syria’s initiative to merge 





with Egypt into one state had thus greatly increased tensions between Iraq and Egypt, and 
caused even deeper division in Arab ranks than previously.  
     The initially warm relations between Iraq and the United Arab Republic following the 
revolution made the hope for an Iraqi accession to the Arab Republic seem quite realistic. 
This impression quickly changed, however, when a power struggle erupted between ‘Abd 
al-Karim Qasim and his deputy ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif. The former advocated the principle 
of wataniyya, nationalism which emphasized the sovereignty of Iraq, while the latter was 
a proponent of qawmiyya, nationalism which emphasized the linguistic and cultural unity 
of all Arabs, with its political corollary of pan-Arabism, that is Arab unity in one single 
state. Qasim outmaneuvered ‘Arif, but this would prove a Phyrric victory because of the 
ensuing political instability in Iraq, and impede the efforts to implement the program of 
the revolution.          
     Iraqi developments in the 1950s had important repercussions on the internal situation 
as well as Iraq’s relations with other Arab states and foreign powers. Ideological-strategic 
considerations in Baghdad, Cairo, London, Washington, and Moscow contributed greatly 
to the polarization of Iraqi and other Arab societies. The blame for this division in the 
Arab world cannot be exclusively laid at the feet of the Western powers, since Nuri and 
Nasser, and to a lesser extent Qasim share the responsibility for the direction events took 
in the Middle East. It is clear that had ideology and strategic considerations been de-
emphasized, tensions between East and West in the Middle East, and between Arab 
leaders, would certainly have decreased. Given conflicting interpretations of Arab unity 
and the prevailing Cold War distrust between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, 
however, such a possibility seemed remote indeed. Furthermore, Nuri and Nasser were so 





deeply entrenched in their ideological and strategically motivated positions that they 
found it next to impossible to modify their stance on a number of issues, such as the 
Baghdad Pact and neutralism. It is clear that had Nasser and Qasim succeeded in 
somewhat reducing their inflated egos they could quite possibly have reached a 
compromise which would have satisfied both sides, since Qasim would have accepted a 
federation with the United Arab Republic with common foreign, defense, and educational 
policies, and complete Iraqi sovereignty with regard to domestic affairs.  
    It is abundantly clear from the arguments advanced in this dissertation that Iraqis, other 
Arabs, and policymakers in London, Washington, and Moscow could have learned many 
valuable lessons from Iraqi history of the 1950s. Iraqis could have realized that they had a 
golden opportunity to create a national identity during this period. The experiments in 
Arab unity and conflicts over various degrees of Arab unity could have led to a 
realization that fundamental differences existed among Arab states and that efforts to 
achieve Arab unity should have taken these differences into account. Furthermore, Cold 
War rivals had ample opportunity to reach an agreement which would have reduced 
tension in the Middle East. Finally, Iraqi history of the 1950s provides an obvious lesson 
to be learned for powers currently involved in Iraq: policies based on self-interest and 
disregard for or ignorance of Arab sensitivities have a tendency to unite Arab public 
opinion, which under the circumstances is a more important consequence than the failed 
efforts to build Arab unity from the top down. A unified Arab public opinion was in the 
1950s a more powerful force than Arab political unity ever was. This is obviously a good 
reason for building a relationship based on true equality and mutual respect.  
 












Year  Million Iraqi Dinars  Barrels per day 
 
1950     5        140,000 
 
1952   40.8            n/a 
 
1953   49.9            n/a 
 
1955   74        700,000 
 
1956   68.8            n/a 
 
1957   48.9            n/a  
 
1958   83.8        625,000 
 













Sources: The Iraq Times, August 2, 1958, January 12, 1959; Office Memorandum from J. Bruce Hamilton, 
IRA/DFI to Cumming, INR, July 14, 1958, Secret, 787.00/7-1458, Subject: The Iraq Crisis, Part II: 
Implications for Oil supplies; Abbas Alnasrawi. The Economy of Iraq: Oil, Wars, Destruction of 
Development and Prospects, 1950-2010 (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press, 1994. p. 
11; Wm. Roger Louis. “The British and the Origins of the Revolution,” in The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: 
The Old Social Classes Revisited, edited by Robert A. Fernea and Wm. Roger Louis (London and New 
York: I. B. Tauris, 1991), p. 45; Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett. “The Social Classes and the 
Origins of the Revolution,” in The Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited, edited by 
Robert A. Fernea and Wm. Roger Louis (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 1991), p. 128 (Marion 
Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett state that the oil revenues in 1958 amounted to ID79.9 million).    
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